Supreme Court of Louisiana FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #021
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 8th day of May, 2019, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2018-B-1812 IN RE: DANTE JEROME BUTLER
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Dante J. Butler, Louisiana Bar Roll number 33753, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen months. It is further ordered that all but one year of this suspension shall be deferred. Following the active portion of the suspension, respondent shall be placed on unsupervised probation for a period of one year. As a condition of probation, respondent is ordered to attend and successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.
CRICHTON, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons. 05/08/18
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2018-B-1812
IN RE: DANTE JEROME BUTLER
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
PER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Dante Jerome Butler, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDERLYING FACTS
By way of background, Charles Taylor and Shawna Terrell were the
principals of an organization known as the Knowledge Center Temple (“KCT”). Mr.
Taylor and Ms. Terrell held themselves out as “pro se paralegals” who assisted
incarcerated individuals with their post-conviction relief proceedings. Mr. Taylor
and Ms. Terrell are not attorneys, nor are they inmates who provide legal services
and assistance to other inmates as “inmate counsel substitutes” under regulations of
the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. 1
In 2014, respondent was approached by Mr. Taylor, who said that he was
looking for an attorney to “go over his work.” Respondent knew that Mr. Taylor
and Ms. Terrell were not attorneys, but he nevertheless agreed to “proofread” the
legal work done by Mr. Taylor and Ms. Terrell on behalf of individuals who
1 See La. DPSC Reg. No. B-05-004, which defines “counsel substitutes” as “persons not admitted to the practice of law, but offenders who aid and assist, without cost, an accused offender in the preparation and presentation of his defense and/or appeal.” contacted KCT. The arrangement between KCT and respondent as to the work to
be performed, or the fee arrangement, was never reduced to writing.
In May 2015, Raymond Casaday contacted KCT after he learned about its
services from individuals at the correctional center where he was incarcerated. Mr.
Casaday advised that his criminal matter was pending on appeal and that he was
seeking assistance with the later filing of an application for post-conviction relief.
Mr. Taylor determined the amount of the fee for the services to be provided would
be $7,000. Mr. Casaday sent $500 to KCT on June 12, 2015, but knowing that Mr.
Taylor and Ms. Terrell were not licensed to practice law, he advised Mr. Taylor that
he wanted an attorney to handle the matter.
On June 20, 2015, Ms. Terrell wrote to Mr. Casaday, advising that she had
received the funds and that “we do have a lawyer for you, so when you’re ready to
start this process please don’t hesitate to let us know.” On June 28, 2015, Ms. Terrell
wrote Mr. Casaday again, advising that she had done a case analysis and could “see
where we can get you another trial based upon newly discovered evidence.” Mr.
Casaday was also advised in this correspondence that respondent would be
representing him. Mr. Casaday subsequently spoke with respondent, who confirmed
the fee for the services to be provided.
On July 15, 2015, Mr. Casaday forwarded an additional $6,500 to KCT via a
check payable to Ms. Terrell, for a total of $7,000. Ms. Terrell cashed the check and
provided respondent with a cash payment of $2,000 for his services. On July 30,
2015, Mr. Taylor promised to provide Mr. Casaday a receipt “showing what you
have paid to us as well as the lawyer.” 2
2 This letter was written on stationery which contained the name and address of both KCT and respondent. Respondent denied that he gave KCT permission to use his name and address on its stationery. However, we note that the record contains a total of nine such letters dated between July 30, 2015 and January 7, 2016, including letters of August 31, 2015, October 19, 2015, and November 22, 2015 which were copied to respondent.
2 In return for the fee paid to KCT, Mr. Taylor and Ms. Terrell gave Mr.
Casaday legal advice and prepared motions, a “pro se” writ application, 3 and a
memorandum in support of an application for post-conviction relief. Mr. Taylor sent
respondent drafts of the memorandum in support of Mr. Casaday’s application for
post-conviction relief, which respondent reviewed, commented upon, and sent back
to Mr. Taylor. Many of respondent’s comments were not incorporated into Mr.
