In re: D.A.H.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: April 20, 2021
• Docket: 20-212
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCCOA-135

No. COA20-212

Filed 20 April 2021

Surry County, No. 19 JB 46

IN THE MATTER OF D.A.H.

Appeal by the Juvenile from an order entered on 13 August 2019 by Judge

Marion M. Boone in Surry County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27

January 2021.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Vanessa N. Totten, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Jillian C. Katz, for the Juvenile.

JACKSON, Judge.

¶1 The issue in this case is whether a juvenile is entitled to Miranda warnings

prior to being interrogated by his school principal, when the school resource officer

(“SRO”) is present but does not ask questions. Because we conclude that the trial

court relied on an improper legal test in determining that the juvenile was not

entitled to Miranda warnings, we reverse and remand this matter for further

proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 This matter arises from a series of events that occurred at Gentry Middle IN RE D.A.H.

Opinion of the Court

School in Mount Airy, North Carolina during March 2019. On 11 March 2019, Deputy

William Sechrist—who acted as the SRO at Gentry Middle School—was informed by

school personnel that a student, Daniel,1 had been found with marijuana on the

school bus. The school bus driver had observed Daniel holding a small netted bag

containing a leafy substance. The bus driver handed over the bag to Deputy Sechrist,

who recognized the substance as marijuana. Deputy Sechrist then escorted Daniel

to the principal’s office and called Daniel’s father.

¶3 Once inside the principal’s office, Daniel “asked to speak freely,” but Deputy

Sechrist told him to “wait until your daddy gets here.” Once Daniel’s father arrived,

Daniel told Deputy Sechrist the details of how he obtained the marijuana. Daniel

explained that the previous weekend, he had contacted a fellow student—13-year-old

Deacon—via Snapchat asking to buy some marijuana. Daniel and Deacon then met

up in the school locker room on the morning of March 11, and Deacon gave Daniel a

small bag of marijuana in exchange for $25. Deputy Sechrist performed a field test

on the substance, which confirmed that the substance was 0.7 grams of marijuana.

¶4 Deacon was absent from school the following two days (March 12 and 13) and

the record contains no indication that the school or the deputy took any efforts to

contact Deacon or his guardian during this time. On 14 March 2019, Deacon

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the privacy of the juveniles. IN RE D.A.H.

reappeared in class and was summoned to the principal’s office. When Deacon

arrived at the principal’s office, both Principal Whitaker and Deputy Sechrist were

present. Deputy Sechrist was in uniform, and Principal Whitaker was wearing a suit

and tie. Principal Whitaker and Deputy Sechrist sat together on one side of the table,

facing Deacon. At the time that Deacon arrived, his guardian had not been told that

Deacon was in the principal’s office.

¶5 Principal Whitaker began questioning Deacon. The only evidence of what

occurred during this meeting comes from the testimony of Deputy Sechrist, who

offered three slightly differing accounts of how the meeting proceeded. When first

asked about the meeting (on direct examination), Deputy Sechrist did not specify

what precisely was asked of Deacon, but stated that Deacon “advised Mr. Whitaker

he did not come to school for two days [because] he was scared he was going to get in

trouble because he . . . sold marijuana to [Daniel].”

¶6 When asked about the meeting for a second time on cross-examination, Deputy

Sechrist stated that Principal Whitaker had “asked [Deacon] to tell . . . what had

taken place,” and in response Deacon told them “that he had sold [Daniel] some

marijuana, where he got it, and all this other stuff.”

¶7 When asked about the meeting for a third time on redirect-examination,

Deputy Sechrist described the conversation in more detail, explaining that the

following exchange occurred between Deacon and Principal Whitaker: IN RE D.A.H.

[Principal]: Where have you been for the last few days?

[Deacon]: Well, I’ve been afraid to come to school I’d get in trouble [sic].

[Principal]: In trouble for what?

[Deacon]: What I sold [Daniel].

[Principal]: What did you sell him?

[Deacon]: Marijuana.

¶8 Deputy Sechrist stated that after this confession, Principal Whitaker called

Deacon’s grandmother, who arrived “probably . . . 10 minutes” after Deacon was

brought into the office. He also stated that “[n]ot very many questions were even

asked prior to her arrival.”

¶9 After Deacon’s grandmother arrived, the principal asked Deacon to tell his

grandmother “what had taken place[,]” and Deacon repeated his statements to his

grandmother. Deputy Sechrist testified that at no point was Deacon read his

Miranda rights, told he did not have to answer their questions, nor told that he was

free to leave.

¶ 10 Several months later, a juvenile petition was filed on 13 May 2019 alleging

that Deacon had sold a schedule six controlled substance (marijuana) to another

student in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1). Deacon filed a motion to suppress

on 13 August 2019, arguing that his statements to Principal Whitaker were IN RE D.A.H.

inadmissible as his confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. A

hearing was held on the matter that same day (13 August 2019), during which the

trial court concluded that Deacon was not entitled to Miranda warnings because the

meeting with the principal was not a custodial interrogation. In denying Deacon’s

motion to suppress, the trial court found and concluded in open court as follows:

I am going to deny the Motion to Suppress. A number of things stand out to me. The officer . . . he is the SRO. He’s there every day. This wasn’t some strange police officer that was called to stand guard at the door. I think it’s not unusual in a school setting for many or any of the children to be called to the office or principal’s office. I don’t think that automatically tends to turn it into a custodial interrogation. The young man was not in custody. He wasn’t even questioned by the School Resource Officer, who was a daily presence there at the school. It wasn’t some strange officer in a uniform.

Also, another reference was made, of which I think that anybody at school would have had reason to ask, if apparently [Deacon] was out of school. Because the officer said that [Deacon] . . . told the principal he didn’t come to school for two days because he was scared he would get in trouble for selling marijuana. I don’t know that any officer would ever even ask: Why didn’t you come to school? But a principal certainly would or should ask if a child’s been absent from school.

