FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON APRIL 9, 2026 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON APRIL 9, 2026 SARAH R. PENDLETON SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
) In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against ) No. 202261-8 ) DAVID RUZUMNA, ) Judge Pro Tempore . ) En Banc ) ____________________________________ ) Filed: April 9, 2026
JOHNSON, J.—This case involves a Commission on Judicial Conduct
(Commission) decision censuring and recommending the removal of Mr. David
Ruzumna, Judge Pro Tempore, from judicial office. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna
challenges that decision, arguing his conduct supports no more than an
admonishment. The court has conducted a de novo review of the record and the
parties’ arguments and now determines that censure and removal is the appropriate
sanction in this case.
BACKGROUND
The Commission charged Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna with violating Canon 1,
rules 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC or Code). The In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
“Statement of Charges” alleged Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna committed judicial
misconduct by
using a stamp of the King County District Court seal and the signature stamp of an elected King County District Court judge without permission, and creating a fraudulent or misleading document which he presented to a parking attendant in an attempt to gain a discounted parking rate for county employees.[1]
Following a fact-finding hearing before a 10-member panel, the Commission
concluded Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna violated CJC 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. One member of
the panel issued a concurrence in part and dissent in part, reasoning that Judge Pro
Tem Ruzumna’s misconduct did not amount to a violation of CJC 1.3 but agreeing
with the ultimate sanction of censure and removal. The CJC Canon 1 rules provide:
Rule 1.1. Compliance with the Law A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Rule 1.2. Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
Rule 1.3. Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so.
Critical to our decision in this case is that the allegations set forth in the
Statement of Charges are not disputed. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna admits to using
1 Statement of Charges at 2.
2 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
the King County District Court seal and the signature stamp of the judge he was
working for when he created a document in attempt to gain discounted parking.
This undisputed misconduct at the very least supports a censure. We reject Judge
Pro Tem Ruzumna’s argument that this misconduct warrants only admonishment,
which is the least severe disciplinary action the Commission can issue, given the
offense.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna has served as a pro tempore (pro tem) judge for
several different courts including the municipal courts of Seattle, Bothell,
Kirkland, Mercer Island, and Everett; Snohomish County District Court; King
County District Court; and King County Superior Court. He began serving as a pro
tem judge in 2013 and also maintains a law practice. This case concerns his service
in King County District Court. On the day the underlying incident occurred, he was
serving as a pro tem for Judge Rebecca Robertson.
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna had an ongoing dispute concerning a parking rate
discount available to King County employees, which allowed a $10 reduction from
the general $30 per day parking rate. On February 16, 2023, he created and
presented a piece of paper to a parking attendant at the Goat Hill Garage with the
following words typed on it:
3 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
2/16/2023 David Ruzumna is employed with the King County District Court as a Judge Pro Tem. Directly underneath the typing was the signature stamp of King County
District Court Judge Rebecca Robertson, the date “Feb. 16 2023,” and, next to that,
the King County District Court seal. Below is a photograph of the piece of paper:
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna does not dispute that he did not have permission to
use the signature stamp. 1 Tr. of Test. of Fact-Finding Hr’g (Tr.) at 84, 247. He also
does not dispute that he put the date on the signature stamp to match the date of the
letter. 1 Tr. at 112.
4 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna had parked in the Goat Hill Garage as a pro tem
judge on several occasions over the preceding months. The garage is owned by
King County and operated by a privately owned company that contracts with King
County. It is commonly used by people working at or visiting the courthouse. The
daily parking rate for the garage is $30, but employees receive a discounted rate of
$20. To receive the discounted rate, King County employees can either (1) pay at a
pay station that verifies their employment status or (2) show their badge or some
other qualifying proof to the parking attendant at the booth. A placard at the pay
station and the booth states, “‘No county discount without ID.’” 1 Tr. at 58. Pro
tem judges do not receive a badge.
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna began parking in the Goat Hill Garage in January
2023. After being charged $30 by the parking attendant on this first occasion, he
commented that the price seemed expensive. The attendant asked if he was a King
County employee and whether he had a pay stub. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna showed
the attendant his name placard. 1 Tr. at 243. The attendant did not accept this as
proof of employment. On a later date, Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna showed the
attendant his judicial robe in an attempt to receive the discount. 1 Tr. at 246. The
attendant did not accept it. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna testified that all these
exchanges were friendly and cordial. 1 Tr. at 258.
