IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 138 / 04-1707
Filed April 7, 2006
IN RE DETENTION OF WILLIE BRADFORD,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Stephen C. Clarke and George L. Stigler, Judges.
Respondent appeals from order for commitment as sexually violent
predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2003). AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, First Assistant State Public Defender, and Michael H.
Adams, Assistant Public Defender, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Denise A.
Timmins, and Andrew B. Prosser, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 2
LARSON, Justice.
Willie Bradford has appealed an order for commitment as a sexually
violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2003), alleging that the
statute is unconstitutional on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds.
We affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
In 1991 Bradford was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse and
indecent contact with a minor and was sentenced to concurrent terms of
twenty-five and two years, respectively. Both offenses are “sexually violent”
offenses as defined by Iowa Code section 229A.2(10)(a). He was confined at
the Anamosa State Penitentiary, but was eligible to be released on June 1,
2004. Prior to his release date, proceedings were commenced to have
Bradford confined as a sexually violent predator. Acting pursuant to Iowa
Code section 229A.3(5), a prosecutors’ review committee appointed by the
attorney general determined that Bradford met the definition of a “sexually
violent predator” and requested the district court to determine that probable
cause existed to believe Bradford was a sexually violent predator. The
district court found probable cause and set a jury trial on the matter.
Bradford filed a motion to dismiss on the constitutional grounds he now
urges, but his motion was denied, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At the trial, the State introduced the videotaped deposition of Anna
Salter, Ph.D., who had examined Bradford to determine whether the court
should order confinement. Dr. Salter testified that Bradford suffered from
pedophilia and that he is likely to engage in predatory acts constituting
sexually violent offenses if not confined in a secure facility. See Iowa Code
§ 229A.1. Dr. Salter based her opinion on “an extensive history of
molesting female children under the age of thirteen.” Dr. Salter used four
tests to determine Bradford’s likelihood to reoffend and rated Bradford as a 3
high risk for reoffending. On one test, he scored the highest possible rating.
At the time of the interview, the expert testified “he’s not old enough [so]
that we can count on age reducing his risk for recidivism.” She noted that
Bradford had not done well in the treatment program that had been
provided for him.
Following the trial, the jury found that Bradford is a sexually violent
predator as defined by Iowa Code section 229A.2(11). The court ordered
Bradford to be committed to the custody of the department of human
services “for control, care, and treatment until such time as his mental
abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be placed in a transitional
release program or discharged.” See Iowa Code § 229A.7(4).
II. The Issues.
Bradford contends that, because his criminal offenses in 1991
predated the enactment of our sexually violent predator act in 1998, the
application of the act to him violated ex post facto and double jeopardy
provisions of both the United States and Iowa Constitutions. These
arguments have been rejected by this court in a series of cases on the
ground that chapter 229A is a civil, not criminal, statute. See In re Det. of
Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 283-86 (Iowa 2000); see also In re Det. of Palmer, 691 N.W.2d 413, 422 (Iowa 2005); In re Det. of Ewoldt, 634 N.W.2d 622, 623
(Iowa 2001); In re Det. of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2001).
However, Bradford argues that the nature of chapter 229A has
changed dramatically because the legislature has amended three sections of
that chapter and has enacted a new statute in chapter 901A (relative to
punishment of persons previously committed as sexually violent predators).
The upshot of all of this, according to him, is that the statute has been
transformed from civil to criminal, thus implicating ex post facto and double
jeopardy principles. 4
These statutory changes since Garren are the addition of (1) section
229A.5B (making it a misdemeanor for a person to leave a secure facility
without permission), (2) section 229A.5C (providing for suspension of the
treatment process during prosecution for any criminal offense committed
while confined as a sexually violent predator), and (3) section 229A.8(1)
(providing rebuttable presumption that commitment should continue). The
fourth statutory change is the addition of Iowa Code section 901A.2(6),
which provides a possible life sentence for persons in a transitional release
program or who have been discharged under chapter 229A if they are
subsequently convicted of a predatory or sexually violent offense. Although
the State contends the issues raised by these amendments are not ripe for
adjudication because they have not yet affected Bradford, we prefer to
affirm the district court’s decision on its merits.
