An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-132
Filed 15 October 2025
Iredell County, No. 24JA000106-480
IN THE MATTER OF: C.R.
Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 21 October 2024 by Judge
Carole A. Hicks in Iredell County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30
September 2025.
Lauren Vaughan for petitioner-appellee Iredell County Department of Social Services.
Brittany T. McKinney, GAL Staff Attorney for the guardian ad litem.
Jason R. Page for respondent-appellant mother.
PER CURIAM.
Mother appeals from the trial court’s adjudication and disposition orders
adjudicating her minor child, Christy,1 neglected and dependent. On appeal, Mother
argues the trial court erred, first, in adjudicating Christy to be neglected and
dependent, and second, in determining that the Iredell County Department of Social
1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the juveniles’ identities, pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: C.R.
Opinion of the Court
Services (“ICDSS”) made reasonable efforts to prevent Christy’s removal from her
home. Upon careful review, we affirm the trial court’s adjudication and disposition
orders.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Mother’s first child, Marcus,2 was born in January 2023. The day after his
birth, Rockingham County Department of Health and Human Services, Division of
Social Services (“RCDSS”), received a report regarding Mother’s “severe cognitive
impairments that impacted [ ] [M]other’s ability to safely and independently parent
the child.” The report alleged that, while Mother was in the hospital, Marcus went
an entire night without food because she did not know how or when to feed him.
Hospital staff observed that Mother did not appear to understand feeding cues. When
Marcus cried, Mother appeared anxious and asked the nurses for assistance.
Additionally, hospital staff had to assist Mother with her own basic needs, as she did
not know how to order food as a patient and required prompting from nurses to
engage in postpartum self-care.
A social worker3 visited the hospital in response to the report. Mother told the
social worker that her boyfriend, whom she had met online three months prior,
planned to teach her how to care for Marcus. When asked about support from family
2 Marcus is not at issue in this case. 3 This social worker was not named in the Record.
-2- IN RE: C.R.
members, Mother explained that she did not have any of their phone numbers. At
that time, she was unemployed.
The social worker then visited the apartment where Mother and her boyfriend
lived. The social worker noted that Mother’s boyfriend also appeared to exhibit signs
of cognitive delays. Although some baby supplies were present, there were no baby
bottles in the home, and Marcus’s bassinet contained items that posed a safety risk
to a newborn. Ultimately, RCDSS filed a juvenile petition alleging Marcus was a
neglected and dependent juvenile, and RCDSS received nonsecure custody of Marcus.
On 7 February 2023, Mother completed a psychological evaluation. The
assessment results indicated that Mother’s overall intellectual ability fell below the
1st percentile, suggesting a “limited ability to care for herself independently” and
“significant challenges in her ability to independently meet the needs of an infant.”
The evaluation also concluded that she was unlikely to benefit from standard
parenting classes.
Approximately one month later, the trial court adjudicated Marcus as a
neglected and dependent juvenile. The case was transferred from Rockingham
County to Mecklenburg County in May 2023 following Mother’s relocation. Coretta
Pellom, a social worker from Mecklenburg County, was assigned to Marcus’s case.
On 31 October 2023, Mother completed a clinical assessment at Daymark
Recovery Services. Based on the assessment, she was diagnosed with unspecified
trauma and stressor-related disorder. It was recommended that Mother engage in
-3- IN RE: C.R.
weekly individual therapy and attend a ten-day stay at a facility providing twenty-
four-hour crisis-based services.
Mother participated in the recommended inpatient treatment at Daymark’s
crisis facility from 1 November to 13 November 2023. During her stay, she met
Tracey Brandon, an employee at the facility. Mother and Ms. Brandon became
friends, and following Mother’s discharge, Ms. Brandon allowed her to move into her
home. As a result, Ms. Brandon was terminated from her employment at Daymark.
Mother gave birth to her second child, Christy, on 31 May 2024 while living
with Ms. Brandon in Iredell County. Shortly thereafter, ICDSS received a report
raising concerns due to the ongoing matter involving Marcus in Mecklenburg County.
Georjeana Moreland, a social worker with ICDSS, visited Mother in the hospital
following Christy’s birth. Ms. Moreland described Mother as “cooperative” and “fairly
pleasant,” but stated that she did not observe Mother directly caring for the infant
during the visit.
