In re Deutsch

533 B.R. 833, 2015 WL 4140579
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
DecidedJune 25, 2015
DocketCASE NO. 14-17004-RAM
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 533 B.R. 833 (In re Deutsch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Deutsch, 533 B.R. 833, 2015 WL 4140579 (Fla. 2015).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DETERMINE THAT DEBTOR’S DISCHARGE DOES NOT AFFECT LIEN ON FUTURE DISABILITY PAYMENTS

Robert A. Mark, Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court

On June 18, 2011, nearly three years prior to the filing of this bankruptcy case, the Debtor entered into a contingency fee agreement with Gregory L. Denes, P.A. (“Denes”) in which the Debtor agreed that Denes would pursue a disability benefits claim for him in exchange for 1/3 of any recovery. The disability claim was settled in 2011 and, during the two and a half years prior to the bankruptcy filing and for almost one year after the filing, the agreement was performed. The Debtor now claims that Denes can no longer enforce the fee agreement against the future monthly disability payments (the “Future Payments”) because Denes did not assert a charging lien prior to the filing of this bankruptcy case or file a proof of claim in this case.

The Debtor’s attempt to extinguish Denes’ right to receive 1/3 of the Future Payments prompted Denes to file a Motion to Determine that Debtor’s Discharge Does Not Affect Lien Upon Future Disability Proceeds (the “Motion”) [DE# 233], For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted. Denes did not need to assert a charging lien prior to the filing of this bankruptcy case, nor file a proof of claim in this bankruptcy case, to preserve his right to receive 1/3 of the Future Payments under the fee agreement.

Factual and Procedural Background

The present dispute arises out of a disability benefits claim the Debtor pursued in 2011 against Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Northwestern”). On June 18, 2011, the Debtor and Denes executed a contingency fee agreement [DE# 233-1] (the “Agreement”). The Agreement states that (1) Denes shall be entitled to receive 33 1/3% of all disability benefits recovered on the Debtor’s claim against Northwestern; and (2) all disability benefits shall be paid into Denes’ trust account and disbursed to the Debtor and Denes on a monthly basis.

In November 2011, Northwestern agreed to pay the disability claim. The [835]*835Agreement was honored and performed in the two and a half years preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case on March 27, 2014, and honored and performed during the first ten months of the administration of this bankruptcy case. Specifically, Northwestern sent each monthly payment to Denes’ trust account and the funds were distributed 1/3 to Denes and 2/3 to the Debtor as provided in the Agreement. Denes also provided assistance to the Debtor in submitting the forms required to confirm the Debtor’s continued disability and right to continue to receive benefits.

After the successful conclusion of the disability case, Denes also represented the Debtor in garnishment actions resulting from a multi-million dollar judgment against the Debtor (the “Garnishment Case”). In the Garnishment Case, Denes successfully obtained a court order dissolving the writs of garnishment. Denes billed the debtor a total of $13,000 but only collected $1,000. Denes wrote off this debt as uncollectible and chose not to file a proof of claim in this bankruptcy case for the balance of the fee.

On March 27, 2014, the Debtor filed a chapter 7 voluntary petition and listed Denes as an unsecured creditor with a claim for an unknown amount of money. As noted, Denes did not file a proof of claim. On January 15, 2015, the Debtor received his discharge. On February 17, 2015, Denes received a copy of a letter the Debtor’s bankruptcy counsel wrote to Northwestern, stating that the Future Payments should be paid directly to the Debtor and not to Denes [DE# 233-2], The Debtor and his former bankruptcy counsel previously assured Denes that the disability proceeds would not be affected by the bankruptcy case. However, the Debtor now argues that Denes is no longer entitled to the disability payments because he did not assert an attorney’s charging lien nor file a proof of claim. In response to Debtor’s February 17, 2015 letter, Denes wrote to Northwestern on March 2, 2015, asserting Denes’ continuing right to receive the Future Payments and asserting a lien on the .Future Payments [DE# 240],

The issue before the Court is whether Denes needed to assert a charging >lien prior to the bankruptcy filing or file a proof of claim in the case to'maintain his right to receive 1/3 of the Future Payments. The Court conducted a hearing on Denes’ Motion on May 21, 2015. Upon review of the record, including the Motion, Debtor’s Response to [the Motion] [DE# 239] and Denes’ Reply in Support of [the Motion] [DE#241], after considering the arguments of counsel presented at the May 21st hearing, and upon review of applicable law, the Court concludes that the Motion should be granted.

Discussion

A. It was Not Necessary or Appropriate for Denes to Assert a Charging Lien Prior to the Bankruptcy Case

Given the facts and the nature of Denes’ rights under the Agreement, it was not necessary or appropriate for Denes to assert a charging lien prior to the filing of this bankruptcy case to preserve his right under the Agreement to receive 1/3 of the Future Payments.

Charging liens are equitable in nature. The Florida Supreme Court defines charging liens as a mechanism by which attorneys may enforce their equitable right to have costs and fees owed for legal services secured by the judgment or recovery in a lawsuit. Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1384 (Fla.1983)(“Baucom”).

In order to impose a charging lien, Florida law requires:

[836]*836(1) a contract between the attorney and client; (2) an express or implied understanding that payment is either contingent upon recovery or will be paid from the recovery; (3) an attempt by the client to avoid paying or a dispute as to the amount of the fee; and (4) a timely notice of a request for a lien.

In re Washington, 242 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir.2001) (citing Baucom at 1385.

In this case, the first and second elements are met by the express terms of the Agreement. However, the third element, the existence of a fee dispute, was not present when this case was filed. Pri- or to filing his bankruptcy case, the Debtor never challenged the Agreement or objected to the procedure provided for in the Agreement in which payments were made to Denes’ trust account. Therefore, there was no reason or basis for Denes to assert a charging lien prior to the filing of this bankruptcy case.

B. Denes Timely Asserted a Postpetition Charging Lien

There was no fee dispute until Debtor’s counsel contacted Northwestern in February of 2015 to challenge the Agreement. At that point, Denes provided á timely charging lien notice by sending the March 5, 2015 letter to Northwestern asserting a lien on the Future Payments. Thus, if a charging lien was necessary to preserve Denes’ rights under the Agreement, the lien was asserted and established promptly after the dispute arose.

C. Denes Did Not Need to File a Proof of Claim

The Debtor argues that Denes was listed as a creditor, that his claim for fees was not secured, and that “his general unsecured claim for fees was discharged.” [DE# 239, p.3].

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Santangelo v. Clarvit
M.D. Alabama, 2022

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
533 B.R. 833, 2015 WL 4140579, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-deutsch-flsb-2015.