In re D.H.

2013 Ohio 1170
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 22, 2013
Docket2012 AP 12 0071
StatusPublished

This text of 2013 Ohio 1170 (In re D.H.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re D.H., 2013 Ohio 1170 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

[Cite as In re D.H., 2013-Ohio-1170.]

COURT OF APPEALS TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

IN THE MATTER OF: JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J D.H. AND D.P Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J. NEGLECTED & DEPENDENT CHILDREN

Case No. 2012 AP 12 0071

OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 11 JN 00367

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: March 22, 2013

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant For Appellee

JOHN BRECHBILL JEFF KIGGANS 153 North Broadway 389 16th Street, SW New Philadelphia, OH 44663 New Philadelphia, OH 44663

For Jack & Dixie Lamb Guardian ad Litem

SHARON BUCKLEY Karen Dummermuth 152 North Broadway 349 East High Avenue New Philadelphia, OH 44663 New Philadelphia, OH 44663 Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 12 0071 2

Farmer, J.

{¶1} On July 20, 2011, appellee, the Tuscarawas County Department of Job

and Family Services, filed a complaint for temporary custody of D.H. born January 10,

2006 and D.P. born August 29, 2008, alleging the children to be dependent and

neglected. Mother of the children is appellant, Melissa Prince; father of D.H. is Jason

Huff and father of D.P. is Charles Sanders.

{¶2} On August 17, 2011, appellant admitted to the complaint as written, and

the trial court found the children to be dependent and neglected. Following a hearing

on September 13, 2011, the trial court granted appellee temporary custody of the

children.

{¶3} On June 5, 2012, appellee filed a motion for permanent custody.

Hearings were held on October 11 and 25, 2012. By judgment entry filed November

13, 2012, the trial court granted permanent custody of the children to appellee.

{¶4} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for

consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:

I

{¶5} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY

TO JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES AS SAID DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."

{¶6} Appellant claims the trial court's decision to grant permanent custody of

the children to appellee was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, as she Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 12 0071 3

was not given a reasonable amount of time to fulfill her case plan and specific findings

of fact made by the trial court were not supported by the evidence. We disagree.

{¶7} As an appellate court, we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the

credibility of the witnesses. Our role is to determine whether there is relevant,

competent and credible evidence upon which the fact finder could base its judgment.

Cross Truck v. Jeffries, 5th Dist. No. CA-5758, (February 10, 1982). Accordingly,

judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential

elements of the case will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the

evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction, 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978).

{¶8} R.C. 2151.414(E) sets out the factors relevant to determining permanent

custody. Said section states in pertinent part as follows:

(E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this

section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the

Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a

reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the

court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear

and convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this

section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the

Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the

child's parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed

with either parent: Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 12 0071 4

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home

and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the

agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused

the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously

and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to

be placed outside the child's home. In determining whether the parents

have substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider

parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social

and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made

available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to

allow them to resume and maintain parental duties.

(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.

{¶9} R.C. 2151.414(B) enables the court to grant permanent custody if the

court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the

child. Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence "which will provide in the mind of

the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established."

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. See also,

In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361 (1985). "Where the degree of proof

required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will

examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence

before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof." Cross, at 477. Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 12 0071 5

{¶10} On the reasonable time standard, the trial court entered the following

specific findings in its judgment entry filed November 13, 2012:

18. On the whole, the Court recognizes signs that Ms. Prince can

eventually achieve long-term sobriety. Her actual ability to do this,

however, is still unknown and the emotional damage to her children has

been great. It is necessary for this Court to separate the needs of these

children from the needs or desires of their parents. In doing this, the Court

must weigh the risk of returning children to a previously destructive

environment, even if that environment shows some signs of improvement.

19. The Court finds that the risk to the welfare of these children

would be dangerously unacceptable if they were placed in an environment

that is less stable than the one in which they reside now.

{¶11} The professionals that dealt with appellant's cocaine, alcohol, and theft

addictions concur that although appellant is striving to reach long-term sobriety, it has

not happened as of the date of the hearing. All agree that one year of sobriety is a

milestone to the achievement of long-term sobriety. T. at 124, 131, 186, 213-214, 237.

{¶12} The caseworker assigned to appellant's case, Jaime Grunder, testified

that enough time had passed and appellant still could not maintain sobriety for one

year. T. at 21, 55. Ms. Grunder pointed to appellant's relapses since completion of

Harbor House inpatient treatment and Aftercare outpatient treatment. T. at 6-7, 9-11,

18-19. Appellant was sober during the programs that ended in March 2012, but by Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2012 AP 12 0071 6

April 2012, she had relapsed because of the stress she was experiencing. T. at 9-10,

12. Ms.

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Related

C. E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co.
376 N.E.2d 578 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1978)
In re Adoption of Holcomb
481 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1985)

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