[Cite as In re C.R., 2024-Ohio-2954.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: CASE NO. 2023-T-0083
C.R. Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division
Trial Court No. 2022 JC 00054
OPINION
Decided: August 5, 2024 Judgment: Affirmed
Charles A.J. Strader, Attorney Charles Strader, LLC, 175 Franklin Street, S.E., Warren, OH 44481 (For Appellant, Miranda Seidner).
James J. Crisan, Martin F. White Co., LPA, 156 Park Avenue, N.E., P.O. Box 1150, Warren, OH 44482 (For Appellee, Nelson Reep).
Alissa A. Kegarise, Amsden Legal, LLC, 1835 Taft Avenue, Niles, OH 44446 (Guardian Ad Litem).
MATT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Miranda Seidner, n.k.a. Miranda Rheins-Guire,
appeals from the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division, ordering her to pay child support to plaintiff-appellee, Nelson Reep, and granting
legal custody of their child, C.R., to Reep. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the lower court. {¶2} On June 22, 2022, Reep filed a Complaint seeking a determination that he
was the biological father of his minor child, C.R., born in 2016, and a shared parenting
plan with Rheins-Guire. The magistrate issued various orders relating to visitation while
the matter was pending.
{¶3} On October 14, 2022, Reep filed a motion to order the parties to use Our
Family Wizard to communicate, attaching group messages demonstrating that Rheins-
Guire would not respond to communications about C.R. unless they were sent to a group
message including her husband, Donald Guire. The court ordered that neither parent
shall require communication by group messages.
{¶4} Rheins-Guire filed a Motion for Custody on January 25, 2023, stating that it
was in the best interest of the child for her to retain custody.
{¶5} A trial was conducted on several days in 2023. The following pertinent
testimony was presented:
{¶6} Reep testified that he and Rheins-Guire moved into a home together in
2016. C.R. was born in 2016. While living together, Reep generally got C.R. ready in the
morning. Rheins-Guire did limited cleaning. He testified that he moved into his parents’
house with C.R. around January 2019 so Rheins-Guire could focus on her studies in a
nursing program. C.R. would spend one to two nights per week with her mother. The
two subsequently ended their relationship.
{¶7} According to Reep, in May 2022, Rheins-Guire married Guire and Reep
became upset that C.R. called Guire, “dad.” Rheins-Guire and C.R. moved to
Pennsylvania to live with Guire, whose residence was approximately two hours from
Case No. 2023-T-0083 Reep’s. During that time, Reep volunteered at C.R.’s school on Wednesdays to exercise
additional visitation with her. Reep testified that there was a meeting at C.R.’s school in
Pennsylvania to discuss behavior issues which led to her receiving counseling and
medication for ADHD.
{¶8} Reep expressed concern with Rheins-Guire’s parenting, stating that she
“puts all of her attention and time into her phone or a tablet and is barely available to the
outside world.” He testified that C.R. was concerned about her mother throwing her
personal items away and he believed Rheins-Guire failed to give C.R. presents for her
birthday or Christmas. Reep testified that prior to Rheins-Guire’s marriage to Guire, C.R.
often was not bathed, had dirty clothes, and her hair was not washed after spending time
at her mother’s residence.
{¶9} Reep testified that Rheins-Guire “threatens my time with [C.R.] a lot as a
form of punishment if I wasn’t well behaved.” When asked about his wishes if he received
custody, he stated that Guire “can have her some weekends. I would like to have a
weekend here and there to do things outside of school throughout the school year.”
{¶10} Shannon Reep, Nelson’s sister, testified that she had a strong relationship
with C.R. She indicated that, beginning in January 2019, C.R. spent a majority of time at
the house where Reep was residing and would see Rheins-Guire on weekends. She
believed C.R. was “different” after moving to Pennsylvania and was confused, anxious,
and did not want to upset people.
{¶11} Patti Jo Reep, Nelson’s mother, testified that Nelson moved in with her in
January 2019. She testified that Reep had C.R. every other week, even after C.R. moved
Case No. 2023-T-0083 to Pennsylvania in 2022, until Reep filed the present matter and then he only saw her on
weekends. She testified that Rheins-Guire did not keep up with C.R.’s hygiene. She
opined that C.R. wants constant attention with Reep because she “doesn’t get attention”
when at her mother’s house and Rheins-Guire was always “sitting on her phone.”
