In Re Debtor's Attorney Fees in Chapter 13 Cases

374 B.R. 903, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2945, 2007 WL 2457465
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 31, 2007
Docket07-MP-00002-MGW
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 374 B.R. 903 (In Re Debtor's Attorney Fees in Chapter 13 Cases) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Debtor's Attorney Fees in Chapter 13 Cases, 374 B.R. 903, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2945, 2007 WL 2457465 (Fla. 2007).

Opinion

*904 ORDER ESTABLISHING PRESUMPTIVELY REASONABLE DEBTOR’S ATTORNEY FEE IN CHAPTER 13 CASES

PAUL M. GLENN, Chief Judge,

MICHAEL G. WILLIAMSON, K. RODNEY MAY and CATHERINE PEEK McEWEN, Bankruptcy Judges.

This order sets forth the procedures that will generally be followed by the judges of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division (“Tampa Division Judges” or “Court”), with respect to the attorneys’ fees to be routinely allowed without a fee application and supporting time records for attorneys representing chapter 13 debtors in cases before the Tampa Division Judges.

Procedural Background

Sections 329 and 330 of the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11, United States Code, 1 permit the Court to determine the reasonable value for services provided by the attorney for the debtor in a chapter 13 case. In this regard, the Tampa Division Judges have generally followed the procedures (“Newman Procedures”) set forth in the case of In re Newman, 2003 WL 751327 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. February 18, 2003) (“Newman”), which establishes a presumptively reasonable fee to be allowed debtor’s counsel and also the requirements for the allowance of such fee. Newman recognizes, however, and this order reaffirms, that any attorney may choose not to charge and seek an award of a presumptively reasonable fee and may instead file a traditional fee application, which will be reviewed by the Court using the lodestar approach and the factors set forth in section 330 and in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974).

The utility of a presumptively reasonable fee, also called a precalculated lodestar amount 2 , is well described in In re Cahill, 428 F.3d 536 (5th Cir.2005). A presumptively reasonable fee

... address[es] the need for both efficiency and flexibility in handling the large number of Chapter 13 cases that bankruptcy courts ... review each *905 year.... This [presumptively reasonable fee] aids bankruptcy courts in disposing of run-of-the-mill Chapter 13 fee applications expeditiously and uniformly, obviating the need for bankruptcy courts to make the same findings of fact regarding reasonable attorney time expenditures and rates in typical cases for each fee application that they review.
[A presumptively reasonable fee] anticipates that bankruptcy courts evaluating traditional fee applications will continue to analyze and adjust fee applications on a case-by-case basis using the lodestar analysis and flexible Johnson factors, ensuring that the lodestar amount in an atypical case will be adjusted to reflect the specifics of that case. This approach strikes the proper balance between the need for efficient disposal of attorneys’ fee applications and the need for a flexible approach that provides for adjustment of the lodestar when necessary.

In re Cahill, 428 F.3d at 540-41 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also In re Eliapo, 468 F.3d 592, 598 (9th Cir.2006) (describing the “virtues” of a presumptively reasonable fee); In re Howell, 226 B.R. 279 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1998) (standardized fee provides simplicity, efficiency, economy, and certainty); cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (noting that “[a] request for attorneys’ fees should not result in a second major litigation”). Indeed, many bankruptcy courts throughout the nation have established presumptively reasonable fees. See, e.g., cases cited above and in Newman and In re Williams, 357 B.R. 434, 439 n. 3 (6th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Chapter 13 Fee Applications, 2006 WL 2850115 (Bankr.S.D.Tex. October 3, 2006); In re Murray, 348 B.R. 917 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.2006); In re Walker, 319 B.R. 917 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2004); In re Smith, 306 B.R. 5 (Bankr.M.D.Ala.2004) 3 .

As a result of additional requirements contained in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), the passage of time, and efficiencies in the administration of chapter 13 cases created by the Court over the last several years, the Tampa Division Judges determined that it was appropriate to review their current procedures with respect to the presumptively reasonable fee for the attorneys for debtors in chapter 13 cases. Accordingly, by administrative order of May 2, 2007, (“May 2nd Order”) the Tampa Division Judges solicited written comments from members of the public and the bar with respect to the services required of the attorney for the debtor in a chapter 13 case in the Tampa Division of this Court, including the type, nature, and extent of the legal services necessary to adequately represent a chapter 13 debtor, the requisite skill level inherent in such services, whether some of such services can be performed by a paralegal or other non-attorney staff of the attorney for the debtor, the amount of time reasonably necessary to perform such services, an appropriate hourly rate for the professional performing such service, and the reasonableness of the overall fee to be charged by the attorney for the debtor in a chapter 13 case. In addition, the Court requested input with' respect to the timing of the payment of such fees and the priority of payments to be made by the debtor towards the attorney’s fee in the Chapter 13 Plan.

The May 2nd Order was served on approximately 800 attorneys who are registered users of the Court’s electronic filing *906 system, representing most, if not all, of the attorneys who regularly appear before the Tampa Division Judges in the representation of chapter 13 debtors and secured and unsecured creditors. In response, numerous attorneys filed papers with the Court indicating an interest in being heard with respect to the issues raised by the May 2nd Order. In addition, the Court appointed an attorney to serve as attorney ad litem to represent the interests of unknown future chapter 13 debtors (“Attorney Ad Litem ”).

A full-day evidentiary hearing (“Hearing”) was conducted on July 13, 2007, with respect to the issues raised by the May 2nd Order and the responses thereto. During the Hearing, the Court sitting en banc

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Bluebook (online)
374 B.R. 903, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2945, 2007 WL 2457465, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-debtors-attorney-fees-in-chapter-13-cases-flmb-2007.