In Re Diagostino

347 B.R. 116, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2141, 2006 WL 2578172
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York
DecidedAugust 28, 2006
Docket19-10170
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 347 B.R. 116 (In Re Diagostino) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Diagostino, 347 B.R. 116, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2141, 2006 WL 2578172 (N.Y. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

ROBERT E. LITTLEFIELD, JR., Bankruptcy Judge.

Currently before the court is the Chapter 13 Trustee’s (“Trustee”) objection to confirmation of Frank and Patricia Diagos-tino’s (the “Debtors”) chapter 13 plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). It is the Trustee’s position that the Debtors’ deduction for charitable contributions in calculating their disposable income under the means test is not permissible as it is not an allowed expense under the Internal Revenue Manual § 5.15.1.10 — Other Expenses.

JURISDICTION

The court has jurisdiction over this contested matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(2)(L) and 1334.

*117 FACTS

The following constitutes this court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Debtors filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition on March 1, 2006 and attached a completed Form B22 C (the “Means Test”), as required by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”). (No. 1.) The Debtors listed on line 45 the amount of $100 per month for “continued charitable contributions.” The Debtors also listed a monthly expense of $100 for charitable contributions on Schedule J (“Current Expenditures of Individual Debtor”). However, in response to question number 7 on the Debtors’ Statement of Financial Affairs as to any gifts or charitable contributions made within the year preceding the filing of this case, the Debtors responded “none.” The parties agree that the Debtors’ annualized current monthly income (CMI) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3)(B) is above the median income for a family of three in New York. (Trustee’s Mem. of Law 1-2; Debtors’ Means Test ¶¶ 21-23.)

On May 4, 2006, the Trustee filed her objection to confirmation. (No. 11.) The parties have stipulated that if the Debtors’ deduction for charitable contributions is not allowed, the disposable minimum income for unsecured creditors would increase from $74,351.25 to $80,351.25. (Debtors’ Mem. of Law Ex. 6.) After a hearing on May 31, 2006, the court issued briefing deadlines for the parties. The Debtors and the Trustee filed their respective memoranda of law on July 5, 2006. (Nos. 14, 15 & 19.) The Debtors filed a reply memorandum of law on July 13, 2006. (No. 17.)

ARGUMENTS

The Trustee argues that because the Debtors’ CMI “exceeds the applicable state median, the Debtors are subject to the means test and their expenses subject to the Internal Revenue Service Guidelines to determine their disposable income for repayment to unsecured creditors.” (Trustee’s Mem. of Law 2.) The Trustee contends § 1325(b)(2) defines disposable income as CMI received by the debtor, less the amounts reasonably necessary to be expended, which in some instances can include charitable contributions pursuant to § 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii). However, she asserts that because the Debtors’ CMI is above the applicable state median income, § 1325(b)(3)(B) controls and the court must refer to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) which requires that the Debtors apply the standards specified by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in computing their expenses. It is the Trustee’s position that under the IRS’s category of Other Necessary Expenses, the Debtors do not qualify for a charitable contribution deduction.

The Debtors argue that BAPCPA did not significantly alter § 1325(b)(2). The Debtors rely on Drummond v. Cavanagh (In re Cavanagh), 250 B.R. 107 (9th Cir. BAP 2000) and In re Petty, 338 B.R. 805 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.2006), to support their position. As the debtors in both of these cases filed their petitions before October 17, 2005, both cases are pre BAPCPA although they were decided after the passage of the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998. It is the Debtors’ contention that the holdings of these cases should be applied by this court to cases filed under BAPC-PA to “make it clear that debtors who make charitable contributions in the regular course of time and on a regular commitment should be given a reasonable deduction in the calculation of disposable income.” (Debtors’ Mem. of Law unnum *118 bered 5.) The court disagrees with the Debtors and, for the following reasons, the court sustains the Trustee’s objection to confirmation.

DISCUSSION

Unlike 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1), which changed little after the passage of BAJPC-PA, §1325(b)(2), on the other hand, was significantly revised. Section 1325(b)(2) which has been termed a definitional section, provides in part:

(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term “disposable income” means current monthly income received by the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care payments, or disability payments for a dependant child made in accordance with applicable nonbankrupt-cy law to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child) less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—
(ii) for charitable contributions that meet the definition of ‘charitable contribution’ under section 548(d)(3) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as defined in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for the year in which the contributions are made....

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) & (b)(2)(A)(ii). Initially, it would appear that the Trustee’s objection to the Debtors’ deduction for charitable contributions could be rebutted with evidence from the Debtors establishing the reasonable necessity of their contribution. However, §1325(b)(3) expounds on the meaning of “amounts reasonably necessary.” More specifically, as it applies to debtors that are above the applicable state median income,

(2) Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2) shall be determined in accordance with subpara-graphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2), if the debtor has current monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than—
(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family income of the applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals....

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3)(B).

Thus, as in the instant case, where debtors are above the median income, the court must look to 11 U.S.C. §

Related

In Re Meyer
467 B.R. 451 (E.D. Wisconsin, 2012)
In Re Sorrell
359 B.R. 167 (S.D. Ohio, 2007)
In Re Hanks
362 B.R. 494 (D. Utah, 2007)
In Re Meyer
355 B.R. 837 (D. New Mexico, 2006)
In Re Tranmer
355 B.R. 234 (D. Montana, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
347 B.R. 116, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2141, 2006 WL 2578172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-diagostino-nynb-2006.