[Cite as In re D.B., 2025-Ohio-4451.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
IN RE: D.B. C.A. No. 31282
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. DL 23 09 0864
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 24, 2025
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, D.B., appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child in the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} D.B. was thirteen years old when these events transpired. He and his younger
brother were living with their aunt and her seven-year-old son, C.B. D.B. and his aunt had their
own bedrooms, but his brother and C.B. shared one. Their shared bedroom had a bunk bed with a
twin-sized mattress on top and a larger mattress on the bottom.
{¶3} One evening, D.B., his brother, and C.B. were all lying on the bottom mattress of
the bunk bed watching television. The aunt felt unwell and was resting in her own bedroom. The
boys checked in on her periodically but otherwise kept to themselves. When they grew quiet for
too long, the aunt went to check on them. 2
{¶4} As the aunt opened the door to the shared bedroom, she immediately noticed two
things. The first was that D.B.’s brother had fallen asleep. The second was that D.B. was lying
on top of her son, both of whom were positioned face down, in the middle of the bed. D.B.
immediately rolled off C.B. when the aunt came into the room. He held a blanket to himself, and
the aunt began yelling and grabbing for it. She saw C.B. trying to pull up his pants as she struggled
to yank the blanket from D.B. When she succeeded, she saw that D.B.’s pajama pants were
unbuttoned. The aunt asked her son whether D.B. was “humping on you[,]” and her son responded
affirmatively.
{¶5} The aunt called the police as well as her brother and niece. Family members arrived
before the police, and they questioned D.B. while yelling at him. When the police arrived, they
conducted interviews and removed D.B. from the home. The aunt then took C.B. to the hospital.
At the hospital, he underwent an interview at the CARE Center and a medical examination. He
disclosed that D.B. had repeatedly reached into his (C.B.’s) pajama pants, touched his genitals,
asked C.B. to “put my privates up him[,]” and tried to put his privates “up [C.B.’s] butt.”
{¶6} As a result of the foregoing incident, D.B. was charged with gross sexual
imposition. His trial took place before a magistrate. During its case-in-chief, the State presented
testimony from the aunt and the social worker who interviewed C.B. at the CARE Center. The
State also introduced the recording of C.B.’s interview and his medical records. D.B. objected to
their admission, but the magistrate overruled his objections. At the conclusion of the trial, the
magistrate adjudicated D.B. delinquent. The juvenile court immediately entered judgment on the
magistrate’s decision and set the matter for a dispositional hearing.
{¶7} D.B. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision and supplemented his filing once
he obtained a trial transcript. While his objections were pending, the juvenile court issued its 3
dispositional orders. The court then ruled on his objections. In doing so, the court confirmed its
prior orders but also ordered the matter remanded to the magistrate for further proceedings.
{¶8} D.B. appealed from the juvenile court’s judgment, but this Court dismissed his
appeal. Because the juvenile court’s order included a remand to the magistrate, we found that it
contemplated further trial court action. Thus, we concluded that the juvenile court had yet to issue
a final, appealable order. See In re: D.B., 9th Dist. Summit No. 31177 (Oct. 28, 2024).
{¶9} Following our dismissal, D.B. moved the juvenile court to partially reconsider its
judgment. D.B. asked the court to remove from its judgment the unnecessary remand to the
magistrate for further proceedings. The juvenile court granted D.B.’s motion and executed a new
judgment entry that omitted the remand.
{¶10} D.B. now appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment and raises four assignments
of error for review. For ease of analysis, we consolidate several of the assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT’S ADMITTING C.B.’S STATEMENTS VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT’S ADMITTING C.B.’S STATEMENTS VIOLATES THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING C.B.’S STATEMENTS UNDER EVID.R. 803(4).
{¶11} In each of the foregoing assignments of error, D.B. challenges the admission of
statements C.B. made at the hospital. The State introduced those statements through the testimony
of the social worker who interviewed C.B., the recording of his interview, and his medical records. 4
According to D.B., the statements were improperly admitted because they violated his rights under
the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions and constituted hearsay under the Ohio Rules of Evidence. For
the following reasons, we reject his arguments.
Federal Confrontation Clause & Ohio Rules of Evidence
{¶12} Generally, “[t]his Court reviews a trial court’s action with respect to a magistrate’s
decision for an abuse of discretion.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.).
