In re D.L.

2026 Ohio 295

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 2025 CA 00068
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re D.L., 2026-Ohio-295.]

COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

IN RE: D.L. Case No. 2025 CA 00068

Opinion And Judgment Entry

Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 2020 DEP 00091

Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry:January 30, 2026

BEFORE: CRAIG R. BALDWIN, P.J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J., DAVID M. GORMLEY Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: SARAH E. EXTEN, for Richland County Children’s Services; WESLEY A. JOHNSTON for Mother

OPINION

Popham, J.,

{¶1} Appellant-mother (“Mother”) appeals the August 28, 2025, Judgment Entry

of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Court Division, which overruled

her objections to the magistrate’s April 14, 2025, decision terminating her parental rights

and granting permanent custody of her minor child Domenic (D.L.) to appellee, Richland

County Children Services (“RCCS”).

Initiation of the Case

{¶2} On June 8, 2020, RCCS filed separate complaints alleging that Child 1

(Domenic - born July 24, 2009) and Child 2 (Dylan - born February 19, 2013) were dependent, neglected, and/or abused. Mother is the biological mother of both children.

The biological father, W.L. (“Father”), is not a party to this appeal.

{¶3} In support of the complaints, RCCS alleged unsafe and unsanitary living

conditions caused by hoarding, the children’s significant special needs, and Mother’s

refusal to engage in mental-health services. Caseworker Christina Jackson averred that

Mother was argumentative and refused RCCS access to the home.

{¶4} On June 10, 2020, the juvenile court ordered Mother not to leave the court’s

jurisdiction. At the July 2, 2020, adjudicatory hearing both parents stipulated to findings

of dependency.

Protective Supervision and Custody Changes

{¶5} On August 14, 2020, the parents stipulated to RCCS protective supervision

while the children remained in Mother’s custody. The court approved the stipulation by

Judgment Entry dated August 27, 2020.

{¶6} Temporary custody was later granted to Father in 2020, and ultimately on

July 26, 2023, temporary custody was returned to RCCS after conditions failed to

improve.

Case Plans

{¶7} RCCS submitted a case plan dated May 7, 2020, which the court approved

on August 21, 2020. A substantially similar plan dated September 9, 2022, was approved

on October 4, 2022. Both plans required the parents to:

Address mental-health needs through evaluation and treatment;

Complete parenting education;

Provide for the children’s medical and special-education needs; and Maintain a clean, sanitary, and organized home environment.

{¶8} Despite years of agency involvement, the parents failed to meaningfully

comply with these requirements.

{¶9} On July 3, 2024, RCCS filed motions for permanent custody of both

children.

Permanent Custody Hearing

RCCS and Service Provider Testimony

{¶10} Ongoing caseworker Shannon Thompson testified that RCCS had been

involved with the family since 2018 and that the complaints were filed after two years of

noncompliance. Both children have severe autism and significant special needs.

{¶11} Thompson testified that Mother never completed parenting education and

consistently refused mental-health counseling. The home conditions were persistently

unsafe, including rotting food, garbage, and feces throughout the residence. Over the

course of the case, the family lived in a motel, with relatives, in a garage, a camper, and

a tent. Neither parent maintained employment.

{¶12} Thompson further testified that at the time of removal, Child 1 required near-

total dental extraction due to severe decay. Mother’s medical conditions—including

diabetes resulting in the amputation of her lower leg—further impaired her ability to meet

the children’s needs. Thompson described Mother as frequently argumentative and

verbally abusive toward caseworkers and service providers.

{¶13} CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocate) Andrea Golias corroborated this

testimony, stating that Mother refused services designed to teach parenting strategies for

autistic children, rejected mental-health treatment, and regularly cursed case workers or abruptly ended meetings. Golias described the home conditions in 2018 as the worst she

had ever encountered.

{¶14} Golias testified that both children had significantly improved in their current

placements: Child 2 was thriving in foster care, and Child 1 was making progress in a

structured group-home setting.

{¶15} Trevor Bender, a court services support administrator, testified that during

home visits he observed hazardous conditions, including accessible medications, knives,

feces, overwhelming odors, squatters in the basement, and children running

unsupervised into the roadway. He testified that the children were not potty trained while

living with their parents but achieved potty training after removal. Providers eventually

refused services due to hygiene concerns and parental hostility.