{¶12} Mark Rheins, Rheins-Guire’s brother, testified that he had not seen C.R.
neglected. He opined that Rheins-Guire found time to be with her daughter even while
working and in school. Shardae Pearson, Rheins-Guire’s sister, testified that the
condition of Rheins-Guire’s home was not concerning, she had no concerns about C.R.’s
hygiene, and Rheins-Guire was a present mother.
{¶13} Miranda Rheins-Guire testified that she had been a certified nursing
assistant from 2015 until 2019 when she graduated nursing school as an LPN. After C.R.
was born, she worked approximately three to four days a week, 12 hours a day. She
completed nursing school in June 2019, continued working around three days a week,
and dedicated other days to caring for C.R.
{¶14} Around February 2019, Rheins-Guire and Reep terminated their
relationship and she requested he leave their home due to arguments. According to her,
following the break-up, she had C.R. four days a week and Reep had her for three days.
This arrangement remained in place until the end of 2019, after which they did a week
on, week off schedule, with her allowing C.R. to also visit with Reep for special events.
{¶15} After Rheins-Guire married Guire, and she and C.R. moved to Pennsylvania
in mid-2022, she intended to keep C.R. at their residence during the week and allow Reep
to visit on weekends. Rheins-Guire testified that she believed it made sense to have
Case No. 2023-T-0083 C.R. live with one parent during the week through the school year. They continued with
this schedule until she received court papers in July 2022. She testified that she did not
threaten to prevent Reep from visiting with C.R.
{¶16} Rheins-Guire testified that a meeting was held with C.R.’s school in
Pennsylvania at the request of her teacher since C.R. had difficulty staying on task and
had become disruptive in class. At the recommendation of her school principal, C.R. has
been in counseling since that meeting. This was based on her level of stress and emotion
at school. She has received treatment for depression and ADHD and Rheins-Guire had
noticed modifications in her behavior since she started counseling. Rheins-Guire testified
that she did not give Reep authorization to see the counseling records because she
wanted these to remain private for C.R.
{¶17} Rheins-Guire testified that she has always been C.R.’s sole legal caretaker
and has taken full responsibility for her, playing with her and participating in various
activities. She denied any hygiene concerns and testified that C.R. bathes herself and
there had not previously been concerns expressed by Reep regarding this issue until the
move to Pennsylvania. Rheins-Guire stated that she “would like to reduce the phone
calls to once or twice a week and . . . get rid of the Wednesday visitation.”
{¶18} The guardian ad litem, Alissa Kegarise, testified that C.R.’s therapist
believed she was being coached or talked to about custody by both parents. Kegarise
felt Rheins-Guire was “much more hands-off” and that Guire does a significant amount of
parenting when C.R. is with them. The Guardian Ad Litem recommended that Reep be
Case No. 2023-T-0083 named residential parent and legal custodian of C.R. and Rheins-Guire granted
companionship two weekends for every one that C.R. is with Reep.
{¶19} A Magistrate’s Decision was filed on May 31, 2023. The magistrate made
the following pertinent best interest findings: each parent wanted to be designated
residential parent, with mother proposing visitation with father on alternating weekends
and father proposing mother have two out of every three weekends; C.R. has had more
limited interaction with Reep since Rheins-Guire relocated to Pennsylvania, a significant
change since she had spent substantial time with both parents previously; C.R. had a
strong relationship with her family on both sides; C.R. had some difficulties adjusting to
her new home, including suffering stress and being diagnosed with ADHD, although she
is doing well in school; the parents have difficulty agreeing on sharing parenting time and
the mother expressing midweek companionship time is “inconvenient” although father
drives to Pennsylvania to visit with the child; and Reep is more likely to honor court-
ordered visitation. The magistrate determined that it was in the best interest of C.R. to
allocate parental rights to Reep and establish “a liberal schedule of companionship for
the Mother.” It recommended that Reep be designated as the residential parent and legal
custodian and that Rheins-Guire be granted two weekends of visitation followed by one
weekend for Reep. It ordered that Rheins-Guire pay child support in the amount of
$154.56 per month. The court issued a Judgment Entry on May 31, 2023, adopting the
Magistrate’s Decision.
