[Cite as In re C.S., 2021-Ohio-3182.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
IN RE C.S. C.A. Nos. 29927 G.S. 29929 29938
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nos. DN 17 11 0948 DN 19 01 0048
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 15, 2021
CALLAHAN, Judge.
{¶1} Appellants Mother, Father, and Grandfather appeal the judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights and placed their two children in the permanent custody of Summit County
Children Services Board (“CSB” or “the agency”). This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Mother and Father are the biological parents of G.S. (d.o.b. 7/25/11) and C.S.
(d.o.b. 11/9/17). Grandfather is the maternal grandfather of the children.
{¶3} These cases have a long and complicated history. When G.S. was an infant, CSB
filed a complaint in juvenile court regarding the child. The details of that case are limited, but
G.S. was ultimately returned to Mother’s legal custody. Mother allowed G.S. to live in
Grandfather’s home, where Mother also lived at times. Although, in 2017, Grandfather moved 2
for legal custody of G.S. in the 2011 dependency case, no change of disposition was granted, and
Mother remained the child’s legal custodian. At no time was Grandfather appointed as a
custodian or guardian for the child. The record indicates, however, that he possessed some sort
of power of attorney regarding G.S.
{¶4} Late in 2017, a couple weeks after C.S. was born, CSB filed a complaint alleging
that that child was abused (endangered) and dependent. In support, the agency alleged that
Mother had used drugs throughout her pregnancy, that the infant exhibited signs of withdrawal
and required treatment with morphine, that Father had both substance abuse and criminal
histories, and that the parents’ relationship was volatile. CSB obtained emergency temporary
custody of C.S. The agency did not remove the then-six-year-old G.S. or file a complaint
regarding that child at that time, because G.S. was then living in another home with Grandfather,
a maternal aunt, and some cousins.
{¶5} Mother later stipulated that C.S. was abused (endangered) and dependent. As
Father did not appear for adjudication, the agency presented evidence to establish C.S.’ abuse
and dependency. The child was then placed in the temporary custody of CSB. The juvenile
court adopted the agency’s case plan which required Mother to engage in chemical dependency
services with an approved provider and follow all recommendations, including submitting to
additional substance abuse and mental health assessments, attending counseling and relapse
prevention or aftercare services, attending support meetings, and submitting to drug screens.
Mother was also required to demonstrate that she had the resources to provide for the child’s
basic needs, including housing, food, clothing, and the like. Father was required to formally
establish paternity and contact the caseworker if he was interested in visitation or custody. 3
Shortly after Father was determined to be C.S.’ biological father, the agency added case plan
objectives for him regarding chemical dependency and mental health services, and basic needs.
{¶6} After the first review hearing, C.S. was continued in the temporary custody of
CSB. At that time, the magistrate’s order expressly found that “[n]o appropriate or willing
relatives have been identified for placement or custody at this time.” When C.S. was 9 months
old, the guardian ad litem filed a report indicating that Mother wanted Grandfather, in whose
home G.S. was staying, to have legal custody of C.S. However, Grandfather had informed the
guardian ad litem that he was not willing or able to seek custody of the infant.
{¶7} Eleven months into the case, CSB filed a motion for a first six-month extension of
temporary custody. The agency asserted that “Kinship [department] previously assessed and
denied [Grandfather], but an updated Kinship Assessment is pending. [Grandfather] is willing to
take placement and to be a concurrent permanency plan.” Accordingly, CSB asserted that an
extension of temporary custody was in C.S.’ best interest so that the agency had time to complete
a second kinship assessment regarding Grandfather. At the sunset dispositional hearing, the
juvenile court granted the agency’s motion for a first six-month extension of temporary custody
of C.S.
{¶8} A month and a half later in January 2019, CSB filed a complaint alleging three
grounds that G.S. was a dependent child. The agency removed the child from the home he
shared with Grandfather, a maternal aunt, and some cousins, after his aunt was found slumped
over the steering wheel of her car in a school parking lot. The aunt evidenced symptoms of
opiate overdose. There were suspicions of drug and excessive alcohol use in the home, as well.