“In so doing, we consider the trial court’s action with reference to the nature of the underlying
matter.” Tabatabai at ¶ 18. “Evidentiary rulings that implicate the Confrontation Clause are
reviewed de novo . . . .” State v. Calhoun, 2021-Ohio-1713, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.). Consequently, we
must conduct “an independent review of the trial court’s decision without any deference to [its]
determination.” State v. Consilio, 2006-Ohio-649, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.).
{¶13} The federal Confrontation Clause affords criminal defendants the right to confront
witnesses against them. U.S. Const., amend. VI. It applies to testimonial statements. State v.
Stahl, 2006-Ohio-5482, ¶ 15. Before a testimonial statement from an unavailable declarant can be
admitted at trial, a criminal defendant must have had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). “[T]estimonial statements are those
made for ‘a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’” State v.
Maxwell, 2014-Ohio-1019, ¶ 40, quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011). “If a
statement’s primary purpose is anything else, the statement is nontestimonial.” Id. at ¶ 40.
{¶14} “Statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment are
nontestimonial.” State v. Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742, ¶ 28. See also Evid.R. 803(4) (providing a
hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment).
Conversely, “statements made to agents of the police for the primary purpose of forensic 5
investigation are testimonial.” Arnold at ¶28. “‘Considerations that should be taken into account
in making [a primary purpose] determination include the manner in which the child was
questioned, whether there was a motive to fabricate, and whether the child understood the need to
tell the truth.’” (Bracketed text in original.) State v. Weaver, 2018-Ohio-2998, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.),
quoting State v. Walters, 2018-Ohio-1175, ¶ 33 (9th Dist.). “The court also may consider ‘the
child’s age and whether the proper protocol for interviewing children alleging sexual abuse was
followed.’” Id. at ¶ 12, quoting Walters at ¶ 33. “[T]he same interview or interrogation might
produce both testimonial and nontestimonial statements.” Arnold at ¶ 41, citing Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828-829 (2006).
{¶15} We begin by outlining the evidence introduced at trial. The aunt testified that she
had custody of D.B. and his younger brother. She also had a seven-year-old son, C.B., who shared
a bedroom with D.B.’s brother. On the evening of the incident, all three boys were watching
television in the shared bedroom. The aunt testified that she was resting in her own bedroom
because she felt unwell. She eventually went to check on the boys, who had been quiet for some
time. The door to the shared bedroom was closed, so the aunt had to open it to step into the room.
When she did so, she saw that D.B.’s brother had fallen asleep. She testified that D.B. and C.B.
were in the middle of the bed, but she could not initially see C.B. because D.B. was lying on top
of him. D.B. and C.B. were positioned face down such that D.B.’s chest was on C.B.’s back. As
the aunt entered the room, D.B. rolled off C.B.
{¶16} The aunt testified that she began yelling, cursing, and demanding to know what
D.B. had done as he denied any wrongdoing. She saw C.B. hurrying to pull up his pants while
D.B. tried to cover himself with a blanket. The aunt grabbed the blanket and attempted to snatch
it from D.B. as he held on. The two struggled for a short while before D.B. released the blanket. 6
The aunt testified that, when she succeeded in taking the blanket from D.B., she could see the flap
of his pajama pants was open. She testified that the pants had a button, and D.B. usually had them
buttoned so that he “wouldn’t walk around inappropriately.”
{¶17} The aunt testified that she asked C.B. whether D.B. was “humping on you[,]” and
C.B. answered affirmatively. She testified that C.B. appeared to be afraid when he answered her
question. The aunt called the police and, after they removed D.B. from her home, she took C.B.
to the hospital.
{¶18} A social worker from the CARE Center met with the aunt and C.B. at the hospital.
The social worker testified that she was independently licensed but worked one night a week at
the CARE Center. She explained that her role was to act as a first responder in the emergency
room. She would interview children and parents and provide that information to the medical team
so they would know what steps to take next. She testified that she was trained to work with
children and had completed forensics training through the Ohio Welfare Training Program. She
testified that she interviewed C.B. because the aunt requested a medical examination and the
interview was the first step in the medical evaluation process.