{¶20} Rheins-Guire filed an Objection to Magistrate’s Decision, and a subsequent
July 21, 2023 Amended Objection. She argued that the factual findings relating to C.R.’s
Case No. 2023-T-0083 custody were inconsistent with the evidence and that there was a lack of evidence to
permit that income be imputed to her for the purposes of child support. On October 13,
2023, the court issued a judgment denying the objections.
{¶21} Rheins-Guire timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error:
{¶22} “[1.] The trial court committed an abuse of discretion in ordering the
Defendant/Appellant to pay child support to the Plaintiff/Appellee, and imputing income
to the Defendant/Appellant.
{¶23} “[2.] The trial court committed an abuse of discretion in reallocating parental
rights and responsibilities of the minor child and designating the Plaintiff/Appellee as
residential parent, and legal custodian, of the minor child.”
{¶24} As an initial matter, we note that appellant’s counsel raised several issues
at oral argument that were not addressed in the appellant’s brief, including that minimum
wage imputed to Rheins-Guire was based on Ohio’s minimum wage rate rather than
Pennsylvania’s and that documents relied upon in the guardian ad litem’s report
contained hearsay. “A party may not advance new arguments for the first time at oral
argument.” State v. Snider, 2022-Ohio-4566, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.); Hughes v. Hughes, 2020-
Ohio-4653, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.) (a party may not raise “an argument for the first time at oral
argument, particularly when the party had ample opportunity to explore such issues in its
brief”). For this reason, we decline to address these arguments.
{¶25} In her first assignment of error, Rheins-Guire argues that the court made
various errors in awarding child support, including that its determination she was
voluntarily unemployed was not supported by the evidence. Reep argues that Rheins-
Case No. 2023-T-0083 Guire’s testimony supported the court’s findings.
{¶26} “Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s determination regarding child
support obligations will not be disturbed on appeal.” Haun v. Haun, 2019-Ohio-5408, ¶ 7
(11th Dist.), citing Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390 (1997). “[T]he term ‘abuse of
discretion’ is one of art, essentially connoting judgment exercised by a court which neither
comports with reason, nor the record.” (Citation omitted.) Shorts v. Shorts, 2008-Ohio-
2317, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.). An abuse of discretion is the court’s “‘failure to exercise sound,
reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d
Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004).
{¶27} “In any action in which a court child support order is issued . . . the court or
agency shall calculate the amount of the parents’ child support and cash medical support
in accordance with the basic child support schedule, the applicable worksheet, and the
other provisions of Chapter 3119. of the Revised Code.” R.C. 3119.02. “When calculating
child support, the trial court must first determine the annual gross income of each parent,”
including the gross and potential income “of a parent the court determines to be voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed.” Lake Cty. Dept. of Job and Family Servs. v. Bailey,
2020-Ohio-986, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.); Rock v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 111 (1993).
“Potential income” includes income, imputed to the parent, which would have been
earned, if the court determines that parent is “voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily
underemployed.” R.C. 3119.01(C)(18)(a). “Whether a parent is ‘voluntarily
underemployed’ within the meaning of [the statute], and the amount of ‘potential income’
to be imputed to a child support obligor, are matters to be determined by the trial court
Case No. 2023-T-0083 based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” Rock at syllabus.
{¶28} “Imputed income that the court or agency determines the parent would have
earned if fully employed” is determined from criteria including, inter alia, the parent’s prior
employment experience, education and training; the parent’s physical or mental
disabilities; availability of employment and wages in the area where the parent resides;
the ability of the parent to earn the imputed income; the age and special needs of the
child; increased earning capacity due to experience; and any other relevant factor. R.C.
3119.01(C)(18)(a)(i)-(xi).
{¶29} As an initial matter, Rheins-Guire argues that the trial court made “no
specific finding that [she] was voluntarily unemployed.”