Ms. Moreland subsequently spoke with Ms. Pellom, who expressed concerns
regarding Mother’s ability to care for an infant. Ms. Moreland also learned that a
petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights in Marcus’s case was pending in
Mecklenburg County. Based on the concerns raised by Ms. Pellom, ICDSS filed a
juvenile petition on 4 June 2024, alleging that Christy was a neglected and dependent
juvenile. On the same day, ICDSS was granted nonsecure custody of Christy.
-4- IN RE: C.R.
On 5 June 2024, the trial court held a hearing to determine the need for
continued nonsecure custody. The trial court ordered that Christy remain in ICDSS
custody and appointed a Rule 17 Guardian ad Litem to represent Mother.4 After
observing Mother during the hearing, the trial court made the following additional
findings: Mother had difficulty understanding basic instructions, such as standing
and raising her hand; struggled to understand legal questions, including the process
of obtaining counsel; and struggled to manage her emotions.
On 10 September 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the juvenile petition.
At the hearing, Ms. Moreland testified, describing her visit with Mother at the
hospital, her conversation with Ms. Pellom, and the home visit she conducted after
Mother’s release from the hospital. Ms. Moreland stated that Mother’s home was
“[c]lean” and “fully equipped with baby items.” She also testified that her roommate,
Ms. Brandon, was considered as a potential placement provider; however, that
placement was ultimately deemed inappropriate because ICDSS had recently closed
a case involving Ms. Brandon and her own child.
Ms. Pellom testified next. She addressed Mother’s case plan progress in
Marcus’s case following its transfer to Mecklenburg County. Ms. Pellom expressed
concerns about Mother’s weekly visits with Marcus, explaining that Mother required
4 The trial court may appoint a Rule 17 Guardian ad Litem “for a parent who is incompetent
in accordance with [N.C.G.S.] 1A-1, Rule 17.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(c) (2023).
-5- IN RE: C.R.
“one-on-one guidance,” needed to be prompted to change his diaper, and must be
reminded that infants drink milk rather than eat solid food. Ms. Pellom further
testified that Mother had not made progress on her case plan. Although Mother
completed a parenting class, it was intended for parents of toddlers and was therefore
not relevant to Mother’s situation. Additionally, Ms. Pellom determined that
placement with Ms. Brandon was inappropriate. She raised concerns about the
circumstances under which she and Mother met and specifically noted that Ms.
Brandon did not allow Mother to go to the hospital when she was in labor with
Christy.
At the hearing, the trial court admitted the following exhibits into evidence:
Mother’s psychological evaluation on 7 February 2023; the clinical assessment from
Daymark on 31 October 2023; medical records from her stay at Daymark from 1
November 2023 to 13 November 2023; and the adjudication and disposition orders
entered on 29 March 2023 in Marcus’s case in Rockingham County. The trial court
additionally took judicial notice of two permanency planning orders entered in
Marcus’s case in Mecklenburg County following hearings held in July and November
2023.
Ultimately, the trial court adjudicated Christy neglected and dependent.
Following a disposition hearing, the trial court ordered that Christy remain in the
custody of ICDSS. The trial court entered written adjudication and disposition orders
on 21 October 2024. On 20 November 2024, Mother timely filed notice of appeal. On
-6- IN RE: C.R.
7 March 2025, Mother filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari (“PWC”) seeking this
Court’s review, acknowledging that her notice of appeal was defective due to Mother’s
lack of signature.
II. Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, we address Mother’s defective notice of appeal.
Pursuant to Appellate Rule 3(b) and N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(c), the notice of appeal must
be “signed by both the appealing party and counsel for the appealing party.” N.C.R.
App. P. 3(b); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(c) (2023). In the present case, Mother’s counsel and
her Rule 17 Guardian ad Litem signed the 20 November 2024 notice of appeal;
however, it was not signed by Mother. See In re Z.A.N.L.W.C., 297 N.C. App. 698,
703 (2025) (Respondent-mother’s Rule 17 Guardian ad Litem “was not a proper party
to file notice of appeal . . . Mother was therefore required to sign the notice of appeal”).
