In re D. W. J.

293 A.2d 268
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 11, 1972
DocketNo. 6270
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 293 A.2d 268 (In re D. W. J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re D. W. J., 293 A.2d 268 (D.C. 1972).

Opinion

KELLY, Associate Judge:

One afternoon in September of 1971, Antonio Wells, age 13, was on his way home with a friend when he observed appellant and another juvenile trying to enter a rear kitchen window of his father’s ground-floor apartment. Antonio went over to the two boys when they called to him. The boys told him that if he did not go through the window, which had been broken and opened, and remove certain items from the apartment, they would kill him or get someone else to “jump” him. Antonio did as he was told, and was later made to sell the items and turn the money received over to appellant and his companion.

Appellant was charged with threats in a menacing manner.1 He presented an alibi defense at trial, which the court did not accept, and was held responsible as charged. [269]*269Appellant’s argument on appeal is that on a charge of threats in a menacing manner under Section 22-504 of the Code it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the elements of an assault; i. e., that a case of threats under the statute is essentially an assault case.

At common law, threatening words, accompanied by a menacing or threatening gesture, constituted an assault.2 Section 22-504, which by its terms relates to assaults or threatened assaults in a menacing manner, codifies the common law offense of assault,3 which has been defined as “an attempt with force or violence to do a corporal injury to another; and may consist of any act tending to such corporal injury, accompanied with such circumstances as denote at the time an intention, coupled with the present ability, of using actual violence against the person”.4

Proof of threats in a menacing manner under Section 22-504 by words alone does not suffice.5 Oral threats to do bodily harm, a crime unknown to the common law, has been made a crime in this jurisdiction by statute, Postell v. United States, D.C.App., 282 A.2d 551 (1971), and appellant could properly have been charged under that statute for his conduct in this case.6 However, the evidence does not sustain a holding that appellant threatened the complainant in a menacing manner within the meaning of Section 22-504 of the Code. The judgment of the trial court must therefore be

Reversed.

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In the Matter of Dwj
293 A.2d 268 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1972)

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Bluebook (online)
293 A.2d 268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-d-w-j-dc-1972.