Taylor’s successive drafts; however, because respondent did not consider himself to
be Mr. Taylor’s supervisor, respondent did not request or require review and
approval of a final draft of the document prior to its submission to Mr. Casaday or a
court. Respondent did not sign or file any pleadings or memoranda on behalf of Mr.
Casaday.
Ultimately, Mr. Casaday refused to sign the post-conviction relief application
prepared by KCT due to its poor quality. On October 16, 2016, Mr. Casaday wrote
to respondent directly regarding the agreement that respondent would complete the
application for post-conviction relief for the $7,000 that Mr. Casaday paid. Mr.
Casaday asked respondent to meet with him and said that he had been relocated to a
closer prison facility. Mr. Casaday wrote, “If you are not going to help me do my
post-conviction then just let me know this and return my money to me so I can get
someone who could help me.” On October 21, 2016, respondent replied to Mr.
Casaday, reminding him “that you are a client of C/S [Charles Taylor/Shawna
Terrell].” On September 28, 2017, several months after the formal charges were
filed in this matter, respondent refunded the sum of $2,000 to Mr. Casaday.
Respondent also worked with KCT on a legal matter for Jeremy Daigre. In
June 2015, Craig Daigre, Jeremy’s father, gave respondent a check for $6,000.
Respondent cashed the check, retained the sum of $2,000 as his fee, and delivered
3 The writ application filed with this court was denied. See State v. Casaday, 15-0607 (La. 2/5/16), 186 So. 3d 1162.
3 the remaining funds to Ms. Terrell. In April 2016, Mr. Taylor forwarded to
respondent a “Supervisory Writ of Habeas Corpus to Vacate a Prejudicial Illegal
and/or Unconstitutional Habitual Offender Multiple Bill Sentence” which Mr.
Taylor had prepared on behalf of Mr. Daigre. In August 2016, the trial court denied
the motion that Mr. Daigre submitted “pro se” to the court. In September 2017,
several months after the formal charges were filed in this matter, respondent filed a
motion to reconsider sentence on behalf of Mr. Daigre.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In October 2016, Mr. Casaday filed a complaint against respondent with the
ODC. In May 2017, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that
his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct:
Rules 5.4(a) (a lawyer shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer), 5.5(a) (a lawyer
shall not practice law in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that
jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so), and 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct).
Respondent answered the formal charges and admitted that he agreed to
proofread legal work performed by Mr. Taylor and Ms. Terrell. However, he denied
that he entered into a lawyer-client relationship with Mr. Casaday or with Mr.
Daigre. He further denied that he acted knowingly or intentionally in facilitating the
unauthorized practice of law or in sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, and suggested
that “his misconduct, if any, was committed negligently.”
Formal Hearing
This matter proceeded to a hearing conducted by the hearing committee in
October 2017. The ODC called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Mr.
4 Casaday, Jeremy Daigre and his father, Craig Daigre, and Ms. Terrell. 4 Respondent
testified on his own behalf and on cross-examination by the ODC. He called no
witnesses to testify before the committee.
Hearing Committee Report
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing
committee made the following findings of fact:
The committee found that respondent shared fees with nonlawyers,
specifically Mr. Taylor and Ms. Terrell. The documentary evidence shows that KCT
charged a $7,000 fee to Mr. Casaday. Ms. Terrell paid respondent $2,000 in cash
on July 15, 2015, and respondent deposited the cash into his bank account the next
day. Respondent refunded the $2,000 fee to Mr. Casaday on September 28, 2017, a
little more than two weeks before the hearing in this matter. In Mr. Daigre’s case,
the evidence shows that Mr. Daigre’s father wrote a check made payable to
respondent for $6,000. The check had the notation “appeal process” handwritten on
the memo line. Respondent testified that he cashed the check, took $2,000 as his
fee, and gave the balance to Ms. Terrell.
The committee also found that respondent facilitated the unauthorized
practice of law by working with nonlawyers to render legal services related to post-
conviction proceedings. Respondent testified that when he agreed to work with Mr.