Moreover, it is well-established that Rule 3 is “jurisdictional, and if not complied with,
the appeal must be dismissed.” In re L.B., 187 N.C. App. 326, 332 (2007). Thus,
because Mother did not sign the notice of appeal, we must dismiss the appeal unless
we grant Mother’s PWC.
Under Rule 21 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure, a “[PWC] may be issued in
appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of the
judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has
been lost by failure to take timely action[.]” N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1). In our discretion,
we grant Mother’s PWC and address the merits of her appeal. See In re A.S., 190
-7- IN RE: C.R.
N.C. App. 679, 683 (2008) (considering the “serious consequences” associated with an
initial adjudication of neglect when granting respondent’s PWC).
III. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial court’s adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency
to determine “(1) whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing
evidence, and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of
fact[.]” In re S.C.R., 217 N.C. App. 166, 168 (2011) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo” on appeal. In
re H.P., 278 N.C. App. 195, 201 (2021). Findings of fact that are not challenged on
appeal are deemed binding and conclusive. In re V.B., 239 N.C. App. 340, 341 (2015).
Moreover, findings of fact supported by clear and convincing evidence are considered
conclusive, even if the record contains evidence to the contrary. In re H.P., 278 N.C.
App. at 201.
Following an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency, the trial court
proceeds to the dispositional phase where the court may consider any evidence that
it considers to be “relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the
juvenile and the most appropriate disposition.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(a) (2023). “The
district court has broad discretion to fashion a disposition from the prescribed
alternatives . . . based upon the best interests of the child. We review a disposition
order only for an abuse of discretion.” In re K.H., 281 N.C. App. 259, 270 (2022)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, “a trial court’s discretionary
-8- IN RE: C.R.
ruling is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it
was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re
S.H., 217 N.C. App. 140, 144 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. Analysis
On appeal, Mother argues the trial court erred by: (A) concluding that Christy
was neglected and dependent, and (B) determining ICDSS made reasonable efforts
to prevent Christy’s placement with ICDSS. We address each argument, in turn.
A. Adjudication
Mother first argues the trial court erred in concluding that Christy was
neglected and dependent because the evidence presented at the hearing primarily
concerned the prior case involving Marcus, which arose under different
circumstances, and she is capable of providing appropriate care for Christy.
1. Challenged Findings of Fact
Mother challenges numerous adjudicatory findings as improper findings or
unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Mother first contends that
portions of Findings of Fact 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, and 17 merely recite witness testimony
rather than reflect the trial court’s independent findings and therefore do not
constitute proper findings of fact.5
5 Although Mother’s brief states that she is challenging Finding of Fact 8, the specific language
she contests appears in Finding of Fact 9. Accordingly, we consider finding of fact 8 to be binding and limit our review to the challenged portion of Finding of Fact 9.
-9- IN RE: C.R.
Our Supreme Court has established that “[r]ecitations of the testimony of each
witness do not constitute findings of fact by the trial judge.” In re A.C., 378 N.C. 377,
383 (2021) (citations omitted); see also In re Bullock, 229 N.C. App. 373, 379 (2013)
(“The trial court must weigh all of the evidence and in its findings, resolve the
conflicts raised, as recitations of the testimony of each witness do not constitute
findings of fact by the trial judge.” (citation modified)). Nevertheless, a finding that
recites witness testimony may still be treated as a proper finding of fact if “it also
includes ‘an indication concerning whether the trial court deemed the relevant
portion of the testimony credible.’” In re H.B., 384 N.C. 484, 490 (2023) (citation
omitted). This is because it is “the trial court’s obligation to evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses who testified at the adjudication hearing and to resolve any
contradictions that existed in the evidence.” In re A.C., 378 N.C. at 384. Likewise,
the trial court may describe witness testimony in a factual finding, “so long as the
court ultimately makes its own findings, resolving any material disputes[.]” In re
A.E., 379 N.C. 177, 185 (2021) (citations omitted).