5 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
After several attempts to receive the discount, Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna
created the aforementioned letter with Judge Robertson’s signature stamp and the
King County District Court seal. After this incident, human resources (HR)
conducted an investigation and determined that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna had
created the letter and used the stamps without authorization. 1 Tr. at 142-44.
Following the investigation, the court’s executive committee unanimously voted to
remove Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna from the pro tem list for King County District
Court. 1 Tr. at 89. A member of the executive committee, Judge O’Toole, described
the decision to remove Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna. Judge O’Toole explained that
“whether Mr. Ruzumna was entitled to an employee discount or not was not the
concern. The concern was the incredible lack of judgment in preparing this letter
and affixing a judge’s signature to it and then passing it off as true to parking
officials was shocking, to say the least.” 1 Tr. at 182-83.
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna argued that he was entitled to the parking discount
and that the photograph of the document is incomplete. He testified, and claimed
from the outset, that the document he created was “covered in multiple random
stamps” as a joke to display to the parking attendant that he should be entitled to
the discount because there was no other way he would have access to the stamps
unless he was an employee. 1 Tr. at 111, 116. He also testified that he believed he
was an employee and was entitled to the parking discount. 1 Tr. at 242. Judge Pro
6 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
Tem Ruzumna was aware he did not receive benefits like vacation or sick leave,
retirement, health insurance, or dental as a pro tem judge. 1 Tr. at 135. Judge Pro
Tem Ruzumna did not at any point reach out to HR or the court administrator to
clarify whether he was entitled to the discount. 1 Tr. at 278.
Heather Dean, the King County District Court budget director, testified that
pro tem judges have not been eligible for the discount since at least 2005. 1 Tr. at
169-70. Kevin Whitley, the HR director who conducted the investigation into this
incident, testified that pro tems are short-term, nonbenefited employees. He
described those benefits as medical, dental, vision, life, ORCA card (regional
transit pass), and parking, explaining that pro tem judges do not receive these
employee benefits. 1 Tr. at 140, 142. Mr. Whitley also testified, based on
measurements he did during the investigation, that there was not enough room left
on the piece of paper to corroborate Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s story that there
were multiple other stamps on the document. 2 1 Tr. at 147-50. Mr. Whitley testified
that the piece of paper was a standard 8.5 x 11-inch size. 1 Tr. at 158-59.
The Goat Hill Garage manager, Regina De Los Santos, testified that there
were no other stamps on the document. 1 Tr. at 61. Ms. De Los Santos was the only
person other than Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna and the parking attendant who saw the
2 Even if it were true that the document did have additional stamps, that is unimportant to our determination of whether the Code was violated.
7 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
document. After Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna showed the document to the parking
attendant, he brought it to Ms. De Los Santos to verify whether it was acceptable.
She did not accept it as proof of employment but took a photo in case it was later
determined that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna was eligible for the discount. Ms. De Los
Santos testified that she gave the document back to the parking attendant and that
in the ordinary course of business, the attendant would have returned the document
to the customer. 1 Tr. at 64. The original document was never found. Judge Pro
Tem Ruzumna testified he does not recall whether the document was given back to
him. 1 Tr. at 255.3
The Commission ultimately determined the testimony of Ms. Dean, Mr.
Whitley, and Ms. De Los Santos was more credible than that of Judge Pro Tem
Ruzumna. The Commission found Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s testimony “was
complicated and at times contradicted his earlier testimony at the hearing, at his
deposition, and his written statements to the Commission.” Comm’n Decision &
Ord. (Order) at 17. The Commission concluded that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna
violated CJC 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, compounded by a unanimous finding that his
ongoing dishonesty throughout disciplinary proceedings resulted in “irreparable
damage to trust and confidence in him as a judicial officer.” Order at 30. The
3 The parking attendant left his employment shortly after these events occurred and could not be found for questioning. 1 Tr. at 79, 2 Tr. at 335.
8 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
ongoing dishonesty referred to is Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s apparent attempts to
minimize or justify his conduct by creating “a convoluted story” representing the
document as a lighthearted means of showing the parking attendant he was entitled
to the discount. Order at 29. Rather, the Commission found that Judge Pro Tem
Ruzumna fabricated this story to conceal the truth in an effort to minimize or
excuse his conduct. The Commission concluded that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna
attempted to falsely convey to the parking attendant that Judge Robertson approved
his use of the discount. Based on these findings, the Commission recommended a
censure and removal from judicial office.
