Edwards, J.
This appeal presents a situation contemplated by our appellate rules but too rarely achieved — a statement of facts and a legal question agreed on by the opposing parties. It should be added that opposing counsel have added to this triumph by briefs which are brief and which cogently argue the interesting legal problem involved.
The question is:
“Will the law imply a promise to pay for emergency services rendered to an unconscious patient by a publie hospital1?”
The facts are:
Sosa Crisan, hereinafter referred to as the “patient,” was an 87-year-old widow of Roumanian origin without any relatives.
While shopping at her grocer’s on March 17,1955, she collapsed and was removed in emergency by the Detroit police department to its Receiving Hospital where she was admitted and remained for 14 days. On March 31st, she was transferred to Central Hospital, an overflow or city-physician’s hospital, which took patients under contract with the city of Detroit, where she died without ever regaining consciousness on February 9,1956, some 11 months later.
Prompt investigation by the city disclosed that the patient owned her own home, whereupon she was classified as a patient with assets and rejected by the Wayne county board of social welfare as, therefore, ineligible for relief.
The city took no steps to appoint a guardian for the patient.
Subsequent investigation disclosed that the patient had $50 in cash, and enjoyed- an income of $33 per month as rent from an upper flat. The value of the home is $7,000.
After her death, the appellee (city of Detroit, claimant) presented its claim against her estate, viz.:
14 days at Receiving at $29.20/day . . '$ 408.80
315 days at Central at $8.90/day .... 2,803.50
ambulance ........................ • 6.00
Total.............. $3,218.30
The referee allowed the claim in its entirety and thereafter the probate and circuit courts affirmed the same. Motion for new trial was denied, and the patient’s executor prosecutes the instant appeal.
Appellant’s contentions are that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties as to charges for the services rendered, that neither- Mrs. Crisan (because of her mental condition), nor the Detroit department of health (because it was only empowered to operate a
public
hospital, and not to make any charges) was able to contract, and that, under these
circumstances, no contract, actual or implied, could arise.
The trial judge answered these arguments succinctly :
“It is obvious that there was no express contract or one implied in fact because following her collapse decedent was never able consciously to express her assent. Nevertheless, one who supplies services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor and the services were necessary to preserve the other’s life or health, and the one supplying it had no reason to know that the other would not consent to receiving them if mentally competent, and it was impossible for the recipient to give consent because of her physical or mental condition (Restatement, Restitution, § 116). This principle has been approved by the Michigan Supreme Court
(In re Dzwonkiewicz Estate,
231 Mich 165).
“The executor’s contention that his obligation to pay must be determined by the decedent’s ability, tested during her lifetime, is not tenable. The authorities upon which he relies are concerned with a statutory obligation to pay when a person shall have been committed to a hospital through legal process. CL 1948, § 330.21, as amended (Stat Ann § 14.811, as amended). The executor also contends that the city of Detroit may not recover because it was under a duty to furnish treatment regardless of the patient’s ability to repay. He directs our attention to no authority for this proposition, and, absent some express limitation, we must conclude that the city of Detroit may charge for services rendered by Receiving Hospital. The city of Detroit is accordingly entitled to recover under'a contract implied in law. The order of the probate court is
therefore affirmed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.”
As to the right of Receiving Hospital to make' charges to nonwelfare patients, there is indeed astonishingly little authority. The corporation counsel points to State policy providing for reimbursement in parallel situations involving hospitalization expenses paid by counties or the State department of social welfare.
While the statutes cited to us are obviously not directly applicable to the present case, they tend to negative the assumption for which appellant seeks our endorsement — namely, that a “public” hospital must perforce be one which renders only free care. No statutory, charter, or ordinance provision is cited which imposes a duty of providing free medical care to persons who are able to pay. Like the trial judge, we decline to supply such a requirement.