With this in mind, we now examine the challenged language in each disputed
finding of fact. Mother first challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 7, which states
“[Marcus] was born in January 2023, [and] it was reported [Mother] did not know
how to provide basic care for the minor child, such as diaper changing and proper
feeding.” This finding is not a recitation of testimony, however, but rather a finding
regarding the background of how social services first became involved with Mother,
- 10 - IN RE: C.R.
and it is supported by the evidence. During the hearing, the adjudication order
entered in Marcus’s case on 29 March 2023 was admitted into evidence. In that
adjudication order, the trial court found that shortly after Marcus’s birth, RCDSS
received a neglect report alleging improper care due to concerns that Mother
“presented with severe cognitive impairments that impacted the mother’s ability to
safely and independently parent the child.” The trial court also found that the report
indicated Mother did not know how and when to feed the child or what to do when
the child cried. Therefore, we hold this finding is a proper finding of fact and is
supported by the evidence. See In re H.P., 278 N.C. App. at 201.
Mother next challenges as a recitation of testimony the portion of Finding of
Fact 9 which states, in relevant part, “Ms. Pellom testified before this Court regarding
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Service[s’] continuing concerns with []
Mother.” This finding, however, is not a recitation of testimony as the finding does
not recite any actual testimony of Ms. Pellom. Rather, it is a finding by the trial court
of the subject matter to which Ms. Pellom testified and appears to serve as an
introduction to the findings immediately following it, which discuss the specific
continuing concerns. Moreover, the finding is supported as Ms. Pellom did testify at
the hearing to Mecklenburg County’s continuing concerns regarding Mother’s ability
to provide proper care.
Mother also challenges the following portions of Findings of Fact 10, 15, 16,
and 17 as mere recitations of testimony:
- 11 - IN RE: C.R.
10. . . . Social Worker Pellom testified that [] Mother completed a parenting [class], however, the class was for toddler parenting instead of infant parenting. . . .
....
15. . . . Social Worker Pellom testified the [] Mother continues to need assistance in her supervised visitations with the minor child [Marcus]. Social Worker Pellom testified that she had not observed [] Mother’s interaction with the minor child [Christy].
16. Social Worker Pellom testified that she informed the Iredell County Department of Social Services of the [] Mother’s imminent delivery of minor child [Christy].
17. Iredell County Social Worker Georjeana Moreland testified that Iredell County’s petition in this matter dated June 3, 2024, was based primarily on concerns stemming from the [] Mother’s open CPS case with Mecklenburg County. Ms. Moreland testified that during her investigation she met with the [] Mother briefly at the hospital following [Christy]’s birth. . . .
Unlike Findings of Fact 7 and 9, these findings do “merely recite[ ] the
testimony of various witnesses rather than indicating what actually happened[.]” In
re J.D.O., 381 N.C. 799, 809 (2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Each finding reiterates the testimony of Ms. Pellom or Ms. Moreland, and the trial
court made no indication regarding the credibility of either witness. Thus, we
disregard these portions of the findings and proceed to Mother’s remaining challenges
to the adjudication order. See id. at 810–813 (holding that findings which merely
recite witness testimony, particularly those introduced by words “testified” or
“state[d]” are not proper findings of fact and must be disregarded when reviewing an
- 12 - IN RE: C.R.
adjudication order).
Mother next challenges Finding of Fact 10 as unsupported by the evidence,
which, excluding the disregarded language from above, states as follows:
Mother had not made progress on her case plan through Mecklenburg County. . . . The [] Mother’s current residence meets minimal standards; however, the home has not been deemed appropriate due to aforementioned concerns regarding Ms. Brandon.
Mother contends that this finding is unsupported, arguing that she had made
progress with housing, had the supplies necessary to care for a child, and consistently
attended visits with Marcus. Contrary to Mother’s argument, this finding is
supported by the evidence. Ms. Pellom testified that Mother had not made progress
on her case plan in Mecklenburg County, and that a petition to terminate her
parental rights was pending in Marcus’s case. While Mother did obtain housing and
had the necessary supplies, both Ms. Moreland and Ms. Pellom testified that the
housing was considered inappropriate due to concerns regarding Ms. Brandon.
Additionally, although Mother attended visits with Marcus, unchallenged Finding of
Fact 15 states that she had not received unsupervised visits with Marcus. Thus,
Mother had not made sufficient progress on her case plan to move beyond supervised
visits. Indeed, Ms. Pellom testified that Mother required “one-on-one guidance”
during visits, needed instruction on meeting an infant’s basic needs, and did not make
progress on her mental health treatment. Thus, Finding of Fact 10 is supported by
clear and convincing evidence. See In re H.P., 278 N.C. App. at 201.
