In re Currier

Supreme Court of Vermont

In re Currier

513 A.2d 41, 147 Vt. 645, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 471

CourtSupreme Court of Vermont

DecidedMay 16, 1986

DocketNo. 85-314; 513 A.2d 42

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 513 A.2d 41 (In re Currier) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Currier, 513 A.2d 41, 147 Vt. 645, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 471 (Vt. 1986).

Pincite

Opinion

Motion to reargue denied June 27, 1986. Under the test established in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963), a court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for post-conviction relief if: the same ground was determined adversely to the petitioner in an earlier petition, the prior determination was on the merits, and the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application. Here, the trial court found that the petitioner could have and did raise his V.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(4) claim in his first petition by alleging that his plea and sentence were contrary to the laws and constitution of the United States and Vermont. The withdrawal with prejudice of the first petition operated as an adjudication on the merits. The petitioner did not show that the ends of justice would be served by permitting a redetermination of this ground. See id. at 16. Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction relief.

Affirmed.

Motion to reargue denied June 27, 1986.

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Motion to reargue denied June 27, 1986. Under the test established in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963), a court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for post-conviction relief if: the same ground was determined adversely to the petitioner in an earlier petition, the prior determination was on the merits, and the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application. Here, the trial court found that the petitioner could have and did raise his V.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(4) claim in his first petition by alleging that his plea and sentence were contrary to the laws and constitution of the United States and Vermont. The withdrawal with prejudice of the first petition operated as an adjudication on the merits. The petitioner did not show that the ends of justice would be served by permitting a redetermination of this ground. See id. at 16. Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction relief.

Affirmed.

Motion to reargue denied June 27, 1986.

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Bluebook (online)

513 A.2d 41, 147 Vt. 645, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 471, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-currier-vt-1986.

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