III. Merits.
In Garren we held that chapter 229A is civil in nature, relying largely
on Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501
(1997). In Hendricks the Court noted that, while it usually defers to the
categorization of a statute by the legislature, this is not necessarily
dispositive in determining whether the proceeding in question was civil or criminal. Id. at 361, 117 S. Ct. at 2082, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 515. However, the
Court will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only if a challenging party
provides the “clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil.” Id.
at 361, 117 S. Ct. at 2082, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 514-15 (alterations in original)
(citation omitted). In Garren we relied on the following two-part test of
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2641, 65
L. Ed. 2d 742, 749-50 (1980): 5 [First,] whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, [the Court] inquire[s] further whether the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
(Citations omitted).
In Garren we noted that the legislature had specifically labeled the act
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 138 / 04-1707
Filed April 7, 2006
IN RE DETENTION OF WILLIE BRADFORD,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Stephen C. Clarke and George L. Stigler, Judges.
Respondent appeals from order for commitment as sexually violent
predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2003). AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, First Assistant State Public Defender, and Michael H.
Adams, Assistant Public Defender, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Denise A.
Timmins, and Andrew B. Prosser, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 2
LARSON, Justice.
Willie Bradford has appealed an order for commitment as a sexually
violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2003), alleging that the
statute is unconstitutional on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds.
We affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
In 1991 Bradford was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse and
indecent contact with a minor and was sentenced to concurrent terms of
twenty-five and two years, respectively. Both offenses are “sexually violent”
offenses as defined by Iowa Code section 229A.2(10)(a). He was confined at
the Anamosa State Penitentiary, but was eligible to be released on June 1,
2004. Prior to his release date, proceedings were commenced to have
Bradford confined as a sexually violent predator. Acting pursuant to Iowa
Code section 229A.3(5), a prosecutors’ review committee appointed by the
attorney general determined that Bradford met the definition of a “sexually
violent predator” and requested the district court to determine that probable
cause existed to believe Bradford was a sexually violent predator. The
district court found probable cause and set a jury trial on the matter.
Bradford filed a motion to dismiss on the constitutional grounds he now
urges, but his motion was denied, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At the trial, the State introduced the videotaped deposition of Anna
Salter, Ph.D., who had examined Bradford to determine whether the court
should order confinement. Dr. Salter testified that Bradford suffered from
pedophilia and that he is likely to engage in predatory acts constituting
sexually violent offenses if not confined in a secure facility. See Iowa Code
§ 229A.1. Dr. Salter based her opinion on “an extensive history of
molesting female children under the age of thirteen.” Dr. Salter used four
tests to determine Bradford’s likelihood to reoffend and rated Bradford as a 3
high risk for reoffending. On one test, he scored the highest possible rating.
At the time of the interview, the expert testified “he’s not old enough [so]
that we can count on age reducing his risk for recidivism.” She noted that
Bradford had not done well in the treatment program that had been
provided for him.
Following the trial, the jury found that Bradford is a sexually violent
predator as defined by Iowa Code section 229A.2(11). The court ordered
Bradford to be committed to the custody of the department of human
services “for control, care, and treatment until such time as his mental
abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be placed in a transitional
release program or discharged.” See Iowa Code § 229A.7(4).
II. The Issues.
Bradford contends that, because his criminal offenses in 1991
predated the enactment of our sexually violent predator act in 1998, the
application of the act to him violated ex post facto and double jeopardy
provisions of both the United States and Iowa Constitutions. These
arguments have been rejected by this court in a series of cases on the
ground that chapter 229A is a civil, not criminal, statute. See In re Det. of
Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 283-86 (Iowa 2000); see also In re Det. of Palmer, 691 N.W.2d 413, 422 (Iowa 2005); In re Det. of Ewoldt, 634 N.W.2d 622, 623
(Iowa 2001); In re Det. of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2001).
However, Bradford argues that the nature of chapter 229A has
changed dramatically because the legislature has amended three sections of
that chapter and has enacted a new statute in chapter 901A (relative to
punishment of persons previously committed as sexually violent predators).
