In re DeRobbio

604 A.2d 1240, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 60, 1992 WL 46438
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedMarch 12, 1992
DocketNo. 92-131-M.P.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 604 A.2d 1240 (In re DeRobbio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re DeRobbio, 604 A.2d 1240, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 60, 1992 WL 46438 (R.I. 1992).

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This matter comes before us on a petition by Chief Judge Albert E. DeRobbio of the District Court seeking that we review and adopt a report submitted by the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline (Commission) concerning alleged ethical violations that might have arisen in the performance of his prosecutorial function in the case of State v. Ralph Byrnes et al.; tried in the Superior Court during the year 1976. This case was better known as the “Bonded Vault Robbery” case. We have examined the report of the Commission which found that Chief Judge DeRobbio committed no violations of the canons of ethics nor caused his office serious disrepute by any of his actions as the prosecutor in the bonded vault robbery trial. We have further examined the record upon which these findings have been based and agree that the findings of the Commission are overwhelmingly supported by the direct and credible evidence. We append the report of the Commission to this opinion, marked as appendix A and adopt its findings and rationale. The inquiry in respect to possible ethical violations arose out of the following circumstances.

On August 14, 1975, the bonded vault robbery took place in the City of Providence. As stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, nine masked men entered the commercial safe-deposit company, robbed its employees at gunpoint, then broke into 146 safe-deposit boxes. It was believed that the robbery produced approximately four million dollars in cash and other valuables. The case was tried during the summer of 1976, and John F. Ouimette (Ouimette) was convicted of one count of conspiracy and one count of aiding and abetting the robbers. In fact the evidence indicated that Ouimette had planned and masterminded the enterprise though he was not present at the scene of the crime. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the principal witnesses at trial was Robert J. Dussault, who testified that he had been a career criminal for twenty years. Ouimette and his co-defendants, Ralph Byrnes and Charles Flynn, appealed to this court. Their appeal was denied in State v. Byrnes, 433 A.2d 658 (R.I.1981). In support of their appeal the defendants raised eight issues. None of these issues included any complaint that the criminal record of Dussault or his plea [1241]*1241agreement with the state had in any way been concealed from them.

However, in 1982 Ouimette sought a reduction of his life sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The motion for reduction was heard before a panel of three judges of the Superior Court. In the course of this hearing, Ouimette admitted his guilt in respect to the robbery under oath in the following terms:

“I — I’m going to be a little nervous, you’ll have to excuse me, but as far as the robbery, I am guilty of the robbery. As far as the money part, that’s not true. There was no millions of dollars. I don’t have no money when I get out to go away, whatever people think. The truth of the matter is, there was no million dollars taken to my knowledge, and that is the truth. Uh, I mean, it’s been built up over the past years. Now it’s up to four million. The first time it was two, three, now it’s up to four, and that is just not the truth.
“I’m sorry about what happened in the robbery. I’m sorry both to the boxhold-ers and especially to the employees in the place.
“And I have changed. I think jail was the right thing for me at the time. I think I learned a lot from being there. I had a lot of time to think, and I got to know myself a little better — a little bit better, I should say.”

Thereafter, John A. Murphy, Esquire, who had assumed the prosecutorial duties in the case after the appointment of Judge DeRobbio to the District Court, asked, the following questions and received the following answers.

“Mr. Murphy: Do you make this admission of guilt freely and of your own volition here today?
“Mr. Ouimette: Yes.
“Mr. Murphy: And you make it knowingly? You feel okay today?
“Mr. Ouimette: I feel very good. Not about the robbery. I feel bad about that. That was the worst thing that ever happened in my life. It was bad, and I, surely, I did get off on the wrong road somehow, but now I know I’m on the right track and I’m starting to get a little education and I feel — I feel good about that. Not the robbery; that was bad.”

After the completion of the hearing Oui-mette’s sentence was reduced from life imprisonment to forty-five years imprisonment with fifteen years suspended.

Such a solemn judicial admission of guilt would normally preclude the raising of any issues, constitutional or otherwise, that might be asserted in respect to the validity of his conviction. See e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (precludes raising issue of double jeopardy); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) (waives relief regarding composition of grand jury); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (precludes collateral relief in respect to a coerced confession); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (relief precluded even if admission of guilt motivated by a desire to avoid death penalty or to obtain a lesser sentence).

Nevertheless Ouimette sought post-conviction relief in the Superior Court based on prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose to Ouimette during the course of the trial the complete criminal record of Robert J. Dussault. This claim was denied by a justice of the Superior Court on the state’s motion for summary judgment. This court affirmed the summary judgment, noting that the prosecutor Albert DeRobbio had not failed to comply with Rule 26.1(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure in that he had turned over to counsel for Ouimette a “rap sheet”1 that listed four convictions, two of which were misdemeanors. DeRobbio stated in open court that this “rap sheet” was the only record he had but admonished counsel for the defendant that it might not [1242]*1242be complete. Prosecutor DeRobbio made the following statement:

“ ‘May I indicate, that the docket I gave [defendant’s counsel] is — the best of my knowledge, may be complete, but it does not indicate on that docket as to whether he was robbing a bank or how many banks he robbed during that period of time, or maybe it’s a complete report. It was only given to [defendant’s counsel] as to information that was within a file that was available to us. That report may not have been complete. But I’m not responsible for completeness of record.’ ” Ouimette v. Moran, 541 A.2d 855, 857 (R.I.1988).

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604 A.2d 1240, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 60, 1992 WL 46438, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-derobbio-ri-1992.