{¶16} ViaQuest1 staff testified that both children demonstrated regression in

behavior following parental visits but made substantial developmental gains in structured

placements. Multiple witnesses confirmed improvements in communication, self-care,

and emotional regulation after removal from parental custody.

Parental Testimony

{¶17} Father testified that he was unemployed, relied on the children’s disability

benefits, and acknowledged unstable housing. He admitted Mother could not care for the

children without assistance and conceded that he interfered with Mother’s medical

treatment.

{¶18} Mother testified that she suffers from diabetes, PTSD, and depression, and

acknowledged refusing mental-health counseling and failing to complete autism-specific

1 ViaQuest is a service provider for behavioral and mental health, and developmental disabilities. parenting programs. Medical records demonstrated Mother’s repeated noncompliance

with her doctors’ treatment recommendations. Mother admitted the family lived in a tent

following her surgery and testified she did not remember the case plan requirements.

{¶19} Mother expressed a desire to retain parental rights to at least one child and

acknowledged that the children could not safely be placed together.

Children’s Progress in Placement

{¶20} Following removal, both children made substantial and sustained progress.

Child 1, placed in a structured group home, became potty trained, improved his

communication skills—including learning American Sign Language—and demonstrated

increased emotional regulation. Child 2, placed in foster care, made progress with

hygiene, schooling, and daily routines.

{¶21} Multiple witnesses testified that both children regressed behaviorally

following parental visits but thrived in their placements. Caregivers consistently described

the children as happier, safer, and better able to function outside parental custody.

Magistrate’s Decision

{¶22} On April 14, 2025, the magistrate issued detailed findings of fact and

granted permanent custody of both children to RCCS. Mother filed objections on July 1,

2025. The juvenile court overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision

by Judgment Entry dated August 28, 20252.

Assignment of Error

{¶23} Mother raises one assignment of error,

2 The magistrate issued separate Findings of Fact/ Conclusions of Law for each child under the

respective case number for that child, and the trial judge issued separate judgment entries under each case number. {¶24} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY

TERMINATING MOTHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [THE CHILDREN] AND

GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY OF [THE CHILDREN] TO RICHLAND COUNTY

CHILDREN SERVICES (RCCS).”

Fundamental Rights and Governing Standards

{¶25} A parent’s right to raise a child is an “essential” and “basic” civil right. In re

Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

The interest in the care, custody, and management of one’s child is therefore

fundamental. Id.; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). Because permanent

termination of parental rights has aptly been described as “the family law equivalent of

the death penalty,” parents must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection

the law allows. In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist. 1991). Accordingly, a juvenile

court’s award of permanent custody must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

Standard of Review

{¶26} The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that appellate review of

permanent-custody determinations under R.C. 2151.414 proceeds under the sufficiency-

of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, depending on the

nature of the arguments raised. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 18. Here, Mother

challenges both.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶27} Sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law, which we review de

novo. State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30; State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 13. Sufficiency is a test of adequacy—whether the evidence, if believed, permits the factfinder

to reach the challenged conclusion as a matter of law. In re Z.C. at ¶ 13, quoting State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).

{¶28} Where, as here, the governing burden of proof is clear and convincing

evidence, the reviewing court examines the record to determine whether the juvenile court

had before it sufficient evidence from which it could form a firm belief or conviction that

the statutory requirements for permanent custody were met. In re Estate of Haynes, 25

Ohio St.3d 101, 103-104 (1986); In re Z.C. at ¶¶ 7-8; In re L.A., 2024-Ohio-3436, ¶ 59

(5th Dist.).

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶29} Manifest-weight review concerns the persuasive effect of the evidence.

Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. In conducting this review, we consider

whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts, resulting in a

manifest miscarriage of justice—even where the evidence is legally sufficient. Thompkins,

78 Ohio St.3d at 386–387.

{¶30} Although an appellate court may act as a “thirteenth juror,” we afford

substantial deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, given its superior

position to observe the witnesses. Eastley at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10

Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). A manifest-weight challenge succeeds only in the exceptional

case where the evidence weighs heavily against the judgment. Thompkins at 387.

