In Re: David Thacker, V. Crystal Skov

CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedOctober 2, 2023
Docket84415-6
StatusUnpublished

This text of In Re: David Thacker, V. Crystal Skov (In Re: David Thacker, V. Crystal Skov) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re: David Thacker, V. Crystal Skov, (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DAVID THACKER, No. 84415-6-I

Appellant, DIVISION ONE

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CRYSTAL SKOV,

Respondent.

FELDMAN, J. — David Thacker appeals the superior court’s orders granting

revision and terminating a domestic violence protection order (DVPO), which he

had obtained from a commissioner, protecting him from his ex-wife, Crystal Skov.

Resolution of this appeal has been delayed substantially because Thacker

repeatedly requested additional time to file his designation of clerk’s papers and

appellate briefs. Consequently, absent revision and termination, the DVPO would

have expired by now. Because reversal of the revision and termination orders

would not provide effective relief to Thacker, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

Blackmon v. Blackmon, 155 Wn. App. 715, 719, 230 P.3d 233 (2010) (“A case is

moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief.”). We likewise deny as moot

Skov’s agreed motion to strike Thacker’s financial declaration. No. 84415-6-I/2

Thacker claims the appeal is not moot because the superior court’s

revision and termination orders “will have significant collateral consequences in

the parties’ current parenting plan action.” The parenting plan action is not

before us. Further, Washington law is clear that the parenting plan action

controls over the DVPO action. Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 595 n.4,

398 P.3d 1071 (2017) (“provisions in [DVPOs] are subject to parenting plans”).

For these reasons, we reject Thacker’s collateral consequences argument.

Lastly, both parties request attorney fees on appeal. Under RAP 18.1, we

may award attorney fees and costs to a party who prevails on appeal. Aiken v.

Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 506, 387 P.3d 680 (2017). To be a prevailing party, a

party “must prevail on the merits.” Ryan v. Dep’t Social & Health Services, 171

Wn. App. 454, 476, 287 P.3d 629 (2012). Because we do not reach the merits in

this appeal, we decline to award either party attorney fees on appeal.

WE CONCUR:

-2-

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Related

Blackmon v. Blackmon
230 P.3d 233 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2010)
Aiken v. Aiken
387 P.3d 680 (Washington Supreme Court, 2017)
Blackmon v. Blackmon
155 Wash. App. 715 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2010)
Ryan v. Department of Social & Health Services
287 P.3d 629 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2012)

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In Re: David Thacker, V. Crystal Skov, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-david-thacker-v-crystal-skov-washctapp-2023.