Therefore, I don’t see that it was outside the scope of anything. I think that was certainly, regardless of who was in the room or not, a proper question. And that’s what it sounds like it was in response to: Why weren’t you in school the past two days? Well, I didn’t come to school the past two days because I was afraid I’d get in trouble for selling marijuana to [Daniel]. IN RE D.A.H.

So I don’t see this as a custodial interrogation. And the motion is denied.

¶ 11 Deacon was ultimately adjudicated delinquent for the sale and delivery of

marijuana. In adjudicating Deacon delinquent, the trial court relied on Deacon’s

confession that he had sold marijuana to Daniel, as well as Daniel and Deputy

Sechrist’s hearing testimony that the substance sold was marijuana.

¶ 12 A disposition order was not entered within 60 days after entry of the

adjudication order, so, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2602, Deacon entered notice

of appeal within 70 days from entry of the adjudication order. The trial court ordered

on 25 October 2019 that disposition was stayed pending resolution of Deacon’s appeal.

II. Analysis

¶ 13 On appeal, Deacon argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress because his statements were the product of a custodial interrogation and

made without Miranda warnings or the additional protections of N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 7B-2101. Deacon further argues that the trial court’s error was prejudicial and not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained below, we hold that the trial

court’s order fails to apply the appropriate legal principles, and we must remand this

matter to the trial court for additional proceedings.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 14 Our review of a trial court’s order on a motion to suppress is “strictly limited IN RE D.A.H.

to determining whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by

competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and

whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of

law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). “Legal

conclusions, including the question of whether a person has been interrogated while

in police custody, are reviewed de novo.” In re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. 453, 456, 700

S.E.2d 766, 769 (2010). Under de novo review, this Court “considers the matter anew

and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” In re A.K.D.,

227 N.C. App. 58, 60, 745 S.E.2d 7, 8 (2013) (citation omitted).

B. Motion to Suppress—Legal Background

1. Juvenile Miranda Rights

¶ 15 This case presents a unique issue regarding the nature and extent of a

juvenile’s right to receive Miranda warnings in the context of a school interrogation.

Miranda rights stem from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,

which guarantees that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be

a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The basic holding of Miranda v.

Arizona instructs that “when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to

questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized” and thus

“[p]rocedural safeguards must be employed.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, IN RE D.A.H.

(1966).

¶ 16 It is well-established that juveniles, just like adults, are entitled to receive

Miranda warnings prior to in-custody interrogations in order to protect their right

against self-incrimination. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). See also K.D.L., 207

N.C. App. at 457, 700 S.E.2d at 770 (“In order to protect the Fifth Amendment right

against compelled self-incrimination, suspects, including juveniles, are entitled to the

warnings set forth in Miranda v. Arizona prior to police questioning.”).

¶ 17 In addition to the rights mandated by Miranda, in North Carolina our General

Assembly “has established statutory protections for juveniles” who face custodial

interrogation. In re L.I., 205 N.C. App. 155, 158, 695 S.E.2d 793, 797 (2010).

Specifically, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101,

[a]ny juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning:

(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;

(2) That any statement the juvenile does make can be and may be used against the juvenile;

(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning; and

(4) That the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that one will be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented and wants representation. IN RE D.A.H.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(a)(1)–(4) (2019).

¶ 18 The Juvenile Code provides for even greater protections if the juvenile who is

interrogated is younger than 16:

When the juvenile is less than 16 years of age, no in- custody admission or confession resulting from interrogation may be admitted into evidence unless the confession or admission was made in the presence of the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or attorney. If an attorney is not present, the parent, guardian, or custodian as well as the juvenile must be advised of the juvenile’s rights as set out in subsection (a) of this section; however, a parent, guardian, or custodian may not waive any right on behalf of the juvenile.

Id. § 7B-2101(b). In this respect, “our General Statutes codify and enhance the

protections required under Miranda.” In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 668, 686 S.E.2d

135, 138 (2009) (emphasis added), rev’d and remanded sub nom. J.D.B. v. North

Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). However, the protections of Miranda and § 7B-2101

are only triggered when the juvenile is subjected to a custodial interrogation. In re

A.N.C., 225 N.C. App. 315, 319, 750 S.E.2d 835, 838 (2013). In other words, “the

general Miranda custodial interrogation framework is applicable to section 7B-2101.”

In re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. at 458, 700 S.E.2d at 770.

¶ 19 In general, a custodial interrogation occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by

law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. (internal marks and IN RE D.A.H.

citation omitted). This inquiry has traditionally been broken down into a two-part

test: (1) whether the suspect was in custody; and (2) whether the statement was

made in the context of an interrogation. See id.

¶ 20 As for the custody element, the basic test is “whether a reasonable person in

the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had

been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.” State v. Greene, 332

N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992). This element is viewed objectively from

the standpoint of a reasonable observer. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323

(1994). As for the interrogation element, an interrogation occurs when the authorities

use “any words or actions” that they “should know are reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301

(1980). This element “is also determined objectively” with reference to the “totality

of the circumstances.” In re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. at 458, 700 S.E.2d at 770.

2. Juvenile Miranda Rights in the Context of the Schoolhouse

¶ 21 The questioning of juveniles in the context of the schoolhouse presents unique

Miranda considerations. First, it should be noted that Miranda “does not

automatically apply to all government actors”—rather, it only applies to

interrogations conducted by (or in concert with) law enforcement officers. Id. at 459,

700 S.E.2d at 771. For example, a student simply being questioned by a principal

would not generally qualify as a custodial interrogation, but a student questioned by IN RE D.A.H.

an SRO certainly could. See id. Second, the schoolhouse is a unique forum because

“schoolchildren inherently shed some of their freedom of action when they enter the

schoolhouse door,” given educators’ need “to control the school environment.” Id.

(internal marks and citation omitted). Due to the constraints inherent in the

schoolhouse environment, we have held that a child is only under custodial

interrogation when “he is subjected to additional restraints beyond those generally

imposed during school.” Id.