The upshot of all of this, according to him, is that the statute has been
transformed from civil to criminal, thus implicating ex post facto and double
jeopardy principles. 4
These statutory changes since Garren are the addition of (1) section
229A.5B (making it a misdemeanor for a person to leave a secure facility
without permission), (2) section 229A.5C (providing for suspension of the
treatment process during prosecution for any criminal offense committed
while confined as a sexually violent predator), and (3) section 229A.8(1)
(providing rebuttable presumption that commitment should continue). The
fourth statutory change is the addition of Iowa Code section 901A.2(6),
which provides a possible life sentence for persons in a transitional release
program or who have been discharged under chapter 229A if they are
subsequently convicted of a predatory or sexually violent offense. Although
the State contends the issues raised by these amendments are not ripe for
adjudication because they have not yet affected Bradford, we prefer to
affirm the district court’s decision on its merits.
III. Merits.
In Garren we held that chapter 229A is civil in nature, relying largely
on Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501
(1997). In Hendricks the Court noted that, while it usually defers to the
categorization of a statute by the legislature, this is not necessarily
dispositive in determining whether the proceeding in question was civil or criminal. Id. at 361, 117 S. Ct. at 2082, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 515. However, the
Court will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only if a challenging party
provides the “clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil.” Id.
at 361, 117 S. Ct. at 2082, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 514-15 (alterations in original)
(citation omitted). In Garren we relied on the following two-part test of
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2641, 65
L. Ed. 2d 742, 749-50 (1980): 5 [First,] whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, [the Court] inquire[s] further whether the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
(Citations omitted).
In Garren we noted that the legislature had specifically labeled the act
as civil and placed it between two other civil provisions. Garren, 620
N.W.2d at 280. We then focused on whether the statute was so punitive in
nature as to negate the intention that it should be civil. In resolving that
issue, we noted the factors set out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963):
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned . . . .
372 U.S. at 168-69, 83 S. Ct. at 567-68, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 660-61.
In applying these factors, we adopted reasoning similar to that of
Hendricks—while chapter 229A did impose an affirmative constraint upon
the individual, this was not sufficient to make it criminal in nature in view
of the fact that the confinement of mentally unstable persons has long been
cited as a classic example of nonpunitive detention. See Garren, 620
N.W.2d at 280 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363, 117 S. Ct. at 2083, 138
L. Ed. 2d at 516 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49,
107 S. Ct. 2095, 2102, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 710 (1987)).
Although Garren held that chapter 229A is civil in nature and has
been reaffirmed in subsequent cases, these cases have not addressed the
specific issues involved in this appeal, i.e., whether the effect of recent 6
statutory amendments following Garren have altered the nature of chapter
229A by making it a criminal statute.
A. Section 229A.5B. In 2001 the Iowa legislature enacted section
229A.5B. This section makes it a simple misdemeanor for a person
detained pursuant to chapter 229A to leave the facility without permission,
to be knowingly and voluntarily absent from the place where the person is
required to be, or to leave the custody of persons transporting or guarding
the committed person. Bradford argues that this new section must be
contrasted with other statutes regarding a person leaving a facility for
mentally ill patients, such as Iowa Code sections 229.13 and 229.14B, or
leaving a facility after commitment for substance abuse as provided in Iowa
Code section 125.85(5). Unlike these other statutes, which merely provide
mechanisms for returning an escaped person to custody, section 229A.5B
imposes criminal sanctions on persons escaping from custody imposed
under chapter 229A. Therefore, Bradford contends, this suggests that
chapter 229A is now criminal in its entirety.
While section 229A.5B makes it a criminal offense to escape after
being committed, it does nothing to alter the civil nature of the underlying
commitment. The criminal penalty is not imposed because the person is in chapter 229A confinement, but because he has committed the crime of
escape while being so confined. Furthermore, we will not assume that the
legislature’s placing of a criminal provision within a statute we have held to
be civil in nature evidences an intent to transform the whole chapter into
one that is criminal in nature. This inference sought by Bradford falls short
of the “clearest proof” required to make chapter 229A criminal in nature.
