In re Crounse

363 F.2d 881
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJuly 28, 1966
DocketPatent Appeal No. 7630
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 363 F.2d 881 (In re Crounse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Crounse, 363 F.2d 881 (ccpa 1966).

Opinion

MARTIN, Judge.

The sole claim on appeal1 is to “the water-insoluble dyestuff having the structural formula.

The issue here is whether that monoazo dyestuff is obvious, 35 U.S.C. § 103, in view of a patent to Fischer, 2,006,211, issued June 25, 1935, that discloses both a generic class of monoazo dyestuffs inclusive of the claimed compound, and, more specifically, a compound which is a position isomer of the claimed compound :

Comparing the reference with the appealed compound, it will be noted that in [882]*882the ring at the upper right, Fischer’s amide (-CONH2) group is attached at the meta, or 3-, position, whereas appellant’s amide group is attached at the para, or 4-, position. In the ring at the lower right, Fischer’s methoxy (-OCH3) group is in the para position, while appellant’s is in the ortho, or 2-, position. The Fischer patent lists the reference isomeric compound as being of “red-orange” shade.

A second reference to Farbwerke Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft (Fischer is listed as the inventor), German patent No. 1,019,416, November 14, 1957, was relied on to show that compounds encompassed by the Fischer U. S. patent, which preferably contain an ortho methoxy substituted arylamide moiety, are disclosed as water insoluble dyestuffs useful for coloring both rubber and textiles.

Appellant states in his brief:

* * * The specific chemistry involved is relatively unimportant to the issues in this case, since the Board of Appeals found, and appellant will not here dispute, that the reference makes the claimed compound “structurally obvious.” However, the Board further said “patentability must depend upon the demonstration of an unexpected property in the claimed compound” * * In this appeal, the unexpected property upon which appellant relies is its color.

That the reference compound renders the claimed compound prima facie “structurally obvious” seems consistent with the approach recently taken by a majority of this court in In re Heyna, 360 F.2d 222, 53 CCPA • — •. Accordingly we shall proceed from there to determine whether or not the color of appellant’s compound is such as to show the invention as a whole non-obvious.

During the prosecution, appellant filed an affidavit under Rule 132 by one Schroeder, a dyestuff expert, who prepared both the claimed and isomeric reference compound and compared them in a standard manner by preparing and testing cloth swatches dyed with various strengths (dilutions) of each compound. The affiant describes the claimed dyestuff as showing a “brilliant and strong bluish-red color * * * ” and the

reference dyestuff as exhibiting a yellowish-red color. The affiant concludes as to the results of five tests directed to other properties relevant to textile printing:

The remaining tests showed that both of the test pigments had excellent resistance to dry cleaning with per-chlorethylene (Test 2), excellent resistance to washing in the absence of chlorine bleach (Test 3-III) and good resistance to washing in the presence of chlorine bleach (Test 3-1V), very good resistance to fading (Test 4), good resistance to discharge printing (Test 5), and excellent resistance to strong alkali (Test 6). In these tests, no substantial difference could be observed between the respective results afforded by Test Pigment No. 1 [claimed compound] and by Test Pigment No. 2 [Fischer compound] as shown on Exhibit Sheet II. [Emphasis added.]

Schroeder concludes that the claimed compound has “highly valuable properties for textile printing,” and that “the Fischer reference compound, Test Pigment No. 2, is a yellowish-red pigment entirely unsuitable as a bluish-red pigment.” 2

[883]*883The examiner considered the affidavit but found it not to remove the rejection, stating:

* * * The showing of record demonstrates no superiority as to the instant compound over a reference compound with respect to various properties, but only a difference in color. Variations in positions of substituents can be expected to result in shifts of shade, so that said showing only demonstrates that which would be expected. Furthermore, since one color cannot be considered superior to another, patentability cannot be predicted upon such a difference alone.

The examiner in the answer referred to the color difference as “of no moment,” since “differences in color can be expected by shifting positions of substitu-ents, as also conceded by applicant.” It was felt that the fact that yellowish-red is not bluish-red is “of no consequence, since the choice of one or the other is a matter of preference rather than necessity.”

However, the board in affirming did consider the physical property of color to be “the only significant difference demonstrated in this record * * *,’’ but alone was not sufficient to render the claimed isomer non-obvious. The board noted that “appellant’s product and that of Fischer share the properties required for appellant’s intended use * * and that:

* * * All of the dyestuffs [of Fischer] exhibit a related reddish color and hence it is not unexpected that appellant’s isomer differs in shade from the isomeric Compound 1 of Fischer in being a bluish-red rather than a red-orange pigment.

Appellant contends that:

* * * a difference in a physical property can be the type of difference which will render a compound, which is structurally obvious, legally unob-vious. ■ [Emphasis added.]

We agree with the statement as emphasized by us. Although a physical property can be the type of difference that will render the compound non-obvious, we do not think the property relied on does in this case.

In his brief appellant also contends:

* * * in a dyestuff, color, which is overwhelmingly the single most important property the compound has, in a most significant property, so that a difference in color can suffice to render a claimed compound legally unobvious. [Emphasis added.]

Except for the argumentative and unsupported statement that color is overwhelmingly the single most important, property, we agree with the proposition as emphasized by us. Although color is a significant property of a dyestuff, one having a most desirable color that is, e. g., not fast, not stable, or is subject to fading will be unsuitable for its intended use. Color, or as the application itself states, “shade,” is only one of “the requirements considered as essential * * * ” by textile printers.3

Appellant’s position is predicated on the view that all properties other than color should be ignored, and that:

* * * while it might have been predictable that his [appellant’s] dyestuff might be a different color than the reference compound, the particular specific color his dyestuff would have was absolutely unpredictable, and this unpredictability suffices to prove non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103.

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Related

In re Zeidler
682 F.2d 961 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1982)
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp.
341 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. New York, 1972)
Application of Ralph E. Miegel and John J. Verbanc
404 F.2d 378 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1968)
Application of Habet M. Khelghatian
364 F.2d 870 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1966)

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Bluebook (online)
363 F.2d 881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-crounse-ccpa-1966.