As to the more difficult question of whether or not on these facts a promise to pay will be implied in law, the Restatement provision relied upon by the trial judge provides as follows:
“A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if
“(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and
■ “(b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and
“(c) the person supplying them had no reason
to know- that the other would not consent to receiving them, if mentally competent; and
“(d) it was impossible for the other to give consent or, because of extreme youth or mental impairment, the other’s consent would have been immaterial.” Restatement, Restitution, § 116.
This Court appears to have considered the problem before us in 2
cases
— In
re Dzwonkiewicz Estate,
231 Mich 165, and
In re Weber’s Estate,
256 Mich 61. In each, the Court found a promise to pay implied in law.
In the
Dzwonkiewicz Case,
there was a statute (CL 1915, § 13968) which made a guardian liable for the “just debts” of a minor, and which is not applicable here. We read the
Weber Case,
however, as authority for holding that Michigan has previously adopted the essence of the Restatement section which we have quoted.
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Edwards, J.
This appeal presents a situation contemplated by our appellate rules but too rarely achieved — a statement of facts and a legal question agreed on by the opposing parties. It should be added that opposing counsel have added to this triumph by briefs which are brief and which cogently argue the interesting legal problem involved.
The question is:
“Will the law imply a promise to pay for emergency services rendered to an unconscious patient by a publie hospital1?”
The facts are:
Sosa Crisan, hereinafter referred to as the “patient,” was an 87-year-old widow of Roumanian origin without any relatives.
While shopping at her grocer’s on March 17,1955, she collapsed and was removed in emergency by the Detroit police department to its Receiving Hospital where she was admitted and remained for 14 days. On March 31st, she was transferred to Central Hospital, an overflow or city-physician’s hospital, which took patients under contract with the city of Detroit, where she died without ever regaining consciousness on February 9,1956, some 11 months later.
Prompt investigation by the city disclosed that the patient owned her own home, whereupon she was classified as a patient with assets and rejected by the Wayne county board of social welfare as, therefore, ineligible for relief.
The city took no steps to appoint a guardian for the patient.
Subsequent investigation disclosed that the patient had $50 in cash, and enjoyed- an income of $33 per month as rent from an upper flat. The value of the home is $7,000.
After her death, the appellee (city of Detroit, claimant) presented its claim against her estate, viz.:
14 days at Receiving at $29.20/day . . '$ 408.80
315 days at Central at $8.90/day .... 2,803.50
ambulance ........................ • 6.00
Total.............. $3,218.30
The referee allowed the claim in its entirety and thereafter the probate and circuit courts affirmed the same. Motion for new trial was denied, and the patient’s executor prosecutes the instant appeal.
Appellant’s contentions are that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties as to charges for the services rendered, that neither- Mrs. Crisan (because of her mental condition), nor the Detroit department of health (because it was only empowered to operate a
public
hospital, and not to make any charges) was able to contract, and that, under these
circumstances, no contract, actual or implied, could arise.
The trial judge answered these arguments succinctly :
“It is obvious that there was no express contract or one implied in fact because following her collapse decedent was never able consciously to express her assent. Nevertheless, one who supplies services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor and the services were necessary to preserve the other’s life or health, and the one supplying it had no reason to know that the other would not consent to receiving them if mentally competent, and it was impossible for the recipient to give consent because of her physical or mental condition (Restatement, Restitution, § 116). This principle has been approved by the Michigan Supreme Court
(In re Dzwonkiewicz Estate,
231 Mich 165).
“The executor’s contention that his obligation to pay must be determined by the decedent’s ability, tested during her lifetime, is not tenable. The authorities upon which he relies are concerned with a statutory obligation to pay when a person shall have been committed to a hospital through legal process. CL 1948, § 330.21, as amended (Stat Ann § 14.811, as amended). The executor also contends that the city of Detroit may not recover because it was under a duty to furnish treatment regardless of the patient’s ability to repay. He directs our attention to no authority for this proposition, and, absent some express limitation, we must conclude that the city of Detroit may charge for services rendered by Receiving Hospital. The city of Detroit is accordingly entitled to recover under'a contract implied in law. The order of the probate court is
therefore affirmed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.”
