In Re Daniel

359 B.R. 320, 57 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 353, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3456, 2006 WL 3848773
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Kansas
DecidedDecember 15, 2006
Docket19-20358
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 359 B.R. 320 (In Re Daniel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Daniel, 359 B.R. 320, 57 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 353, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3456, 2006 WL 3848773 (Kan. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER SUSTAINING TRUSTEE’S OBJECTION TO DEBTOR’S PLAN

Following oral argument on November 15, 2006, the Court took under advisement the Chapter 13 Trustee’s objection to Debtor’s plan that proposes to be completed in 18 months without making payments to unsecured creditors. The Chapter 13 Trustee, William H. Griffin (hereafter Trustee), appears by Dianna J. Lord. Debtor, Thelma E. Daniel (hereafter Debt- or), appears by David A. Reed. There are no other appearances. The Court has jurisdiction. 1 Having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court is now ready to rule and, for the reasons stated below, sustains the Trustee’s objection. FACTS.

The relevant facts are undisputed and are based upon the schedules and other filings. Debtor’s proposed plan provides for payments of $305 per month. These payments shall be used for the payment of attorney fees of $2,500 at the rate of $125 per month and payment of a secured car loan of $2,404.95 at the rate of $155 per month, with a discount rate of 9.25%. The plan provides a dividend of 0% to unsecured creditors. The Trustee objects to the plan because it completes in 18 months and asserts the plan should be amended so it will complete in no less than 36 months.

The Debtor’s schedules evidence the following regarding her income, expenses, and debts. Form B22C, Part I, Report of Income, shows $2,738 monthly income, which is below the median. Because Debt- or is below-median income,' Parts III through VI are not completed.

Schedule D, Secured Claims, shows only one claim, $2,404.95 owed to Empire on a purchase money loan secured by a 1992 Buick. Schedule F, Unsecured Claims, shows a total of $16,229.67. Schedule I, Current Income of Individual Debtor(s), shows monthly income of $2,443.00. Schedule J, Current Expenditures of Individual Debtor(s), shows total monthly expenses of $2,138 and net monthly income of $305.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES.

The Trustee objected to Debtor’s plan, so the Court may not confirm the plan unless the conditions of §§ 1325(b)(1)(A) or *322 (B) 2 are satisfied. Those subsections provide:

(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan—
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.

It is the Trustee’s position that the plan does not satisfy § 1325(b)(1)(B) because it does not run for 36 months, which is the applicable commitment period for below-median income debtors, as defined by § 1325(b)(4)(A). The Trustee contends the plan should be amended to provide for monthly payments of $305 for the entire 36 month period, which would result in a dividend to unsecured creditors.

The Debtor responds that for a below-median income debtor, a Chapter 13 plan may run for less than three years without paying 100% of allowed unsecured claims. Debtor argues that the phrase “applicable commitment period” referred to in § 1325(b)(4)(A) is a multiplier which requires only a certain dividend to unsecured creditors, rather than a temporal requirement specifying a minimum number of payments. Debtor then asserts that because she has zero disposable income according to Form B22C, a plan of 36 months is pointless, because payments of $0.00 per month times 36 months generates no income for the plan, so a shorter plan period is permitted.

ANALYSIS.

Controlling Statutes and Applicable Rules.

Debtor’s position, which relies upon Official Form B22C to establish that her disposable income is zero, requires the Court to carefully examine the Code as amended by BAPCPA 3 and the implementing Rules and Official Forms. In accord with § 1325(b)(1)(B), quoted above, Debtor’s plan may be confirmed over the objection of the Trustee only if the plan provides that all of the debtor’s “projected disposable income” to be received during the “applicable commitment period” will be dedicated to the payment of unsecured creditors.

The term “applicable commitment period” is defined by § 1325(b)(4), as follows:

(4) For purposes of this subsection, the ‘applicable commitment period’-
(A) subject to subparagraph (B), shall be—
(i) 3 years; or
(ii) not less than 5 years, if the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse combined, when multiplied by 12, is not less than— [applicable median income for the appropriate family size]; and
(B) may be less than 3 or 5 years, whichever is applicable under subpara- *323 graph (A), but only if the plan provides for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter period.

The Trustee submits that in this case the “applicable commitment period” as determined by the foregoing subsection is three years, since the Debtor is below-median income and the plan does not propose to pay unsecured creditors in full over less than three years. The Debtor challenges this conclusion based only upon the premise that she has no projected disposable income so a three year plan is pointless.

The Code does not define “projected disposable income.” The meaning of the word “projected” in light of the new definition of “disposable income” is not without difficulty. 4 In this case, however, neither of the parties contend that projected disposable income is different from disposable income as defined by the Code. The Court therefore finds for this case “projected disposable income” is the same as the “disposable income.”

The Code does define “disposable income” for purposes of § 1325(b)(1), the condition for confirmation after objection by the Trustee. Subsection 1325(b)(2) provides as follows:

(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘disposable income’ means current monthly income received by the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care payments, or disability payments for a dependent child ...) less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—
(A)(i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor ... that first becomes payable after the date the petition is filed; and
(ii) for charitable contributions ...; and—
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.

The calculation of disposable income therefore starts with current monthly income.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Vollen
426 B.R. 359 (D. Kansas, 2010)
In Re Slusher
359 B.R. 290 (D. Nevada, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
359 B.R. 320, 57 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 353, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3456, 2006 WL 3848773, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-daniel-ksb-2006.