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S. Ct. at 2082, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 514-
15. 7
In addition, there are sound reasons for the legislature to criminalize
escapes from 229A confinements but not escapes from other settings. One
of the main purposes of chapter 229A is the protection of the public. See
Iowa Code § 229A.1 (Sexually violent predators have “antisocial personality
features that are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment
modalities and that render them likely to engage in sexually violent
behavior.”). To punish the escape of such persons is logical; it tends to
deter escapes and aids the protection of the public. In addition,
commitment under chapter 229A is long-term, compared to treatment
under chapter 229 (mental illness), which is “intended to provide short-term
treatment” to those with mental disorders. Iowa Code § 229A.1; see also
Iowa Code § 125.85(1) (providing commitment for term not to exceed ninety
days for substance abuse). The escape of a sexually violent predator is
therefore a greater risk to the community and more disruptive to their
treatment plan, thus warranting a more serious response.
Although the specific issue raised here has apparently not been
adjudicated in other states, many states have criminalized escape by
sexually violent predators, yet their courts have held their sexually violent
predator laws to be civil in nature. For example, Florida has made escaping from civil commitment a second-degree felony, see Fla. Stat. § 394.927(1),
yet it has held that the statute is civil in nature. See Westerheide v. State,
831 So. 2d 93, 100 (Fla. 2002). Missouri law creates a class “D” felony for
escape from commitment, which includes commitment pursuant to its
sexually violent predator act. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.195. Missouri
courts have, nonetheless, held its sexually violent predator act to be civil in
nature. See Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 790 (Mo. 2002). In re
Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637 (Tex.), cert. denied, Fisher v. Texas,
126 S. Ct. 428, 163 L. Ed. 2d 326 (2005), involved a sexually violent 8
predator act that provided for outpatient civil commitment subject to many
restrictions. The Texas court found that its commitment process was civil
in nature, even though a separate section of the statute provided that a
violation of one of the commitment requirements is a third-degree felony. In
the case of People v. Runge, 805 N.E.2d 632, 639 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 813 N.E.2d 227 (Ill. 2004), an Illinois appellate court held that the
escape statute, which criminalized escape by a civilly committed person
under Illinois’s sexually violent predator act, did not violate constitutional
equal protection guarantees. In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140,
155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003), the Supreme Court held that Alaska’s sex
offender registration act was civil, even though a knowing failure to comply
subjects a person to criminal prosecution.
We conclude that the addition of a criminal component to the civil
commitment statute does not alter the overall nature of the statute and that
it remains civil, not criminal.
B. Iowa Code section 229A.5C. In 2002 the legislature again
amended the sexually violent predator act by adding section 229A.5C. This
section provides that, if a person commits a criminal offense during
treatment, the treatment process will be suspended until the criminal proceedings, including any term of confinement, are complete. According to
Bradford,
[a]rguably chapter 229A is intended to serve a dual purpose: protection of the public and long-term, meaningful treatment of sex offenders. If punishment of those confined is not intended, why would the needed long-term, meaningful treatment be suspended during coexisting criminal proceedings? In either case, the person would be confined, so public safety is not at issue. Confinement under chapter 229A for treatment and confinement awaiting trial or serving a sentence is still confinement. Certainly a person may receive treatment while awaiting trial, and may receive treatment while serving a sentence of incarceration. 9
We disagree with Bradford’s observation that “punishment of those
confined is . . . intended” by this statutory amendment. If a person is
“punished” under section 229A.5C, it is because he has been found guilty of
a separate crime committed while confined as a sex offender. His argument
that continued confinement under chapter 229A best suits the legislature’s
twin goals of treatment and protection of the public does not give sufficient
consideration to the safety of persons confined with him. Section 229A.5C,
we believe, is a rational effort to deter crimes under those conditions. We
do not believe the legislature intended to forego criminal prosecution for
persons committed under chapter 229A, and we find the policy reasons
presented by Bradford to the contrary unpersuasive.