Taylor and Ms. Terrell, he knew they were not attorneys but were rather “pro se
paralegals” who rendered legal services to incarcerated individuals. Although
respondent contends that he only proofed legal pleadings sent to him by Mr. Taylor
and Ms. Terrell, the evidence establishes that respondent’s work went well beyond
proofreading. The committee found by clear and convincing evidence that
4 Mr. Taylor could not be located. Ms. Terrell said that he “is in hiding” and described him as a “scammer.”
5 respondent rendered legal services to both Mr. Casaday and Mr. Daigre and that both
men were respondent’s clients.
Based on these factual findings, the committee found that respondent violated
Rules 5.4(a), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a), as charged in the formal charges.
The committee determined that respondent knowingly violated duties owed
to the legal profession. His conduct caused actual harm to Mr. Casaday and Mr.
Daigre, who paid for legal services and reasonably believed that a licensed attorney
would provide same; however, “they received nothing more than pointless drivel
masquerading as legal documents that Respondent claimed to have ‘proofed.’”
Furthermore, the unauthorized practice of law by a non-licensed person is a violation
of state law and is an affront to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s exclusive and plenary
power to define and regulate all facets of the practice of the law. The baseline
sanction for respondent’s misconduct is disbarment.
In mitigation, the committee found the following factors: absence of a prior
disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and inexperience in the practice of law
(admitted 2011). In aggravation, the committee found the following factors: a
dishonest or selfish motive and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
conduct.
In formulating a recommendation for an appropriate sanction, the committee
considered In re: Morris, 14-1067 (La. 10/15/14), 149 So. 3d 229. In Morris, the
respondent had an arrangement with Citizens Against Legal Abuse (“CALA”), a
non-licensed domestic corporation that provided legal services to prospective
clients. CALA and the respondent maintained adjacent offices, and respondent was
advertised as available to represent clients referred by CALA. To facilitate the
arrangement, attorney-client contracts with letterhead that included the name of
CALA and of the respondent were given to prospective clients. In exchange for the
6 referral, the respondent would remit to CALA a percentage of the fee paid by the
client, characterizing the payments as “donations.” CALA retained primary
responsibility for setting, quoting, and collecting legal fees from prospective clients.
After concluding the contractual terms with the client, a CALA employee would
contact the respondent to advise her that she had been retained and to provide details
regarding the legal matter. Under these circumstances, the court found that the
respondent shared legal fees with a nonlawyer, facilitated the unauthorized practice
of law by a nonlawyer, and shared fees with a corporation not licensed to practice
law, in violation of Rules 5.4(a), 5.5(b), and 7.2(b) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. While recognizing that the baseline sanction was disbarment, the court
deviated downward to a three-year suspension in light of the significant mitigating
circumstances present.
The committee found that Morris is similar to the case at hand. While the
baseline sanction for respondent’s knowing violation of Rules 5.4(a), 5.5(a), and
8.4(a) is disbarment, the committee agreed that the appropriate sanction is a three-
year suspension from the practice of law, with an order of restitution. The committee
also recommended that respondent be assessed with costs and expenses.
Respondent filed an objection to the severity of the sanction recommended by
the hearing committee.
Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After reviewing this matter, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing
committee’s factual findings are not manifestly erroneous, and that the committee
correctly found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
Despite at all times knowing that Mr. Taylor and Ms. Terrell were not lawyers,
respondent agreed to and did assist them in providing legal services to prison
inmates, in violation of Rule 5.5(a), and shared in fees received from the prisoners
7 for those services, in violation of Rule 5.4(a). These violations establish the
derivative violation of Rule 8.4(a). Further, respondent admitted to the material facts
giving rise to the rule violations in his sworn statement and hearing testimony. He
subsequently admitted all charged violations in his brief to the disciplinary board.
The board determined that respondent violated duties owed to his client, the
public, and the profession. Respondent acted knowingly in facilitating the
unauthorized practice of law by KCT and in sharing fees with them. Respondent
knew that Mr. Taylor and Ms. Terrell were not lawyers, yet he willingly assisted
them in the preparation of legal pleadings and shared in fees for those services.
Respondent’s conduct caused actual harm to Mr. Casaday and Mr. Daigre. Mr.
