In re Delta Food Processing Corp.

313 F. Supp. 788, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11476
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Mississippi
DecidedJune 3, 1970
DocketNo. GBK 7046
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 313 F. Supp. 788 (In re Delta Food Processing Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Delta Food Processing Corp., 313 F. Supp. 788, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11476 (N.D. Miss. 1970).

Opinion

ORMA R. SMITH, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This Memorandum Opinion will of necessity be short and concise. The urgency of the matter does not permit the Court to render an opinion containing extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.

If it should become necessary or advisable after the entry of the Order herein for the Court to prepare and render a supplemental opinion embracing additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court reserves the right to do so at the proper time.

The only issue before the Court at this time is whether the petition filed herein by petitioning creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 526 has been filed in good faith. Section 546, Title 11 U.S.C.A. provides:

“§ 546. Good faith of petition

Without limiting the generality of the meaning of the term ‘good faith’, a petition shall be deemed not to be filed in good faith if—
(1) the petitioning creditors have acquired their claims for the purpose of filing the petition; or
(2) adequate relief would be obtainable by a debtor’s petition under the provisions of chapter 11 of this title; or
(3) it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected; or
(4) a prior proceeding is pending in any court and it appears that the interests of creditors and stockholders would be best subserved in such prior proceeding.”

The parties have stipulated that of the four grounds aforesaid upon which a determination can be made that a petition is not filed in good faith, the only ground with which we are concerned is [790]*790ground three, which is: “it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected”.

If the Court finds from the evidence in the case sub judice that it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected, it is the duty of the Court to deny the petition. Conversely, however, if the Court finds that it is not unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected, it is the Court’s duty to approve the petition.

It must be distinctly understood that the Court is not presently passing upon the feasibility of the plan injected into the case by the testimony of W. L. Smith, Jr., speaking on behalf of Smith Pride Foods, Incorporated. The plan proposed by the witness Smith is not at issue in the proceedings at this time. The only thing the Court considers at this time is whether it is unreasonable to expect that a feasible plan of reorganization can be effected. In order to furnish a guideline for the Court, it is well that reference be made to decisions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the District Courts within that Circuit.

The Fifth Circuit in R. L. Witters Associates v. Ebsary Gypsum Company, 93 F.2d 746 (5 Cir. 1938), which arose under the predecessor to Chapter X, § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act said:

“Under the rule (established by the cited cases), if it is clear that under no reasonable possibility can the debt- or conform to and obtain the benefits of the statute, and that therefore the petition was manifestly filed, if by the debtor, for delay, or if by petitioning creditors, for harassment, the petition may be dismissed before the plan stage is reached, as wanting in the good faith the statute requires. Under that rule, where the good faith of the filing is attacked, before the plan stage has been reached, unless the impossibility of conforming to and obtaining the benefits of the statute clearly appears, the petition should not be dismissed as not filed in good faith. It should be retained, and questions of plan- and reorganization worked out in the thorough and complete way the statute provides for later steps in the proceedings.”1

Judge Frederick J. R. Heebe, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division, has published two exhaustive opinions on the subject which now concerns the Court in the case sub judice. In re Plaza Towers, Inc., 1967, 294 F. Supp. 714; In re Southern Land Title Corporation, 1968, 301 F.Supp. 379. While these two cases deal primarily with real property, as suggested by counsel for Winthrop Lawrence Corporation in their brief, the underlying principle or rule of law is the same. In the Plaza Totvers case Judge Heebe said:

“Chapter X is designed for the benefit of all who have claims against or interest in the debtor. It is a remedial statute whereby both unsecured and secured debt, as well as interested stockholders, may be adjusted, modified, or otherwise dealt with. For purposes of good faith it is not necessary to show that an equity may exist for the stockholders, or even for all classes of creditors. The requirement of good faith is satisfied if there is shown to be some possibility of an equity or value for creditors who are satisfied with the financial rehabilitation provided by Chapter X. Sections 130 and 179 of the Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 530 and 579, clearly indicate that utilization of Chapter X proceedings by an insolvent debtor is both authorized and justified.
If this proceeding is not dismissed now, then at some later stage we will be called upon to review the merits of any plans of reorganization that may be proposed. At that time, we will have to take a searching look at the fairness,, equity and feasibility of such plans.”2

[791]*791Judge Heebe said in Southern Land Title Corporation, supra, as follows:

“In determining whether the requisite value or equity exists, the emphasis must be on the future and the ability of the corporation to carry on in the future. The present financial straits of the debtor is irrelevant to the extent that it may be modified by reorganization for the very purpose of Chapter X is to modify and adjust the present stranglehold on the debtor in order that it may continue to operate. The present is relevant, however, as is the past, as an indication of what caused the debtor’s floundering condition and what may be expected for the future. Unless the court is satisfied that the prospects for the future are so bleak that no chance for reorganization exists, it should not preclude those who petition from the opportunity to attempt reorganization. The petition is not to be dismissed for lack of good faith merely because the petitioners have no equity, as established by the above authorities; the petition is not to be dismissed for lack of good faith merely because the debtor is unable to meet its present obligations as they mature for this is exactly the cause of the need for corporate reorganization; the petition is not to be dismissed for lack of good faith merely because no plan of reorganization can be devised in which all of the creditors and stockholders may participate, as established by the above authorities. In urging their extreme arguments, the opposing creditors have simply chosen to overlook the very nature of corporate reorganization. At this stage, we must only be satisfied that a chance to reorganize the debtor corporation as a viable concern for the future does exist.” 3

In A-Cos Leasing Corporation v. Wheless (5 Cir.

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Bluebook (online)
313 F. Supp. 788, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-delta-food-processing-corp-msnd-1970.