¶ 22 The first case to fully articulate this heightened schoolhouse standard was In

re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. at 454, 700 S.E.2d at 768. There, after a 12-year-old student

was discovered with marijuana in the classroom, he was taken to the assistant

principal’s office. Id. The SRO arrived at the assistant principal’s office, briefly spoke

with the juvenile, frisked him to search for weapons, and then transported the

juvenile in his patrol car to the principal’s office (which was located in a separate

building). Id. Once in the principal’s office, the SRO remained present while the

principal questioned the juvenile. Id. The juvenile first denied that the marijuana

was his, but eventually confessed. Id. All in all, the juvenile was questioned “for

about five or six hours” by the principal and “was not permitted to leave for lunch.”

Id. at 455, 700 S.E.2d at 768. The questioning began around 9:00 a.m., but the

juvenile’s mother was not contacted until around 3:00 p.m. Id. The juvenile later

filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial court. Id. at 455, 700 S.E.2d IN RE D.A.H.

at 768-69.

¶ 23 On appeal, we held that the juvenile’s confession “should have been

suppressed” as it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Id. at 456, 700

S.E.2d at 769. We noted that “despite the decreased level of freedoms in schools,” we

still must not “forget that police interrogation is inherently coercive—particularly for

young people.” Id. at 459, 700 S.E.2d at 771. We emphasized that the State “has a

greater duty to protect the rights of a respondent in a juvenile proceeding than in a

criminal prosecution.” Id. at 460, 700 S.E.2d at 771 (internal marks and citation

omitted).

¶ 24 We concluded that the juvenile’s statements were made during a custodial

interrogation because “a reasonable person in his situation would believe he was

functionally under arrest.” Id. at 461, 700 S.E.2d at 772. As for the custody element

of the Miranda test, we relied on the following factors to conclude that the juvenile

was in custody: (1) the juvenile “knew he was suspected of a crime” and was “accused

of drug possession”; (2) he “was interrogated for about six hours”; (3) the interrogation

occurred “generally in the presence of an armed police officer”; (4) the juvenile “was

frisked by that officer and transported in the officer’s vehicle” to the principal’s office;

and (5) “at no point was there any indication that [the juvenile] was free to leave.”

Id. We reasoned that these occurrences went beyond “the usual restraints generally

imposed during school” and instead were closer to those that would “likely [be] IN RE D.A.H.

experienced by an arrestee.” Id.

¶ 25 As for the interrogation element of the Miranda test, we first noted that this

was a “unique situation because [the SRO] did not ask any questions.” Id.

Nevertheless, we concluded that an interrogation had occurred because

[the SRO’s] conduct significantly increased the likelihood [the juvenile] would produce an incriminating response to the principal’s questioning. His near-constant supervision of [the juvenile’s] interrogation and “active listening” could cause a reasonable person to believe [the principal] was interrogating him in concert with [the SRO] or that the person would endure harsher criminal punishment for failing to answer.

Id. Thus, because the juvenile had “made his confession in the course of custodial

interrogation without being afforded the warnings required by Miranda and section

7B-2101(a), and because he was not apprised of and afforded his right to have a

parent present,” we held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.

Id. at 462, 700 S.E.2d at 773.

¶ 26 Another prominent recent case addressing the issue of schoolhouse

interrogations was In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. at 668, 686 S.E.2d at 138 (2009). There, a

13-year-old student was called into the principal’s office after he was found in

possession of a stolen camera. Id. at 665-66, 686 S.E.2d at 136. Present in the room

were the assistant principal, the SRO, and an investigator employed by the local

police force. Id. Prior to the meeting, the juvenile was not given a Miranda warning, IN RE D.A.H.

and was not offered the opportunity to speak with a parent. Id. During the

approximately 30 to 45 minute interview, the assistant principal repeatedly urged

the juvenile to “do the right thing” and “tell the truth,” and the investigator informed

him that he knew about the stolen cameras. Id. at 666-67, 686 S.E.2d at 136-37. The

juvenile ultimately confessed to having stolen the cameras, and these incriminating

statements later resulted in an unsuccessful motion to suppress by the juvenile. Id.

at 666-68, 686 S.E.2d at 137.

¶ 27 When the case reached the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Court held that

no Miranda warning was necessary because no custodial interrogation had occurred.

Id. at 670, 686 S.E.2d at 139. The Court based its holding on the fact that the SRO

participated only minimally in the questioning; the juvenile was not restrained or

locked in the room; and the juvenile appeared to have participated willingly. Id. The

Court specifically declined to consider the juvenile’s “age and his status as a special

education student” in reaching its holding, explaining that these factors were not an

appropriate part of the objective test under Miranda. Id. at 671-72, 686 S.E.2d at

139-40.

¶ 28 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, however, granting certiorari to

review whether “a child’s age would have affected how a reasonable person in the

suspect’s position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.” J.D.B. v. North

Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271-72 (2011) (internal marks and citation omitted). The IN RE D.A.H.

Court ultimately reversed and remanded the case, after determining that a child’s

age should be a relevant consideration in a custody analysis. Id. at 281.

¶ 29 The Court began by noting the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial

interrogation—a risk which is “all the more acute” when the subject is a juvenile. Id.

at 269 (internal marks and citation omitted). Observing that “children generally are

less mature and responsible than adults,” the Court went on to note that minors also

“often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices

that could be detrimental to them.” Id. at 272 (internal marks and citation omitted).

Specific to law enforcement interrogations, “a reasonable child subjected to police

questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would

feel free to go,” the Court observed. Id. And in many cases, “the custody analysis

would be nonsensical absent some consideration of the suspect’s age.” Id. at 275.

¶ 30 The Court considered the school setting to present just such a situation. Id.

In the school setting, “[n]either officers nor courts can reasonably evaluate the effect

of objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children without

accounting for the age of the child subjected to those circumstances[,]” the Court

reasoned. Id. at 276. The Court went on to note that

the effect of the schoolhouse setting cannot be disentangled from the identity of the person being questioned. A student—whose presence at school is compulsory and whose disobedience at school is cause for disciplinary action—is in a far different position than, say, a parent IN RE D.A.H.

volunteer on school grounds to chaperone an event[.] . . . Without asking whether the person questioned in the school is a minor, the coercive effect of the schoolhouse setting is unknowable.

