In re DeMartino

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re DeMartino

259 A.D. 794, 19 N.Y.S.2d 529, 1940 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6675

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 20, 1940

StatusPublished

This text of 259 A.D. 794 (In re DeMartino) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re DeMartino, 259 A.D. 794, 19 N.Y.S.2d 529, 1940 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6675 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1940).

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Opinion

Order affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. Memorandum: The magistrate before wham the petitioner pleaded guilty to a violation of a 'speed ordinance, this being the third conviction for speeding within eighteen months, did not require a surrender of the petitioner’s license to operate a motor vehicle. He did, however, immediately send a certificate of conviction of petitioner to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, The Commissioner revoked petitioner’s license more than ten days after the conviction and more than ten days after the time he received the certificate of conviction. The failure to comply with the provisions of section 71-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law rendered such revocation void. That statute, requiring certain acts to be performed by public officials for the protection of the rights of individuals, is mandatory. (People v. Sutcliffe, 255 App. Div. 299.) All concur. (The order adjudges the order of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles purporting to revoke the license of petitioner to be null and void.) Present — Crosby, P. J., Cunningham, Taylor, Harris and McCurn, JJ. [See post, p. 976.]

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Order affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. Memorandum: The magistrate before wham the petitioner pleaded guilty to a violation of a 'speed ordinance, this being the third conviction for speeding within eighteen months, did not require a surrender of the petitioner’s license to operate a motor vehicle. He did, however, immediately send a certificate of conviction of petitioner to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, The Commissioner revoked petitioner’s license more than ten days after the conviction and more than ten days after the time he received the certificate of conviction. The failure to comply with the provisions of section 71-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law rendered such revocation void. That statute, requiring certain acts to be performed by public officials for the protection of the rights of individuals, is mandatory. (People v. Sutcliffe, 255 App. Div. 299.) All concur. (The order adjudges the order of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles purporting to revoke the license of petitioner to be null and void.) Present — Crosby, P. J., Cunningham, Taylor, Harris and McCurn, JJ. [See post, p. 976.]

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Bluebook (online)

259 A.D. 794, 19 N.Y.S.2d 529, 1940 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6675, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-demartino-nyappdiv-1940.

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