In re Delroy S.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Delroy S.

113 A.D.3d 448, 978 N.Y.2d 183

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 14, 2014

StatusPublished

This text of 113 A.D.3d 448 (In re Delroy S.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Delroy S., 113 A.D.3d 448, 978 N.Y.2d 183 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

Pincite

Opinion

The court should have suppressed appellant’s statement on the ground that it was the product of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. Under the circumstances, a reasonable 11 year old would not have felt free to leave (see Matter of Ricardo S., 297 AD2d 255 [1st Dept 2002]). Nevertheless, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]). Independent of the statement, which added little to the presentment agency’s case, there was overwhelming evidence that both established appellant’s guilt of the assault and weapon charges and disproved his justification defense. In what began as a fistfight, appellant stabbed his unarmed opponent in the back at a time when appellant clearly had the ability to retreat safely rather than using deadly physical force. We have considered and rejected appellant’s arguments concerning his justification defense.

The evidence did not support the inferences that appellant committed the delinquent acts of petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree.

Probation was the least restrictive dispositional alternative consistent with appellant’s needs and the community’s need for protection (see Matter of Katherine W., 62 NY2d 947 [1984]), particularly in light of the seriousness of the assault. Concur— Sweeny, J.P., Renwick, Andrias and Freedman, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

The court should have suppressed appellant’s statement on the ground that it was the product of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. Under the circumstances, a reasonable 11 year old would not have felt free to leave (see Matter of Ricardo S., 297 AD2d 255 [1st Dept 2002]). Nevertheless, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]). Independent of the statement, which added little to the presentment agency’s case, there was overwhelming evidence that both established appellant’s guilt of the assault and weapon charges and disproved his justification defense. In what began as a fistfight, appellant stabbed his unarmed opponent in the back at a time when appellant clearly had the ability to retreat safely rather than using deadly physical force. We have considered and rejected appellant’s arguments concerning his justification defense.

The evidence did not support the inferences that appellant committed the delinquent acts of petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree.

Probation was the least restrictive dispositional alternative consistent with appellant’s needs and the community’s need for protection (see Matter of Katherine W., 62 NY2d 947 [1984]), particularly in light of the seriousness of the assault. Concur— Sweeny, J.P., Renwick, Andrias and Freedman, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

113 A.D.3d 448, 978 N.Y.2d 183, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-delroy-s-nyappdiv-2014.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack