In re C.P.

2025 IL App (4th) 241207-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 7, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-1207
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE This Order was filed under 2025 IL App (4th) 241207-U FILED January 7, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-24-1207, 4-24-1208 cons. Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re C.P. and X.P., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Adams County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 24JA15 v. ) 24JA16 Kristi P., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) John C. Wooleyhan, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vancil and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appointed appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, finding no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.

¶2 In August 2024, the circuit court entered an order finding respondent mother,

Kristi P. (Mother), unable to care for her minor children, C.P. (born in October 2006) and X.P.

(born in March 2008). The court adjudicated the minors neglected and abused and made them

wards of the court. In September 2024, Mother appealed the court’s dispositional order.

Appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a supporting brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 732

N.E.2d 140 (2000), arguing no nonfrivolous issue could be raised on appeal. We provided Mother with notice of counsel’s intent and an opportunity to respond and have received no

response. For the following reasons, we grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the court’s

judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On February 8, 2024, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship,

alleging C.P. and X.P. were neglected and/or abused based on their living conditions. According

to the petition, a sergeant with the Quincy Police Department and an investigator with the Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) observed infestations of mice, maggots,

and cockroaches in their home, along with “numerous animal droppings.” The home had

“several safety hazards,” including fire hazards created by multiple appliances and electronics

plugged into power strips and cords running under furniture. Officers executing a search warrant

on the house observed cannabis and drug paraphernalia on a coffee table in the living room,

which the minor children could access. Pursuant to the warrant, officer seized electronics from

the house, and the minors’ father, James P. (Father), was arrested and charged with three counts

of child pornography in Adams County case No. 24-CF-97. In 2020, DCFS indicated both

Mother and Father for environmental neglect based on similar living conditions.

¶5 On February 9, 2024, the circuit court entered a temporary custody order, finding

there was an immediate and urgent necessity to remove the children from the home and placing

them in the temporary custody of DCFS. When the children were taken into protective custody,

C.P., a 17-year-old male, was living in the basement, where a water heater had exploded. The

school he attended made provisions for him to shower there, and he was provided a “hygiene

bucket” with necessary toiletry items. By February 2024, C.P. had missed 38 out of 108 days of

the 2023-24 school year. X.P., a 15-year-old female, was living in the attic, with a space heater

-2- as her only source of heat. After she reported she had not showered in weeks, the school began

providing her a with a toothbrush, deodorant, and appropriate clothing when she arrived at

school, as well as assistance brushing her hair. By February 2024, X.P. had missed 41 out of 110

days of the 2023-24 school year.

¶6 On July 19, 2024, DCFS filed a report indicating Mother still lived in the same

house, which continued to have many safety hazards. After an inspection on June 25, 2024, it

was determined the attic needed new ceiling tiles and appropriate air ventilation, the basement

and main floor needed a deep cleaning, and the main floor needed new flooring, bathroom tiles,

and kitchen cabinets. Additionally, an exterminator was needed to address the cockroach

infestation. DCFS obtained funding for the exterminator and a new washing machine, but the

home remained “in major disrepair and unfit for the children to return.” Mother claimed she

could not move “because she has 3 dogs, and her husband will need a residence when he is

released from prison.” Despite Father’s conviction, Mother insisted he was innocent. Mother

looked into renting a separate apartment, but based on her income from her part-time job, it was

unclear whether she could afford to do so. Mother was permitted weekly supervised visitation

with each child. In June 2024, Mother switched her visits from in-person to videoconference

because the long drives—five hours to C.P.’s placement and three hours to X.P.’s placement—

caused bruising on her legs and high blood pressure.

¶7 The report described the prognosis for Mother achieving reunification with the

children within the next 5 to 12 months as “guarded.” While Mother was cooperating with

DCFS, maintaining her visits, and engaging in parenting classes and mental health treatment, her

home was “still in need of major repair and has numerous environmental concerns.” While

DCFS secured funding to address some of those issues, it could not fix every problem that

-3- existed within the home. The report recommended DCFS receive custody and guardianship of

C.P. and X.P., with a goal of independence for C.P. and a return home goal for X.P., pending a

status hearing.

¶8 On August 15, 2024, the circuit court conducted a dispositional hearing. Based on

the report, the State argued Mother was unwilling to properly parent, care for, or protect the

children, and placement with her would be contrary to their health and safety. The State

requested Mother receive supervised visitation. The guardian ad litem (GAL) recommended

Mother be found unable, rather than unwilling, to care for the children, and he echoed the State’s

recommendation that her visits with the children be supervised. Mother’s counsel asserted

Mother had made verbal arrangements to rent another property, she completed her parenting

classes, and her contact with the children presented no safety concerns. Mother’s counsel also

noted another organization supervised Mother’s visits with C.P. Based on this, counsel requested

DCFS be granted discretion regarding visitation.

¶9 After the hearing, the circuit court entered a dispositional order finding the

children were neglected and abused, making them wards of the court, and granting their

guardianship and custody to DCFS. The court found Mother’s visits would continue to be

supervised by DCFS, and it set independence as C.P.’s goal and return home as X.P.’s goal,

pending a status hearing. The order determined Mother was unable to care for the children based

on her refusal to remediate the issues with their living conditions. Mother filed her notice of

appeal on September 16, 2024.

¶ 10 This appeal followed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

-4- ¶ 12 On appeal, Mother’s appointed appellate counsel filed a motion seeking leave to

withdraw as counsel. Mother did not file a response. Appellate counsel argues no meritorious

issue can be raised on appeal challenging the circuit court’s finding Mother refused to remedy

the conditions rendering her home unsafe for the minors’ return and ordering her visits with the

minors be supervised. We agree and grant the motion to withdraw as counsel.

¶ 13 As an initial matter, we find we have jurisdiction to consider Mother’s appeal.

“[T]his court has an independent duty to consider whether it has jurisdiction over an appeal and

to dismiss the appeal if it finds that jurisdiction is lacking.” In re Tiona W., 341 Ill. App. 3d 615,

619, 793 N.E.2d 105, 108 (2003). “[A]ppeals from final judgments under the Juvenile Court Act

[of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022))] are governed by the rules applicable to

civil cases.” In re Janira T., 368 Ill. App. 3d 883, 891, 859 N.E.2d 1046, 1053 (2006) (citing Ill.

S. Ct. R. 660(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001)). “To vest an appellate court with jurisdiction, a party must

file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment from which appeal is sought.” In re J.J.,

316 Ill. App. 3d 817, 826, 737 N.E.2d 1080, 1087 (2000); see Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1,

1994); Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). The circuit court entered the dispositional order

from which Mother appeals on August 15, 2024. Mother filed her notice of appeal 32 days later,

on September 16, 2024. However, the final day of the 30-day filing window fell on a Saturday,

and we exclude Saturdays and Sundays from our computation when those days would otherwise

be the final day to file an appeal. See 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2022). Therefore, Mother’s notice of

appeal was timely filed.

¶ 14 We agree with counsel’s assertion no nonfrivolous argument can be made

challenging the circuit court’s judgment. “[A] dispositional order entered in a proceeding under

the [Act] is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the court.” In re Beatriz S., 267 Ill.

-5- App. 3d 496, 500, 641 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1994). “The paramount consideration in proceedings

under the Act is the best interests of the child.” In re J.T., 2024 IL App (1st) 232041, ¶ 67. The

circuit court is best positioned to determine a child’s best interests, and we afford such decisions

“broad discretion and great deference.” In re E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667, 756 N.E.2d 422,

427 (2001). The court “has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the

parties and witnesses and, therefore, is in the best position to determine the credibility and

weight of the witnesses’ testimony.” E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d at 667. We will reverse a court’s

dispositional determination “only if the court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of

the evidence.” In re Taylor B., 359 Ill. App. 3d 647, 650, 834 N.E.2d 605, 607-08 (2005). “A

decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly

apparent.” In re Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 48, 187 N.E.3d 763.

¶ 15 In her notice of appeal, Mother protests the circuit court’s determination she

refused to remediate the conditions making her home unsafe for the children’s return. The record

clearly supports the court’s conclusion. According to the DCFS report, Mother’s home still

needed “major repair” and presented “numerous environmental concerns” several months after

the children were placed in shelter care. While DCFS secured funding for a new washing

machine and a cockroach exterminator, DCFS could not fix all the remaining problems. The

court’s determination regarding Mother’s failure to address the unsafe living conditions which

led to the children’s removal from her care was not against the manifest weight of the evidence,

as multiple issues with the residence remained unresolved. See Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th)

200658, ¶ 48.

¶ 16 Mother’s notice of appeal also contests the circuit court’s order that her visits with

C.P. and X.P. would continue to be supervised by DCFS. After reviewing the report and hearing

-6- arguments from the State, GAL, and Mother’s counsel, the court determined it was in the

children’s best interests for Mother’s visits to remain supervised. Mother’s visits had been

supervised for the duration of the case, and the State and GAL recommended they continue to be

supervised. Mother’s counsel argued Mother was not a safety threat to the children during visits

and noted another organization supervised Mother’s visits with C.P., though she did not make

any specific argument regarding Mother’s visits with X.P. Based on the report and the arguments

presented, the court ordered Mother’s visits would continue to be supervised. Given the record

before us and our deferential standard of review, we cannot say the court’s decision was against

the manifest weight of the evidence, as the opposite conclusion is not clearly apparent. Ta. T.,

2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 48.

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as

counsel because no meritorious argument can be raised on appeal, and we affirm the circuit

court’s judgment.

¶ 19 Affirmed.

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