Id. at 276 (internal marks and citation omitted).

¶ 31 Accordingly, the Court found that considering a child’s age was perfectly

consistent with the objective nature of the Miranda test. Id. The Court cautioned

that while “a child’s age will [not] be a determinative, or even a significant, factor in

every case,” in many cases it is “a reality that courts cannot simply ignore.” Id. at

277. Thus, the Court ultimately held that “so long as the child’s age was known to

the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent

to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the

objective nature of that test.” Id. at 277.

¶ 32 Another prominent decision in our juvenile Miranda caselaw was In re D.A.C.,

225 N.C. App. 547, 741 S.E.2d 378 (2013). There, officers were investigating gunshots

that had been fired into a home when they encountered a juvenile in the yard across

the street. Id. at 548, 741 S.E.2d at 379. The juvenile’s father came outside and

encouraged the juvenile “to go with the officers and to be truthful.” Id. The officers

asked the juvenile if he would speak with them and they received an affirmative

response. Id. They walked with the juvenile to the corner of the yard, about “ten feet

outside the home, where they talked for about five minutes.” Id. They all stood at IN RE D.A.H.

arms’ length from each other, and though both officers were armed, “neither of them

touched or made any movement towards their weapons at any point.” Id. at 548-49,

741 S.E.2d at 380. However, the officers never expressly told the juvenile that he was

free to leave or that he did not have to answer their questions. Id.

¶ 33 After the officers asked the juvenile whether he had fired the shots, the

juvenile confessed. Id. at 549, 741 S.E.2d at 380. The juvenile later filed a motion to

suppress his confession for violation of his Miranda rights, which was denied by the

trial court. Id. On appeal, we held that the trial court acted properly because the

juvenile was not subjected to a custodial interrogation while speaking with the

officers. Id. at 550, 741 S.E.2d at 380. “A careful analysis of the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the making of [the] Juvenile’s statement clearly

indicate[d] . . . that [he] was not subject to the degree of restraint inherent in a formal

arrest[,]” we reasoned. Id. at 552, 741 S.E.2d at 382. We relied on the fact that (1)

the officers “asked him to step outside, rather than instructing him to do so”; (2) the

juvenile did nothing more than “answer a simple, straightforward question” posed to

him by the officers; (3) during the conversation, all three participants “were standing

and remained at arm’s length from each other”; (4) the conversation occurred “in

broad daylight,” “in an open area in [the juvenile’s] own yard with his parents

nearby”; and (5) the conversation only lasted for about five minutes. Id. at 553, 741

S.E.2d at 382. IN RE D.A.H.

¶ 34 Finally, In re R.P., 216 N.C. App. 585, 718 S.E.2d 423, 2011 WL 5185568 (2011)

(unpublished), demonstrates how this Court has addressed cases that fail to properly

apply the standard from J.D.B. There, a high-school student filed a motion to

suppress an incriminating statement he made to an SRO, but his motion was denied

by the trial court. Id. at *1-2. On appeal, we discussed the decisions in both In re

K.D.L. and J.D.B., noting that under then-current North Carolina Miranda law, we

were required to consider both (1) whether the student had been subjected to

restraints that go beyond “the limitations that are characteristic of the school

environment in general,” and (2) how “the juvenile’s age and experience” might factor

into the custodial question. Id. at *3 (internal marks and citation omitted). However,

because the trial court failed to issue a written order, and because the trial transcript

left us “unable to discern whether the trial court considered the juvenile’s age in

accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s mandate in In re J.D.B.,” we

concluded that it necessary to remand the matter for further fact-finding. Id. at *4.

3. Clarifying the Juvenile Custodial Interrogation Test

¶ 35 Today we harmonize our prior opinions on this issue in light of the United

States Supreme Court’s holding in J.D.B. and the holdings of our sister courts in

other states. There can be no doubt that educators and law enforcement are

increasing their collaboration in the school setting and that school officials are

increasingly becoming active participants in the criminal justice system. While IN RE D.A.H.

potentially warranted for both the educational and safety needs of our children, this

cooperation must be consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against self-

incrimination. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in J.D.B., the Fifth

Amendment requires that minors under criminal investigation be protected against

making coerced, inculpatory statements, even when—and perhaps, in some cases,

particularly because—they are on school property. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 275. Increased

cooperation between educators and law enforcement cannot allow the creation of

situations where no Miranda warnings are required just because a student is on

school property.

¶ 36 To that end, we believe that one aspect of the schoolhouse Miranda test is

particularly deserving of an in-depth review here—namely, the extent of the SRO’s

involvement in the interrogation. On one end of the custodial spectrum, it is near-

universally agreed that a meeting solely between a student and school officials

generally will not qualify as a custodial interrogation. See In re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App.

at 459, 700 S.E.2d at 771 (noting that Miranda “does not automatically apply to all

government actors”—rather, it only applies to interrogations conducted by, or in

concert with, law enforcement officers); D.Z. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 246, 247 (Ind. 2018)

(“[W]hen school officials alone meet with students, a clear rule governs: Miranda

warnings are not required.”); Martin R. Gardner, Removing Miranda from School

Interrogations, 99 NEB. L. REV. 16, 30 (2020) (“If there is no law enforcement IN RE D.A.H.

involvement, then there is no custody and no Miranda applicability.”).

¶ 37 On the other end of the spectrum, an interview that features heavy SRO

involvement or direction will often qualify as a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., In

re R.H., 568 Pa. 1, 4-8, 791 A.2d 331, 332-35 (2002) (holding that Miranda warnings

should have been given where a student was removed from class by an SRO and

interrogated by the officer for 25 minutes, and where the interrogation “ultimately

led to charges by the municipal police, not punishment by school officials pursuant to

school rules”).