{¶30} This court has held that “[a] trial court must expressly find that a parent is
voluntarily underemployed or unemployed before imputing income.” Byers v. Cartechine,
2017-Ohio-9334, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.). It has also noted, however, “there is no ‘magic
language’ requirement in making th[e] finding” before imputing income for child support
purposes. Winkelman v. Winkelman, 2008-Ohio-6557, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.).
{¶31} The Ohio Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Ayers v. Ayers,
2024-Ohio-1833. It held that “the domestic-relations court must expressly find that a
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed as a condition precedent to imputing
potential income for child-support-calculation purposes.” Id. at ¶ 27. However, the trial
court is not required to include “a recitation of particular words.” Id. at ¶ 23. “The precise
wording is . . . inconsequential, but the domestic-relations court’s order must clearly
evince a finding that a parent’s unemployment or underemployment is voluntary.” Id.
Case No. 2023-T-0083 {¶32} While the court did not explicitly use the phrase “voluntarily unemployed,”
there is no question that this is what the court found. The lower court found that, although
Rheins-Guire had a LPN certification, she “is choosing not to work currently,” i.e.,
voluntarily deciding not to work, and that there was no evidence that she could not work,
again showing the voluntary nature of her unemployment. This was sufficient to
demonstrate the lower court made a finding that Rheins-Guire was voluntarily
unemployed. Winkelman at ¶ 22 (“[i]mplicit in [the court’s factual findings regarding the
lack of employment] is the finding that [the parent] is presently voluntarily
underemployed”).
{¶33} Rheins-Guire also argues that the lower court erred in finding her voluntarily
unemployed since “there was no evidence that was presented that [her LPN] certification
was still valid, as Ohio requires said certifications to be renewed every two (2) years, as
does the State of Pennsylvania.”
{¶34} At the trial, Rheins-Guire was asked “you’re now a licensed LPN in the State
of Ohio?” to which she responded in the affirmative. She also testified: “I filed the
paperwork necessary to transfer my license from Ohio to Pennsylvania.” Based on the
information presented to the court, it appears she had a current license at the time of the
trial. It is not relevant whether it has since expired since the court must base its decision
upon the testimony before it. Further, even presuming that she had not renewed her
license, this alone would not prevent a finding that she was voluntarily unemployed as
there is nothing in the record to indicate why her license could not be renewed. See
Drucker v. Drucker, 2000 WL 739520, *2 (8th Dist. June 8, 2000) (appellant was found to
Case No. 2023-T-0083 be voluntarily unemployed where he lacked a license to practice law in Florida, since “the
record does not reflect any reason appellant could not have become licensed to practice
law in Florida” and his voluntary failure to obtain such license did not “support a finding
that his unemployment was involuntary”).
{¶35} Rheins-Guire also argues that the record does not contain evidence
regarding the availability of jobs in her area, the rate of pay for such jobs, or that she is
able to work a full-time job at minimum wage.
{¶36} As to Rheins-Guire’s ability to work a full-time job, she testified that she had
worked both as a nursing assistant and then an LPN in the years immediately preceding
her marriage to Guire and that she had worked three to four days per week, 12 hours a
day, which would constitute full-time work. There was nothing in the record to indicate an
inability to do so at this time. We find no abuse of discretion in determining that she is
capable of full-time work.
{¶37} It is accurate that there was no evidence presented as to the availability of
current positions in the nursing field in her area or the rate of pay for such jobs. While
there was no evidence as to rate of pay, the court imputed minimum wage and a
determination as to prevailing wages in the nursing profession would not have decreased
the amount of support owed.
{¶38} As to the lack of evidence on the availability of jobs, Reep contends it is
common knowledge that there are nursing jobs available throughout the country, although
the trial court did not make a finding on this issue. Nonetheless, we observe that while
consideration of the R.C. 3119.01(C)(18) factors is required to impute income, Huth v.
Case No. 2023-T-0083 Huth, 2019-Ohio-2970, ¶ 33 (11th Dist.), it has been held that “the statute does not require
evidence be presented as to each factor before the court may impute income.” Yenni v.
Yenni, 2022-Ohio-2867, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.); Chapman v. Chapman, 2007-Ohio-1414, ¶ 12
(10th Dist.) (the law does not require that “evidence must be presented as to each factor
in order for the trial court to impute income”). It has been held that the trial court’s decision
to impute income is supported by a sufficient basis where there was evidence regarding
the father’s prior work experience, income, education, and mental health concerns, even
where there was no testimony regarding the prevailing wages and employment
opportunities in his industry. Chapman at ¶ 12-18 (observing that “the absence of
testimony regarding the employment availability or wage and salary levels in a particular
geographic area . . . is a factor a trial court must consider in determining whether, and in
what amount, to impute income”). Here, while there was no testimony about the
availability of employment and wages in Pennsylvania, this does not preclude the court
from imputing income, as it had evidence on several other factors including Rheins-
Guire’s work history and education. Further, as noted above, it imputed only minimum
wage, likely taking into account the lack of testimony on the prevailing wages in her field.
We find no abuse of discretion in imputing to Rheins-Guire an income of $21,008 given
the field in which she works and her experience.
{¶39} The first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶40} In her second assignment of error, Rheins-Guire argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in allocating parental rights and responsibilities and the evidence
did not support its decision, arguing that the decision “appears to be nothing more than
Case No. 2023-T-0083 the trial court preferring the Plaintiff/Appellee over Defendant/Appellant.”
{¶41} “The trial court’s judgment involving the allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Ruff v.
Ruff, 2023-Ohio-2349, ¶ 62 (11th Dist.). “‘This court, as well as the Supreme Court of
Ohio, has held that decisions involving the custody of children are within the discretion of
the trial court and accorded great deference on review.’” Id., citing Ash-Holloway v.
Holloway, 2022-Ohio-4248, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.). Because the trial court is in the best position
to observe the witnesses and parties, “the reviewing court . . . should be guided by the
presumption that the trial court’s findings were indeed correct.” Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio
St.3d 71, 74 (1988).
{¶42} “When making the allocation of the parental rights and responsibilities for
the care of the children . . . the court shall take into account that which would be in the
best interest of the children.” R.C. 3109.04(B)(1). “In determining the best interest of a
child . . . the court shall consider all relevant factors,” including “[t]he wishes of the child’s
parents regarding the child’s care”; “[t]he child’s interaction and interrelationship with the
child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interest”; “[t]he child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community”; “[t]he
mental and physical health of all persons involved”; “[t]he parent more likely to honor and
facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights”; and
“[w]hether either parent has established a residence . . . outside this state.” R.C.
3109.04(F)(1)(a), (c)-(f), and (j).
{¶43} In the present matter, the magistrate outlined the reasons for the
Case No. 2023-T-0083 determination of parental rights, addressing each of the best interest factors. Particularly
relevant to its custody determination in this matter, the magistrate found that C.R. has
had changes in her life from the move to Pennsylvania and had disruption from the
change in her ability to see her father and that Rheins-Guire is less likely to facilitate
parenting time. Further, it noted concerns with allowing Reep additional visitation time
during the school year.
{¶44} Rheins-Guire argues that the court failed to use updated information relating
to the child’s relationships since the move to Pennsylvania and failed to consider evidence
that she fostered relationships on both sides of the family. The Magistrate’s Order
specifically recognizes the move to Pennsylvania and how it has impacted C.R.’s
relationships. Consistent with the testimony of Rheins-Guire and Reep, it found that C.R.
previously spent significant time with both parents and that Reep is now limited to
weekends and midday visits. Such a conclusion was not inconsistent with Rheins-Guire’s
expressed desire that C.R. stay with her during the week while in school. The magistrate
properly recognized that C.R. has relationships with relatives on all sides, a fact not
changed by the move. The magistrate’s decision did not rely on outdated facts; it merely
discussed the prior time C.R. spent with each parent to show the contrast in time that is
now available to Reep and how this impacted C.R.’s relationship with him. It is also worth
noting that the testimony demonstrated that relatives with which C.R. has a strong
relationship reside in Ohio rather than Pennsylvania. While Rheins-Guire argues that the
court failed to take into account evidence that she fostered relationships on both sides, it
accurately stated the evidence relating to C.R.’s interactions with and availability to her
Case No. 2023-T-0083 various relatives.