{¶19} The social worker testified that she spoke with the aunt and C.B. to gain background
information from them before formally interviewing C.B. She referred to their initial interaction
as a first responder interview. She then took C.B. to a separate room for a longer interview, and
the State played the recording of that interview at trial. The social worker testified that she
interviewed C.B. for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. During the recorded
interview, she told him that the purpose of his interview was to make sure his body was safe and
healthy. She told him that he would be having a medical check-up after the interview. She also
told him that the interview was being recorded and that other people like police officers, social 7
workers, or lawyers could look at the interview to make sure he stayed safe. The social worker
admitted that her interviews were viewed and used by both law enforcement and medical
personnel. Before speaking with C.B. about the incident that occurred, the social worker spent
time reviewing the rules for the interview with him. She explained that he was only to tell the
truth, he should tell her if he did not know something, and he should correct her if she got
something wrong. The social worker had him practice following each rule through an example.
{¶20} C.B. made a variety of statements during his recorded interview. He agreed that he
was sharing a bed with D.B. and D.B.’s brother while the three of them were watching television.
He described the way he and the other boys were lying on the bed. C.B. stated that D.B.’s brother
fell asleep before D.B. “started acting gay.” When asked what that meant, C.B. said that D.B.
began moaning and trying to touch his (C.B.’s) privates. C.B. said that he told D.B. to stop when
D.B. went to touch him. Nevertheless, D.B. repeatedly reached into his (C.B.’s) pajama pants,
touched his genitals, asked C.B. to “put my privates up him[,]” and tried to put his privates “up
[C.B.’s] butt.” C.B. described what happened when the aunt came into the bedroom. He also
answered questions about D.B.’s clothing and his own clothing. C.B. told the social worker that
D.B.’s pajama pants were down. He said that D.B. kept pulling his (C.B.’s) pajama pants down
while C.B. kept trying to pull them back up. When the social worker asked whether D.B. had said
anything during the incident, C.B. responded, “gay words.” The social worker asked C.B. what
that meant, and C.B. responded that D.B. was “moaning” and “saying daddy.” C.B. denied that
anything came out of D.B.’s penis during the encounter. He testified that this type of situation had
never happened before and that D.B. had never threatened him.
{¶21} The social worker testified that she was well versed in forensic interviewing. She
agreed that it was important to ask open-ended questions during an interview because some 8
children are easily influenced. The social worker admitted that, at times, she failed to ask C.B.
open-ended questions. She explained that she sometimes repeated what C.B. had just said because
he was very quiet, she had difficulty hearing him, and she wanted to make sure that she understood
him correctly. She also explained that she prompted C.B. a few times based on information he
had told her during his first responder interview. Accordingly, most of that information still came
from C.B.
{¶22} On cross-examination, the social worker admitted a single instance where the
formatting of her questioning was inappropriate. She asked C.B. whether D.B.’s clothes were on
or off or something else during the incident. C.B. responded that D.B. had his pajamas on. The
social worker then asked, “so, they were pulled up?” C.B. responded, “well, when my mom
walked in, he tried to pull them up.” The social worker then asked, “so, his pajama pants were
down when he was doing that to you?” C.B. answered yes. The social worker admitted that her
final question in that exchange was not appropriate based on C.B.’s prior response because it was
a leading question and, before she asked it, C.B. had not told her that D.B.’s pajama pants were
down.
{¶23} The magistrate determined that the statements C.B. made during his CARE Center
interview were neither testimonial nor hearsay because they were made for the purpose of medical
diagnosis and treatment. In his objections to the magistrate’s decision, D.B. argued that the
magistrate erred by admitting C.B.’s statements because (1) his CARE Center interview was
conducted for a forensic purpose rather than a medical one; (2) D.B. was never subject to cross-
examination; and (3) the admission of the statements affected the outcome of the trial. D.B. argued
that the statements the social worker recorded in C.B.’s medical records were likewise
inadmissible for those same reasons. 9
{¶24} In ruling on D.B.’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, the juvenile court noted
that CARE Center interviews serve a dual purpose, and thus, can produce both testimonial and
nontestimonial statements. The court found that most of C.B.’s statements were nontestimonial
because they were elicited for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Those statements
included C.B.’s description of D.B.’s actions in touching his genitals and trying to put his penis
“up [C.B.’s] butt.” The juvenile court found that other statements were testimonial because they
only served a forensic purpose. Those statements included C.B.’s description of D.B.’s behavior
as “gay” and his statements that D.B. was moaning and “saying daddy” during the encounter. The
juvenile court found that the magistrate erred by admitting C.B.’s testimonial statements.
Nevertheless, it concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the
testimonial statements did not contribute to D.B.’s finding of delinquency. Thus, the juvenile court
overruled D.B.’s objections.
{¶25} D.B. argues that the juvenile court erred when it overruled his objections to the
magistrate’s decision. He argues that nearly all C.B.’s statements were testimonial because they
served a forensic or investigative purpose. According to D.B., those statements included: (1)
C.B.’s description of where he, the other boys, and the aunt were located during the incident; (2)
C.B.’s description of his and D.B.’s clothing; (3) C.B.’s identification of D.B. as the perpetrator;
and (4) C.B.’s description of what D.B. allegedly said during the incident. D.B. notes that there
was no ongoing emergency at the time C.B. was interviewed. Instead, he argues the interview was
conducted to aid the police in their investigation. He notes that the social worker did not even ask
C.B. how his body felt until the end of the interview. Instead, she stressed that the interview was
for his safety and that police officers and lawyers would review it to help keep him safe. According
to D.B., the social worker failed to limit herself to open-ended questions, fed C.B. answers, and 10
acted as an agent of law enforcement. He argues that the admission of C.B.’s statements violated
his rights under the federal Confrontation Clause because they were testimonial and admitted
without a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Further, he argues that C.B.’s statements
amounted to hearsay because they were not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and
treatment.
{¶26} As previously noted, “[s]tatements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and
treatment are nontestimonial.” Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742, at ¶ 28. They are not barred by the
Confrontation Clause or the rules of hearsay. See id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; Evid.R.
803(4). C.B. was only seven years old at the time of his interview, the social worker stressed the
importance of him telling the truth, and the record does not disclose that he possessed any apparent
motive to fabricate the allegations he made against D.B. See Weaver, 2018-Ohio-2998, at ¶ 12
(9th Dist.), quoting Walters, 2018-Ohio-1175, at ¶ 33 (9th Dist.). The social worker testified that
C.B.’s interview was the first step in the diagnostic process. She testified that it served the primary
purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Indeed, at the start of the interview, she told C.B. that
he was being interviewed to keep his body safe and healthy and that he would receive a medical
check-up when they were finished. It is undisputed that C.B. received a medical exam after the
interview.
{¶27} Although D.B. claims that nearly all C.B.’s statements were testimonial, “[t]his
Court has held that statements identifying a perpetrator, describing instances of abuse, and
describing the manner in which the perpetrator touched the victim’s body are all admissible as
statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment.” Weaver at ¶ 24. Thus, the
juvenile court correctly determined that C.B.’s statements about how D.B. touched his genitals and
tried to insert his penis “up [C.B.’s] butt” were nontestimonial. We also agree with the juvenile 11
court that the magistrate’s error in admitting any testimonial statements was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Conway, 2006-Ohio-791, ¶ 78 (“A constitutional error can be held
harmless if we determine that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
{¶28} A constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if there is no
“reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the [adjudication
of delinquency].” Id., citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). The State presented
the testimony of the aunt, who described what happened when she entered the bedroom C.B. shared
with D.B.’s younger brother. She testified that D.B. was lying on top of C.B., rolled off him when
she entered the room, tried to hold a blanket to himself, and had his pajama pants unbuttoned. She
also testified that C.B. had his pants down, appeared scared, and confirmed that D.B. had been
“humping on him[.]” Moreover, the State presented the nontestimonial statements C.B. made to
the social worker, wherein he said that D.B. repeatedly touched his genitals and tried to insert his
penis “up [C.B.’s] butt.” Even if C.B.’s interview resulted in some testimonial statements, there
is no reasonable probability that those statements contributed to the adjudication of delinquency.
Thus, their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶29} Upon review, D.B. has not shown that the juvenile court erred by rejecting his
argument under the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Consequently, his second
and third assignments of error are overruled.
Ohio Confrontation Clause
{¶30} D.B. also argues that the juvenile court erred by admitting C.B.’s statements
because Ohio’s Confrontation Clause is broader than the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause. The juvenile court found the two clauses to be coextensive. D.B. argues that the juvenile
court erred in its legal determination because, in State v. Storch, 66 Ohio St.3d 280 (1993), the 12
Ohio Supreme Court “concluded that the Ohio Constitution’s confrontation right provided
‘greater’ protections than the U.S. Constitution’s.”
{¶31} In Storch, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the admissibility of a three-year-old
child’s statements to her mother, a physician, and the head of a child abuse investigation unit.