ANALYSIS
The Commission exists to facilitate the investigation of complaints of
misconduct by judges. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31 (amend. 71). This provision
empowers the Commission to investigate, conduct hearings, establish procedural
rules for disciplinary proceedings, and, in some cases, make recommendations to
the Supreme Court to impose certain forms of discipline. In re Disciplinary Proc.
Against Buchanan, 100 Wn.2d 396, 399, 669 P.2d 1248 (1983). The Commission
may independently impose admonishment, reprimand, or censure. WASH. CONST.
art. IV, § 31(4). Where the Commission recommends suspension, removal, or
retirement of the judge, that authority exists exclusively in the Supreme Court.
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31(5).
9 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
We review Commission decisions de novo. In re Disciplinary Proc. Against
Anderson, 138 Wn.2d 830, 843, 981 P.2d 426 (1999). This standard does not mean
we conduct a new evidentiary hearing, independent of the Commission. Rather, we
review the findings of the Commission and conduct an independent evaluation of
the record to determine whether the judge violated the Code and, if so, the
appropriate sanction. The Commission must prove factual findings by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence. We are not bound by the Commission’s findings
or conclusions. In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Turco, 137 Wn.2d 227, 246, 970
P.2d 731 (1999). That being said, we give the Commission’s findings and
credibility determinations considerable weight as the body that had the opportunity
to directly observe witnesses and their demeanor. In re Disciplinary Proc. Against
Deming, 108 Wn.2d 82, 110, 736 P.2d 639 (1987).
1. Code Violations
As an initial matter, it does not appear CJC 1.1 and 1.2 are seriously in
dispute. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 16. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna admits he misused a
sitting judge’s signature stamp and the official court seal when he created a false or
misleading document in an attempt to gain discounted parking. This constitutes
impropriety and a lack of integrity in violation of CJC 1.2 and so necessarily CJC
1.1. Importantly, the use of the term “fraudulent” in this case does not implicate
criminal conduct. It is used in the ordinary meaning of the word and does not
10 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
require a criminal burden of proof. And whether the term “fraudulent” or
“misleading” is used to describe the document at issue makes no difference to our
conclusion. Further, whether Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna was entitled to the discount
or the document was intended to be farcical neither minimizes nor excuses this
conduct. On these facts alone, we find that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna violated CJC
1.1 and 1.2.
The Commission found additional impropriety based on its conclusion that
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna repeatedly lied throughout disciplinary proceedings,
including while under oath. Order at 23. The Commission perceives Judge Pro Tem
Ruzumna’s story about the additional stamps on the document as an initial lie that
he fabricated to minimize or excuse his conduct, which “bound him to the same
story as the situation progressed and he felt required to keep lying.” Order at 28.
We agree. The Commission’s findings of fact and credibility determinations are
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Ms. De Los Santos testified
unequivocally that there were no other stamps on the letter. Mr. Whitley testified
that there was not sufficient space left on the paper to contain additional stamps.
Further, Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s testimony regarding whether the letter was
returned to him and his explanation for changing the date on the signature stamp
was confusing and conflicted with his earlier testimony. This constitutes substantial
11 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
evidence that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna fabricated the story about additional
stamps.
While lying or not testifying truthfully during the Commission’s disciplinary
proceedings is not itself a violation, it does compound our earlier finding of
impropriety. Not only is Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s initial misconduct in creating
the document deceitful, demonstrating a lack of integrity and judgment, but his
continued explanation demonstrates a further lack of integrity. Dishonesty in the
disciplinary proceedings can also come into the Deming factor analysis when
considering an appropriate sanction.
With regards to CJC 1.3, the Commission split as to whether a violation of
this rule requires some type of knowledge. The Commission’s concurrence/dissent
reasoned that “the Rule is intended to focus on the misuse of judicial power and
prestige typically to receive benefits outside of their judicial employment and to
which the judge knows they are not entitled.” Comm’n Concurrence, in part,
Dissent, in part at 2.