- 13 - IN RE: C.R.
Mother also raises issue with Finding of Fact 10 because the order contains no
“aforementioned” concerns regarding Ms. Brandon. This appears to be a harmless
typographical error, however, as the order contains numerous findings of fact after
this finding identifying the concerns for Ms. Brandon as a caretaker. See In re J.K.P.,
238 N.C. App. 334, 343 (2014) (explaining that typographical errors are “mistakes in
writing or copying something into the record, or other, similar mistakes that are not
changes in the court’s reasoning or determination” (emphasis added)). Therefore,
Mother has suffered no harm as a result of this typographical error, and we overrule
her challenge.
Mother next challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 14, which states, “Mother
has not followed through with any mental health treatment during the pendency of
her CPS case in Mecklenburg County.” Mother contends that this finding is
unsupported, noting that her Daymark records from November 2023, which were
admitted into evidence, demonstrate that she participated in mental health
treatment during the pendency of Marcus’s case. Unchallenged Finding of Fact 13
states, however, that Mother’s treatment plan recommended weekly individual and
group therapy following her stay at Daymark. When asked about Mother’s
compliance with this recommendation, Ms. Pellom testified that Mother had not
made progress on her mental health during Marcus’s case. Ms. Pellom also noted
that Mother frequently relocated within North Carolina, which made it difficult to
connect her with services and establish care. Thus, although Mother completed a
- 14 - IN RE: C.R.
ten-day stay with Daymark, she did not follow through with the recommended weekly
therapy and had not made sufficient progress in addressing her mental health.
Accordingly, we disregard this finding to the extent it may indicate she did not
participate in any treatment, but otherwise find it supported. See In re H.P., 278
N.C. App. at 201.
Mother next challenges Finding of Fact 18, which states:
[Mother] has significant cognitive defects which hinder her ability to provide necessary care for the minor child [Christy]. These cognitive delays have been present throughout the pendency of the case involving the minor child [Marcus] and continue to be present, regarding the minor child [Christy]. [] Mother is unable to provide an appropriate alternative arrangement for the care of the minor child.
Mother argues that this finding is unsupported, asserting that there were no
medical reports of concern from the hospital where Christy was born. She also notes
that Ms. Moreland testified she was uncertain whether Mother was capable of caring
for Christy. Additionally, Mother argues that she made alternative care
arrangements by offering Ms. Brandon and her preacher as potential caretakers for
Christy. Unchallenged Finding of Fact 11, however, addresses Mother’s psychological
evaluation from February 2023, which concluded that “Mother was found to be less
than the 1st percentile in overall intellectual ability with significant challenges in
her ability to meet the needs of an infant.” It further concluded that, “it would be
unlikely [that] Respondent Mother would benefit from standard parenting classes.”
- 15 - IN RE: C.R.
The concerns regarding Mother’s cognitive abilities persisted, as Ms. Pellom testified
that Mother had not made progress on her case plan and continued to require
assistance during visits with Marcus. Although Ms. Moreland did not personally
observe Mother’s ability to care for Christy, the unresolved concerns from Marcus’s
case remained. Lastly, Mother correctly notes that she identified Ms. Brandon and
her preacher as potential alternative placement options. But Ms. Moreland testified
that Mother was unable to provide the preacher’s name, and, as discussed more
below, Ms. Brandon was determined to be an inappropriate placement. Thus, while
Mother provided possible alternative childcare providers, she did not provide
appropriate alternative arrangements for the care of Christy.
Mother next challenges Finding of Fact 19, which states:
Ms. [] Brandon is not an appropriate placement for the minor child. Ms. Brandon has never been approved as an appropriate placement for the minor child [Marcus] in the Mecklenburg County case. This inappropriateness continues in the matter of [Christy].
Mother contends this finding is unsupported, pointing to Ms. Moreland’s
testimony that Mother’s home was appropriate. She further argues that Ms. Pellom’s
concern regarding Ms. Brandon preventing Mother from going to the hospital while
in labor is no longer relevant to Christy’s case. Mother is correct that Ms. Moreland
described the home shared by Mother and Ms. Brandon as “[c]lean” and “fully
equipped with baby items”; however, Finding of Fact 19 does not address the physical
condition of the home; rather, it addresses the ongoing concerns regarding Ms.
