In re Credico
This text of 611 F. App'x 754 (In re Credico) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION
In March 2014, a grand jury indicted Justin Michael Credico on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) and two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A) relating to obscenity-laced and racially charged threats that he allegedly left in the voicemail mailbox of an FBI special agent in Philadelphia.1 The grand jury charged him with directing his statements against the special agent he called, that agent’s wife, another special agent, and that agent’s daughter. Pending his upcoming trial, Credico is being detained at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia.
Credico, who (with standby counsel) is representing himself in the criminal case, filed a motion to dismiss the second through fourth counts of the indictment. He maintained that the Government could not show that the elements of the crimes were met. On February 18, 2015, the District Court denied the motion. Credico promptly sought reconsideration. He ar■gued that a trial on counts two through four would violate his right to protection from double jeopardy on the basis that those counts were impermissibly multiplic-itous. Although the District Court concluded that the claim was not a basis for reconsideration, the District Court held a hearing on the issue and denied the claim [755]*755as meritless. The District Court also denied Credico’s oral motion to file an interlocutory appeal from that ruling. Credico immediately appealed (C.A. No. 15-2759).
Shortly thereafter, Credico submitted the petition for a writ of mandamus that we consider today.2 He requests that we direct the District Court to stay “any and all proceedings” until we resolve his double jeopardy claim in his separate appeal.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976). A petitioner must ordinarily have no other means to obtain the desired relief, and he must show a clear and indisputable right to issuance of the writ. In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 772 (3d Cir.1992).
First, Credico has an appeal pending which may provide a means to obtain the relief he desires (if not the stay of proceedings, effectively the same relief from trial on three counts). Second, without fore-judging Credico’s appeal, we conclude that he does not have a clear and indisputable right to a writ of mandamus imposing a stay of the District Court proceedings to prevent a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. His double jeopardy claim is essentially that counts two to four of his indictment charge the same offense as the first count, so they may lead to multiple sentences for a single violation, which is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir.1992) (defining “multiplicitous indictment”). However, that does not appear to be the case,3 despite Credico’s argument that it is because the voicemails were left only in one special agent’s voice-mail mailbox. Each count in the indictment described threats against a different person protected by the statute; stated differently, each count required proof of a fact that the others did not. Cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (explaining that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not”).
Additionally, we conclude that it is inappropriate to grant mandamus relief under the circumstances of this case where Cred-ico has not complied with the Clerk’s Order to file a certificate of service showing that he has served his petition and his ifp motion on each party to the proceeding, including the District Court judge.4 See Fed. R.App. P. 21(a).
For these reasons, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.5
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
611 F. App'x 754, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-credico-ca3-2015.