We recently discussed the purpose of this rule in Keenan when we reversed
the Commission’s finding that Judge Keenan’s approval of a bus ad to support a
nonprofit community college violated CJC 1.3. In re Disciplinary Proc. Against
Keenan, 199 Wn.2d 87, 101, 502 P.3d 1271 (2022). We explained that although
“abuse” is not defined in the 2007 ABA Model Code, it is defined by Black’s Law
12 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
Dictionary as “‘[t]o depart from legal or reasonable use in dealing with (a person
or thing); to misuse.’” Keenan, 199 Wn.2d at 101 (alteration in original) (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 13 (11th ed. 2019)).
We clarified that the terminology in this rule was changed from “lend” to
“abuse” to avoid unnecessary confusion. Keenan, 199 Wn.2d at 101. For example,
writing a letter of recommendation for a law clerk or extern might “lend” the
prestige of the judge’s office, but it does not “abuse” the power of office. On the
other hand, using judicial letterhead to gain an advantage in conducting personal
business or alluding to judicial status to gain favorable treatment violates the rule.
CJC 1.3 cmt. 1.
We conclude that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s conduct violates CJC 1.3
because it represents a departure from reasonable use. While no express knowledge
requirement exists in CJC 1.3, the word “abuse” suggests the judge must act in
some unreasonable or wrongful manner. To be sure, Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna did
not reasonably but mistakenly misuse stamps to which he was otherwise entitled to
use. Rather, he violated the trust of a sitting judge by misappropriating her
signature stamp and the official court seal while he had access to her office in
attempt to receive a benefit.
The unauthorized misappropriation of official judicial insignia to achieve a
personal benefit—however small—constitutes an ethical violation. Judge Pro Tem
13 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
Ruzumna created a document that purported to have been signed or authorized by
Judge Robertson. In doing so, at least four steps were taken in its preparation. First,
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna created a dated document. Second, and most seriously, he
accessed Judge Robertson’s signature stamp and stamped the document. Third, he
changed the date on the stamp to match the date of the document he created.
Finally, he accessed and affixed a court clerk seal to the document. He then
unsuccessfully presented the document to the parking attendant in attempt to
receive a discount.
We do not need to decide whether Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna reasonably
believed he was entitled to the discount to come to this conclusion. Even if he were
so entitled, this means of receiving the discount abuses the prestige of judicial
office because it is not a reasonable use of this judicial insignia. Judge Robertson’s
reaction and the executive committee’s response reflect the severity of this
misconduct. Judge Robertson described her reaction to learning about the letter as
“confused,” “shocked,” and “incredulous.” 1 Tr. at 84, 85. She confirmed that she
is the only person authorized to use her signature stamp and that only clerks or
administrative staff are allowed to use the court seal when accepting documents to
indicate they have been filed. In her testimony, Judge Robertson described the
gravity of misusing court stamps, stating, “Judges carry an exceeding amount of
power, and their court orders must be followed. So it was very concerning to me
14 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
that someone could or did misuse that stamp given the weight that it could carry.” 1
Tr. at 91.
Further, the intent to deceive exists—Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna presumably
would have accepted the discount had it been given. We know this because he
believed he was entitled to the discount and created the document with the intent of
receiving it. Thus, his testimony that the document was intended as a joke lacks
credibility because he created it for the very purpose of receiving the discount.
Even if Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna were entitled to the discount, this conduct abuses
the prestige of judicial office.
There were several other legitimate means by which Judge Pro Tem
Ruzumna could have attempted to receive the discount that would not have abused
his judicial status. For example, he could have contacted HR or the court
administrator to provide him with formal confirmation that he was eligible for the
discount. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s decision to abuse judicial insignia instead of
use an alternative means to receive the discount violates CJC 1.3 and reflects a
serious lack of the judgment and integrity that we expect from judges.
As Judge Robertson’s testimony explained, judicial signature stamps and
court seals carry significant legal weight. Misuse of these stamps, which are
reserved for official court documents, threatens the integrity of the judiciary and
risks eroding public confidence in the courts. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s argument
15 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
that he was entitled to the discount and he created the document as a lighthearted
attempt to demonstrate that entitlement fails to acknowledge the severity of his
offense and does not minimize or excuse his conduct.