{¶45} Rheins-Guire also argues that, contrary to the magistrate’s finding, there
was no testimony that C.R. had difficulties adjusting to her new home and issues relating
to her new school were addressed through counseling facilitated by Rheins-Guire. The
magistrate found that C.R. had difficulty adjusting to her new home and school. There
was ample testimony regarding the fact that C.R. had behavioral concerns warranting
intervention by her teacher and principal which came about after the move to
Pennsylvania. In addition, while Rheins-Guire argues that the magistrate was mistaken
in finding that C.R. had difficulty adjusting to her new home, Patti Reep testified that after
the move, C.R. sought “reassurance of love” and seeks “constant attention,” and Rheins-
Guire testified that C.R. had “been very stressed out” and emotional, inquiring about when
she would see her father. These were relevant considerations in her ability to adjust to
the move and her home life.
{¶46} Rheins-Guire argues that the lower court “appears to be making
assumptions about what is contained within the counseling records,” observing it made a
statement that Rheins-Guire knew C.R. told the therapist she was uncomfortable with
Reep, which was contrary to her assertion she did not look at therapy records. She
contends that she could have obtained this information in other ways. Even if Rheins-
Guire’s argument is accurate, this did not have any bearing on the outcome of this case,
as whether Rheins-Guire looked at the therapy records was not cited as a justification for
the decision on custody.
{¶47} Rheins-Guire also contends that the court could not make any findings in
Case No. 2023-T-0083 reliance on the contents of the counseling records in its decision since they were not in
the record. Further, it could not consider any statements made in the guardian ad litem’s
report in reliance on counseling records since the “Guardian ad Litem report that was
submitted would not be able to be considered by the trial court, since [it] was not admitted
as evidence by either party.” However, the magistrate did not cite counseling records as
justification for the decision, but instead merely observed that C.R. received counseling,
had been stressed out, and received treatment for ADHD. Additionally, a review of the
guardian ad litem report reveals no specific references to the counseling records apart
from noting the facts of her receiving counseling and ADHD medication.
{¶48} Nonetheless, any argument that the court could not rely on the guardian ad
litem report because it was not admitted as evidence lacks merit. Courts have held that,
while Sup.R. 48.06(C)(2) provides that “[t]he court shall consider the recommendation of
the guardian ad litem in determining the best interest of the child only when the report . .
. has been admitted as an exhibit,” this is only a guideline and, where the parties had
access to the report prior to trial, were aware of the guardian’s recommendation, and had
the opportunity to cross-examine the guardian, the report could be considered by the
court. In re D.C.J., 2012-Ohio-4154, ¶ 51 (8th Dist.). Here, the GAL report was filed prior
to trial on January 17, 2023, counsel for both parties cross-examined the GAL, and
Rheins-Guire’s counsel’s questioning showed he was clearly aware of the contents of the
report as well as the recommendation made. We find no reason the court could not
consider any of its contents. Further, while Rheins-Guire argues that the court did not
inquire of the guardian ad litem regarding various issues, there was significant cross-
Case No. 2023-T-0083 examination of the guardian ad litem which demonstrated the basis for her
recommendation.
{¶49} Finally, Rheins-Guire argues that there is “nothing in the record that states
that the minor child is not being cared for by the Defendant/Appellant, there is nothing in
the records that states that the best interest of the minor child was served by custody
being awarded to the Plaintiff/Appellee.” The court decided the allocation of parental
rights, not a modification, and, even presuming that Rheins-Guire properly cared for her
daughter and could be an appropriate legal custodian, the court had to take into account
all of the circumstances and determine how parental rights would be best allocated given
their ability to facilitate visitation as well as the distance between the two parents’ homes.
Rheins-Guire’s ability to be a suitable custodian does not render the court’s decision an
abuse of discretion and the appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.
{¶50} The second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶51} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,
concur
Case No. 2023-T-0083