NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 190688-U March 3, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in 4th District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-19-0688 under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re C.S., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Vermilion County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 17JA26 v. ) Kuslaiah B., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Thomas M. O’Shaughnessy, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court’s findings respondent was an unfit parent and it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate his parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent father, Kuslaiah B., appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights to C.S. (born February 2, 2006). On appeal, respondent argues the trial court’s
findings he was an unfit parent and it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate his parental
rights were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In July 2019, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights to
C.S. Paragraph 6a of the petition alleged respondent was an unfit parent as he failed to maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor’s welfare. Paragraph 6b of
the petition alleged respondent was an unfit parent as “[t]he child is in the guardianship of the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services [(DCFS)] and the parent was
incarcerated as a result of a criminal conviction at the time of the
filing of this petition, and prior to incarceration the parent had little
or no contact with the child, or provided little or no support for the
child, and the parent’s incarceration will prevent the parent from
discharging his parental responsibilities for the child for a period in
excess of [two] years after the filing of this petition.”
The petition further alleged it would be in the minor’s best interest to terminate respondent’s
parental rights.
¶5 In October 2019, the trial court held a fitness hearing. The court heard testimony
from respondent, the minor’s mother, and the minor’s caseworker. We note the record discloses
respondent pointed his finger in a gun-like fashion at the minor’s mother after she testified. The
following is gleaned from the testimony presented.
¶6 Despite being aware of the minor’s birth, respondent visited with the minor only
once before DCFS became involved. He also never provided the minor’s mother with child
support.
¶7 At the time of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, respondent was
incarcerated. Respondent remained incarcerated and had a projected parole date in June 2025.
When asked if there was a possibility that he would “get out” earlier than June 2025, respondent
testified, “I’m scheduled to get out [December] 2022.”
¶8 After DCFS became involved, respondent received a service plan, which
recommended counseling and parenting classes. Despite a desire to sign up for those services,
-2- respondent was unable to do so because of the length of his remaining sentence. Respondent had
visited with the minor approximately five times since being incarcerated. The minor’s caseworker
supervised a visit in November 2018 and believed the visit was “appropriate.” Respondent also
had sent the minor letters while incarcerated; however, he had not sent a letter since before August
2018. He never sent any gifts to the minor.
¶9 The State argued the evidence demonstrated respondent was an unfit parent as
alleged in paragraphs 6a and 6b of its petition to terminate parental rights. Respondent argued the
State failed to show he was an unfit parent as alleged in paragraph 6a of the petition. The guardian
ad litem (GAL) argued the State had met its burden and established respondent was an unfit parent
as alleged in paragraph 6b of its petition.
¶ 10 After considering the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court found the
State had established respondent was an unfit parent as alleged in paragraphs 6a and 6b of its
petition to terminate parental rights. Specifically, the court found:
“[H]e has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of concern, and
responsibility as to the minor’s welfare and the child is in the
guardianship of [DCFS]. Mr. Bridges was incarcerated as a result of
criminal conviction at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate
and prior to his incarceration he had little or no contact with the child,
provided little or no support for the child and his incarceration will
prevent him from discharging his parental responsibilities for a period
in excess two years after the filing of this petition. The evidence is
uncontradicted he had one visit with the child prior to the child going
into care and he was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the petition.
That prior to incarceration he provided little or no support to the child
-3- and that he will not be released from custody of the Department of
Corrections till December of 2022 which is a period in excess of two
years from the filing of the petition. The Court notes father’s
incarceration is a result of his voluntary actions. It is by those voluntary
actions that he is unable to complete services necessary for
reunification.”
¶ 11 Immediately following the fitness hearing, the trial court held a best-interest
hearing. The court heard testimony from the minor’s caseworker. The following is gleaned from
the testimony presented.
¶ 12 The minor, who was then 13 years old, had been placed with his maternal aunt for
about two years. The minor’s aunt provided the minor with a safe, loving environment. The minor
had ties to the community where he lived and participated in multiple sport leagues. The minor
attended unsupervised visits with his mother and sister. The minor expressed a desire to live with
his aunt. The minor’s mother supported the minor’s aunt obtaining guardianship. The minor’s
caseworker believed guardianship would be in the minor’s best interest.
¶ 13 Prior to DCFS involvement, respondent had visited with the minor only once. After
DCFS became involved, the minor expressed an interest in visiting with respondent. He then
visited with respondent approximately five times. During the year prior to the best-interest hearing,
the minor no longer wished to visit with respondent. In June 2019, the minor refused to attend a
scheduled visit. The minor had not received any letters or cards from respondent in at least a year.
¶ 14 The State argued the evidence demonstrated it would be in the minor’s best interest
to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Respondent, through counsel, stated, “I don’t have a
position.” The minor’s mother and the GAL agreed with the State’s position.
¶ 15 Based on the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court, after considering
-4- the statutory best-interest factors found in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705
ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)), found it would be in the minor’s best interest to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.
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NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 190688-U March 3, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in 4th District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-19-0688 under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re C.S., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Vermilion County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 17JA26 v. ) Kuslaiah B., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Thomas M. O’Shaughnessy, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court’s findings respondent was an unfit parent and it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate his parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent father, Kuslaiah B., appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights to C.S. (born February 2, 2006). On appeal, respondent argues the trial court’s
findings he was an unfit parent and it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate his parental
rights were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In July 2019, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights to
C.S. Paragraph 6a of the petition alleged respondent was an unfit parent as he failed to maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor’s welfare. Paragraph 6b of
the petition alleged respondent was an unfit parent as “[t]he child is in the guardianship of the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services [(DCFS)] and the parent was
incarcerated as a result of a criminal conviction at the time of the
filing of this petition, and prior to incarceration the parent had little
or no contact with the child, or provided little or no support for the
child, and the parent’s incarceration will prevent the parent from
discharging his parental responsibilities for the child for a period in
excess of [two] years after the filing of this petition.”
The petition further alleged it would be in the minor’s best interest to terminate respondent’s
parental rights.
¶5 In October 2019, the trial court held a fitness hearing. The court heard testimony
from respondent, the minor’s mother, and the minor’s caseworker. We note the record discloses
respondent pointed his finger in a gun-like fashion at the minor’s mother after she testified. The
following is gleaned from the testimony presented.
¶6 Despite being aware of the minor’s birth, respondent visited with the minor only
once before DCFS became involved. He also never provided the minor’s mother with child
support.
¶7 At the time of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, respondent was
incarcerated. Respondent remained incarcerated and had a projected parole date in June 2025.
When asked if there was a possibility that he would “get out” earlier than June 2025, respondent
testified, “I’m scheduled to get out [December] 2022.”
¶8 After DCFS became involved, respondent received a service plan, which
recommended counseling and parenting classes. Despite a desire to sign up for those services,
-2- respondent was unable to do so because of the length of his remaining sentence. Respondent had
visited with the minor approximately five times since being incarcerated. The minor’s caseworker
supervised a visit in November 2018 and believed the visit was “appropriate.” Respondent also
had sent the minor letters while incarcerated; however, he had not sent a letter since before August
2018. He never sent any gifts to the minor.
¶9 The State argued the evidence demonstrated respondent was an unfit parent as
alleged in paragraphs 6a and 6b of its petition to terminate parental rights. Respondent argued the
State failed to show he was an unfit parent as alleged in paragraph 6a of the petition. The guardian
ad litem (GAL) argued the State had met its burden and established respondent was an unfit parent
as alleged in paragraph 6b of its petition.
¶ 10 After considering the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court found the
State had established respondent was an unfit parent as alleged in paragraphs 6a and 6b of its
petition to terminate parental rights. Specifically, the court found:
“[H]e has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of concern, and
responsibility as to the minor’s welfare and the child is in the
guardianship of [DCFS]. Mr. Bridges was incarcerated as a result of
criminal conviction at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate
and prior to his incarceration he had little or no contact with the child,
provided little or no support for the child and his incarceration will
prevent him from discharging his parental responsibilities for a period
in excess two years after the filing of this petition. The evidence is
uncontradicted he had one visit with the child prior to the child going
into care and he was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the petition.
That prior to incarceration he provided little or no support to the child
-3- and that he will not be released from custody of the Department of
Corrections till December of 2022 which is a period in excess of two
years from the filing of the petition. The Court notes father’s
incarceration is a result of his voluntary actions. It is by those voluntary
actions that he is unable to complete services necessary for
reunification.”
¶ 11 Immediately following the fitness hearing, the trial court held a best-interest
hearing. The court heard testimony from the minor’s caseworker. The following is gleaned from
the testimony presented.
¶ 12 The minor, who was then 13 years old, had been placed with his maternal aunt for
about two years. The minor’s aunt provided the minor with a safe, loving environment. The minor
had ties to the community where he lived and participated in multiple sport leagues. The minor
attended unsupervised visits with his mother and sister. The minor expressed a desire to live with
his aunt. The minor’s mother supported the minor’s aunt obtaining guardianship. The minor’s
caseworker believed guardianship would be in the minor’s best interest.