2. Appropriate Sanction
We conduct an independent evaluation of the Deming factors to determine
the appropriate sanction. In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Eiler, 169 Wn.2d 340,
353, 236 P.3d 873 (2010) (plurality opinion). The nonexclusive list of Deming
factors includes (a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a
pattern of conduct, (b) the nature, extent and frequency of occurrence of the acts of
misconduct, (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom, (d)
whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official capacity or in private life,
(e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred, (f)
whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify their conduct, (g)
the length of service on the bench, (h) whether there have been prior complaints
about this judge, (i) the effect the misconduct has on the integrity of and respect for
the judiciary, and (j) the extent to which the judge exploited their position to satisfy
personal desires. 108 Wn.2d at 119-20.
The Commission has adapted the Deming factors into a more elaborate rule
of procedure guiding its determination of appropriate discipline. Commission on
Judicial Conduct Rules of Procedure (CJCRP) 6(c). The court will apply factors
16 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
from both standards. See Eiler, 169 Wn.2d at 353 (citing CJCRP 6(c)). The
Deming factors and CJCRP 6(c) overlap significantly, with a few notable
differences. In addition to the nonexclusive list of Deming factors, the Commission
rule directs consideration of four additional factors: (1) whether the judge
flagrantly and intentionally violated the oath of office, (2) the nature and extent to
which the acts of misconduct have been injurious to other persons, (3) whether the
judge cooperated with the commission investigation and proceeding, and (4) that
the judge’s compliance with an opinion by the ethics advisory committee shall be
considered by the commission as evidence of good faith. CJCRP 6(c)(1)(E), (F),
(2)(E), (F). While no single factor is dispositive or necessarily holds more weight
than another, we have recently held removal is limited to flagrant and intentional
violations of the oath of office or misuse of power. In re Disciplinary Proc. Against
Flood, 5 Wn.3d 673, 684, 580 P.3d 432 (2025). This makes the factor addressing
whether the judge’s conduct was flagrant and intentional, which the Commission
did not consider, particularly relevant in removal cases. The remaining factors
should be considered as they are relevant to the case and under a totality of the
circumstances type test.
Past removal cases have involved harassing, abusive, or deceitful behavior.
See Deming, 108 Wn.2d at 120; In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Ritchie, 123
Wn.2d 725, 735, 870 P.2d 967 (1994); Anderson, 138 Wn.2d at 857. In Ritchie and
17 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
Anderson, dishonest or deceitful behavior warranted removal from judicial office.
In Ritchie, 123 Wn.2d at 735, the judge repeatedly misrepresented the purpose of
his travel in reimbursement requests, amounting to a pattern of misconduct
involving dishonesty for personal gain, defrauding the public, and misrepresenting
facts and circumstances. In Anderson, 138 Wn.2d at 857, the judge continued to
participate in a for-profit corporation, deliberately failed to disclose payments
made on his public disclosure filings, and attempted to misrepresent a car loan
payment as a gift when it was in fact related to negotiations regarding the sale of
the business. This court found that his conduct “clearly exhibit[ed] a pattern of
dishonest behavior unbecoming of a judge.” Anderson, 138 Wn.2d at 857.
Neither of the above removal cases involved dishonest conduct that occurred
while the judge was engaged in official duties. Rather, it was general dishonesty,
unfitting for a judge, which warranted removal. In this case, Judge Pro Tem
Ruzumna not only engaged in dishonest conduct, like Ritchie and Anderson, but he
also abused the power of his judicial status when he created a false document while
engaged in judicial duties. This satisfies a flagrant and intentional misuse of
judicial power.
Whether the judge flagrantly and intentionally violated the oath of office
As described above, Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s conduct can be fairly
considered flagrant and intentional because it involved misappropriating and
18 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
misusing official judicial insignia. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna engaged in this
intentional behavior to gain a personal financial benefit. This conduct demonstrates
disregard for ethical responsibilities based on the weight these stamps carry. Judge
Pro Tem Ruzumna’s violation reflects a lack of respect for the integrity of the
judiciary.
Whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidence of a pattern of conduct
While the act of creating the document took multiple steps, the misuse of
judicial stamps occurred as an isolated instance. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna did
engage in a pattern of conduct by displaying multiple judicial items in an attempt
to receive the parking discount. Without direct testimony from the parking
attendant, we cannot presume to know the effect of Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s
conduct. But we can presume that a distinct power differential exists between a
judge and a parking attendant. That power differential is inherent. Judges should
not only be aware of that difference when interacting with the public but also
should not abuse that authority. We accordingly find this factor aggravating under
these facts.
