In re Delmoro

48 Misc. 3d 628, 11 N.Y.S.3d 439
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedApril 30, 2015
StatusPublished

This text of 48 Misc. 3d 628 (In re Delmoro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Delmoro, 48 Misc. 3d 628, 11 N.Y.S.3d 439 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

David F. Everett, S.

Blind application of the Kaiser formula (Matter of Kaiser, 198 Misc 582 [1950]) can result in the inequitable and unjust distribution of proceeds from a wrongful death action. In estate matters involving a wrongful death recovery, it is the obligation of counsel to ensure that careful consideration be given to the particular circumstances surrounding a decedent’s distributees to ensure an equitable and appropriate distribution in each and every case. There are instances where the “years of dependency” formula at the heart of Kaiser is appropriate. There are also instances where its rigid application is not only ill-advised, but would lead to inequitable consequences which do not serve the best interests of a decedent’s distributees. Under those circumstances, it is incumbent upon counsel, in their submissions to the surrogate, to deviate from Kaiser and propose an alternate method of calculation in order to achieve a fair and just result. The miscellaneous proceeding currently before this court is one of those instances.

Petitioner Deena Delmoro, as executrix of the estate of Ronald A. Delmoro also known as Ronald Anthony Delmoro (decedent), commenced the instant proceeding seeking a decree: (i) authorizing her to settle a medical malpractice cause of action for $2.45 million against defendants Daniel Solomon, M.D., Kalyani Bhuta, M.D., Douglas R. Mailly, M.D., and Ian M. Matsuura, M.D./Nighthawk Radiology Services LLC, arising from decedent’s wrongful death; (ii) allocating the proceeds of the settlement between the pending causes of action for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering; (iii) fixing and determining legal fees; (iv) approving the distribution of the wrongful death proceeds according to the Kaiser formula; and (v) settling her account, together with related relief. Jurisdiction is complete.

Under the circumstances before the court, the petition must be granted in part and denied in part for the reasons set forth below.

Decedent died testate on August 16, 2009, allegedly due to medical malpractice. He is survived by petitioner, his wife, [630]*630who, in her capacity as executrix, commenced the above referenced medical malpractice/wrongful death action. Decedent is also survived by his four children, two of whom, Stephen Delmoro and Daniel Delmoro, were under the age of 21 at the time of his death.

Upon review of the submissions, the court finds that the proposed settlement of the underlying lawsuit is fair and reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding decedent’s death, and grants that portion of the petition which seeks authorization to settle the medical malpractice/wrongful death action for $2.45 million. The filing of a bond is dispensed with. The court also grants that portion of the petition that seeks to allocate the settlement proceeds at 81.63% to wrongful death and 18.37% to conscious pain and suffering.1

However, the portion of the petition that seeks approval of a distribution of the wrongful death proceeds according to the arithmetic (fractional) formula set forth in Kaiser is denied. While Kaiser is a landmark case in the field of estate law, adherence to its distribution formula is not appropriate in circumstances such as those presented here, where the resulting distribution would inequitably penalize a distributee without proper justification.

How the Kaiser Formula is Typically Applied

Under Kaiser, a decedent’s spouse and children under the age of 21 at the time of the decedent’s death each receive a share of the wrongful death proceeds. The amount of each share is determined by a fraction in which the denominator is the sum of the number of years of anticipated dependency of the surviving spouse plus the total number of years of anticipated dependency of all children under 21 at the time of the decedent’s death. The numerator for each such distributee is the number of that distributee’s years of anticipated dependency (Matter of Acquafredda [Czygier], 189 AD2d 504, 505 n 1 [1993]). The anticipated dependency period for the decedent’s spouse is the shorter of either the spouse’s own life expectancy or the decedent’s life expectancy, as measured by recognized mortality tables (id.). The anticipated dependency period for each child is measured by the number of years from the date of decedent’s death until the child reaches the age of 21 (id.).

[631]*631How the Application of Kaiser Would Affect the Instant Case

In the instant case, decedent’s wife (the petitioner) is currently 57 years of age and decedent’s offspring are currently ages 22, 25, 38 and 40.2

At the time of his death, decedent was 61 years of age, with a life expectancy of 20.8 years, and petitioner was 51, with a life expectancy of 32.4 years. Therefore, in a Kaiser calculation, the anticipated dependency period for petitioner is 20.8 years, as that figure represents the lesser of the two life expectancies. With respect to the two youngest offspring, Stephen was 17 years of age, with an anticipated period of dependency of 3.99 years, while Daniel was 20 years of age, with an anticipated period of dependency of 0.17 years.

Following the fractional formula set forth in Kaiser, the denominator for each fraction would be 24.96 (the sum of the years of anticipated dependency of petitioner, Stephen and Daniel, or 20.8 + 3.99 + 0.17 = 24.96). Petitioner’s numerator would be 20.8, and her fractional share 20.8/24.96; Stephen’s numerator would be 3.99, and his fractional share 3.99/24.96; and Daniel’s numerator would be 0.17, and his fractional share 0.17/24.96. Converting the fractions to percentages, under Kaiser, the distribution of the wrongful death portion of the settlement proceeds to decedent’s wife and two youngest offspring would be as follows: 83.33%, or $1,381,624.27 to petitioner; 15.999É) or $265,116.27 to Stephen; and 0.68<%; or $11,274.51 to Daniel. The resulting disparity of over a quarter of a million dollars between the amounts of wrongful death proceeds as they would be distributed under Kaiser to Stephen and Daniel, who are now both over the age of 21, close in age and similarly situated in life, would be neither equitable nor appropriate.

Acquafredda and Deviating from Kaiser

As the first appellate court to undertake a review of the Kaiser formula, the Appellate Division, Second Department declared, in Acquafredda, that “there is no imperative for the automatic application of Kaiser . . . , that the Surrogate is vested with discretion and with equitable powers as to the proportional allocation of wrongful death proceeds, and that the Surrogate did not improvidently exercise his discretion in declining to utilize the Kaiser formula” (Acquafredda at 506).

[632]*632In affirming the decision of the Suffolk County Surrogate’s Court to deviate from Kaiser in its method of distribution, the Appellate Division reviewed the changes in this area of estate law (id. at 507-510). Included in the Court’s historical review was the common-law prohibition against wrongful death recovery (see explanation in Whitford v Panama R.R. Co.,

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Related

Gonzalez v. New York City Housing Authority
572 N.E.2d 598 (New York Court of Appeals, 1991)
Whitford v. . the Panama Railroad Company
23 N.Y. 465 (New York Court of Appeals, 1861)
In re Acquafredda
189 A.D.2d 504 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1993)
In re the Estate of Duffy
208 A.D.2d 1169 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1994)
In re the Accounting of Kaiser
198 Misc. 582 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1950)
In re the Estate of Pridell
206 Misc. 316 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1954)
In re the Estates of Maerkle
44 Misc. 2d 617 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1964)
In re the Estate of Singleton
96 Misc. 2d 169 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1978)
In re the Estate of Feld
153 Misc. 2d 615 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
48 Misc. 3d 628, 11 N.Y.S.3d 439, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-delmoro-nysurct-2015.