- 16 - IN RE: C.R.
Brandon as a caretaker and her presence in the home. Further, substantial evidence
presented at the hearing supports Finding of Fact 19. Both Ms. Moreland and Ms.
Pellom testified that ICDSS had recently closed a case involving Ms. Brandon and
her own child. Additional concerns were raised about the nature of Ms. Brandon’s
relationship with Mother, specifically that Ms. Brandon allowed Mother to move in
after her discharge from Daymark and was subsequently terminated from her
employment as a result. Furthermore, while the concern that Ms. Brandon prevented
Mother from going to the hospital may not be a persisting concern, it nonetheless
reflects issues with Ms. Brandon’s judgment and her ability to safely support Mother,
and, potentially, Christy.
Mother lastly challenges Finding of Fact 20, which states:
Ms. Brandon has failed to show appropriate behavior with the Department in that she is uncooperative and argumentative. In her testimony, Ms. Brandon denied that the [] Mother was unable to properly care for the minor child due to her severe cognitive disabilities. Further, Ms. Brandon has recent CPS history regarding her own biological child.
Mother argues this finding “is not supported by any evidence, much less clear
and convincing evidence[,]” noting that Ms. Brandon did not testify during the
adjudication hearing. We agree with Mother that this finding is partially
unsupported, as the trial court relied on evidence presented at the dispositional
hearing rather than the adjudicatory hearing. See In re Z.J.W., 376 N.C. 760, 773
(2021) (“[A] trial court should not consider testimony received at the dispositional
- 17 - IN RE: C.R.
phase of a termination proceeding in making adjudicatory findings of fact[.]” (citation
omitted)). Therefore, the portions of the finding concerning Ms. Brandon’s
interactions with ICDSS and her opinion regarding Mother’s ability to care for
Christy are disregarded. As discussed supra, however, there was other evidence at
the adjudicatory stage that Ms. Brandon had a prior history with ICDSS and that
portion of the finding is upheld. See In re H.P., 278 N.C. App. at 201.
2. Neglect
Next, Mother challenges the trial court’s conclusion that Christy was a
neglected juvenile. She argues that the petition relied solely on the prior case
involving her other child, Marcus, and did not reflect her current circumstances. In
support, Mother emphasizes that she had obtained stable housing, secured necessary
supplies to care for a child, received support from church members willing to assist
with Christy, maintained employment at Wal-Mart immediately prior to Christy’s
birth, and was actively participating in therapy. Given these circumstances, Mother
contends there was no evidence that Christy was at risk of physical, mental, or
emotional impairment.
A neglected juvenile is defined in pertinent part as one whose parent “does not
provide proper care, supervision, or discipline” or “creates or allows to be created a
living environment that is injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-
101(15)(a), (e) (2023). “To adjudicate a juvenile neglected, some physical, mental, or
emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a
- 18 - IN RE: C.R.
consequence of the failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline is
required.” In re R.B., 280 N.C. App. 424, 432 (2021) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “A court need not wait for actual harm to occur to the child if there
is a substantial risk of harm.” In re J.N.J., 286 N.C. App. 599, 613 (2022) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). In cases involving newborns, “the decision of the trial
court must of necessity be predictive in nature, as the trial court must assess whether
there is a substantial risk of future abuse or neglect based on the historical facts of
the case.” In re J.N.J., 286 N.C. App. at 612 (citation omitted).
“In determining whether a juvenile is a neglected juvenile, it is relevant
whether that juvenile . . . lives in a home where another juvenile has been subjected
to abuse or neglect by an adult who regularly lives in the home.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-
101(15). The trial judge is afforded “some discretion in determining the weight to be
given” to a prior adjudication of neglect involving that parent. In re J.A.M., 372 N.C.
1, 9 (2019). We have held, however, that
[t]he prior adjudication of a sibling as neglected may not, standing alone, support an adjudication of neglect. Instead, additional factors must be present to suggest that the neglect . . . will be repeated. A parent’s failure to correct the conditions that lead to the prior adjudication of neglect . . . may support the likelihood of the repetition of neglect.
