In re Depo-Provera Cases

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: February 25, 2026
• Docket: 513, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN RE: DEPO-PROVERA § No. 513, 2025 LITIGATION § § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware § § C.A. No. N25C-10-202

Submitted: December 30, 2025 Decided: February 25, 2026

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the notice and supplemental notice of appeal from an

interlocutory order and the exhibits attached thereto, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Over three hundred plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) have filed lawsuits in the

Superior Court alleging that their use of depot medroxyprogesterone acetate or its

generic equivalents (together, “Depo-Provera”) caused them to develop intercranial

meningiomas. In their complaints, Plaintiffs, represented by different law firms,

allege that the defendants—Pfizer, Inc.; Pharmacia, LLC; and Pharmacia & Upjohn

Company LLC (together, “Defendants”)—wrongfully developed, designed, tested,

manufactured, labeled, packaged, promoted, advertised, marketed, distributed

and/or sold Depo-Provera and therefore bear responsibility for their cancer

diagnoses and related injuries (the “Depo-Provera Actions”). Similar lawsuits are

pending in a multidistrict products liability action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida (the “MDL”) and other state courts. The parties

expect that hundreds more Depo-Provera Actions will be filed in Delaware.

(2) On November 18, 2025, the Superior Court entered a case management

order intended to facilitate a threshold ruling on the issue of general causation and

to coordinate the Superior Court’s general-causation proceedings with those in the

MDL and other state actions. At the same time, the Superior Court entered two

additional orders meant to be read together with the case management order. One

order appointed BrownGreer PLC to serve as the data administrator vendor for the

Depo-Provera Actions and directed the parties to use the online BrownGreer MDL

Centrality System as a document repository and e-discovery platform (the “Data

Administration Order”). The other order directed each plaintiff to provide initial

documentary proof of her Depo-Provera use and meningioma diagnosis (the “Case

Vetting Order,” and, together with the Data Administration Order, the “Orders”).

All three orders are similar to those entered in the MDL and other state actions.

(3) Plaintiffs represented by Collins Price Warner Woloshin, Rhoades &

Morrow LLC, and Keller Postman LLC (“Keller Plaintiffs”) asked the Superior

Court to certify an interlocutory appeal of the Orders under Supreme Court Rule 42.

Keller Plaintiffs argued that the Orders decided substantial issues of material

importance—a threshold inquiry under Rule 42—because (i) the court had no

authority, under either its rules or its inherent authority, to enter the Orders, and (ii)

2 the Data Administration Order requires disclosure of confidential information to a

third-party vendor in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). Keller Plaintiffs also maintained that four

of the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors weighed in favor of certification: (i) the Orders resolved

a question of law for the first time; (ii) the Orders conflict with other trial court

decisions; (iii) the Orders relate to the construction of a statute that should be settled

before the entry of a final judgment; and (iv) interlocutory review of the Orders

would serve considerations of justice. The remaining plaintiffs and Defendants

opposed the application.

(4) The Superior Court declined to certify an interlocutory appeal. The

court determined that the Orders did not decide a substantial issue of material

importance that merits appellate review before a final order because they do not

relate to the merits of the case and do not establish any legal rights. Rather, the court

found that the purpose of the Case Vetting Order is merely to confirm the existence

of information that has been alleged in each complaint. The court observed that the

Case Vetting Order does not, as Keller Plaintiffs claimed, potentially dispose of any

of Plaintiffs’ claims—if a complaint is found to be lacking documentary proof, it

will be dismissed without prejudice to re-file with the required documentation. The

court also found it evident that it could use its inherent authority to manage a

complex litigation docket by way of the Orders. Finally, the Superior Court found

3 that—assuming that Plaintiffs are “covered entities” under HIPAA and that HIPAA

applies to a personal injury plaintiff who puts her physical condition at issue in a

lawsuit—the Orders did not decide a substantial issue of material importance

because the information that they require Plaintiffs to disclose is alleged in each

plaintiff’s publicly filed complaint. And the Superior Court concluded that, even if

Keller Plaintiffs had identified a substantial issue justifying the certification of an

interlocutory appeal, none of the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors weighed in favor of

certification.

(5) We agree with the Superior Court that interlocutory review is not

warranted in this case. Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the

sound discretion of the Court.1 In the exercise of our discretion and giving due

weight to the Superior Court’s analysis, the Court has concluded that the application

for interlocutory review does not meet the strict standards for certification under

Rule 42(b). Exceptional circumstances that would merit interlocutory review of the

Orders do not exist in this case, 2 and the potential benefits of interlocutory review

do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by an

interlocutory appeal. 3

1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(v). 2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii). 3 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii). 4 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the interlocutory appeal be

REFUSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice