[Cite as In re Creation of Park Dist. Within Chester Twp., 2017-Ohio-4031.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
IN THE MATTER OF THE CREATION OF A PARK OPINION DISTRICT WITHIN CHESTER TOWNSHIP CASE NO. 2016-G-0082
Appeal from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, Case No. 84 PC 000139.
Judgment: Reversed and vacated.
Frank H. Scialdone and Todd M. Raskin, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., 100 Franklin=s Row, 34305 Solon Road, Solon, Ohio 44139; Bridey Matheney, Assistant Prosecutor, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, Ohio 44024 (For Appellant C Chester Township Board of Trustees).
James M. Gillette, City of Chardon Police Prosecutor, PNC Bank Building, 117 South Street, Suite 208, Chardon, Ohio 44024 (For Appellee C Chester Township Park District Board of Commissioners).
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., Eighth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.
{¶ 1} The core of this appeal is the extent of the probate court’s jurisdiction over a
judicially created park district under R.C. Chapter 1545. The probate court invoked its own
continuing jurisdiction in a case initiated by the Chester Township Board of Trustees
(“Trustees”) in 1984 to create the Chester Township Park District (“Park District”). The
central question, as framed by the parties, is whether the probate court maintained jurisdiction over the Trustees and the township as a political entity either through the
exercise of its plenary power to enforce the terms of the 1984 order creating the Park
District or, otherwise, through the probate court’s continuing jurisdiction over the Park
District as provided in R.C. Chapter 1545.
{¶ 2} The May 10, 1984 order creating the Park District did not impose any
obligations or duties. It simply created the legal entity known as the Park District,
established the territorial limits of the Park District, and noticed an intent to appoint the
original Park District Board of Commissioners (“Commissioners”). There are no terms in
that order to be enforced in perpetuity. See, e.g., Am. Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio
St.3d 343, 349, 575 N.E.2d 116 (1991) (case remanded for further proceedings including
the exercise of continuing jurisdiction in connection with enforcing the terms of a
permanent injunction). Generally in Ohio, trial courts do not maintain the power, plenary or
otherwise, to enforce the terms of a final order absent the grant of continuing jurisdiction or
an express retention of jurisdiction in the final judgment. See, e.g., Infinite Sec. Solutions,
L.L.C. v. Karam Props. II, 143 Ohio St.3d 346, 2015-Ohio-1101, 37 N.E.3d 1211, ¶ 30
(power to enforce settlement agreement must be expressly included in final judgment of
dismissal); In re Adams, 45 Ohio St.3d 219, 543 N.E.2d 797 (1989) (although domestic
relations court generally has continuing jurisdiction, statutory scheme does not include the
continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony); In re J.F., 121 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-318,
902 N.E.2d 19, ¶ 20. Because there was nothing to enforce in the order creating the Park
District, the Park District has focused its entire argument on the statutory grant of
2 continuing jurisdiction conferred on a probate court in matters involving a park district as
the basis for the probate court’s action.
{¶ 3} Based on the statutory framework, however, we must conclude that the
probate court exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring portions of an arm’s-length agreement
entered under R.C. 1545.14 to be invalid and imposing the costs of the master
commissioner, appointed to review the Commissioners’ conduct, against an unrelated
political entity. In light of the demonstrated confusion over a park district=s functions and
the probate court’s role within Chapter 1545, we must begin with the facts of this case as
they relate to the statutory framework within which the Park District operates.
{¶ 4} Upon the creation of a park district, the probate court is required to appoint
three commissioners to the board whose terms expire on a rotating basis for the first three
years. R.C. 1545.05. Thereafter, each commissioner is appointed for a three-year term.
Id. Judge Frank Lavrich created the Park District and appointed the first Commissioners
on May 17, 1984. In the early years, the Trustees were responsible for soliciting volunteers
and applications for the position of Commissioner, and the probate court accepted the
Trustees’ recommendation for filling any vacancy. In September 1993, Judge Charles
Henry succeeded Judge Lavrich, and according to the record, Judge Henry followed his
predecessor’s procedure. By July 2007, the probate court began taking applications for the
position of Commissioner directly instead of filtering the applications through the Trustees.
{¶ 5} The creation of the Park District created a legal entity, separate and apart from
the township. However, the creation of the Park District did not automatically transfer any
land or property over which the Park District could assert control. R.C. 1545.14 expressly
3 provides that a park district cannot acquire or control any park, park lands, parkways,
playgrounds, or other lands, or boulevards owned or controlled by any other public
authority unless an agreement is reached between the park district and the public authority
in possession of such lands. Id. In other words, the public authorities maintained their
ownership interests in any park land within the territorial limits of the Park District after its
creation. There is no statutory obligation for any public authority to cede ownership or
control of its park lands to a park district. A park district does not have a purpose unless
there are properties to be maintained, to be developed, or over which the park district could
assume control. The legislature contemplated this possibility and provided for the
dissolution of a park district after a prolonged period of inactivity. R.C. 1545.38 (upon
notice that the park district has not made any expenditures or deposits of funds in five
years, the district shall be dissolved). In order to avoid this situation, the legislature
provided two mechanisms.
{¶ 6} A park district could purchase or acquire its own property. R.C. 1545.11.
Under R.C. 1545.11, the commissioners could, but were not required to, acquire
lands either within or without the park district for conversion into forest reserves and for the conservation of the natural resources of the state, including streams, lakes, submerged lands, and swamp lands, and to those ends may create parks, parkways, forest reservations, and other reservations and afforest, develop, improve, protect, and promote the use of the same in such manner as the board deems conducive to the general welfare.
The commissioners have the discretion to obtain such property through gift, purchase by
cash or installment payments, or by appropriation, which can only occur through the
manner provided in R.C. 163.01 to 163.22. Any gift of property must be approved by the
probate court. R.C. 1545.11. The Park District has not obtained any property of its own.
4 {¶ 7} The second method of obtaining a purpose for a park district is through R.C.
1545.14, which is entitled “Cooperation with other public authorities.” That section provides
that the commissioners may enter into agreements with other legislative or public
authorities in control of parks or park lands, whether within or without the park district,
either (1) to assume control of all or a portion of any existing lands or (2) to otherwise
contract or cooperate with the other public authority in connection with the “use,
development, improvement, and protection of parks or park lands.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
It is important to note the disjunctive phrasing of the options.
{¶ 8} The commissioners of a park district do not need probate court approval
before entering any agreement under R.C. 1545.14. The agreements are left to the
discretion of the commissioners appointed to manage the park district. If the legislature
had intended for the commissioners to seek probate court approval, language similar to
sections 1545.11, 1545.12(B), and 1545.15, all of which require approval before the
commissioners undertake specific actions, could have been included in R.C. 1545.14.
State ex rel. Cordray v. Court of Claims of Ohio, 190 Ohio App.3d 161, 2010-Ohio-4437,
941 N.E.2d 93, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.) (the omission of language dictates the conclusion that the
legislature did not intend the omitted language to have any force or effect in proceedings
under the statutory section). The contracting option provides the park district with a limited
role in which the township delegates some or all of its responsibility over park lands to the
park district through an agreement.
{¶ 9} Although it is a far better practice to define that role in writing, there is no
legislative requirement that a park district enter a written contract with the public authority; it
5 may simply “cooperate with” the other political body for the maintenance, use, and
development of the park lands. There is also no statutory requirement specifying the
degree of control over the park lands that the public authority must delegate to the park
district. According to the unambiguous terms of R.C. 1545.14, the public authority may
retain any degree of control it deems necessary in contracting or cooperating with the park
district. Regardless of which option is chosen, the park district is authorized to develop,
improve, and protect those lands as if the lands were acquired by the commissioners. Id.
{¶ 10} The legislature also provided park districts with several options to obtain
funding. The park district may levy a dedicated tax in an amount not to exceed one-half of
one mill, but only “[a]fter the budget commission of the county in which the district is
located certifies such levy, or such modification thereof as [the budget commission]
considers advisable, to the county auditor, he shall place it upon the tax duplicate.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, it is within the commissioners’ discretion whether to seek the
dedicated tax, and even if the commissioners decide to pursue the independent source of
funding, the county budget commission must certify the tax if they consider any portion of it
advisable. Id. In this case, the Park District received the dedicated tax up until 2002.
According to the master commissioner, the township eliminated it.1 Despite the elimination
of the tax, the township provided the Park District with its necessary funding—as would be
expected considering the fact that the township still owned the properties and had an
obligation and desire to ensure the continuing vitality of the park lands. See R.C. 511.37
(1.) It is not clear from the record under what authority the township could eliminate a county tax without the county budget commission’s approval or action. The county budget commission is responsible for making any decisions whether to reduce or modify a tax levy of a park district. 2008 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 08-020, at 21; R.C. 1545.20.
6 (township trustees may make contributions of money from its general fund to the park
district for the purpose of planning, acquisition, management, and improvement); 1988
Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 88-033 (interpreting R.C. 511.37 to mean that the board of a park
district does not need to seek approval of the funding terms from the probate court).
{¶ 11} In addition to the dedicated millage, the commissioners may directly submit a
request for an additional tax levy to the voters by resolution. R.C. 1545.21. Outside of
taxes, a park district may also receive a share of the undivided local government fund as
determined by the county budget commission for the purpose of managing the park land
properties. 2008 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 08-020, at 21-22, citing R.C. 5747.51.
{¶ 12} In April 1985, the Park District and the Trustees negotiated an arm’s-length
agreement under R.C. 1545.14 wherein the Trustees, with “the authority and responsibility
to operate and maintain park lands within Chester Township” agreed (1) to allow the Park
District to assume control of all park lands owned by the township for a period of five years
unless either party terminates the agreement with 90 days’ advance notice; (2) that the
Park District would operate, maintain, develop, improve, and protect the park lands for the
residents of Chester Township and the public; (3) that subject to prior approval from the
Trustees, the Commissioners could (a) enter agreements with other political subdivisions
for the use and operation of the parks, (b) construct or alter permanent improvements on
the park or park lands, and (c) contract for and incur debts that could result in liens being
imposed on the township’s park land properties; and (4) that the Commissioners must
agree that no rangers or park officers shall be appointed other than police officers
employed by the township. No one disputed the terms of that agreement.
7 {¶ 13} In 1993, following the expiration of the original agreement and a short period
in which the Park District cooperated with the township to maintain the park lands without a
formal agreement, the Park District and the township negotiated a second agreement
nearly identical to the first. There were two material differences between the agreements:
(1) the 1993 agreement was for a period of five years, to renew yearly into perpetuity, but
subject to the same 90-day termination clause; and (2) the 1993 agreement was not for the
stated purpose of the Park District assuming all control over the township’s park lands.
The Park District had a more limited role. The Park District only had the contractual
authority to use, develop, improve, and protect the park lands within the township and
subject to the limitations to which the Park District agreed. No one, and certainly neither of
the real parties in interest to the agreement, challenged any aspect of the 1993 agreement
in any court of competent jurisdiction.
{¶ 14} In the early part of 2014, an anonymously drafted “report” surfaced, entitled
“Chester Township Park District 2013 Review” (“the review”). The review questioned the
Park District’s financial affairs. Under R.C. 1545.06, which provides that any park
commissioner may be removed at the discretion of the probate judge, the probate court
had continuing jurisdiction to sua sponte consider removing any one of the Commissioners
based on those allegations of financial misconduct. If, in exercising its grant of continuing
jurisdiction, the probate court felt it necessary to remove any Commissioner, the court was
required to provide that Commissioner with at least ten days’ notice ahead of the statutorily
mandated public hearing. R.C. 1545.06.
8 {¶ 15} Upon receiving the review, the probate court appointed Attorney Mary Jane
Trapp as the master commissioner under the court’s “fiduciary oversight authority.” During
the proceedings on the master commissioner’s report, the probate court clarified that its
jurisdiction was derived from R.C. 2101.06 and R.C. 1545.06, although no individual
Commissioner was ever put on notice that the court intended to remove any one of them
from office.
{¶ 16} A master commissioner’s duties under R.C. 2101.06 should not be confused
with the probate court’s authority to appoint an investigator as statutorily provided in other
probate matters, such as guardianship proceedings. R.C. 3109.04(C) (a probate court can
order an investigation, but the investigator must be made available for cross-examination at
trial); R.C. 2111.042 (a probate court may appoint an investigator to review the
guardianship of a minor). The statute, R.C. 2101.06, unlike other provisions in the Revised
Code dealing with the authority of a probate court, does not authorize the trial court to
appoint an investigator. See, e.g., R.C. 2151.28(I) (a guardian ad litem’s functions include
“investigation, mediation, monitoring court proceedings and monitoring services provided
for the child”). Generally, if a court appoints an investigator when statutorily authorized to
do so, “[t]o protect the parties’ due process rights, the trial court must make [the
investigator] available for direct and cross-examination.” In re A.L., 6th Dist. Lucas No.
L-10-1355, 2011-Ohio-2569, ¶ 35. The legislature’s decision to provide statutory authority
for the probate court to investigate in other proceedings but omit such language from the
statute authorizing the appointment of a master commissioner must be presumed to be for
a purpose. State ex rel. Cordray, 190 Ohio App.3d 161, 2010-Ohio-4437, 941 N.E.2d 93,
9 at ¶ 27 (10th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Fink v. Registrar, Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA98-02-021, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4261 (Sept. 14, 1998); and Metro.
Secs. Co. v. Warren State Bank, 117 Ohio St. 69, 76, 158 N.E. 81 (1927).
{¶ 17} The appointment of a master commissioner under R.C. 2101.06 is analogous
to the appointment of a magistrate. See, e.g., State ex rel. Estate of Hards v. Klammer,
110 Ohio St.3d 104, 2006-Ohio-3670, 850 N.E.2d 1197, ¶ 3 (appointed guardian filed suit
on behalf of ward, and master commissioner appointed under R.C. 2101.06 and Civ.R. 53
to resolve motions and applications regarding the dispute); R.C. 2101.31. The master
commissioner resolves issues of fact. R.C. 2101.31. After a master commissioner has
been “properly appointed by the probate court,” she has a statutory duty to take sworn
evidence and render a report just as a magistrate would issue a magistrate’s decision
subject to court approval. State ex rel. Estate of Hards v. Klammer, 11th Dist. Lake No.
2004-L-189, 2005-Ohio-2655, ¶ 21. The parties have the right to file objections as any
party would under Civ.R. 53 or its equivalent. R.C. 2101.06 (“[t]he report may be excepted
to by the parties and confirmed, modified, or set aside by the court.”).
{¶ 18} The probate court in this case tasked the master commissioner with
addressing the issues raised in the review and to determine, examine, and either resolve or
provide the probate court with a proposed resolution. As the probate court requested, and
the master commissioner understood, her task was to investigate the allegations in the
review and provide recommendations for the “best practices” under which the Park District
should operate.
10 {¶ 19} Complicating matters, the master commissioner’s report was not filed as part
of the record, nor did the probate court require such. It appears that the report was
provided to the probate court, published on the court’s website, but never entered into the
record of the proceedings. The journal entry “confirming” the report incorporates the report
by reference, but the report was not attached to the judgment entry either.
{¶ 20} Both parties have invited us to consider the master commissioner’s report as
it was considered by the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Chester Twp. v. Grendell,
147 Ohio St.3d 366, 2016-Ohio-1520, 66 N.E.3d 683. Although we recognize that the Ohio
Supreme Court reviewed the report as evidence in the original writ action and not upon the
probate court’s record, if any error exists in considering the report for the purposes of this
appeal, such an error was invited by agreement among the parties. Further, if the report is
not considered, there was no evidence before the probate court upon which the court could
have acted. The probate court’s orders are all premised on the findings and conclusions
within the master commissioner’s report.
{¶ 21} In the master commissioner’s report, the master commissioner determined
upon her “research and discussions with those involved with the park district’s formation”
that the intent behind the Park District’s creation was to keep the township politics out of
the park district. The master commissioner ultimately concluded, through interviews and
research, that the Park District and its employees had not committed any knowing
violations of Ohio law. Several policy and procedure “recommendations” were also
provided. No sworn testimony was taken, nor did the probate court require the master
commissioner to do so or resolve any factual disputes. After submitting the report, the
11 probate court made several findings of facts and conclusions of law but otherwise adopted
the master commissioner’s unfiled report. Judgment Entry Findings of Fact Conclusions of
Law, November 26, 2014 (“Confirmation Order”).
{¶ 22} At the same time the master commissioner was reviewing the allegations
against the Commissioners regarding financial decisions, a state agency was conducting a
formal audit of the Park District’s finances relating to the same allegations. The Park
District is required to present its yearly budget to the Geauga County Budget Commission
and to the township trustees in order to comply with R.C. 5705.36(A)(1). As part of that
process, the township fiscal officer had requested a state audit of the Park District that was
under way as of the date of the master commissioner’s report. It appears the probate court
appointed the master commissioner to investigate that which other executive agencies
were in the process of reviewing. The probate court could not have been aware of the
audit at the time it appointed the master commissioner, but there was no consideration of
the separate audit after the fact was disclosed in the master commissioner’s report. The
outcome of the audit is not in the record before us.
{¶ 23} In the Confirmation Order, the probate court went further than reviewing the
conduct of the Commissioners and specifically concluded that (1) the Trustees had
terminated the dedicated millage for the Park District, directly contravening the
fundamental purpose for creating the Park District; (2) the 1993 agreement addressing the
Trustees’ contractual right to review any construction or alteration of any permanent
improvement on the park lands impeded the Park District’s separate purpose; (3) the
Commissioners had the sole statutory authority to levy the millage under R.C. 1545.20; (4)
12 the Trustees must provide funding until the Park District sets up its independent funding
through dedicated millage; and (5) the Park District, the Commissioners, and the Park
District’s employees must comply with the recommendations made by the master
commissioner regarding the “best practices” for operating a park district.
{¶ 24} The Trustees appealed the Confirmation Order, but the original appeal was
dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. The Confirmation Order had not finalized the actual
costs associated with the master commissioner’s investigation, even though the parties
were ordered to split the undetermined costs with the probate court. In re Creation of Park
Dist. Within Chester Twp., 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3242, 2015-Ohio-1210, ¶ 7.
Without the imposition of a specific cost, the probate court’s decision was not a final one
within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02.
{¶ 25} After the appeal was dismissed, the Trustees sought a writ of prohibition from
the Ohio Supreme Court. In denying the writ, it was held that the Trustees “clearly have an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way of appeal.” Grendell, 147 Ohio
St.3d 366, 2016-Ohio-1520, 66 N.E.3d 683, at ¶ 21. Because the probate court did not
patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the potential removal of the
Commissioners, the writ had to be denied. Id. at ¶ 30. There was an express reluctance to
circumvent the appellate process. Id. at ¶ 31. Indeed, it has been continually maintained
that a “court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction,
and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by way of appeal.” State
ex rel. Huntington Natl. Bank v. Kontos, 145 Ohio St.3d 102, 2015-Ohio-5190, 47 N.E.3d
133, ¶ 19, citing State ex rel. Shumaker v. Nichols, 137 Ohio St.3d 391, 2013-Ohio-4732,
13 999 N.E.2d 630, ¶ 10, and State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264,
2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5.
{¶ 26} The probate court believed it maintained continuing jurisdiction over the
Trustees based on the Ohio Supreme Court’s statement that
[t]he probate court’s authority to create park districts and its plenary power “to dispose fully of any matter” that is properly before it surely includes the ability to issue orders to enforce the entry creating the park district, including orders that impose duties on those interfering with the park district’s purposes.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 30. As we have already discussed, the 1984 order creating the
Park District imposed no prospective obligations on any parties, much less the Trustees or
the township. Although there is no question the probate court has some plenary power
under its statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction, that power is not unbridled. In this
regard, it is important to understand what was decided in Grendell and what was not. The
case was an original action for a writ of prohibition. The only matter to be resolved was
whether the probate court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over a specific
matter. Salloum v. Falkowski, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-L-124, 2016-Ohio-5005, ¶ 32
(Grendell, J., concurring) (in a writ of prohibition action, the court is not “called upon to
decide whether the lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the underlying case is proper,
only whether there is a ‘patent and unambiguous’ lack of jurisdiction”). It was not an action
to determine whether the probate court possessed jurisdiction over any particular issue.
Id., citing Grendell at ¶ 31 (it was only decided whether the probate court patently and
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction, and after concluding that it did not, the court was
unwilling “to issue a writ and circumvent the appellate process”).
14 {¶ 27} Nevertheless, in May and June 2016, the probate court entered two
additional orders citing the Ohio Supreme Court’s obiter dictum as the basis of its
jurisdiction to proceed. In the May order, the probate court found certain provisions in the
1993 agreement to be in conflict with the Park District’s authority and ordered the parties to
negotiate a new agreement. In the June judgment entry, the probate court further held (1)
that the 1993 agreement between the Park District and the township infringes on the Park
District’s authority to assume all control of all park lands within the territorial limits of the
Park District, allegedly conflicting with R.C. Chapter 1545, and (2) that the Park District and
the township must bear 75 percent of the $40,000 cost of the master commissioner under
R.C. 2101.06 and 2101.07.
{¶ 28} The fees were imposed against the township under the belief that the probate
court has a plenary power to prevent others from interfering with the Park District’s
purposes under R.C. 2101.24(C), and as a result, the court could order any such party to
pay the costs of investigating the Park District’s operations despite the fact that those
parties had no control over the Park District’s operational management. Further, the
probate court held that the creation of the Park District meant that all the “township’s lands
used for township park purposes, regardless of the record ownership, are under the
jurisdiction of the Park Board” at the expense of the title owner’s property rights and R.C.
1545.14, which expressly provides any public authority the ability to delegate some
authority to a park district without surrendering all control over the park lands. In light of its
sua sponte findings, the probate court concluded that the portions of the 1993 agreement
that vested any control over the park lands with the Trustees were not enforceable, and the
15 township was “permanently restrained and enjoined” from enforcing or acting on any of
those provisions that preserved the township’s authority over its own park lands.
{¶ 29} This appeal followed in which the Trustees claim the probate court exceeded
its jurisdiction by sua sponte voiding the terms of a lawful agreement entered under R.C.
1545.14 in the Confirmation Order and the June 2016 order and erred by imposing the
master commissioner’s fees as costs against the township.
{¶ 30} At the most basic of levels, the probate court’s orders all depend on the
proper invocation of the court’s continuing jurisdiction over the Park District. In order for a
court to exercise any judicial power or resort to its plenary power at law, it must have
continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. State ex rel. McGinty v.
Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals, 142 Ohio St.3d 100, 2015-Ohio-937, 28 N.E.3d 88, ¶ 13. A
court in want of jurisdiction cannot exercise its judicial power by entering any judgment or
order in furtherance of a case. Id. at ¶ 27. Further, a court with jurisdiction to act is limited
to reviewing only those issues within the scope of that jurisdiction. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 11th
Dist. Portage No. 2007-P-0023, 2008-Ohio-833, ¶ 67 (the trial court, although possessing
jurisdiction over some of the issues, exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the manner in
which an asset should be distributed and that portion of the order must be vacated); see
also Lisboa v. Karner, 167 Ohio App.3d 359, 2006-Ohio-3024, 855 N.E.2d 136; Tanagho v.
Tanagho, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 92AP-1190, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 1201, 10 (Feb. 23,
1993).
{¶ 31} “Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those
types of cases expressly authorized by the applicable statutes.” Swift v. Gray, 11th Dist.
16 Trumbull No. 2007-T-0096, 2008-Ohio-2321, ¶ 37-39, citing Rudloff v. Efstathiadis, 11th
Dist. Trumbull No. 2002-T-0119, 2003-Ohio-6686, ¶ 6, and Schucker v. Metcalf, 22 Ohio
St.3d 33, 34, 488 N.E.2d 210 (1999). A court cannot create its own jurisdiction—it only has
“such jurisdiction as may be provided by law.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section
3(B)(2). “ ‘The existence of the court’s own subject-matter jurisdiction in a particular case
poses a question of law which the court has the authority and responsibility to determine.’ “
Id., quoting Burns v. Daily, 114 Ohio App.3d 693, 701, 683 N.E.2d 1164 (11th Dist.1996).
Appellate courts “review that determination de novo without any deference to the
conclusion reached below.” Id., citing Burns.
{¶ 32} R.C. 2101.24 is silent with respect to the probate court’s jurisdiction over park
districts. Instead, R.C. 2101.24(A)(2) provides that probate courts have jurisdiction if
another section of the Revised Code expressly confers jurisdiction over that subject matter
upon the probate court and no other section of the Revised Code confers jurisdiction over
that subject matter upon any other court or agency. A probate court’s jurisdiction over a
park district is, therefore, solely governed by R.C. Chapter 1545. That chapter confers
upon the probate court continuing jurisdiction over a park district case in order
(1) to appoint the park district’s board of commissioners, R.C. 1545.05(A);
(2) to expand the board to five members upon the park district’s request, R.C. 1545.05(B);
(3) to remove any commissioners after providing a hearing and no less than 10 days’ notice of the intent to do so, R.C. 1545.06 (and this may include the power to investigate certain conduct related to any one commissioner);
(4) to approve the park district’s acceptance of donations of money or property, R.C. 1545.11;
17 (5) to approve the sale of lands if the lands are within the county of the probate court’s territorial jurisdiction, R.C. 1545.12(B);
(6) to approve the annexation of any territory within the probate court’s territorial jurisdiction, R.C. 1545.15; and
(7) to dissolve the park district if the results of a certified vote are presented to the probate court or the park district is inactive for a period of five years, R.C. 1545.36 and 1545.38.
The probate court’s continuing jurisdiction as set forth in R.C. Chapter 1545 is narrow. See
Grendell, 147 Ohio St.3d 366, 2016-Ohio-1520, 66 N.E.3d 683, at ¶ 23 (probate court’s
jurisdiction over the park district is derived from R.C. Chapter 1545 and is limited to
dissolving the park district or appointing and removing commissioners, and the only role the
township trustees have is in applying for the creation of the park district). Importantly, the
probate court’s continuing jurisdiction is limited to certain acts or questions involving the
park district’s board of commissioners or over the commissioners themselves as it relates
to the court’s power to appoint and remove. There are no other statutory sections
providing the probate court with (1) a general supervisory power over park district matters
or (2) any additional jurisdiction over a party or entity other than the park district’s board of
commissioners.
{¶ 33} Although the probate court has plenary power at law and in equity over some
matters, those matters must be “properly before the court,” i.e., based on the grant of
jurisdiction. R.C. 2101.24(C) is not an independent source of the probate court’s
jurisdiction. Likewise, R.C. 2101.06 is not an independent source either. Klammer, 110
Ohio St.3d 104, 2006-Ohio-3670, 850 N.E.2d 1197, at ¶ 3. In that latter section, the
legislature unambiguously provided that a probate court “may appoint a special master
18 commissioner in any matter pending before the judge.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2101.06.
As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in Klammer, if a probate court has basic statutory
jurisdiction, such as to appoint and remove guardians, then that court also has basic
statutory authority to appoint a special master commissioner under R.C. 2101.06 to carry
out its fact-finding function. Id. Thus, in order to have jurisdiction to appoint a master
commissioner, there must be a matter properly pending before the probate court at the
time. Id. Both R.C. 2101.24(C) and 2101.06 are confined by the probate court’s
jurisdiction; neither expands it. A court must possess jurisdiction over the matter before
exercising its plenary power. McGinty, 142 Ohio St.3d 100, 2015-Ohio-937, 28 N.E.3d 88.
{¶ 34} In this case, the probate court’s continuing jurisdiction over the park district
matter is solely dependent on R.C. Chapter 1545. In this regard, the probate court had
jurisdiction to consider the removal of the Commissioners. R.C. 1545.06. As a result, the
appointment of the master commissioner to take testimony and report the testimony with
respect to the potential removal of a Commissioner is not the issue.
{¶ 35} The issue before us is whether the probate court exceeded the scope of its
continuing jurisdiction to consider removing any one of the Commissioners, (1) by imposing
costs upon the township as a separate legal entity—incurred through the appointment of
the master commissioner for the express purpose of investigating allegations of financial
misconduct within the Park District and to provide consulting services to the Park District;
and (2) by invalidating a contractual agreement entered between the Park District and the
township defining the scope of the Park District’s involvement with the township’s park
lands. Mitchell, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2007-P-0023, 2008-Ohio-833, at ¶ 67.
19 {¶ 36} The grant of continuing jurisdiction under Revised Code Chapter 1545.06 is
limited. The probate court exceeded its continuing jurisdiction to remove a commissioner
in appointing the master commissioner to investigate all aspects of the Park District’s
operations and its contractual relationship with the township and then impose those costs
upon the township, a separate and distinct political body. The probate court also lacked
jurisdiction to sua sponte enjoin the township from enforcing the negotiated contract terms
of the 1993 agreement. The probate court’s jurisdiction, as applicable in this case, is
statutorily limited to determining whether to remove any of the Commissioners. More
simply stated, the legislature has not provided the probate court with a general grant of
fiduciary oversight over the Park District. Grendell, 147 Ohio St.3d 366, 2016-Ohio-1520,
66 N.E.3d 683, at ¶ 27 (the legislature did not provide probate courts with a general
supervisory power over park districts). Although we recognize that the probate court judge
acted with good intentions in seeking the master commissioner’s report before acting on
the allegations in the review and that the master commissioner herself acted in good faith,
nevertheless, there are limitations as to the scope of the probate court’s jurisdiction under
the statute.
{¶ 37} Because the trial court exceeded the grant of continuing jurisdiction, the
Confirmation Order and the June 2016 order were not within the purview of the probate
court’s plenary power over matters properly before it under R.C. 2101.24(C). Those orders
must be vacated. Once the probate court concluded that removal of the commissioners
was unnecessary based on the master commissioner’s report, the inquiry should have
terminated. No other action was authorized by the legislature, and the township is not a
20 party over which the probate court has continuing jurisdiction—the township has no
authority to remove or appoint any of the Commissioners. The master commissioner’s
fees imposed as costs against the township were improper.
{¶ 38} None of this is to suggest that the Park District is without protection or
recourse with respect to others interfering with the Park District’s operations or in resolving
contract disputes over agreements entered under R.C. 1545.14—the two primary areas of
concern upon which the probate court acted.
{¶ 39} As a separate and distinct political entity, the Park District is capable of suing
and being sued in a court of competent jurisdiction. Marrek v. Cleveland Metroparks Bd. of
Commrs., 9 Ohio St.3d 194, 195, 459 N.E.2d 873 (1984); R.C. 1545.07; see
also Schenkolewski v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys., 67 Ohio St.2d 31, 37, 426 N.E.2d 784
(1981). If a contract dispute erupts under any agreement entered under R.C. 1545.14, the
Park District is authorized to file a breach of contract or declaratory judgment action to
determine its rights and obligations under the agreement. Buckman-Peirson v. Brannon,
159 Ohio App.3d 12, 2004-Ohio-6074, 822 N.E.2d 830, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.); Bd. of Twp. v. Bd.
of Park Commrs., 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 80 CA 21, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 13397, 3 (Nov.
20, 1981). A probate court, however, lacks jurisdiction to enter declaratory judgments over
contract disputes. Brannon. (R.C. 2101.24 does not grant a probate court jurisdiction to
resolve breach of contract actions or a declaration of rights under an enforceable contract).
{¶ 40} Further, if the Commissioners feel the need to protect the Park District from
outside interference, R.C. 1545.09(A) mandates that the Commissioners adopt bylaws and
rules as they deem advisable for “the preservation of good order within and adjacent to
21 parks and reservations of land, and for the protection and preservation of the parks,
parkways, and other reservations of land under its jurisdiction and control and of property
and natural life therein.” If the Commissioners enact bylaws to preclude others from
interfering with the good order and maintenance of the park district, there are statutory
procedures and penalties available for relief that the park district could pursue in a court of
competent jurisdiction. Id.; R.C. 1545.99; see, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Park Dist. v. Fladda,
63 Ohio Misc.2d 110, 112, 619 N.E.2d 1244 (M.C.1993) (although its authority is
constitutionally vague, the park district had authority to enact rules governing the use of the
park lands subject to the penalty restrictions provided by statute); In re DeGeronimo, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 40089, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 11282, 7 (June 28, 1979) (the board of
park commissioners has the power to adopt rules and regulations for the preservation of
order within the park lands under its control). Much like the Commissioners’ unilateral
ability to contract under R.C. 1545.14, the legislature has not required the Commissioners
to seek probate court approval before enacting any bylaws.
{¶ 41} Despite the limitations on the scope of the probate court’s continuing
jurisdiction, the Park District, as a separate and distinct political entity, has statutory
mechanisms at its disposal to protect its rights and those of the public it serves.
22 [Cite as In re Creation of Park Dist. Within Chester Twp., 2017-Ohio-4031.] {¶ 42} We sustain the two assignments of error.2 Although the probate court
possessed continuing jurisdiction to consider removing any of the Commissioners as the
current proceedings originated, the scope of that jurisdictional grant of authority was
limited. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing the master
commissioner=s fees as costs against an unrelated political agency and by considering the
validity of a contractual agreement entered between two separate and distinct political
entities. We reverse and vacate the Confirmation Order and June 2016 order.
{¶ 43} It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
{¶ 44} The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
{¶ 45} It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this
judgment into execution.
{¶ 46} A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J., Tenth Appellate District, sitting by assignment,
PATRICK M. MCGRATH, J., Retired, Tenth Appellate District, sitting by assignment,
concur.
(2.) The Trustees had filed a motion to stay the lower court’s proceedings following the filing of this appeal. During the appellate proceedings, the Trustees supplemented the record with a decision from Judge John J. Lohn, who sat by assignment in the probate proceedings after Judge Timothy J. Grendell recused himself from the proceedings, which occurred while this case was on appeal and was outside the scope of our review. The decision issued by Judge Lohn appears to have resolved the issues raised in the motion to stay, and we deny it as moot.