Statutory Framework for Permanent Custody

{¶31} R.C. 2151.414 establishes a two-pronged inquiry for permanent custody.

The juvenile court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that one of the circumstances set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) - (d) applies, and (2) that granting

permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

{¶32} Here, the trial court found that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applied to Child 2 and

further determined, in the alternative, that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) was satisfied for both

children.3 Either finding—when coupled with a best-interest determination—is

independently sufficient to support an award of permanent custody. In re Dalton, 2007-

Ohio-5805 (5th Dist.); In re K.C., 2024-Ohio-2081, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.).

Temporary Custody for Twelve of Twenty-Two Months

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)

{¶33} With respect to Child 2, the juvenile court expressly found that the child had

been in the temporary custody of RCCS for more than twelve months of a consecutive

twenty-two-month period at the time the agency filed its motion for permanent custody.

Magistrate’s Decision, Aug. 28, 2025, Case No. 2020-DEP-0092, ¶ 14.

{¶34} The “12-of-22” provision reflects the legislature’s deliberate balance

between reunification efforts and the child’s need for timely permanence. In re C.W.,

2004-Ohio-6411, ¶ 22. Once the statutory time has elapsed, the focus properly shifts from

parental opportunity to the child’s need for stability. Id. at syllabus.

{¶35} Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s twelve-of-twenty-two-month

finding with respect to Child 2. Accordingly, this finding alone—when coupled with a best-

interest determination, supports the award of permanent custody for Child 2, and our

3 The court found that Child 1 had not been out of the care and custody of his parents for 12 months

out of the previous 22 months when RCCS filed its motion for permanent custody. Aug. 28, 2025, Magistrate’s Decision, Case No. 202-DEP-0091, ¶14. analysis could properly end there. In re Calhoun, 2008-Ohio-5458 (5th Dist.); In re: K.C.,

2024-Ohio-2081, ¶45 (10th Dist.).

Placement with Mother Within a Reasonable Time

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)

{¶36} Nevertheless, the juvenile court also determined that the children cannot be

placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her, pursuant

to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). That determination is likewise supported by clear and

convincing evidence.

{¶37} Under R.C. 2151.414(E), if the court finds that any one of the enumerated

factors exists as to a parent, it must conclude that the child cannot or should not be placed

with that parent within a reasonable time. In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95 (1996).

{¶38} Here, the record amply supports the juvenile court’s findings under R.C.

2151.414(E)(1) and (2). Despite more than four years of agency involvement, extensive

case-planning, and the provision of services, Mother failed continuously and repeatedly

to remedy the conditions that led to removal. The juvenile court found—and the evidence

confirms—that Mother consistently refused to engage in mental-health treatment and

rejected services designed to address the children’s autism. Service providers and

caseworkers testified that Mother was frequently hostile, verbally abusive, and

uncooperative, often ending meetings prematurely. Providers eventually declined to

continue services due to parental conduct and ongoing hygiene concerns.

{¶39} Mother’s medical conditions further limited her ability to meet the children’s

needs. Medical records admitted at trial documented repeated noncompliance by Mother with her follow-up care. Mother admitted she did not recall the requirements of the case

plan and conceded that she declined participation in recommended services.

{¶40} Father testified that Mother could not care for the children without

assistance and acknowledged unstable housing and lack of income. He admitted

engaging in conduct that interfered with Mother’s medical treatment.

{¶41} The court specifically noted that Mother “doggedly, and at times angrily,

resisted” RCCS’s efforts to involve her in mental-health counseling. The record further

demonstrates that any marginal progress was inconsistent, short-lived, and insufficient to

address the underlying concerns.

{¶42} Completion—or partial completion—of a case plan does not itself preclude

permanent custody. A case plan is a means to an end, not the end itself. In re J.L., 2004-

Ohio-6024, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). Where, as here, the problems that precipitated removal

persist despite services, the court does not err in finding that reunification is not

reasonably achievable. In re Summerfield, 2005-Ohio-5523 (5th Dist.); In re K.C., 2024-

Ohio-2081, ¶ 56 (10th Dist.).

{¶43} Although the record reflects that Mother loves her children, love alone does

not overcome years of noncompliance, instability, and unmet special needs. The

evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother has made virtually no

sustained progress since RCCS’s initial involvement in 2018, and that additional time

would not alter that reality.