¶ 38 Then there are cases between those two ends of the spectrum—cases like the

present one—where the SRO is present while the juvenile is questioned by school

officials but does not participate in the questioning, or where the SRO participates

minimally in the questioning. We hold that circumstances such as these can indeed

qualify as custodial interrogations where Miranda warnings are required. As

discussed above, in In re K.D.L., we held that Miranda warnings were required even

when the SRO remained silent throughout the juvenile’s interview. See In re K.D.L.,

207 N.C. App. at 461, 700 S.E.2d at 772 (holding that a custodial interrogation had

occurred—despite the fact that the SRO “did not ask any questions”—because the

SRO’s “near-constant supervision” of the interrogation and “active listening”

throughout might “cause a reasonable person to believe” that the principal was

interrogating the juvenile “in concert with” the SRO). IN RE D.A.H.

¶ 39 Today we reaffirm this principle. We agree that when a student is interrogated

in the presence of an SRO—even when the SRO remains silent—the presence of the

officer can create a coercive environment that goes above and beyond the restrictions

normally imposed during school, such that a reasonable student would readily believe

they are not free to go. This holding recognizes the “reality that courts cannot simply

ignore”—that juveniles are uniquely susceptible to police pressure and may feel

compelled to confess when a reasonable adult would not. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 277.

¶ 40 Moreover, this holding is consistent with the decisions of other state appellate

courts. Since the time In re K.D.L. was decided in 2010, several other state appellate

courts have approved of this rationale—recognizing that oftentimes the presence of

an SRO during schoolhouse questioning can transform what otherwise might appear

to be a voluntary encounter into a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., N.C. v.

Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 852, 854-62 (Ky. 2013) (holding that Miranda warnings

were required when the SRO was “present throughout” the juvenile’s interrogation

by the principal—despite the SRO’s minimal involvement in the questioning—

because “[n]o reasonable student . . . would have believed that he was at liberty to

remain silent, or to leave” under the circumstances); State v. Antonio T., 352 P.3d

1172, 1179-80 (N.M. 2015) (holding that the SRO’s “mere presence during [the

principal’s] questioning of [the juvenile] converted the school disciplinary

interrogation into a criminal investigatory detention,” because the SRO’s presence IN RE D.A.H.

“created a coercive and adversarial environment that does not normally exist during

interactions between school officials and students”); B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225,

229-34 (Ind. 2018) (holding that although the officers “did not directly question” the

juvenile during his interrogation by the principal, nevertheless the “consistent police

presence” throughout the interview “would place considerable coercive pressure on a

reasonable student in [the juvenile’s] situation” and required the provision of

Miranda warnings).

¶ 41 Thus, we reiterate that the presence of an SRO (or other law enforcement

officer) while a student is interrogated by a school official weighs heavily on the scale

when determining whether what otherwise might appear to be a voluntary encounter

is instead a custodial interrogation. However, we also note that the involvement of

an SRO in the questioning is a factor which is relevant, but is not by itself dispositive,

to the question of whether the encounter between a child and a school official is a

custodial interrogation. We still must look to all of the remaining Miranda factors to

determine if any statements the student makes were the product of a custodial

interrogation.

a. Custody

¶ 42 The first element of the Miranda test asks whether the juvenile was in

custody. As explained by the United States Supreme Court, IN RE D.A.H.

[W]hether a suspect is in custody is an objective inquiry. Two discrete inquiries are essential to the [custody] determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.

...

Rather than demarcate a limited set of relevant circumstances, we have required police officers and courts to examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including any circumstances that would have affected how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.

J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270-71 (internal marks and citation omitted).

¶ 43 After thoroughly reviewing the caselaw from this state, the United States

Supreme Court, and persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, we conclude that

the following factors are most relevant in determining whether a juvenile is in

custody in the context of a schoolhouse interview:

(1) traditional indicia of arrest;

(2) the location of the interview;

(3) the length of the interview;

(4) the student’s age;

(5) what the student is told about the interview;

(6) the people present during the interview; and, IN RE D.A.H.

(7) the purposes of the questioning.

¶ 44 First—was the student subjected to any of the traditional indicia of arrest? If

the student was handcuffed, transported in a police car, subjected to a search of his

or her person or belongings, or otherwise bodily restrained, then this is a strong

indication that the student was in custody. See, e.g., In re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. at

461, 700 S.E.2d at 772 (juvenile was in custody when he was “frisked by [the] officer

and transported in the officer’s vehicle to [the principal’s] office,” as this is a type of

restraint that is “more likely experienced by an arrestee” than a student); State v.

Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 339, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001) (“Circumstances supporting

an objective showing that one is ‘in custody’ might include a police officer standing

guard at the door, locked doors, or application of handcuffs.”); B.A., 100 N.E.3d at 232

(“On the other end of the [custody] spectrum lie armed and uniformed police officers

who pull students from class in handcuffs before questioning them.”).

¶ 45 Second—where was the interview held? If the interview was conducted in a

location that a reasonable child might consider confining, this tends to show that the

child was in custody. See, e.g., State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 818, 948 P.2d 166, 173

(1997) (“We think it unlikely that the environment of a principal’s office or a faculty

room is considered by most children to be a familiar or comfortable setting, for

students normally report to these locations for disciplinary reasons[.]”). On the other

hand, if the interview was held in a location where a child is likely to feel comfortable IN RE D.A.H.

and at-ease, this tends to show that the child was not in custody. See, e.g., In re

D.A.C., 225 N.C. App. at 553, 741 S.E.2d at 382 (holding that no custody occurred

because “instead of being involved in a closed door conference room with police and

an assistant principal, [the] juvenile was questioned in an open area in his own yard

with his parents nearby”) (internal marks and citation omitted). Other relevant

considerations include the size of the room, whether the door was closed or locked,

and the child’s familiarity with that specific location.

¶ 46 Third—how long was the interview? A long, drawn-out questioning tends to

show that the child was in custody, whereas a very brief questioning does not.

Compare In re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. at 461, 700 S.E.2d at 772 (juvenile was in

custody where he “was interrogated for about six hours, generally in the presence of

an armed police officer”) with In re D.A.C., 225 N.C. App. at 553, 741 S.E.2d at 382

(juvenile was not in custody when “the conversation between Juvenile and the

investigating officers . . . lasted for about five minutes”). Other relevant

considerations include whether the child was offered a place to sit, and whether the

child is offered common courtesies such as food, water, or bathroom breaks. See State

v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 164, 804 S.E.2d 438, 443 (2017) (suspect was not in

custody when “the detectives offered [him] food or drink” and bathroom breaks were

made available).

