In re County of Suffolk

62 A.D.2d 1054, 404 N.Y.S.2d 154, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11143

This text of 62 A.D.2d 1054 (In re County of Suffolk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re County of Suffolk, 62 A.D.2d 1054, 404 N.Y.S.2d 154, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11143 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinion

In a condemnation proceeding, the claimants appeal from an order and decree (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated March 22, 1977, which, after a nonjury trial, inter alia, awarded them $85,000 as compensation for Damage Parcel No. 1 and $422,500 as compensation for Damage Parcel No. 2. Order and decree modified, on the law and the facts, by (1) adding thereto provisions (a) that the highest and best use of the subject property on the day title vested was as a wholesale flower growing business, the use which then existed, (b) that the said use was a specialty for which claimants are entitled to be compensated under the summation method and (c) that the value of the land is determined to be $25,000 per acre and (2) deleting (a) the amounts "eighty five thousand ($85,000)” and "four hundred twenty two thousand five hundred ($422,500)” from the first and fourth decretal paragraphs thereof and substituting therefor the amounts $39,000 and $396,875, respectively, which amounts represent only the value of the land of the damage parcels and (b) the amount "$507,500.00” from the fourth decretal paragraph thereof and substituting therefor the amount $435,875. As so modified, order and decree affirmed, with costs payable by petitioner to claimants, and proceeding remitted to the Special Condemnation Term for a trial limited to the question of the amount of the reproduction cost of the improvements, less depreciation, and the value of the plant material (nursery stock) and for the entry of an appropriate amended order and decree. At the further trial, the parties may rely upon evidence already in the record, in addition to such other evidence as they may adduce. On December 9, 1974 the claimants-appellants’ real property, approximately 18.9 acres in the Town of Babylon, was condemned by the petitioner, County of Suffolk. From 1919 until "sometime in the summer of 1975”, the Van Bourgondien family operated a wholesale flower growing business on the property. In its decision after the trial, the court highlighted the parties’ different claims as follows: "The claimants contend that the highest and best use of the property is as it existed on December 9, 1974. They further contend that this use was a 'specialty’ and that the measure of damages is the value of the land plus reproduction costs of the improvements less depreciation. The petitioner contends that the highest and best use was for residential purposes and that a market approach to value is appropriate. The divergent approaches have resulted in the following valuation:

VALUATION

"The claimants’ appraiser, using a cost approach, estimated damages

as follows:

1. Land value (17.435 acres) $ 435,875.

2. Main Residence 133,250.

3. Greenhouses 664,276.

4. Plant Materials 110,878.

5. Mise, bldgs. 47,165.

rounded at $ 1,391,000 ■

"The petitioner’s appraiser, using a market value approach, estimated damages as follows:

1. Land value (15.875 acres) $ 422,500

2. Main house and lot (1.56 acres) 75,000

$ 497,500.”

[1055]*1055The court concluded: "The court finds from the credible evidence that the highest and best use of the land is for residential development, and therefore no value can be attributed to the greenhouse improvements and the nursery stock for it is '. . .illogical to award damages for buildings that must be destroyed to achieve the use contemplated in the award of damages for the land’ (Acme Theatres v State, 26 N.Y.2d 385 * * *).” The trial court thus agreed with the theory and valuations of petitioner’s appraiser, except that the court made a further award of $10,000 for Damage Parcel No. 1. Accordingly, the order and decree entered awarded damages as follows: Damage Parcel No. 1: $85,000 (main house and lot); Damage Parcel No. 2: $422,500 (land). Thus, nothing was awarded claimants for the greenhouse complex, the nursery stock or the "headquarters value” of the main residence (which was equipped and wired with devices for monitoring the boiler systems and the temperature and ventilation of the greenhouses). We disagree with the trial court. The main question on this appeal is whether the claimants’ evidence meets the standards for a specialty as set forth by this court in Matter of County of Nassau (Colony Beach Club of Lido) (43 AD2d 45, 49, affd 39 NY2d 958): "Before a property can qualify as a specialty entitled to the summation approach, the following criteria must be established, (a) The improvement must be unique and must be specially built for the specific purpose for which it is designed; (b) There must be a special use for which the improvement is designed and the improvement must be so specially used; (c) There must be no market for the type of property (here, a beach and cabana club) and no sales of property for such use; and (d) The improvement must be an appropriate improvement at the time of the taking and its use must be economically feasible and reasonably expected to be replaced(Emphasis in original.) In our opinion, claimants fully established their contentions that the highest and best use on the taking date was the then present usage (wholesale flower growing nursery), that the property was a specialty and that the measure of damages is the value of the land, plus reproduction costs of the improvements, less depreciation (cf. Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], supra). We find that the evidence adduced by claimants specifically met all of the criteria set forth in Colony and that the evidence adduced by the county did not refute the claimants’ proof. The case was tried with extreme thoroughness by both sides and we see no purpose in setting forth a factual review of the extensive testimony and exhibits, except to note certain significant highlights. Philip Van Bourgondien testified that the business had been founded in 1919 by his father, the late C. J. Van Bourgondien. It has remained a family business since that time. At the time of the taking there were "about 17 or 18 family members working in it”, including the founder’s children and grandchildren. "The business supported all of these family members”. Philip testified that the nursery operation’s gross sales were: in 1973-$216,000; in 1974 "It jumped to $311,000 or $312,000”, "almost a $100,000 increase”; and in 1975 the figure was $306,000, and "this was not [even] a full year at the property.” Although the claimants did not place their books and records in evidence, we find that there was ample proof in this record to establish the specialty nature of the subject wholesale flower growing operation—which, on the vesting date, had been in existence and operating at this site for approximately 55 years and was then supporting 17 to 18 members of the Van Bourgondien family, including the founder’s grandchildren. The books and records were available and the county could [1056]*1056have placed them in evidence, or otherwise elicited expense figures, if it so desired (the real estate tax figures had been placed in evidence). Although evidence was elicited that in 1972, and again in 1973, contracts were entered into to sell the property, those contracts were subject to the purchasers obtaining a change of zone from the present Residence C to Multiple Residence. The respective purchasers withdrew their applications for zoning changes and neither sale was consummated.

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Related

Marraro v. State of New York
189 N.E.2d 606 (New York Court of Appeals, 1963)
Masten v. State
175 N.E.2d 166 (New York Court of Appeals, 1961)
Diocese of Buffalo v. State
248 N.E.2d 155 (New York Court of Appeals, 1969)
Acme Theatres, Inc. v. State
258 N.E.2d 912 (New York Court of Appeals, 1970)
In re the County of Nassau
353 N.E.2d 849 (New York Court of Appeals, 1976)
Masten v. State
11 A.D.2d 370 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1960)
Kelder v. State
22 A.D.2d 999 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1964)
In re the County of Nassau
43 A.D.2d 45 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1973)
In re the City of New York
51 A.D.2d 147 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
62 A.D.2d 1054, 404 N.Y.S.2d 154, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11143, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-county-of-suffolk-nyappdiv-1978.