{¶44} Accordingly, we conclude that competent, credible evidence supports the

juvenile court’s finding that the children cannot be placed with Mother within a reasonable

time or should not be placed with her. Best Interest of the Children — R.C. 2151.414(D)

{¶45} When determining whether permanent custody is in a child’s best interest,

a juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, including those set forth in R.C.

2151.414(D)(1). No single factor is dispositive; rather, the court must weigh the totality of

the circumstances. In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56.

Interaction and Interrelationship — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)

{¶46} The evidence demonstrated that the children’s interactions with their

parents were destabilizing rather than beneficial. Multiple witnesses testified that both

children regressed behaviorally following parental visits, often requiring days to

reestablish routine and emotional regulation. These regressions were particularly

concerning given the children’s severe autism and need for consistency.

{¶47} In contrast, both children formed stable and supportive relationships in their

placements. Child 1 showed significant improvement in communication, hygiene, and

behavioral regulation in his structured group-home setting. Child 2 demonstrated

progress in daily living skills and schooling while in foster care. The record reflects that

these placements provided predictability, structure, and specialized care the children

require—conditions that were never achieved in parental custody.

Wishes of the Children — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b)

{¶48} Due to their ages and developmental limitations, the children were unable

to meaningfully express their wishes. The trial court therefore appropriately relied on the

recommendations of the CASA, who supported permanent custody after observing the

children’s needs, progress, and parental limitations. Custodial History — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c)

{¶49} The children have been subject to agency involvement since 2018 and

removed from parental custody for an extended period. Despite years of intervention,

services, and repeated opportunities to remedy the conditions leading to removal, the

parents failed to achieve or maintain a safe, stable, and sanitary home or to meet the

children’s medical and developmental needs. The length and continuity of this custodial

history weigh heavily in favor of permanency.

Need for a Legally Secure Permanent Placement — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d)

{¶50} The record overwhelmingly establishes that the children require a legally

secure placement that can provide long-term stability and address their significant special

needs. Neither parent demonstrated the ability or willingness to provide such an

environment.

{¶51} Mother refused mental-health treatment, declined autism-specific parenting

services, failed to complete further parenting education, and remained noncompliant with

medical recommendations. Housing instability persisted throughout the case, and neither

parent maintained employment nor a viable plan for independent support. Father

acknowledged that Mother could not care for the children without assistance and Mother

conceded that the children could not safely be placed together.

{¶52} The children’s dramatic improvement following removal underscores the

necessity of permanence. The juvenile court reasonably concluded that reunification was

not achievable within a reasonable time and that only permanent custody could provide

the stability these children require. Additional Relevant Factors — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e)

{¶53} The court also considered the parents’ demonstrated lack of commitment,

as evidenced by repeated refusals to engage in services, hostile interactions with

providers, and failure to prioritize the children’s basic needs. Despite extensive assistance

from RCCS, the parents made no meaningful progress toward reunification.

Conclusion

{¶54} Considering the totality of the evidence and each factor under R.C.

2151.414(D), the record clearly supports the juvenile court’s determination that granting

permanent custody to RCCS was in the children’s best interest. The children’s need for

safety, stability, and specialized care—needs that were met only after removal—outweigh

the parents’ expressed desire to maintain parental rights.

{¶55} We find that the trial judge correctly found that Child 2 had been in the

temporary custody of RCCS for over twelve months of a consecutive 22-month period.

{¶56} We further find the trial judge’s determination that Mother had failed to

remedy the issues that caused the initial removal and, therefore, the children could not

be placed with her within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with her, was based

upon competent credible evidence and is not against the manifest weight or sufficiency

of the evidence.

{¶57} We further find that the trial court’s decision that permanent custody to

RCCS was in the children’s best interest was based upon competent, credible evidence

and is not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence. {¶58} Because the evidence in the record supports the trial judge’s judgment, we

overrule Appellant-Mother’s assignment of error and affirm the decision of the Richland

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.

For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Richland County Court

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division is affirmed. Costs to Appellant-Mother.

By: Popham, J.

Baldwin, P.J. and

Gormley, J., concur