¶ 47 Fourth—how old was the student? As explained by the United States Supreme IN RE D.A.H.

Court in J.D.B., younger children are far more “vulnerable or susceptible to outside

pressures” than older children or adults. See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272 (internal marks

and citation omitted). Thus, the younger the student, the more sensitive the student

will be to circumstances that could be coercive—“[s]o long as the child’s age was

known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively

apparent to any reasonable officer.” Id. at 274. Compare Doe, 130 Idaho at 819, 948

P.2d at 174 (holding that it was “unlikely that any ten-year-old would feel free to

simply leave” when questioned by an SRO or school authorities); with J.D.B., 564

U.S. at 277 (explaining that “teenagers nearing the age of majority” are unlikely to

feel the same coercive pressures as younger children) (internal marks and citation

¶ 48 Fifth—what was the student told about the interview? If the student is

informed that he or she is free to leave, that answering questions is not required, or

is offered the opportunity to call a parent or guardian, then this tends to show that

the student was not in custody. See, e.g., In re Hodge, 153 N.C. App. 102, 108, 568

S.E.2d 878, 882 (2002) (juvenile was not in custody when the detective “prefaced her

interview with [the juvenile] by saying, ‘you don’t have to talk to me,’ ‘I am not going

to arrest you’”). On the other hand, if the student is not informed about the nature

of the interview, and is not told whether his or her presence is compulsory or

voluntary, this weighs in favor of the conclusion that the student was in custody. See IN RE D.A.H.

In re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. at 461-62, 700 S.E.2d at 772-73 (juvenile was in custody

where he “knew he was suspected of a crime,” and there was “no suggestion anything

transpired that would cause him to believe he was free to leave”). And of course, a

student is certainly in custody if he or she is expressly told not to leave.

¶ 49 Sixth—who all is present during the interview? If the student is questioned in

the presence of multiple SROs or other law enforcement officers, or even by numerous

school officials, this tends to show that the student was in custody. See, e.g., B.A.,

100 N.E.3d at 232 (considering the “number of officers present and how they are

involved” as a key step in custody analysis). On the other hand, if a parent, guardian,

or other person who can advocate for the child (such as a guidance counselor), is

present or nearby during the interview, this suggests a reasonable child would not

have felt coerced. Compare In re D.A.C., 225 N.C. App. at 553, 741 S.E.2d at 382

(juvenile was not in custody when he was “questioned in an open area in his own yard

with his parents nearby”); with Doe, 130 Idaho at 818, 948 P.2d at 173 (juvenile was

in custody when “[n]o parent or other adult concerned with Doe’s best interest was

present during the questioning”).

¶ 50 Seventh—what were the objectively apparent purposes of the interview? In

other words, was the interview primarily a criminal investigation or primarily a

school disciplinary matter? See Antonio T., 352 P.3d at 1179 (“Questioning a child

for school disciplinary matters is distinguishable from questioning a child for IN RE D.A.H.

suspected criminal wrongdoing.”); N.C., 396 S.W.3d at 865 (explaining that even

“when law enforcement is involved” in the questioning of a student, Miranda

warnings are not necessary “if the matter purely concerns school discipline”). If the

interview was the result of specific criminal suspicion directed toward the student,

questioning occurring during the investigation of this suspicion will be subject to

closer scrutiny by courts. See In re D.A.C., 225 N.C. App. at 552, 741 S.E.2d at 382

(holding that “the degree to which suspicion had been focused on the defendant” prior

to the interview is a relevant Miranda factor) (internal marks and citation omitted);

In re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. at 461, 700 S.E.2d at 772 (interview was custodial when

juvenile “knew he was suspected of a crime” as opposed to a mere violation of school

rules). On the other hand, if the interview is a disciplinary investigation into the

breaking of school rules and its result is unlikely to involve the criminal justice

system, questioning of the student will not be considered to have occurred while the

student was in custody. See, e.g., Matter of Phillips, 128 N.C. App. 732, 735, 497

S.E.2d 292, 294 (1998) (no Miranda warnings required when school officials “did not

question the juvenile to obtain information to use in criminal proceedings but

questioned her simply for school disciplinary purposes”).

¶ 51 The purpose of an interview (criminal vs. disciplinary) can also be revealed by

examining the degree and nature of the cooperation between school officials and law

enforcement, including an SRO. Did the SRO work with the school official by IN RE D.A.H.

following a set of pre-defined procedures in conducting the interview? For example,

if school officials typically follow a certain process when disciplining a child for

breaking school rules, and use a different process when investigating criminal

activity, then the use of (or departure from) these procedures is instructive. See, e.g.,

N.C., 396 S.W.3d at 854 (evidence showed that student was in custody when principal

and SRO had employed a “loose routine they followed for questioning students when

there was suspected criminal activity”).

b. Interrogation

¶ 52 The second element of the Miranda test asks whether the juvenile was subject

to an interrogation. Under this element, the primary concern is whether the

authorities employed “any words or actions” that they “should know are reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.

The focus here is on “the suspect’s perceptions” of the encounter, “rather than on the

intent of the law enforcement officer.” State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 406, 533 S.E.2d

168, 199 (2000).

¶ 53 In the context of a schoolhouse interrogation, the following factors are most

relevant to the interrogation element:

(1) the nature of the questions asked (interrogative or mandatory);

(2) the willingness of the juvenile’s responses; and,

(3) the extent of the SRO’s involvement. IN RE D.A.H.

