In Re Davis

209 B.R. 893, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 694, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 988, 1997 WL 386121
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJune 11, 1997
Docket19-02383
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 209 B.R. 893 (In Re Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Davis, 209 B.R. 893, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 694, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 988, 1997 WL 386121 (Ill. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON HARRISON’S OBJECTION TO PLAN

JACK B. SCHMETTERER, Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtors filed an Amended Chapter 13 Plan which classified unsecured creditors into two groups, one which was to receive full payment and one only a percentage. Mark Harrison (“Harrison”) as an unsecured creditor objected to Debtors’ plan, asserting that these classifications unfairly discriminated against him. The parties filed briefs and the matter was taken under advisement. For reasons stated below, and based on the undisputed facts asserted, Harrison’s objection to Debtors’ amended Chapter 13 plan will be denied.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are undisputed:

Johnny and Venus Davis (“Debtors”) reside in an apartment complex managed by Diversified Realty Corporation (“Diversified”), pursuant to a month to month lease. Debtors’ apartment is federally subsidized by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). Debtors pay a below-market rate of $277 per month. Debtors’ lease provides for automatic monthly renewal unless the lease is terminated. Grounds for termination include non-payment of rent. Debtors currently owe Diversified approximately $6,558 in rent arrearage.

On November 15, 1996, Debtors filed their voluntary petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11, 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. On February 4, 1997, Debtors filed their amended plan. The Amended Plan creates a separate classification for the unsecured non-priority debt for Diversified’s rent arrearage. It proposes to pay Diversified’s claim in full, while paying only 10% to the other unsecured creditors. In addition, Debtors’ plan proposes to assume their lease agreement with Diversified. Current monthly rental payments to Diversified are to be made directly by Debtors.

Harrison, an unsecured creditor, objected to Debtors’ Plan on grounds that the separate classification of unsecured debt due to Diversified constitutes unfair discrimination among classes of unsecured creditors in violation of § 1322(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Harrison argues that 100% payment to Diversified would result in payment to general unsecured creditors’ claims of only 10%, whereas equal pro rata distribution of the same cash flow among all unsecured creditors would result in each receiving 45% of each claim. Harrison argues, from the perspective of the unsecured creditors, that this discrimination is unfair.

Debtors argue that the separate classification is necessary for a successful Chapter 13 reorganization. It is undisputed that Debtors’ current rent is significantly below the market rate, and they would have an extremely difficult, if not impossible, time se *895 curing alternative housing. If they are unable to assume their lease with Diversified, Debtors argue that they will be evicted and face homelessness. Before Debtors can assume the lease, they must cure all rent arrearage. If they cannot assume the lease, Debtors apprehend that Diversified will terminate it and evict them. If that happens, they could not complete their Chapter 13 Plan.

This fear of Debtors is well founded. On December 3, 1996, Diversified moved to lift the automatic stay arguing that Debtors’ lease was terminated and could not be assumed. On December 10, 1996, Diversified’s motion was conditionally denied with the proviso that Debtors pay post-petition rent and also confirm a plan providing for full payment of all rent arrearage by March 11,1997. Although Debtors’ Plan has not yet been confirmed, Diversified has withheld action, apparently because the proposed Plan is favored by it.

JURISDICTION

This matter is before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 and is referred here by Local District Court Rule 2.33. Subject matter jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L).

DISCUSSION

The Bankruptcy Code specifically allows for different classes of unsecured debts in Chapter 13. Section 1322(b) provides that a plan may “designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in section 1122 of this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated....” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (emphasis added). Some degree of discrimination must be lawful, “otherwise Congress wouldn’t have modified the term [discriminate] with the word ‘unfair.’ ” In re Blackwell, 5 B.R. 748, 751 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1980). Thus, a Chapter 13 plan may discriminate, but not unfairly. In re Eiland, 170 B.R. 370, 374 (Bankr. N.D.Ill.1994) (citing McCullough v. Brown, 162 B.R. 506, 508-09 (N.D.Ill.1993)).

As Harrison argues, the Amended Plan provides 100% payment to one unsecured creditor while paying the other unsecured creditors only 10%. It clearly operates in favor of Diversified and discriminates against the general unsecured creditors. Therefore, the issue here is whether the Plan discriminates unfairly.

The burden as to whether the proposed discrimination is unfair rests with Debtors. In re Liggins 145 B.R. 227, 230 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1992) (citations omitted). At a minimum, Debtors must make some “evidentiary showing of the necessity to pay the [rent] claim in full so that [they] may continue to occupy this particular apartment. The critical question will be whether there is such necessity that justifies a mere token payment of other unsecured debt.” Id. at 231. Moreover, the fairness of classification must be viewed from the perspective of creditors other than Diversified. See Eiland, 170 B.R. at 377; McCullough, 162 B.R. at 512.

There is no statutory standard for determining whether a plan discriminates “unfairly.” See In re Christopher, 151 B.R. 475, 478 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993). Some courts have applied a four-part test for determining whether a discrimination is unfair:

(1) whether the discrimination has a reasonable basis;
(2) whether the debtor can carry out a plan without the discrimination;
(3) whether the discrimination is proposed in good faith; and
(4) whether the degree of discrimination is directly related to the basis or rationale for the discrimination.

McCullough, 162 B.R. at 509 (citing In re Leser, 939 F.2d 669, 672 (8th Cir.1991)). However, this test has been criticized as of late, viewing it as “amorphous,” “abstract,” “illogical,” and “circular.” McCullough, 162 B.R. at 509-12.

(5) A recent trend, favored by several judges, is to look at fairness from the creditor’s perspective. Eiland, 170 B.R.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
209 B.R. 893, 38 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 694, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 988, 1997 WL 386121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-davis-ilnb-1997.