¶ 13 Prior to DCFS involvement, respondent had visited with the minor only once. After
DCFS became involved, the minor expressed an interest in visiting with respondent. He then
visited with respondent approximately five times. During the year prior to the best-interest hearing,
the minor no longer wished to visit with respondent. In June 2019, the minor refused to attend a
scheduled visit. The minor had not received any letters or cards from respondent in at least a year.
¶ 14 The State argued the evidence demonstrated it would be in the minor’s best interest
to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Respondent, through counsel, stated, “I don’t have a
position.” The minor’s mother and the GAL agreed with the State’s position.
¶ 15 Based on the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court, after considering
-4- the statutory best-interest factors found in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705
ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)), found it would be in the minor’s best interest to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. The court entered a written order terminating respondent’s parental
rights.
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court’s findings he was an unfit parent and
it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate his parental rights were against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
¶ 19 A. Unfitness Finding
¶ 20 Respondent asserts the trial court’s finding he was an unfit parent was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. The State disagrees.
¶ 21 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the State must prove parental unfitness
by clear and convincing evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28, 115 N.E.3d 102. A trial court’s
finding of parental unfitness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Id. ¶ 29. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence “only where the
opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” Id.
¶ 22 The trial court found respondent was an unfit parent as defined in sections 1(D)(b)
and 1(D)(r) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(r) (West 2018)). Respondent asserts
the court’s finding under section 1(D)(b) was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Respondent does not address the court’s finding under section 1(D)(r).
¶ 23 Only one ground for a finding of unfitness is necessary if it is supported by clear
and convincing evidence. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 349, 830 N.E.2d 508, 514 (2005); In
-5- re M.R., 393 Ill. App. 3d 609, 613, 912 N.E.2d 337, 342 (2009). By challenging only one of the
two grounds on which the trial court found him unfit, respondent has conceded his unfitness on
the unchallenged ground of unfitness (In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 268, 760 N.E.2d 542, 547
(2001)), and he has forfeited any argument he may have had on the unchallenged ground by failing
to raise it in his brief (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018); In re K.J., 381 Ill. App. 3d
349, 353, 885 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (2008)).
¶ 24 Setting aside respondent’s concession and forfeiture, the trial court’s finding
respondent was an unfit parent under section 1(D)(r) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(r)
(West 2018)) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Under section 1(D)(r), a parent
is “unfit” if
“[t]he child is in the temporary custody or guardianship of [DCFS],
the parent is incarcerated as a result of criminal conviction at the
time the petition or motion for termination of parental rights is filed,
prior to incarceration the parent had little or no contact with the child
or provided little or no support for the child, and the parent’s
incarceration will prevent the parent from discharging his or her
parental responsibilities for the child for a period in excess of [two]
years after the filing of the petition or motion for termination of
parental rights.” Id.
The evidence demonstrated (1) the minor was in the temporary custody and guardianship of DCFS,
(2) respondent was incarcerated at the time of filing of the petition to terminate parental rights,
(3) respondent had little contact with, and provided no support for, the minor prior to his
incarceration, and (4) respondent’s incarceration would prevent him from discharging his parental
-6- responsibilities for a period in excess of two years after the filing of the petition to terminate
parental rights. Given this evidence, the trial court’s finding respondent was an unfit parent under
section 1(D)(r) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we need not address the
other ground for the court’s unfitness finding. See In re Z.M., 2019 IL App (3d) 180424, ¶ 70, 131
N.E.3d 1122.
¶ 25 B. Best-Interest Findings
¶ 26 Respondent asserts the trial court’s finding it was in the minor’s best interest to
terminate his parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State disagrees.
¶ 27 At the best-interest stage, a “parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child
relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d
347, 364, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227 (2004). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 367. When considering whether termination of
parental rights would be in a child’s best interest, the trial court must consider several statutory
factors within the context of the child’s age and developmental needs. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)
(West 2018).
¶ 28 This court will not reverse a trial court’s finding termination of parental rights is in
a child’s best interests unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Anaya J.G.,
403 Ill. App. 3d 875, 883, 932 N.E.2d 1192, 1199 (2010). Again, a finding is against the manifest
weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id.
¶ 29 The evidence at the best-interest hearing demonstrated the minor, who was then 13
years old, expressed a desire to live with his aunt, who he had been placed with for about two
years. The minor’s aunt provided the minor with a safe, loving environment. The minor had ties
to the community where he lived and attended visits with his mother and sister. Conversely, the
-7- minor’s relationship with respondent was essentially nonexistent. The minor had visited with
respondent approximately six times in 13 years. The minor had not received any letters or cards
from respondent in at least a year. The minor expressed that he no longer wished to visit with
respondent. Given this evidence, the trial court’s finding it was in the minor’s best interest to
terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
-8-