In re J.N.J., 286 N.C. App. at 613 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
This Court addressed a similar issue in In re E.N.S. 164 N.C. App. 146, 149
(2004). In that case, the juvenile, E.S., was removed from the respondent’s care
- 19 - IN RE: C.R.
immediately after birth, before the respondent had been discharged from the hospital.
The trial court adjudicated E.S. as neglected based on events that occurred prior to
his birth, specifically, the prior adjudication of the respondent’s oldest child as
neglected and dependent approximately two years earlier. Id. at 150. Additionally,
following the adjudication of the respondent’s oldest child and before E.S.’s birth, the
respondent “continued to demonstrate behavior that evidenced she would neglect
E.S.” Id. Moreover, the respondent’s circumstances had not improved after E.S.’s
birth. Id. On appeal, this Court upheld the adjudication, concluding that the trial
court appropriately considered both the prior adjudication and the likelihood that
neglect would continue in the future. Id. at 151.
The present case is akin to In re E.N.S. Marcus was born in January 2023 and
adjudicated neglected because Mother was unable to provide him with basic care due
primarily to her cognitive delays. During the pendency of Marcus’s case, Mother
failed to make progress on her case plan. Specifically, she did not engage in mental
health treatment and had not received unsupervised visits with Marcus. A petition
to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Marcus was pending as of the hearing date
in the present case. Mother’s cognitive impairments significantly limited her ability
to meet Marcus’s basic needs and remained unchanged at the time of Christy’s birth.
Furthermore, Mother’s living arrangement was inappropriate, as Ms. Brandon was
not a proper placement, and Mother was unable to identify an appropriate alternative
placement for Christy.
- 20 - IN RE: C.R.
Accordingly, the trial court properly considered both the prior adjudication of
neglect in Marcus’s case and the continuing circumstances that led to that
adjudication in evaluating the likelihood of continued neglect in Christy’s case. See
id. at 151; In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. at 9. The same concerns that were present in
Marcus’s case, particularly Mother’s cognitive impairments and inability to provide
appropriate care, were still present at the time of Christy’s birth. These unaddressed
concerns demonstrate that there was a substantial risk of future neglect. See In re
J.N.J., 286 N.C. App. at 612. Taken together, the trial court’s findings are sufficient
to support its determination that Christy is a neglected juvenile. See In re S.C.R.,
217 N.C. App. at 168.
3. Dependency
Mother also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Christy is a
dependent juvenile. A dependent juvenile is one “in need of assistance or placement
because . . . the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the
juvenile’s care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care
arrangement.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9). Therefore, “the trial court must address both
(1) the parent’s ability to provide care or supervision, and (2) the availability to the
parent of alternative childcare arrangements.” In re D.S., 286 N.C. App. 1, 20 (2022)
(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court properly considered both Mother’s ability to provide care
and the availability of alternative child care arrangements. The trial court found
- 21 - IN RE: C.R.
that Mother “has significant cognitive defects which hinder her ability to provide
necessary care” for Christy. As discussed supra, the trial court made numerous
findings concerning Mother’s inability to provide appropriate care for an infant.
Additionally, the trial court found that Mother “is unable to provide an appropriate
alternative arrangement for the care of” Christy. Regarding Ms. Brandon, the trial
court determined that she was not an appropriate placement and had not been
approved as such in Marcus’s case. Additionally, Mother could not provide Ms.
Moreland with the name of the preacher. These findings satisfy both prongs of the
definition of a dependent juvenile under N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9). Accordingly, the trial
court’s conclusion that Christy is a dependent juvenile is affirmed. See In re S.C.R.,
For these reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s determination
that Christy is a neglected and dependent juvenile.
B. Reasonable Efforts
Mother additionally argues ICDSS did not make reasonable efforts to prevent
Christy’s removal from her home. Specifically, Mother challenges as unsupported
Finding of Fact 23 in the adjudication order, which finds that ICDSS made reasonable
efforts to prevent Christy’s removal and that it would be contrary to her best interests
to return home. Mother also challenges Conclusion of Law 2 in the disposition order,
which concludes that “[IC]DSS has made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for
placement of the juvenile outside the juvenile’s own home.”
- 22 - IN RE: C.R.