Casaday paid a total of $7,000 and Mr. Daigre paid a total of $6,000 for legal work
prepared by nonlawyers which respondent “proofed.” In each case, respondent
received $2,000 for his work. Further, his actions contributed to a delay in these
prisoners having licensed lawyers fully review their cases and pursue any
legitimately available procedures for obtaining post-conviction relief. Considering
the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board found the applicable
baseline sanction is suspension.
The board found the only aggravating factor present is vulnerability of the
victims. In mitigation, the board recognized the following factors: absence of a prior
disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, inexperience in the practice of law, and
character or reputation. The board specifically rejected respondent’s argument that
he should be credited with the mitigating factor of a timely good faith effort to rectify
the consequences of his misconduct. According to respondent, he offered to enroll
as counsel and return all fees he received from Mr. Casaday, and he has now
undertaken to represent Mr. Daigre in his motion to reduce sentence. However, the
board pointed out that as far back as the fall of 2016, Mr. Casaday began requesting
8 that respondent either move forward with his post-conviction relief or return his
money. Mr. Casaday testified before the hearing committee in October 2017 that
respondent sent him a letter “not long ago” saying he would handle the post-
conviction matter. Mr. Casaday no longer trusted respondent and wanted his money
back. Respondent returned the $2,000 to Mr. Casaday by letter dated September 28,
2017, approximately three weeks before the hearing. Under these circumstances,
the board found there was not a timely and good faith effort on respondent’s part to
rectify the consequences of his misconduct.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board noted that a wide
range of sanctions have been imposed in cases involving the unauthorized practice
of law, up to and including disbarment, depending upon the specific facts and
circumstances presented. The ODC relies on the disbarment cases, which often
involve systematic delegation of professional responsibilities to nonlawyer staff, in
arguing that disbarment should be the baseline sanction here. However, the board
found the circumstances presented in those cases are distinguishable from the facts
of the instant matter, which involves only two instances of a young lawyer assisting
a nonlawyer whom the respondent perceived as a “jailhouse lawyer” in the
unauthorized practice of law. Further, one of the clients affected has chosen to keep
respondent as his attorney and respondent has continued to represent him at no
additional charge.
The board also found distinguishable the Morris case relied upon by the
committee. The respondent in Morris was charged with misconduct relating to the
CALA arrangement; however, additional attorney misconduct was present,
including lack of diligence, failure to communicate, and failure to return an unearned
fee. The respondent was also found to have converted more than $28,000 in client
funds, made false statements to the ODC, and engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The court focused on the conversion
9 as the “most egregious conduct” and determined that while disbarment would
ordinarily be appropriate for such misconduct, a downward deviation to a three-year
suspension was warranted in light of the mitigating factors present.
On the other hand, in cases in which an attorney has engaged in an isolated
instance of assisting a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law, the court has
imposed relatively short periods of suspension. In In re: Mopsik, 04-2395 (La.
5/24/05), 902 So. 2d 991, the respondent was suspended for sixty days for abdicating
his professional responsibilities in a client matter to his paralegal and failing to
exercise any supervision over the paralegal’s activities in the matter. The court
concluded that Mopsik violated Rules 5.3 (responsibilities regarding nonlawyer
assistance) and 5.5, and that although his conduct was negligent, a suspension was
warranted due to the following aggravating factors: a prior disciplinary record,
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the
victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law.
In In re: Burns, 17-2153 (La. 5/1/18), 249 So. 3d 811, the respondent sent a
paralegal to participate in a pre-trial conference due to a conflict with another case.
The paralegal did not inform the court or the other lawyers that he was not a lawyer.
The board found that Burns violated Rules 5.5(a) and 8.4(a), and concluded that a
sixty-day suspension was the applicable baseline sanction. However, because Burns
had given false testimony during the disciplinary proceeding, the board found that
an upward deviation was warranted and recommended that Burns be suspended for
one year and one day. The court concurred in the finding of the rule violations and
imposed a one-year suspension with Ethics School.