C. Iowa Code section 229A.8(1). In 2002 the legislature amended
chapter 229A to add this language:
Upon civil commitment of a person pursuant to this chapter, a rebuttable presumption exists that the commitment should continue. The presumption may be rebutted when facts exist to warrant a hearing to determine whether a committed person no longer suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged, or the committed person is suitable for placement in a transitional release program.
Iowa Code § 229A.8(1).
Bradford argues that this amendment, like those previously
discussed, criminalizes commitments and shows an intent by the legislature
to shift the emphasis of chapter 229A from civil to criminal. He contends
that “the legislature has shifted accountability for the continued
confinement to the confined person.” He argues that,
[r]ather than confining a committed person until they are no longer a threat, and requiring the state to justify such confinement on a periodic basis, chapter 229A now requires the person to be held until he can prove he is entitled to an 10 opportunity to make the state justify his continued confinement.
Bradford overstates the extent of the burden imposed on him by this
statute. He is not required to prove he is entitled to discharge, or even that
he is entitled to a hearing; he is required only to show some facts exist to
warrant a hearing on the need for continued confinement.
The legislature has provided no rationale for this amendment, but we
believe it is likely based on the very practical assumption that, unless there
is some evidence of improvement sufficient to trigger a hearing, the State,
which has already proven the need for confinement beyond a reasonable
doubt, need not repeatedly prove its case. A committed person still has the
right to “have a current examination of the person’s mental abnormality
made once every year,” Iowa Code § 229A.8(2), and an “annual report shall
be provided to the court that committed the person under this chapter.”
Iowa Code § 229A.8(3). According to Bradford’s argument, the effect of the 2002 rebuttable
presumption amendment is to alter the purpose and effect of chapter 229A
to make it punitive, since the confinement is no longer linked to the stated
purpose of the commitment, which is “ ‘to hold the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others.’ ” Garren, 620
N.W.2d at 280 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363, 117 S. Ct. at 2083, 138
L. Ed. 2d at 516). We disagree. The amendment still shows an intent to
hold committed persons only as long as necessary—until they are no longer
a threat to others. A committed person may petition the court for discharge
or placement in a transitional release program at the annual review
provided by Iowa Code section 229A.8(4). If the person shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that a final hearing should be held
concerning his condition, the court must set a hearing within sixty days. 11
Iowa Code § 229A.8(5)(e). At the final hearing, the State must show the
need for continued confinement by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Iowa
Code § 229A.8(6)(d). The burden is to show that the person’s mental
abnormality remains such that he is likely to commit sexually predatory
acts if discharged or placed in a transitional program. Iowa Code
§ 229A.8(6)(d)(1), (2). We conclude that section 229A.8(1) does not shift the
burden of proof on confinement to the committed person and does not
evidence an intent to criminalize chapter 229A.
D. Iowa Code section 901A.2(6). Iowa Code section 901A.2(6),
enacted in 2002, is also claimed by Bradford to evidence an intent to
transform sexually violent predator commitments into criminal cases.
Under this section, if a person who has been placed in a transitional release
program or discharged pursuant to chapter 229A is subsequently convicted
of a sexually predatory or sexually violent offense, he shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment (with or without the possibility of parole, depending on
whether the subsequent offense is greater than a misdemeanor). Bradford
argues that this new provision, which in itself is obviously criminal in
nature, changes the nature of the entire chapter from civil to criminal.
Section 901A.2(6) changes the effect that a commitment under chapter 229A may have in the future, but that does not alter chapter 229A
itself. To be sentenced in accordance with section 901A.2(6), a person must
have committed a new sexually violent or predatory offense. At this point,
the goals of retribution and deterrence are appropriate, and Bradford does
not argue otherwise. The enactment of this section, however, does not
make an original commitment under chapter 229A criminal in nature.
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude that none of the amendments discussed make chapter
229A punitive in nature; therefore, ex post facto and double jeopardy 12
protections do not apply. Bradford has not shown, by the “clearest proof,”
that the statute is now punitive and has not offered any persuasive reasons
why this court should depart from its contrary conclusion in Garren. We
therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.