In re: Daniel S. Banyai

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Vermont
DecidedDecember 2, 2025
Docket24-10242
StatusUnknown

This text of In re: Daniel S. Banyai (In re: Daniel S. Banyai) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In re: Daniel S. Banyai, (Vt. 2025).

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF VERMONT Filed’ & □□□□□□□ On Docket 12/02/2025

In re: Daniel S. Banyai, Case # 24-10242 Debtor. Chapter 7

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Debtor requests this Court to reconsider its prior order granting the Town of Pawlet (the Town) relief from the automatic stay to pursue its non-bankruptcy rights to foreclose on its liens on real property located at 541 Briar Hill Road, West Pawlet, Vermont (the Property).! The Town asserts this Court should not reconsider its prior order because Debtor has failed to meet his burden of proof.” For the reasons articulated below, the Court agrees with the Town and denies Debtor’s Motion to Reconsider. JURISDICTION The Court has jurisdiction over this contested matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 1334, and the Amended Order of Reference entered by the U.S. District Court on June 22, 2012. The Court determines that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G), this proceeding contains core matters, over which this Court has constitutional authority to enter a final judgment. FACTUAL BACKGROUND As this Court has previously detailed, Debtor and the Town (the Parties) have been

48. 2 ECF 55.

involved in ongoing litigation concerning the Property since 2019.3 This Court first plunged into the Parties’ litigation history when considering Debtor’s motion to avoid the judicial liens of the Town. The Court ultimately found that while the Debtor had a valid homestead exemption in the Property as of the Petition Date, that homestead exemption did not protect the Property from the Town’s liens under Vermont law. Following the Court’s decision on Debtor’s motion to avoid the

Town’s judicial liens, the Town moved for relief from the automatic stay (the Motion for Relief).4 The Town noticed the Motion for Relief under this Court’s default procedure.5 The Court held an initial hearing on the Motion for Relief on August 15, 2025 (the Initial Hearing).6 At the Initial Hearing, the Court directed the Town to re-notice the Motion for Relief and provide notice directly to Debtor in accordance with Vt. LBR 4001-1(d).7 During the Initial Hearing, Debtor concedes he was physically present in the courtroom.8 After the Town re-noticed the Motion for Relief,9 the Court held a hearing on October 3, 2025. At that time, Debtor was represented by counsel who appeared at the hearing and represented he had experienced communication issues with his client and that he had received no instructions or guidance on Debtor’s position on the Motion for Relief.10 Because the Town established relief

3 See Exhibit 1C, Decision on Post-Judgment Motion for Contempt and Fines, ECF 26-3; see also Town of Pawlet v. Banyai, No. 105-9-19 Vtec. 4 See Town of Pawlet’s Motion for Relief from Stay, ECF 33. 5 ECF 33-1. 6 See Hearing Held dated August 15, 2025. 7 “A creditor seeking relief from stay must file a motion with a certificate of service showing service of the motion on the debtor, the debtor’s attorney (if any), the case trustee (if any), any parties affected by the motion or having an interest in the property that is the subject of the motion, all parties in interest who have requested notice and the United States Trustee.” The Town’s initial certificate of service did not meet these requirements. 8 On August 15, 2025, Debtor was present in the courtroom with counsel representing him in an adversary proceeding which had a hearing set for the same day. 9 See ECF 38 and 39. 10 See ECF 59 at 1:53-2:20. from stay was appropriate under §§ 362(d)(1) and (2), the Court granted the Town’s request for in rem relief and denied the Town’s in personam relief against the Debtor.11 On October 17, 2025, the Court received a letter from Debtor which the Court deemed to be the Motion to Reconsider.12 In Debtor’s letter, Debtor reiterated communication issues with his counsel and absent such communication issues he would not have missed the hearing because he

wishes to keep the Property. Debtor later supplemented the Motion to Reconsider.13 Debtor claims he did not receive information from his attorney about the Motion for Relief or that the Court would hold a hearing on the motion.14 The Debtor further claims that he has been unduly prejudiced by the granting of the Motion for Relief.15 Debtor argues he was unduly prejudiced by the non-performance and lack of communication with his attorney and that he had not been in communication with his attorney since June 2025. Due to the lack of communication, Debtor’s counsel withdrew as counsel of record.16 The Town objects to the Motion to Reconsider on independent grounds. Primarily, the Town disputes Debtor did not have notice of the Motion for Relief because he was present in the

courtroom during the Initial Hearing and the Town re-noticed the Motion for Relief at this Court’s direction, which included direct notice to Debtor in addition to notice to his attorney.17 During the Initial Hearing, the Town made clear it would re-notice the Motion for Relief. While Debtor claims he received no information about the Motion for Relief from his attorney, he does not address the

11 ECF 44. 12 ECF 48. 13 ECF 53. 14 ECF 53, ⁋ 5. 15 ECF 53, ⁋ 9. 16 ECF 49 and 62. Debtor supported his attorney’s withdrawal. ECF 53. 17 ECF 55. fact that the record in this case demonstrates he received actual notice directly from the Town. In addition, the Town argues its Motion for Relief was premised upon the undisputed facts which were presented in connection with the contested matter on Debtor’s motion to avoid the Town’s judicial liens. Thus, no relief would be warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), made applicable to this case by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024.18

At the October 3, 2025, hearing, Debtor’s attorney confirmed Debtor had been provided actual notice of the Motion for Relief and the Notice of Hearing, for each hearing on the Motion for Relief.19 Following that hearing and the Court’s findings that in rem relief was proper, the Court granted the Motion for Relief.20 The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Reconsider on November 14, 2025, at which Debtor and counsel for the Town appeared. During this hearing, Debtor articulated he had been prejudiced due to his lack of representation and knowledge regarding the process and inferred he had a valid argument against the Motion for Relief.21 When asked, Debtor was unable to provide a cogent argument to support a valid argument that the Motion for Relief had been granted in error

and implied alternative counsel would be necessary to help him identify and present such an argumnet. However, Debtor had not yet sought alternative counsel to assist him in that endeavor. Given the status of the state court foreclosure proceeding, the Court allowed Debtor until November 21, 2025, to file either a supplement the record to further support his Motion to

18 ECF 55. 19 ECF 59 at 1:53-2:20. 20 ECF 44. 21 Debtor claims that he had delivered paperwork to his attorney for defense of the Motion for Relief. When specifically questioned about the nature of the paperwork, Debtor did not elaborate on what, if any, would have been presented by his attorney on his behalf. Debtor’s counsel represented at the October 3, 2025 hearing that there was no legal basis to object to the Motion for Relief.

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