¶ 54 First—what was the nature of the statements made by the questioner? If the

questions were mostly open-ended (e.g., “would you like to tell me what happened?”),

this weighs against concluding that the questioning was an interrogation. See, e.g.,

In re D.A.C., 225 N.C. App. at 553, 741 S.E.2d at 382 (juvenile was not subject to

custodial interrogation when he was “asked . . . rather than instruct[ed]” to cooperate,

and “did nothing more . . . than answer a simple, straightforward question”). On the

other hand, if the questions are accompanied by imperative statements suggesting

compliance is mandatory (e.g., “you have to tell me the truth”), this supports the

conclusion that the questioning was an interrogation. See, e.g., In re K.D.L., 207 N.C.

App. at 462, 700 S.E.2d at 773 (juvenile was subject to custodial interrogation when

he was not “given the option of answering questions,” but rather was instructed to

answer). The tone of voice, volume, and body language used by the questioner are

also relevant here. See Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 164, 804 S.E.2d at 443 (no custodial

interrogation when the conversation with the suspect was “calm and cordial in tone”

and “the detectives offered [the suspect] food or drink”).

¶ 55 Second—how willingly did the subject respond to the questions? If the juvenile

makes a wholly unsolicited or spontaneous statement, such a statement is unlikely

to be considered to have been made in the context of interrogation. See In re D.L.D.,

203 N.C. App. 434, 444, 694 S.E.2d 395, 403 (2010) (no custodial interrogation

occurred when juvenile’s “unsolicited and spontaneous” statement was “not [made] at IN RE D.A.H.

the questioning of the officers”) (internal marks and citation omitted). On the other

hand, if a juvenile expresses hesitancy or reluctance to answer, claims ignorance of a

subject, or must be coaxed into answering, this weighs in support of the ultimate

conclusion that any statements made occurred during an interrogation.

¶ 56 Third—what was the extent of the involvement of law enforcement? As

discussed above, a custodial interrogation can occur even when the SRO is present

while a student is interviewed by school officials but does not ask questions.

However, the scope and extent of the SRO’s involvement in the questioning is still a

relevant factor in ascertaining whether or not an interrogation occurred. If the SRO

was not present for the entirety of the questioning or for significant portions of it, the

absence of the officer can weigh against the conclusion that the questioning qualified

as an interrogation. See In re R.B.L., 242 N.C. App. 383, 776 S.E.2d 363, 2015 WL

4429626, at *1-8 (2015) (unpublished) (juvenile was not subject to custodial

interrogation when the SRO “stood off to [the] side,” did not ask questions, and

“entered and exited the room several times” during the interview). On the other

hand, if the SRO directs the questioning, either by leading it or participating heavily

in it, this weighs in support of the conclusion that the questioning was an

interrogation. In re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. at 461, 700 S.E.2d at 772.

¶ 57 Finally, we note that as with the reasonable adult standard, no single factor is

controlling in determining whether statements made by a juvenile are the product of IN RE D.A.H.

custodial interrogation. Rather, the inquiry is whether the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the questioning “add up to custody.” J.D.B., 564 U.S. at

278 (citation omitted).

C. Application

¶ 58 Now we turn to the facts of the present case and the issue of whether the

statements Deacon made were the product of a custodial interrogation. To briefly

review, 13-year-old Deacon was called into to the principal’s office after officers

received a tip that Deacon had sold marijuana to another student. He was then

questioned by the principal while the SRO was present the entire time, and after

some prompting made a confession. It was not until after Deacon made this

confession that his guardian was contacted, and at no point was he told that he was

free to leave or to refuse to answer questions. We hold that this amounted to a

custodial interrogation and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise and

denying the motion to suppress.

1. Custody

¶ 59 First—would a reasonable student in Deacon’s place have felt free to terminate

the interview and leave, under these circumstances? We conclude that a reasonable

13-year-old would not, given the location of the interview, what Deacon could have

known about the interview before it began, the people present during the interview,

and the investigatory purpose of the interview. IN RE D.A.H.

¶ 60 Thirteen-year-old Deacon arrived at school on the morning of 14 March 2019

knowing that he was in trouble—knowing that his classmate had recently been

caught with the marijuana that Deacon had sold him. In fact, he had been absent

from school the prior two days because he was so nervous about what might happen

when he returned. His worries were confirmed when he was summoned to the

principal’s office that morning, where both Principal Whitaker and Deputy Sechrist

were waiting for him. The two authority figures sat together opposite Deacon.

Deputy Sechrist was wearing his uniform, and Principal Whitaker was dressed

formally in a suit. Deacon was not told that he was free to go, was not told that he

did not have to answer questions, and was not told that he could call his grandmother

if he wished.

¶ 61 We hold that, under these circumstances, no reasonable 13-year-old would

have felt free to leave. Even before any questions were asked, it appeared that this

interview was for purposes of a criminal investigation rather than a mere disciplinary

matter. Deacon’s classmate Daniel had been caught with marijuana only three days

prior, and had admitted that he bought the drugs from Deacon. Deputy Sechrist and

Principal Whitaker were thus following a lead as a part of a criminal investigation

when they called Deacon into the office to be questioned.

¶ 62 The State contends that this was purely a disciplinary matter (and that no

Miranda warning was required) because Principal Whitaker was only concerned with IN RE D.A.H.

why Deacon had missed school the previous two days. While it is true that Deacon

had missed school for two days, if this had been a pure disciplinary matter regarding

Deacon’s absences, then there would have been no reason to have the SRO present.

Though the record does not demonstrate what typical procedures Gentry Middle

School follows when a student has accrued two days’ worth of absences—absences

which might not have been unexcused2—we strongly suspect that not every instance

involves a student being summoned out of class to meet with the principal and a

uniformed SRO.

¶ 63 Moreover, once inside the principal’s office—an intimidating atmosphere to

any reasonable 13-year-old—Deacon found himself in a room not only with the

principal, but also the same officer that had questioned Daniel. A reasonable student

in Deacon’s position would believe that he was going to be questioned about potential

criminal behavior, not disciplined for missing two days of school. Accordingly, we

hold that Deacon was in custody at the time of his questioning by Principal Whitaker

and Deputy Sechrist.