While Mother challenges both the adjudication and disposition orders on this
issue, Mother has not cited any law requiring the trial court to make a finding
regarding reasonable efforts in its adjudication order. “It is not the job of this Court
to create an appeal for [the appellant, or] to supplement an appellant’s brief with
legal authority or arguments not contained therein.” Jonna v. Yaramada, 273 N.C.
App. 93, 104 (2020) (brackets omitted). Mother has not argued how any alleged error
in Finding of Fact 23 would invalidate the trial court’s adjudication of Christy as
neglected or dependent. As a result, Mother’s challenge to the adjudication order
based on ICDSS making reasonable efforts is overruled. See id. at 104.
As for Mother’s challenge of this in the disposition order, under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
903(a3), the trial court’s dispositional order placing the juvenile in out-of-home care
must “contain specific findings as to whether the department has made reasonable
efforts to prevent the need for placement of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a3)
(2023). “Reasonable efforts” is defined as “[t]he diligent use of preventive or
reunification services by a department of social services when a juvenile’s remaining
at home or returning home is consistent with achieving a safe, permanent home for
the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(18). When
assessing whether efforts were reasonable, “the juvenile’s health and safety shall be
the paramount concern.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a3).
While Mother challenges the conclusion in the dispositional order that ICDSS
made reasonable efforts, she does not challenge any of the dispositional findings.
- 23 - IN RE: C.R.
Notably, Finding of Fact 7 in the dispositional order states that ICDSS made
reasonable efforts to prevent the need for Chirsty’s placement. Because Mother did
not challenge this finding, it is binding for purposes of this appeal. See In re V.B.,
239 N.C. App. at 341 (“Unchallenged findings are binding on appeal.” (citation
omitted)). This unchallenged finding, in turn, supports the conclusion concerning
ICDSS’s efforts. See In re S.C.R., 217 N.C. App. at 168.
Even if Mother had properly challenged the finding, we conclude the finding is
sufficiently supported by the evidence. In this case, each of the trial court’s orders,
including the initial order for nonsecure custody, include specific findings that ICDSS
made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for placement. In the trial
court’s initial nonsecure custody order, it found that “Mother was unable to identify
any other appropriate caretakers or make an appropriate plan for the minor child.”
In a subsequent order on the need for continued nonsecure custody, the trial court
found that ICDSS had interviewed and gathered information from hospital staff,
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Mother, and other collateral
sources. The trial court also found that ICDSS had made efforts to identify and locate
the putative father. In the next nonsecure custody order, the trial court noted that
ICDSS had conducted an assessment of Mother’s home. In the following order, the
trial court found that ICDSS had interviewed both Mother and Ms. Brandon, visited
their residence, and performed background checks.
Additionally, at the dispositional hearing, social worker Madeline Mulkey
- 24 - IN RE: C.R.
testified that Mother began a parenting program in August 2024 and had started
therapy. Ms. Mulkey also testified she visited Mother’s home the week prior to the
dispositional hearing and had set up paternity testing for the putative father.
This evidence supports the finding that ICDSS made reasonable efforts to
prevent the need for Christy’s placement outside of the home. The trial court
appropriately balanced those efforts with Christy’s health and safety as the
paramount concern, as required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a3). The trial court found that
Christy’s removal was necessitated by “Mother’s inability to provide basic care to the
minor child due to significant cognitive delay” and the overall “instability” of Mother.
The evidence shows ICDSS explored numerous alternative placement options for
Christy with consideration of her best interests. ICDSS also assessed Mother’s home,
reviewed Mother’s mental health records, interviewed both Mother and Ms. Brandon,
and conducted background checks. Additionally, ICDSS continued to connect Mother
with mental health and parenting resources through referrals.
Given the circumstances surrounding Christy’s removal and the statutory
requirement to prioritize the juvenile’s health and safety, the trial court did not err
in finding and concluding that ICDSS’s efforts were reasonable. Accordingly, the
dispositional order is affirmed. See In re S.C.R., 217 N.C. App. at 168.
V. Conclusion
Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s adjudication of Christy to be neglected
and dependent, and its determination that ICDSS made reasonable efforts to prevent
- 25 - IN RE: C.R.
Christy’s removal from Mother’s home.
AFFIRMED.
Panel consisting of Chief Judge DILLON and Judges FLOOD and MURRY.
Report per Rule 30(e).
- 26 -