CSB alleged that the aunt had been trying to buy Vicodin for Grandfather who admitted using
non-prescribed Vicodin for pain. Grandfather also admitted having had a beer before picking up 4
C.S. once from daycare. CSB alleged that the aunt was engaging in prostitution out of
Grandfather’s home. Grandfather denied this but admitted that the aunt gave massages to men in
the home where G.S. and the aunt’s young children were living. Mother informed the agency
that she was also staying in Grandfather’s home with G.S. at times. At the time of G.S.’
removal, Mother and Father had made minimal progress on their case plan objectives to remedy
the concerns that had caused the removal of G.S.’ sister from Mother’s and Father’s custody.
Mother and Father both stipulated to G.S.’ dependency and his placement in the temporary
custody of CSB.
{¶9} In April 2019, CSB moved for a second six-month extension of temporary
custody of C.S. based on Mother’s progress. Although Father had not made any progress, the
juvenile court granted the second six-month extension of temporary custody based on Mother’s
additional substantial compliance with her case plan objectives. Two weeks later, G.S. was
continued in the agency’s temporary custody after a review hearing. Shortly thereafter, Mother
requested and received unsupervised visitation with both children, provided that she not allow
Father and/or Grandfather to be present.
{¶10} Almost immediately, Mother began to regress. She became financially dependent
on Father, began missing counseling sessions, prioritized Father over the children, and brought
both Father and Grandfather to her unsupervised visits. After the next review hearing, the
magistrate maintained both children in the agency’s temporary custody and ordered that
Mother’s visits thereafter would be supervised at the agency visitation center. The magistrate
made the express finding that “[n]o appropriate or willing relatives have been identified for
placement or custody at this time.” 5
{¶11} On October 17, 2019, 23 months after filing its complaint regarding C.S. and nine
months after filing its complaint regarding G.S., CSB filed a motion for permanent custody of
both children. The agency alleged that C.S. had been in its temporary custody in excess of 12 of
22 consecutive months and that G.S. could not or should not be returned to his parents’ custody.
CSB premised the allegation regarding G.S. on Mother’s and Father’s failures to remedy the
concerns impacting their abilities to provide a safe and stable home for the child, as well as the
parents’ chronic mental health and chemical dependency problems that precluded reunification
within a year. In addition to its allegations regarding the best interest of the children, CSB also
asserted that “[d]espite family search and engagement efforts, no relatives are identified who are
willing/able/appropriate to take Legal Custody.”
{¶12} One week later, on October 24, 2019, Grandfather filed four pro se motions:
motions to intervene in each child’s case and motions for legal custody of each child. After a
sunset hearing in November 2019, the juvenile court scheduled pretrial and hearing dates for the
agency’s permanent custody motion. Although the trial court had not yet ruled on Grandfather’s
motions to intervene, it copied Grandfather on the scheduling order.
{¶13} In the meantime, Father filed a motion for legal custody of both children to
Mother and Father, or alternatively legal custody of the children to Grandfather. Mother filed
alternative motions for legal custody, legal custody with protective supervision, legal custody to
both Mother and Father with protective supervision, legal custody to Grandfather with protective
supervision, or a six-month extension of temporary custody.
{¶14} The juvenile court continued the originally scheduled March 25, 2020 permanent
custody hearing due to the Covid-19 pandemic. It rescheduled the final dispositional hearing for
mid-August 2020. In the meantime, the trial court scheduled a hearing on Grandfather’s motion 6
to intervene for June 25, 2020. On June 29, 2020, the juvenile court granted Grandfather’s
motion to intervene without objection by any party.
{¶15} Father requested transport from prison for the permanent custody hearing.
Because inmates could not be transported due to pandemic restrictions, the juvenile court
continued the permanent custody hearing until December 21 and 22, 2020, as Father was
scheduled to be released from prison prior to that time. For an unknown reason, the juvenile
court again continued the permanent custody hearing until January 14 and 15, 2021. Mother
filed renewed motions, including the five prior alternative dispositional motions, plus a motion
for legal custody to her and Father and a motion for legal custody to Grandfather, each without
ongoing protective supervision. On January 12, 2021, two days before the permanent custody
hearing began, Grandfather filed a “renewed” motion for legal custody of both children. This
was the first time he filed a dispositional motion as a party to the action.
{¶16} A visiting judge held a hearing on all pending dispositional motions and gave the
parties the opportunity to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. All parties
except the guardian ad litem did so. CSB proposed an award of permanent custody, Father and
Grandfather proposed granting legal custody to Grandfather, and Mother proposed an award of
any of her alternative dispositions. In their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
Mother, Father, and Grandfather each noted that CSB had never added Grandfather to the case
plan or developed case plan objectives for him.
{¶17} The juvenile court issued a judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights and granting permanent custody of both children to CSB. The court found that C.S. had
been in the agency’s temporary custody in excess of 12 months of a consecutive 22-month
period, that G.S. could not or should not be returned to his parents’ custody based on their 7
failures to remedy concerns, and that an award of permanent custody was in the best interest of
the children. Mother, Father, and Grandfather each timely appealed, raising identical
assignments of error for review.
II.
MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT TERMINATED THE PARTIES’ PARENTAL RIGHTS AS THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. (sic.)
FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT TERMINATED THE PARTIES’ PARENTAL RIGHTS AS THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
GRANDFATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT TERMINATED THE PARTIES’ PARENTAL RIGHTS AS THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. (sic.)
{¶18} Mother, Father, and Grandfather purport to assign error relating to the evidentiary
basis for the juvenile court’s judgment awarding permanent custody of C.S. and G.S. to CSB.
Specifically, each party’s sole assignment of error asserts that the judgment was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. None of the appellants argue, however, that the juvenile court’s
findings regarding either prong of the permanent custody test were against the manifest weight of 8
the evidence. Instead, Mother, Father, and Grandfather focus their arguments1 on an alleged
deficiency in the agency’s case plan. Specifically, each appellant argues that CSB’s failure to
add case plan objectives for Grandfather for the purpose of “reunification” of the children with
him constituted reversible error. This Court disagrees.
{¶19} As this Court has frequently noted, the juvenile court derives its sole authority in
dependency, neglect, and abuse cases from the comprehensive statutory scheme set out in R.C.
Chapter 2151. E.g., In re A.P., 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0022-M, 2012-Ohio-3873, ¶ 16.
R.C. 2151.412, which addresses case plans, further directs the director of job and family services
to adopt rules regarding the content, format, development, implementation, and modification of
case plans. Those rules are found in various provisions of the Ohio Administrative Code.
{¶20} CSB was required to “prepare and maintain a case plan” for C.S. and G.S. R.C.
2151.412(A)(2). The agency filed its original case plan prior to C.S.’ adjudication, amended that
case plan once, and then a second time prior to G.S.’ adjudication, fulfilling its statutory
obligation. See R.C. 2151.412(D). The agency’s case plan goal remained reunification with the
parents throughout the case, even after CSB moved for permanent custody. At all times, the case
plan objectives were designed to remedy concerns regarding both parents.
{¶21} Mother, Father, and Grandfather argue that CSB was required to add Grandfather
to the case plan once he became a party to the case. Moreover, they argue that the agency was
further required to create case plan objectives for Grandfather designed to remedy concerns
regarding his ability to be a suitable caregiver for the children in an effort to facilitate
“reunification” of the children with him. This Court is not persuaded by the appellants’
arguments.
1 Mother and Grandfather have submitted identical briefs except for their identification of 9
{¶22} Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-38-05(E) identifies who is a party to the case plan. In
addition to the child, child’s attorney (if applicable), and guardian ad litem, the list includes the
child’s “parent, guardian or custodian.” Id. at (E)(1), (3), (4), (5), and (7).2 “Custodian” is
defined as “a person who has legal custody of a child or a public children services agency or
private child placing agency that has permanent, temporary, or legal custody of a child.” R.C.
2151.011(B)(11); see also Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-1-01(B)(84). “Legal custody” is “a legal
status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child and to
determine where and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and
discipline the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all
subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.” R.C. 2151.011(B)(21);
see also Juv.R. 2(V) and Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-1-01(B)(171). “Guardian” means “a person,
association, or corporation that is granted authority by a probate court pursuant to Chapter 2111.
of the Revised Code to exercise parental rights over a child to the extent provided in the court’s
order and subject to the residual parental rights of the child’s parents.” R.C. 2151.011(B)(17);
see also Juv.R. 2(N) and Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-1-01(B)(130). Beyond those enumerated
persons, the juvenile court may “specifically identif[y] * * * [a]ny other party” * * * as a party to
the case plan.” Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-38-05(E)(8).
{¶23} Grandfather is not the parent of either child. Neither had he ever been awarded
legal custody of the children or appointed by the probate court as their guardian. Although he
became a party to the juvenile proceedings, he was never “specifically identified by the
[juvenile] court as a party to the case plan.” See Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-38-05(E)(8). In fact,
the named appellant and the addition of one sentence in Grandfather’s brief. 2 Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-38-05(E)(2) and (6) include two additional specific categories of individuals not applicable to this case. 10
there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Grandfather ever moved the court for an order
identifying him as a party to the case plan. Accordingly, CSB had no obligation to treat
Grandfather as a party to the case plan, add objectives for him, or seek his agreement regarding
amendments, as the agency would have to do regarding designated parties to the case plan. See
Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-38-05(T).
{¶24} None of the case law cited by the appellants supports the argument that CSB was
required to include Grandfather as a party to the case plan in this case. In In re J.H., 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 19CA011522, 2019-Ohio-4510, and In re S.R., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27209, 2014-
Ohio-2749, this Court reversed awards of permanent custody based on the agency’s failure to
add the respective fathers to the case plans. In In re A.P., 2012-Ohio-3873, at ¶ 1, we reversed
based on the agency’s removal of the child’s grandmother from the case plan although the
grandmother was the legal custodian of the child when the child was removed. Mother, Father,
and Grandfather have cited no authority requiring the addition of extended family members to
the case plan where those family members were not the subject child’s legal custodian or
guardian or had not been designated by the juvenile court as parties to the case plan. This Court
declines to expand the agency’s duty in the absence of compelling or persuasive authority.
{¶25} Neither is this Court persuaded by the appellants’ arguments that Grandfather’s
addition to the case plan was necessary for purposes of “reunification.” Given the substantial
right of parents to raise their children, they are entitled to “every procedural and substantive
protection the law allows[,]” including “the obligation of the agency to make reasonable efforts
to reunify the child[ren] with one or both parents.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)
In re H.S., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28944 and 28948, 2018-Ohio-3360, ¶ 14. The law does not
recognize rights for grandparents akin to parental rights regarding the care and control of their 11
grandchildren. In fact, only under very limited circumstances do grandparents even have the
legal right to visitation with their grandchildren. See, e.g., R.C. 3109.11 and 3109.12.
Reunification efforts, therefore, inure to the benefit of parents and legal custodians or guardians,
i.e., nonparents who have been legally endowed with parental rights. See In re A.P., 2012-Ohio-
3873, at ¶ 27-28 (recognizing the overriding goal of the case plan to enable the child to return
“home,” i.e., “the place where the child resided, prior to the commencement of an abuse,
dependency, or neglect case, with one or both of her parents, guardian, or custodian.”)
(Emphasis added.) In other words, “case planning and reunification efforts are required to be
directed to the person who was the child’s legal caretaker at the time the case began: a parent or
parents, guardian, or custodian.” Id. at ¶ 29. As a grandparent who was never awarded legal
custody or guardianship of the children, Grandfather had no right to reunification efforts by the
agency.3
{¶26} R.C. 2151.412(F)(2) and (3) provide the exclusive means for modifying case
plans.4 Subsection (2) allows “[a]ny party [to] propose a change to a substantive part of the case
plan, including, but not limited to, the child’s placement and the visitation rights of any party.”
