In re Dionne W.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Dionne W.

267 A.D.2d 1096, 701 N.Y.S.2d 574, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13923

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 30, 1999

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 267 A.D.2d 1096 (In re Dionne W.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Dionne W., 267 A.D.2d 1096, 701 N.Y.S.2d 574, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13923 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Although it appears that petitions seeking termination of parental rights based on permanent neglect and mental illness-were filed concurrently and that the hearings encompassed both petitions, the only order contained in the record terminated respondent’s rights based on a finding that, because of mental illness, respondent was presently and for the foreseeable future unable to care for her children. There is no merit to respondent’s contention that Family Court should have ordered a suspended judgment. A suspended judgment is a dispositional alternative upon a finding of permanent neglect (see, Family Ct Act § 631). There is no statutory provision providing for a suspended judgment when parental rights are terminated based on mental illness (see, Social Services Law § 384-b [3] [g]; [4] [c]). (Appeal from Order of Erie County Family Court, Rosa, J. — Terminate Parental Rights.) Present — Pine, J. P., Hayes, Wisner, Pigott, Jr., and Scudder, JJ.

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—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Although it appears that petitions seeking termination of parental rights based on permanent neglect and mental illness-were filed concurrently and that the hearings encompassed both petitions, the only order contained in the record terminated respondent’s rights based on a finding that, because of mental illness, respondent was presently and for the foreseeable future unable to care for her children. There is no merit to respondent’s contention that Family Court should have ordered a suspended judgment. A suspended judgment is a dispositional alternative upon a finding of permanent neglect (see, Family Ct Act § 631). There is no statutory provision providing for a suspended judgment when parental rights are terminated based on mental illness (see, Social Services Law § 384-b [3] [g]; [4] [c]). (Appeal from Order of Erie County Family Court, Rosa, J. — Terminate Parental Rights.) Present — Pine, J. P., Hayes, Wisner, Pigott, Jr., and Scudder, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

267 A.D.2d 1096, 701 N.Y.S.2d 574, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13923, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-dionne-w-nyappdiv-1999.

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