2. Interrogation

¶ 64 We must next address whether Deacon was subjected to interrogation—i.e.,

whether the questioning was of a nature that the two authority figures should have

2 Deputy Sechrist admitted at the suppression hearing that he did not know whether

Deacon’s absences were unexcused. IN RE D.A.H.

known was likely to elicit an incriminating response from Deacon. We conclude that

the answer to this question is also yes, given the nature of the questions asked, the

length of the interview, the extent of Deputy Sechrist’s involvement, and the

differential treatment of Deacon as compared to Daniel.

¶ 65 After Deacon arrived at the principal’s office, he began to be questioned by

Principal Whitaker, while Deputy Sechrist sat by the principal’s side and observed

throughout. However, Deputy Sechrist’s testimony regarding the content of the

interview was not exhaustive. He offered three slightly differing accounts of what

happened: (1) initially testifying that Deacon apparently volunteered the information

about the marijuana sale without being prompted; (2) then clarifying that Principal

Whitaker had asked Deacon to tell them “what had taken place,” whereupon Deacon

confessed; and (3) finally stating that Principal Whitaker had simply asked Deacon

“where have you been for the last few days,” to which Deacon responded that he had

skipped school for fear of being punished for the marijuana sale.

¶ 66 Though it is not clear precisely what questions Principal Whitaker asked

Deacon, it is clear that Deacon’s grandmother was not contacted until after Deacon

had already confessed in response to the questioning. Deputy Sechrist also stated

that “not very many questions were even asked” prior to the grandmother being

called—but the very phrasing of this statement implies that multiple questions were

asked before Deacon’s guardian was notified, and that enough were asked to elicit a IN RE D.A.H.

confession. Under these circumstances, both Principal Whitaker and Deputy Sechrist

should have known that asking these questions of a 13-year-old (who was already the

suspect of a criminal investigation and likely knew he was a suspect, and who had

not yet been afforded any ability to contact his guardian), would have been likely to

result in an incriminating statement.

¶ 67 We also cannot ignore the fact that Deacon received a very different treatment

than his classmate Daniel. After Daniel was found with marijuana on the school bus,

he was escorted by Deputy Sechrist to the principal’s office, and his father was

immediately contacted. Once inside the principal’s office, Daniel asked whether he

could “speak freely,” but Deputy Sechrist expressly instructed him to “wait until your

daddy gets here.” Daniel was not asked any questions until after his father arrived.

¶ 68 In contrast, Deacon was not advised to keep quiet until his guardian arrived,

and Deacon’s guardian was not even contacted until after he had confessed. This

unequal treatment underscores that the purpose of interviewing Deacon was to

conduct a criminal investigation, not to investigate whether he had broken a school

rule about absences. Unlike Daniel, Deacon did not have access to a guardian or

other adult concerned with his best interest during the questioning, demonstrating

that the purpose of the questioning was to elicit an inculpatory response from a

criminal suspect, rather than to mete out school discipline for missing class.

¶ 69 As the State notes, it is true that Deputy Sechrist himself asked no questions IN RE D.A.H.

of Deacon during the interview, based on Deputy Sechrist’s testimony. However, as

in In re K.D.L., Deputy Sechrist’s presence during the entirety of the interview

“significantly increased the likelihood” that Deacon “would produce an incriminating

response to the principal’s questioning.” 207 N.C. App. at 461, 700 S.E.2d at 772.

Moreover, we find it relevant that Deputy Sechrist was intimately involved in the

investigation from the outset. He investigated the original incident on the bus,

escorted Daniel to the principal’s office, warned Daniel not to speak prior to his father

arriving, and was present throughout Daniel’s questioning. Prior to speaking with

Deacon, Deputy Sechrist had also performed lab tests on the substance recovered

from Daniel to confirm it was marijuana. On the day of questioning Deacon, Deputy

Sechrist was in uniform, he sat on the same side of the desk as the principal, and was

present for the entire interview. Under these circumstances, Deputy Sechrist was

more than just an observer to a school disciplinary conversation—he was a law

enforcement officer investigating a crime.

¶ 70 Finally, we note that the trial court relied on an erroneous legal standard in

concluding that Deacon’s interview was not a custodial interrogation. The trial court

based its determination primarily on the “fact” that Deputy Sechrist was not “some

strange officer in uniform” and that it was “not unusual in a school setting” for a

student “to be called into a principal’s office.” This is not the test for whether a

Miranda warning is required. IN RE D.A.H.

¶ 71 First, aside from the fact that there was no evidence in the record to support

the finding that Deputy Sechrist was not a “strange officer in uniform,” it bears

emphasizing that the Miranda inquiry is an objective, not subjective, test.

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004). Any supposed familiarity between

a 13-year-old and an investigating officer is irrelevant under a proper Miranda

inquiry. Id. at 668-69 (relying on a suspect’s “prior history with law enforcement” in

a Miranda analysis is “improper” because “[t]he inquiry turns too much on the

suspect’s subjective state of mind and not enough on the objective circumstances of

the interrogation”) (internal marks and citation omitted).

¶ 72 Rather, the objective Miranda inquiry turns on (1) “the circumstances

surrounding the interrogation”; and (2) whether “given those circumstances,” a

reasonable 13-year-old would “have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the

interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). The

circumstances here were that Deacon, a 13-year-old suspect in a criminal

investigation, was called out of class to be questioned in the principal’s office

alongside the SRO; was neither told he was free to leave nor that he did not have to

answer questions; and was not provided the option of contacting his guardian until

after he had already confessed.

¶ 73 The trial court was required to take these circumstances into account to

determine whether a reasonable 13-year-old in Deacon’s position would have felt free IN RE D.A.H.

to terminate the encounter and leave. There is no indication in the trial court’s order

that it considered or applied this standard. Accordingly, the trial court erred in

denying the motion to suppress Deacon’s confession; in concluding that the

questioning did not amount to a custodial interrogation; and in concluding that

Deacon was not entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment or N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 7B-2101.

III. Conclusion

¶ 74 The trial court erred in concluding that Deacon’s confession was not the

product of a custodial interrogation and in denying the motion to suppress Deacon’s

confession. We therefore reverse and remand the order of the trial court.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judges HAMPSON and CARPENTER concur.