The statute requires the party moving for modification of the case plan to file the proposed
changes with the court and give notice to all parties, including the guardian ad litem. The parties
then have seven days in which to object and request a hearing to determine whether the proposed
changes should become the order of the court. Assuming, without deciding, that “party” in this
3 The appellants’ argument regarding “reunification” of C.S. with Grandfather is even more tenuous, as that child was removed from her parents’ care shortly after birth without ever having lived in Grandfather’s home. 4 Subsection (3) addresses exigent situations and allows the agency to implement emergency modifications to the case plan without prior notice to the parties or adoption by the court. 12
context refers to parties to the case and not merely parties to the case plan, there is nothing in the
record to indicate that Grandfather, once he became a party to the case, ever moved to modify
the case plan to include objectives designed to remedy the agency’s concerns regarding his
suitability as a caregiver for the children. In the absence of such a request by Grandfather,
followed by the adoption by the juvenile court of any proposed modifications to the case plan,
CSB had no statutory duty to add case plan objectives for Grandfather.
{¶27} Finally, Mother, Father, and Grandfather argue that CSB was required to work
with Grandfather in the interest of maintaining the children in the least restrictive out-of-home
placement, prioritizing seeking legal custody to a member of the children’s extended family over
permanent custody. In developing its case plan, the agency is guided by R.C. 2151.412(H)(2)
which prioritizes an award of legal custody to a “suitable member of the child’s extended
family” over an award of permanent custody. Mother, Father, and Grandfather disregard the
word “suitable” in the statute and instead argue to impute a duty on the agency to rehabilitate a
relative who has been assessed and determined to be inappropriate, where no such duty exists.
R.C. 2151.412(H)(5) directs the agency to pursue permanent custody if a child cannot or should
not be returned to his parents and no suitable member of the child’s extended family or suitable
nonrelative is able to accept legal custody of the child.
{¶28} CSB assessed Grandfather twice prior to initiating the instant cases, in 2011 and
2015. Because of concerns illuminated during those assessments, the agency determined that he
was not a suitable placement for G.S. at those times. Notwithstanding Grandfather’s prior
unsuitability, the agency initiated a new (third) kinship assessment late in 2018, after
Grandfather indicated his interest in placement and possible legal custody of C.S. Unfortunately,
due to concerns regarding Grandfather’s own personal issues, as well as his failure to 13
acknowledge the significance of the issues of his own adult children, including Mother, CSB
again found Grandfather unsuitable for placement or custody of the children.5 As there is no
statutory obligation for the agency to work to try to rehabilitate an unsuitable relative or
nonrelative before seeking permanent custody, CSB’s failure to add case plan objectives for
Grandfather does not require reversal of the juvenile court’s award of permanent custody of C.S.
and G.S. For the above reasons, the appellants’ substantive arguments in their assignments of
error are not well taken.
{¶29} As previously noted, none of the appellants make arguments relating to the
manifest weight of the evidence. Nevertheless, given the substantial rights implicated when
parental rights are terminated, this Court addresses that assigned error in the interest of justice.
See In re T.B., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 29560 and 29564, 2020-Ohio-4040, ¶ 15 (considering
whether the judgment awarding permanent custody was against the manifest weight of the
evidence even though the parents-appellants failed to make any substantive arguments in support
of that assigned error).
{¶30} In considering whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest
weight of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers
the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
[finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
[judgment] must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal quotations and citations
omitted.) Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. When weighing the
evidence, this Court “must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.”
Id. at ¶ 21.
5 G.S. had been placed in the agency’s emergency temporary custody by this time. 14
{¶31} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent
custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both
prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the
temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the
child or another child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent
three times; or that the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C.
2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of
the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and
2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). The best interest
factors include: the interaction and interrelationships of the children, the wishes of the children,
the custodial history of the children, the children’s need for permanence and whether that can be
achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and whether any of the factors outlined in R.C.