Considering the jurisprudence, the board determined that respondent’s
behavior was far less grievous than the cases involving a more pervasive pattern and
practice of the facilitation of the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers and fee
sharing, which have resulted in disbarment. The circumstances of this matter are
10 more in line with those in Mopsik which involved misconduct in the handling of one
case. However, unlike respondent, Mopsik was a seasoned lawyer with almost forty
years of experience at the time of his misconduct. He also had a prior disciplinary
record and refused to acknowledge his wrongful conduct. Conversely, respondent
was inexperienced in the practice of law when he first encountered Mr. Taylor.
Furthermore, he was actually involved with only two clients of KCT; he has now
undertaken the full representation of one of the “clients,” Jeremy Daigre, without
charging an additional fee; multiple letters were submitted in support of respondent’s
good character; and he has no prior disciplinary offenses.
Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six months, fully deferred, subject to a one-year period of
probation and attendance at Ethics School. The board also recommended that
respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of the proceeding.
One board member concurred in the sanction recommended by the board.
Two board members dissented and would recommend a suspension of not less than
one year and one day.
The ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.
Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).
DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
11 manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
There is clear and convincing evidence in the record that respondent
improperly shared legal fees with Mr. Taylor and Ms. Terrell and assisted them in
practicing law. Respondent knew that Mr. Taylor and Ms. Terrell were not lawyers,
yet he willingly assisted them in the preparation of legal pleadings and shared in fees
for those services. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct as charged by the ODC.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent’s conduct was knowing. He violated duties owed to his clients,
the public, and the legal profession, causing actual harm to Mr. Casaday and Mr.
Daigre. Considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the
baseline sanction in this matter is suspension.
The record supports the aggravating factor of vulnerability of the victims. The
record supports the following mitigating factors: absence of a prior disciplinary
record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude
toward the proceedings, inexperience in the practice of law (admitted 2011), and
character or reputation.
12 With respect to the issue of discipline, we agree with the disciplinary board
that a wide range of sanctions have been imposed in cases involving the unauthorized
practice of law, up to and including disbarment, depending upon the specific facts
and circumstances presented. While we do not find respondent’s conduct warrants
disbarment, it is important to note that in cases involving fee sharing with a
nonlawyer, “we have imposed a suspension of one year and one day.” In re: Watley,
01-1775 (La. 12/7/01), 802 So. 2d 593. Furthermore, in In re: Mopsik, 04-2395 (La.
5/24/05), 902 So. 2d 991, we imposed an actual period of suspension for the
negligent facilitation of the unauthorized practice of law, suggesting that where, as
here, knowing misconduct is at issue, an actual period of suspension would certainly
be warranted.
Based on this jurisprudence, we will reject the recommendation of the
majority of the disciplinary board that respondent receive a fully deferred
suspension. Rather, respondent shall be suspended from the practice of law for
eighteen months, with all but one year deferred, subject to a one-year period of
unsupervised probation. Respondent shall also be required to attend Ethics School.
DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is
ordered that Dante J. Butler, Louisiana Bar Roll number 33753, be and he hereby is
suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen months. It is further
ordered that all but one year of this suspension shall be deferred. Following the
active portion of the suspension, respondent shall be placed on unsupervised
probation for a period of one year. As a condition of probation, respondent is ordered
to attend and successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics
School. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the
13 ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the
conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be
grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing
additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are
assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1,
with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s
judgment until paid.
14 05/08/19
CRICHTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s determination that respondent has violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct as charged. However, I disagree with the sanction
imposed, as I find it too harsh under the particular circumstances.
Although the violations here are indeed serious and fall well below the
standard expected in the legal profession, I find the majority failed to adequately
consider the mitigating factor of respondent’s inexperience in the practice of law at
the time this arrangement began. Specifically, respondent was admitted in 2011, and
in 2014, he entered into this particular fee arrangement with the non-lawyers. In my
view, a mere three years into the practice of law at the time respondent’s misconduct
began is a significant mitigating factor in this matter. See generally, In Re: Abdalla,
17-453 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1223 (Crichton, J., dissenting from the sanction
imposed as too harsh, finding significant mitigating factors the majority failed to
consider). Consequently, I dissent from the majority’s sanction, and would order
respondent to be suspended for one year, with all but six months deferred, followed
by a one year period of probation with conditions (including attendance and
successful completion of a session of the Louisiana State Bar Association's Ethics
School).