As to the right of Receiving Hospital to make' charges to nonwelfare patients, there is indeed astonishingly little authority. The corporation counsel points to State policy providing for reimbursement in parallel situations involving hospitalization expenses paid by counties or the State department of social welfare.
While the statutes cited to us are obviously not directly applicable to the present case, they tend to negative the assumption for which appellant seeks our endorsement — namely, that a “public” hospital must perforce be one which renders only free care. No statutory, charter, or ordinance provision is cited which imposes a duty of providing free medical care to persons who are able to pay. Like the trial judge, we decline to supply such a requirement.
As to the more difficult question of whether or not on these facts a promise to pay will be implied in law, the Restatement provision relied upon by the trial judge provides as follows:
“A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if
“(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and
■ “(b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and
“(c) the person supplying them had no reason
to know- that the other would not consent to receiving them, if mentally competent; and
“(d) it was impossible for the other to give consent or, because of extreme youth or mental impairment, the other’s consent would have been immaterial.” Restatement, Restitution, § 116.
This Court appears to have considered the problem before us in 2
cases
— In
re Dzwonkiewicz Estate,
231 Mich 165, and
In re Weber’s Estate,
256 Mich 61. In each, the Court found a promise to pay implied in law.
In the
Dzwonkiewicz Case,
there was a statute (CL 1915, § 13968) which made a guardian liable for the “just debts” of a minor, and which is not applicable here. We read the
Weber Case,
however, as authority for holding that Michigan has previously adopted the essence of the Restatement section which we have quoted.
There is surprisingly little case authority to be found in the reports of the other States upon the problem with which we are concerned. In
Cotnam
v.
Wisdom,
83 Ark 601 (104 SW 164, 12 LRA NS 1090, 119 Am St Rep 157, 13 Ann Cas 25), the supreme court of Arkansas held (Ann Cas headnote):
' “A snrgeon summoned by a spectator in an emergency to attend an injured and unconscious person may recover the reasonable value of his services from the estate of the patient although the patient dies- without ever regaining consciousness.”
The court (p 605) relied heavily for its reasoning* upon a New Hampshire case which said:
“We regard it as well settled by the cases referred to in the briefs of counsel, many of which have been commented on at length by Mr. Shirley for the defendant, that an insane person, an idiot, or a person utterly bereft of all sense and reason by the sudden stroke of accident or disease, may be held liable,
in assumpsit, for necessaries furnished to him in good faith while in that unfortunate and helpless condition. And the reasons upon which this rests are too broad, as well as too sensible and humane, to be overborne by any deductions which a refined logic may make from the circumstance that in such cases there can be no contract or promise in fact, — no meeting of the minds of the parties. The cases put it on the ground of an implied contract; and by this is not meant, as the defendant’s counsel seems to suppose, an actual contract, — that is, an actual meeting of the minds of the parties, an actual, mutual understanding, to be inferred from language, acts, and circumstances, by the jury, — but a contract and promise, said to be implied by the law, where, in point of fact, there was no contract, no mutual understanding, and so no promise. The defendant’s counsel says it is usurpation for the court to hold, as matter of law, that there is a contract and a promise, when all the evidence in the case shows that there was not a contract, nor the semblance of one. It is doubtless a legal fiction, invented and used for the sake of the remedy. If it was originally usurpation, certainly it has now become very inveterate, and firmly fixed in the body of the law.”
Sceva
v.
True,
53 NH 627, 630.
See, also, 3 Page on Contracts (2d ed), § 1521.
The rationale of the New Hampshire and Arkansas courts is similar to that of the Restatement rule relied on by the circuit judge. The first comment under the Restatement rule quoted above is:
“Comment:
“a.
The rule stated in this section exists in order that a person needing help in an emergency and not able to ask for it should obtain it, the attainment of such a result being aided by assuring compensation to the person rendering the aid if the other is solvent.” Restatement, Restitution, § 116, p 484.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr, Kelly, Smith, Black, Kavanagh, and Souris, JJ., concurred.