The nature, extent, and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct
As we have previously stated, unauthorized use of a sitting judge’s signature
stamp and the court seal to gain a personal benefit—however small—is a serious
ethical violation. This constitutes a violation of Judge Robertson’s trust and also a
19 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
lack of respect for the legal significance of judicial insignia and accordingly the
judiciary. We find the nature of this misconduct aggravating.
Whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom
Typically, we have viewed this factor as aggravating when the conduct
occurs while the judge is sitting on the bench. 4 Here, the conduct did not occur
while Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna was presiding from the bench. This factor is of less
significance under these circumstances.
The nature and extent to which the acts of misconduct have been injurious to other persons
This conduct directly impacted Judge Robertson and that of the district court
by abusing the power of office while Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna was entrusted with
judicial duties. As an elected judge, this misconduct threatens Judge Robertson’s
credibility and constitutes a serious betrayal of trust. It also resulted in the
executive committee’s unanimous action to remove Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna from
the pro tem list.
Finally, Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna intended to deceive the parking attendant
into giving him the discount based on this misappropriation of judicial stamps. We
know there was intent to deceive because Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna presumably
would have accepted the discount if the parking attendant had allowed it. While we
4 See, e.g., Eiler, 169 Wn.2d at 354; In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Hammermaster, 139 Wn.2d 211, 246, 985 P.2d 924 (1999); Deming, 108 Wn.2d at 120.
20 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
cannot conclude exactly how the parking attendant felt in his interactions with
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna, we can presume that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s repeated
references to his judicial status had some effect on the parking attendant. Although
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna claims the document was a joke, we know the parking
attendant did not view it as such because he brought it to his manager to determine
whether it was acceptable. This illustrates that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna, at the
very least, put the parking attendant in the uncomfortable position of having to
either refuse a judge’s repeated requests for the parking discount or fail to follow
the instructions of his employer. We find this factor aggravating.
Whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official capacity or in private life
While this misconduct did not occur while Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna was
presiding from the bench, it did occur while he was acting as a pro tem judge. We
have held that there must be an articulable nexus between a judge’s misconduct
and their judicial duties. Turco, 137 Wn.2d at 244. In Turco, the misconduct at
issue occurred outside of the judge’s official capacity because it involved domestic
violence. But this bore an articulable nexus to the judge’s duties due to
inappropriate statements he had made while presiding over domestic violence
cases, which we found adversely reflected on his fitness for hearing those cases.
The actual conduct here occurred inside the court, while Judge Pro Tem
Ruzumna was acting in his official capacity as a pro tem and had access to Judge
21 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
Robertson’s office. An articulable nexus exists to his judicial duties because judges
are expected to act with integrity. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s lack of integrity in
creating a misleading document demonstrates a failure to adhere to the ethical
duties required of a judge. We find this factor aggravating.
Whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred
Our cases have repeatedly held that failure to take accountability for
misconduct is an aggravating factor. 5 Although Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna candidly
admits creating this document, his minimization of the severity of this act by
referring to it as farcical and lighthearted represents deflection, not genuine
remorse. The failure to recognize the gravity of misappropriating official judicial
insignia, joking or not, demonstrates that he has not recognized the magnitude of
his misconduct. We find this factor aggravating.
Whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify the conduct
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna did suggest willingness to improve his adherence
to ethical responsibilities and did complete a judicial ethics class; however, he does
not explain how this ethics seminar relates to his misconduct. 1 Tr. at 269. Further,
5 See, e.g., Hammermaster, 139 Wn.2d at 246 (failure to acknowledge impropriety is aggravating even when judge admitted his actions); Turco, 137 Wn.2d at 250 (describing the judge’s lack of contrition); Anderson, 138 Wn.2d at 856 (judge’s argument demonstrated a failure to understand the magnitude of his misconduct and disregarded the importance of judicial integrity).
22 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s postdecision statement reflects a lack of genuine
remorse.6 Based on this conduct, we find this factor aggravating.