2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); see In re R.G., 9th Dist. Summit Nos.
24834, 24850, 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11. Clear and convincing evidence is that which will
“produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368
(1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶32} No appellant challenges the juvenile court’s first-prong findings, and the record
supports those findings. C.S. had been in the agency’s temporary custody for approximately 21
months at the time CSB filed its motion for permanent custody. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)
(setting the date that a child enters the temporary custody of the agency as the earlier of the date
of the child’s adjudication or 60 days after the child’s removal from the home). In addition, G.S.
could not and should not be returned to his parents’ custody, as Mother and Father failed 15
continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the concerns underlying the child’s
continued removal from her home. Both parents had long-term chemical dependency issues
which continued to impact their abilities to provide a safe and stable home for G.S. Despite
numerous referrals by the agency and some participation by Mother and Father in various
substance abuse services, neither parent was able to achieve sustained sobriety or gain insight
into their addiction issues. For these reasons, the juvenile court’s first-prong findings in support
of permanent custody are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶33} As to best interest of the children, the juvenile court’s findings were also
supported by clear and convincing evidence. C.S. was removed by CSB shortly after her birth,
based in large part on Mother’s use of various drugs throughout her pregnancy and the infant’s
suffering from withdrawal symptoms upon birth. Father also had significant substance abuse
issues, as well as involvement in criminal activity. Upon her release from the NICU, C.S. spent
her entire life in foster care. G.S. was a subject child in a prior case but ultimately remained in
Mother’s legal custody. Mother and G.S. lived together at times in Grandfather’s home, while
Mother on other occasions left the child to live in Grandfather’s home without her. The
caseworker testified that G.S. had been residing in Grandfather’s home just over a year when the
child was removed. Grandfather had a power of attorney regarding G.S., but the extent of his
authority over the child is unknown and not explained in the record. The record is clear,
however, that Grandfather was not the child’s legal custodian or guardian and, accordingly, had
no legal rights akin to parental rights regarding G.S.
{¶34} Although the children have remained in separate foster homes, they visit with
each other and share a close bond. G.S.’ foster family is not available as a permanent placement 16
for him, but C.S.’ foster family is very familiar with G.S. and may be able to provide a
permanent home for him. G.S. is comfortable in that environment.
{¶35} Mother and Father visited sporadically with the children for the first six months of
the case, but their visits became more consistent over time. Grandfather frequently attended
visits with Mother and Father. The caseworker and guardian ad litem reported that the parents
were appropriate with the children during visits.
{¶36} C.S. was too young to express her wishes for custody. Besides G.S.’ expressed
comfort in his foster home, there is nothing in the record to indicate that he had any strong
opinion about his custody. The guardian ad litem opined that it was in the best interest of both
children to be placed in the permanent custody of CSB for purposes of adoption.
{¶37} Both children require permanency after the significant length of time each spent
in the agency’s custody. G.S. had been removed two years earlier, while C.S. had been in the
agency’s care for more than three years at the time of the hearing. Mother and Father are not
able to provide a safe and stable home for the children due to various unresolved mental health,
substance abuse, and basic needs issues. No suitable alternative caregiver was available for legal
custody.
{¶38} Based on a thorough review of the evidence, this is not the exceptional case
wherein the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by
granting permanent custody of the children to CSB. The clear and convincing evidence
supported the juvenile court’s first-prong findings of the permanent custody test and
demonstrated that the termination of Mother’s and Father’s rights was necessary in the best
interest of the children. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s judgment awarding permanent custody 17
of C.S. and G.S. to CSB was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother’s,
Father’s, and Grandfather’s assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶39} Mother’s, Father’s, and Grandfather’s respective assignments of error are
overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellants.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN FOR THE COURT 18
CARR, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
AMBER R. CROWE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
NEIL P. AGARWAL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
BRENDON KOHRS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
TONY PAXTON, Attorney at Law, for G.S.
KRISTOPHER IMMEL, Guardian ad Litem.