Storch at 280-284. The Supreme Court compared the text of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause with that of Ohio’s Confrontation Clause to aid in the interpretation of newly
adopted Evid.R. 807. Id. at 287-295. The Supreme Court noted that the admission of a statement
under the federal constitution could still violate Ohio’s constitutional right of confrontation in
certain instances. Id. at 291. Nevertheless, its holding was specifically limited to Evid.R. 807, its
constitutionality, and its application. See id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. See also
State v. Muttart, 2007-Ohio-5267, ¶ 46, fn. 5.
{¶32} “The State need not satisfy the rigors of Evid.R. 807[] if [a] child’s statement can
be admitted through a different hearsay exception.” State v. Lortz, 2008-Ohio-3108, ¶ 20 (9th
Dist.). One such exception is Evid.R. 803(4), which permits the introduction of statements made
for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. In re E.L., 2019-Ohio-1490, ¶ 8 (9th
Dist.). In State v. Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically addressed the interplay between
the federal Confrontation Clause, Ohio’s Confrontation Clause, and Evid.R. 803(4). See Arnold,
2010-Ohio-2742, ¶ 12-44. In so doing, the Supreme Court wrote: “‘Section 10, Article I [of the
Ohio Constitution] provides no greater right of confrontation than the Sixth Amendment.’” Id. at
¶ 12, quoting State v. Self, 56 Ohio St.3d 73, 79 (1990). Thus, in the context of child advocacy
centers and Evid.R. 803(4), the Supreme Court has recognized that the two Confrontation Clauses
are coextensive. The Arnold decision was issued 17 years after Storch. 13
{¶33} D.B. has not shown that he is entitled to greater rights under the Ohio Constitution.
The juvenile court correctly determined that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and
Ohio’s Confrontation Clause are to be interpreted coextensively in the context of Evid.R. 803(4).
D.B.’s argument to the contrary lacks merit. Accordingly, his first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN D.B.’S ADJUDICATION.
{¶34} In his fourth assignment of error, D.B. argues that his adjudication of delinquency
is based on insufficient evidence. We do not agree.
{¶35} “When considering this issue, this Court applies the same standard of review as that
applied in an adult criminal context.” In re L.M., 2012-Ohio-1025, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). When reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution to determine whether the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to sustain a
conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991).
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶36} Relevant to this appeal, gross sexual imposition occurs when a person has sexual
contact with another and “[t]he other person . . . is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not
the offender knows the age of that person.” R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). “‘Sexual contact’ means any
touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock,
[or] pubic region . . . for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C. 14
2907.01(B). “A person’s purpose or intention may be proven through direct or circumstantial
evidence.” State v. Persinger, 2014-Ohio-4125, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). “[I]n the absence of direct
testimony regarding sexual arousal or gratification, the trier of fact may infer a purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification from the ‘type, nature and circumstances of the contact, along with the
personality of the defendant.’” State v. Antoline, 2003-Ohio-1130, ¶ 64 (9th Dist.), quoting State
v. Cobb, 81 Ohio App.3d 179, 185 (9th Dist. 1991).
{¶37} D.B. argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his adjudication
of delinquency because, “assuming the trial court properly excluded C.B.’s statements about D.B.
allegedly ‘moaning’ and saying ‘daddy’ while touching C.B.,” there was no evidence that he
touched C.B. for the purpose of sexual gratification.
{¶38} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that
sufficient evidence was presented whereby the trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that D.B. touched C.B.’s erogenous zones for the purpose of sexual gratification. The aunt testified
that D.B. rolled off C.B. as soon as she came into the room and attempted to hide himself beneath
a blanket. She testified that she had to snatch the blanket away from D.B. When she successfully
did so, she saw that D.B.’s pajama pants were unbuttoned. A rational trier of fact could have
concluded that D.B. immediately rolled off C.B. and held a blanket to himself to hide the fact that
his pajama pants were undone and/or that he was sexually aroused. Moreover, the State introduced
C.B.’s statements that D.B. repeatedly touched his genitals and tried to insert his penis “into
[C.B.’s] butt[.]” That evidence eliminated the possibility of accidental contact. Even without the
evidence of D.B. moaning or saying “daddy[,]” the State set forth circumstantial evidence that he
repeatedly touched C.B.’s erogenous zones for the purpose of sexual gratification. D.B. has not 15
shown that his adjudication of delinquency is based on insufficient evidence. As such, his fourth
assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶39} D.B.’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT
STEVENSON, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR. 16
APPEARANCES:
JOSEPH SHELL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.