Length of service on the bench
Long tenure is generally considered an aggravating factor under our
precedents. Flood, 5 Wn.3d at 686. The longer a judge has been in their position,
the more they are expected to understand the significance of their conduct and its
effect on the integrity of the judiciary.7 Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna has been a pro
tem judge for over 10 years. A judge with any level of experience should
understand that misuse of another judge’s signature stamp is improper. This is
particularly true for a judge who has spent considerable time on the bench and
understands the power that judicial office holds. We find this factor aggravating.
Whether there have been prior complaints about this judge
There is no evidence that Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna has engaged in prior
misconduct or had prior complaints made against him. In fact, Judge Pro Tem
Ruzumna presents compelling evidence of his positive reputation in the legal field.
6 In this statement, Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna disparages disciplinary counsel and expresses frustration with the Commission’s disciplinary procedure. He claims Ms. De Los Santos’s testimony was motivated to “cover her own [a**]” and states, referring to disciplinary counsel, “[Y]ou should be ashamed of yourself, and I do believe that if you have anything like a conscience, your conduct in this case will haunt you for the rest of your life.” Statement of David Ruzumna at 8. 7 Eiler, 169 Wn.2d at 354 (“Judge Eiler’s long years on the bench aggravate, rather than mitigate, her misconduct—she should know better.”).
23 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
He served on the character and fitness board for the state bar association and
volunteers at the Phinney Ridge legal clinic. 1 Tr. at 227-231. He was also well
regarded in his judicial abilities among his former colleagues who testified. 1. Tr.
at 94, 209. This factor is therefore mitigating.
The effect the misconduct has on the integrity of and respect for the judiciary
Misappropriating official court stamps for a relatively petty purpose greatly
risks the integrity of the judiciary. These stamps are reserved for official court
documents, which carry significant legal weight. The public respects judicial
decisions because they are seen as legitimate. Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s use of
these stamps to receive a financial benefit—however small—risks placing the
legitimacy of judicial institutions in question. This conduct is deeply concerning
and represents a profound lack of respect for the integrity of the judiciary.
The extent to which the judge exploited the judge’s official capacity to satisfy personal desires
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s attempts to use his judicial office to receive a
parking discount cannot be excused. The violation here occurred because of the
means by which Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna attempted to receive the discount. He
used official judicial stamps in an unauthorized manner to receive a personal
financial benefit. This factor is aggravating.
24 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
Whether the judge cooperated with the commission investigation and proceeding
A judge accused of committing judicial misconduct has every right to defend
themselves against the allegations of the Commission. Judges are entitled to a fair
proceeding. Failure to enter into a stipulation or strongly defending against the
Commission’s allegations are not appropriately considered failure to cooperate. We
correctly rejected the Commission’s recommendation of removal in Flood because
those issues are not appropriately viewed as aggravating factors.
Nonetheless, a judge’s conduct throughout disciplinary proceedings can be
factored in when considering an appropriate sanction. In this case, it is Judge Pro
Tem Ruzumna’s ongoing dishonesty to the Commission in an attempt to minimize
his conduct that results in our finding that this factor is aggravating.8 Judge Pro
Tem Ruzumna continuously denied the severity of his misconduct in his testimony
regarding the presence of additional stamps. Not only does his initial misconduct
reflect a lack of judgment and integrity incompatible with what we expect of a
judge, his ongoing attempts to minimize that misconduct also reflect a lack of
integrity. It is this behavior that we view as noncooperation with disciplinary
proceedings.
8 We are further troubled by the unwarranted criticism and disparagement of the Commission and counsel in Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s postdecision statement.
25 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
Based on the above analysis of the Deming and CJCRP 6(c) factors, we
agree with the Commission that the appropriate sanction in this case is removal.
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna will not be eligible for judicial office or to engage in pro
tem work in the future unless his eligibility is reinstated. DRJ 11. Even considering
the mitigating factors, the nature of Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s decision to
misappropriate official judicial insignia demonstrates that he has engaged in
dishonesty unfitting for a judge.
CONCLUSION
We adopt the Commission’s recommendation censuring and removing Judge
Pro Tem Ruzumna from office. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence exists that
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna violated CJC 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. Honesty and integrity are
among the most critical traits expected of those entrusted with judicial office.
Judge Pro Tem Ruzumna’s violations warrant the sanction of removal.
26 In re David Ruzumna, No. 202261-8
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