In Re Danny Patrick McCoy v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 03-25-00882-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00882-CV

In re Danny Patrick McCoy

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM BASTROP COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator Danny Patrick McCoy, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of

mandamus challenging the denial of his motion to recuse the trial court judge in the underlying

suit. Relator alleges in his petition that Judge Robert H. Trapp, the regional presiding judge for

the Second Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, abused his discretion by refusing to hold a

hearing on the motion to recuse. Relator asks us to issue a writ of mandamus directing Judge

Trapp to vacate the order denying recusal and “[o]rder compliance with [Rule] 18a(f) [of the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure], including a hearing with notice and a ruling based upon the

evidence….” Based on the following, we deny the petition.

Rule 18a of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs the recusal of judges. Tex. R.

Civ. P. 18a. A party may file a motion stating grounds for the trial judge’s recusal. Id. R. 18a(a).

When a motion is filed, the judge must either sign an order of recusal or refer the matter to the

presiding judge of the administrative judicial district, who should either consider the motion or

assign another judge to hear the motion. Id. R. 18a(f), (g). McCoy does not dispute that the trial court timely referred his recusal motion to Judge Trapp, the regional presiding judge in this case,

who proceeded to consider the motion himself. Rather, McCoy complains that Judge Trapp denied

the motion “without holding a mandatory hearing and without making required findings.” The

rule expressly provides, however, that “[a] motion to recuse that does not comply with this rule

may be denied without an oral hearing,” provided that the order “state the nature of the

noncompliance.” Id. R. 18a(g)(3)(A) (“Summary Denial for Noncompliance”) (emphasis added).

Here, in the complained-of order as it appears in the appendix attached to McCoy’s petition, Judge

Trapp explains that the alleged bias in the case was founded on rulings made by the trial judge.

See Id. R. 18a(a)(3) (recusal motion “must not be based solely on the judge’s rulings in the case”);

see also Drake v. Walker, 529 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.) (“Judicial

rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on bias or

partiality.”). It was on that ground that Judge Trapp summarily denied the motion without

a hearing.

Mandamus will not issue where there is “a clear and adequate remedy at law, such

as a normal appeal.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “An

order denying a motion to recuse may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the

final judgment.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(j)(1). Accordingly, a party seeking to challenge the

denial of a recusal motion under Rule 18a has an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Union

Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. 1998); see also In re Lutz, 164 S.W.3d 721, 723-24

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding) (“Review of the denial of a motion to recuse via the

normal appellate process is an adequate remedy, and thus intervention in trial court proceedings

by appellate courts through the extraordinary remedy of writ of mandamus is not justified.”).

2 Because the record before this Court shows that McCoy’s recusal motion was

denied under Rule 18a, we conclude that he has an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Lutz,

164 S.W.3d at 724. Accordingly, the temporary stay is lifted, and the petition for writ of

mandamus is denied. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

__________________________________________ Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Theofanis

Filed: January 13, 2026