In Re DeGross

272 B.R. 309, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1004, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1694, 2001 WL 1743491
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedOctober 22, 2001
Docket01-2412-3F7
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 272 B.R. 309 (In Re DeGross) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re DeGross, 272 B.R. 309, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1004, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1694, 2001 WL 1743491 (Fla. 2001).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JERRY A. FUNK, Bankruptcy Judge.

This case came before the Court upon the United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). The Court conducted a hearing on August 2, 2001. The Court instructed the parties to submit briefs in lieu of oral argument. Upon the evidence and the arguments of the parties, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on March 20, 2001. (Doc. 1.) On May 14, 2001 the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a report of no distribution. (Doc. 9.) On June 25, 2001 the United States Trustee (the “Trustee”) filed its Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 10.)

On her schedules Debtor lists unsecured non-priority debt of $62,622.00, $632.00 of which represents medical bills, and the remainder of which represents credit card debt. Debtor lists one secured claim in the amount of $7,921.00 which represents her automobile, a 1995 Nissan Pathfinder.

Debtor’s income at the time of the filing of the petition was approximately $63,400.00. Her monthly income exceeded her monthly expenses by $114.00. Subsequent to the filing of the petition, Debtor changed employers. Her current salary is approximately $62,000.00 annually. (Tr. at 11.)

Debtor’s monthly housing expenses of $1,544.00 consist of the following: $1,100.00 for rent, $150.00 for utilities, $50.00 for water and sewer, $50.00 for telephone, $29.00 for alarm security, $65.00 for cable, and $100.00 for home maintenance. Debtor has a roommate who does not pay rent or contribute to any of the household expenses such as food or utilities. Debtor testified that her roommate is unable to contribute financially because of a back injury.

Debtor’s monthly expense for food, clothing, and miscellaneous expenditures is $1,155.00 which includes $400.00 for food, $100.00 for clothing, $50.00 for dry cleaning, $75.00 for medical and dental expenses, $150.00 for recreation, $30.00 for charitable contributions, $150.00 for regular business expenses, and $200.00 for miscellaneous emergency expenses.

Debtor’s monthly transportation expense of $642.00 consists of a car payment of $380.00, insurance of $102.00, and $160.00 for gas, oil changes, vehicle registration fee, and repairs.

Debtor’s Schedule I indicates her former employer withheld $252.00 monthly from her salary for health insurance. However, Debtor’s pay-stub for the pay period beginning on May 31, 2001 and ending on June 15, 2001 indicates her former employer withheld $79.19 for that pay period or *312 $158.38 monthly. (Tr. Ex. 11.) 1 Debtor also spends an additional $155.00 monthly for health insurance, $25.00 monthly for life insurance, and $95.00 monthly for short term and long term disability. Debtor testified she has arrhythmia, a heart condition, which periodically requires her to seek medical attention. Debtor testified that she maintains health insurance beyond that provided by her employer to ensure uninterrupted coverage because of frequent changes in ownership and health benefits in the nursing home industry. (Tr. At 17.)

Debtor testified that she filed for bankruptcy relief to obtain a fresh start and to discharge her debts in order to purchase a home. She testified that she incurred the credit card debt approximately ten years ago and has not made a payment in five years. She also testified that, with the exception of two credit card companies, none of her creditors has attempted to collect its debt within the last six years. Finally, the only debt debtor has incurred during the last five years is the purchase of her vehicle.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Trustee seeks dismissal of Debtor’s petition on the basis that granting the relief Debtor seeks would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) provides that a court may dismiss a Chapter 7 case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts if the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7. There is a presumption in favor of granting relief to the debtor. A court must first determine whether the debts are primarily consumer debts as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 108. Debtor concedes that her debts are primarily consumer debts. The Court must therefore determine whether granting relief would constitute a substantial abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7.

Substantial Abuse

Because Congress did not define substantial abuse, courts have been forced to grapple with its definition. It is clear that a debtor’s ability to pay is always a factor in a court’s substantial abuse determination. A debtor’s ability to pay is measured by what [she] could pay in a hypothetical Chapter 13 case. Stuart v. Koch, 109 F.3d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir.1997). What varies among courts is the extent to which they rely on a debtor’s ability to pay. Several circuit courts have held that a debtor’s ability to pay, standing alone, is sufficient to warrant dismissal on substantial abuse grounds. In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 984-985 (8th Cir.1989); Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir.1988).

Other Circuit courts have adopted an approach which considers a Debtor’s ability to pay along with other circumstances, the circumstances varying from court to court. See Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778, 783-784 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal on substantial abuse grounds based on ability to pay followed by analysis of the totality of the circumstances to determine presence of aggravating or mitigating factors); Stewart v. United States Trustee (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 809 (10th Cir.1999) (ability to pay primary factor but other mitigating “unique hardship” and aggravating factors must be considered); First *313 USA v. Lamanna (In re Lamanna), 153 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1998) (adopting totality of the circumstances test set forth in Krohn and noting that ability to pay is primary but not conclusive factor of substantial abuse); Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gregory David Miller
M.D. Florida, 2022
Noel Jevon Chambers
M.D. Florida, 2022
Angelo Luis Hernandez, Jr.
M.D. Florida, 2022
In re Wierzbicki
506 B.R. 935 (M.D. Florida, 2014)
In Re Ricci
456 B.R. 89 (M.D. Florida, 2009)
In Re Norwood-Hill
403 B.R. 905 (M.D. Florida, 2009)
In Re Cribbs
387 B.R. 324 (S.D. Georgia, 2008)
In Re Henebury
361 B.R. 595 (S.D. Florida, 2007)
In Re Hester
330 B.R. 809 (M.D. Florida, 2005)
Turner v. Johnson (In Re Johnson)
318 B.R. 907 (N.D. Georgia, 2005)
In Re Brown
301 B.R. 607 (M.D. Florida, 2003)
In Re Luikart
319 B.R. 1 (M.D. Florida, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
272 B.R. 309, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1004, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1694, 2001 WL 1743491, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-degross-flmb-2001.