In Re Debtor: Eagan Avenatti, LLP

District Court, C.D. California·Decided December 10, 2021·No. 8:21-cv-01631·Unknown

Opinion

O JS-6 United States District Court Central District of California

In re EAGAN AVENATTI LLP, Case No. 8:21-cv-01631-ODW

Debtor. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO WITHDRAW REFERENCE [10] RICHARD A. MARSHACK, as Chapter 7 Trustee for Eagan Avenatti, LLP, Bankruptcy Case No.: 8:19-bk-13560-SC

Plaintiff, Adversary Case No.: 8:20-ap-01086-SC

v. Related Case No.: 8:21-cv-00336-ODW THE X-LAW GROUP, P.C., a professional corporation,

FILIPPO MARCHINO, an individual,

ELBA HERNANDEZ, individually and as personal representative and successor in interest to Andres Ramirez, deceased,

YOUNG BLUE LLC, a limited liability company, SANDY LE, individually and on behalf of Tina Ngan Le, decedent,

Defendants. Defendants The X-Law Group, P.C., Filippo Marchino, and Elba Hernandez (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) move this Court to withdraw the reference of the adversary proceeding, case number 8:20-ap-01086-SC (the “Adversary Proceeding”), from the Bankruptcy Court. (See Moving Defs.’ Am. Notice (“Notice”) and Mot. Withdraw Reference (“Mot.” or “Motion”), ECF No. 10.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Moving Defendants’ Motion.1 Plaintiff Richard A. Marshack is the 11 U.S.C. Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of the law firm Eagan Avenatti, LLP (“Debtor”). (Mot. 1.) On May 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Adversary Proceeding2 against Defendants. (Id.); see generally Compl., Richard A. Marshack v. The X-Law Group, PC, et al., Case No. 8:20-ap-01086 (SCx) (“Adversary Proceeding”), ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). In the Adversary Proceeding, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on October 26, 2020, Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 92 (“FAC”), and a Second Amended Complaint on February 25, 2021, Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 160 (“SAC”).3 Moving Defendants now move this Court to withdraw reference of the Adversary Proceeding from the Bankruptcy Court on the basis that Defendants Hernandez and Marchino are entitled to a jury trial for the claims Plaintiff asserted against them and did not consent to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction. (Notice 2, 3.)

1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 2 The Adversary Proceeding is related to the underlying Bankruptcy Court proceeding, case number 8:19-bk-13560-SC. 3 Moving Defendants request the Court to take judicial notice of three documents from the Adversary Proceeding docket: (1) Plaintiff’s SAC, (2) Defendants’ May 20, 2021 answer to the SAC, and (3) a June 16, 2021 status conference hearing transcript (the “Hearing Transcript”). (Defs.’ Req. Jud. Notice (“RJN”), ECF No. 2.) Courts may take judicial notice of court filings and other undisputed matters of public record. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). As all documents are court records, the Court GRANTS the RJN and takes judicial notice of the documents but does not take judicial notice of the disputed matters contained therein. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). Moving Defendants also assert the reference should be withdrawn because “judicial waste would ensue if the Trustee’s other claims for relief against X-Law Group and Mr. Marchino were not withdrawn.” (Id. at 3.) In his opposition to the Motion, Plaintiff first argues that the Motion should be denied as untimely. (Pl.’s Opp’n (“Opp’n” or “Opposition”) 7–10, ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff also asserts alternative bases for denying the Motion. (See generally Opp’n.) However, the Court need not analyze those arguments as it finds Defendants’ Motion is in fact untimely. Accordingly, as set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), “[t]he district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred” to the bankruptcy court, “on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown.” (emphasis added). Thus, as a preliminary matter, the Court must first determine whether any such motion is “timely.” In re Vestavia Hills, Ltd., 630 B.R. 816, 850 (S.D. Cal. 2021). A “[m]otion to withdraw [reference from bankruptcy court] is timely if it was made as promptly as possible in light of the developments in bankruptcy proceeding.” Id. at 851 (quoting Sec. Farms v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers, 124 F.3d 999, 1007 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997)). The purpose of the timeliness requirement is to ensure “that the request for withdrawal be filed as soon as practicable . . . so as to protect the court and the parties in interest from useless costs and disarrangement of the calendar, and to prevent unnecessary delay and the use of stalling tactics.” Id. (quoting In re Gen. Teamsters Warehousemen & Helpers Union, No. 5-90-03823 ASW, 1994 WL 665288, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1994)). Once the basis for withdrawal becomes apparent, “a party has a plain duty to act diligently—or else, to forever hold his peace.” Id. The party seeking withdrawal has the burden of establishing the propriety of withdrawing the reference. FTC v. First All. Mortg. Co., 282 B.R. 894, 902 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Considering the time between Plaintiff’s filing of the Adversary Proceeding and the time Defendants brought their Motion, the Court finds that the Motion was not “made as promptly as possible” and is therefore untimely. See In re Vestavia Hills, Ltd., 630 B.R. at 850. In determining the timeliness of a motion to withdraw, “courts have focused not just on the absolute amount of time that has passed, but the extent of the proceedings that have already occurred in the case.” Id. at 851. “Courts have found a motion to withdraw the reference untimely when a significant amount of time has passed since the moving party had notice of the grounds for withdrawing the reference or where withdrawal would have an adverse effect on judicial economy.” Id. (quoting Hupp v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 07-CV-1232-WQH (NLS), 2007 WL 2703151, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007)). Accordingly, the threshold determination is when Defendants first “had notice of the grounds for withdrawing.” Id. Moving Defendants’ grounds for withdrawal are based on their asserted right to a jury trial for the claims Plaintiff brought against them. (Notice 2, 3.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Moving Defendants had notice of their grounds for withdrawal as of the October 26, 2020 FAC, when they first became aware of Plaintiff’s claims. In their Motion, Moving Defendants assert that their grounds for withdrawal stem from Plaintiff’s claims in the February 25, 2021 SAC: (1) quantum meruit- related declaratory relief claim against Hernandez and X-Law (the SAC’s First Claim); (2) quantum meruit claim against Hernandez (the SAC’s Second Claim); (3) damages claims against X-Law and Marchino for violations of an automatic stay and Bankruptcy Court order (the SAC’s Third Claim); and (4) the voidable transaction or fraudulent transfer claim against Marchino and X-Law (the SAC’s Fourth Claim). (Notice 2, 3.) However, Plaintiff’s earlier-filed FAC includes all of these claims. See FAC ¶¶ 58–65, 108–132 (alleging Second Claim against Hernandez and X-Law for quantum meruit and related declaratory relief claims, Eighth Claim against X-Law and Marchino for damages resulting from violations of the automatic stay and Bankruptcy Court order, and Ninth Claim against Marchino and X-Law for voidable transfer or transaction). Defendants therefore had notice of the

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In Re Debtor: Eagan Avenatti, LLP, (C.D. Cal. 2021).

In Re Debtor: Eagan Avenatti, LLP (In Re Debtor: Eagan Avenatti, LLP) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related