In re Condemnation of Lots Nos. 2, 27, 803

58 F. Supp. 832, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2622
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJanuary 3, 1945
DocketCondemnation No. 2969
StatusPublished

This text of 58 F. Supp. 832 (In re Condemnation of Lots Nos. 2, 27, 803) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Condemnation of Lots Nos. 2, 27, 803, 58 F. Supp. 832, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2622 (D.D.C. 1945).

Opinion

McGUIRE, Associate Justice.

Motion denied.

Strictly speaking, the “motion to strike” interposed in these proceedings is in substance and effect a challenge to the array, and is treated as such.

“Motions to strike” do not apply in eminent domain proceedings. Rule 81, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

A condemnation jury, so called, is a misnomer. It is an inquest or commission appointed by the Court under authority of an act of Congress. It differs generally from an ordinary jury in important and essential aspects, and this in the District of Columbia.

(1) It consists of less than 12 persons.

(2) Unanimity is not required.

(3) Its members in the District of Columbia, must be freeholders. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 17 S.Ct. 618, 41 L.Ed. 1079.

There is no constitutional requirement under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment that the just compensation to be paid for property taken for public use shall be required to be determined by a jury as that term is commonly understood. It may (and has been in the District of Columbia, referred to Commissioners, and this comparatively latterly) — these have been appointed by the Court or by the executive — or to an inquest composing less or more than the number of men who go to make up the ordinary jury, or to arbitrators. Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Turnpike Co. 6 Cranch 233, 3 L.Ed. 209; Secombe v. Railroad Co., 23 Wall. 108, 117, 118, 23 L.Ed. 67; United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519, 3 S.Ct. 346, 27 L.Ed. 1015; Long Island Water-Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 17 S.Ct. 718, 41 L.Ed. 1165. See also generally on the subject: Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 17 S.Ct. 966, 42 L.Ed. 270.

This being so Title 8, Sec. 44 U.S.C. 8 U.S.C.A. § 44 does not apply.

Indeed the practice both in England and this country before the adoption of the Constitution, was to have the amount to be paid for the public taking of private property, determined by tribunals other than common law juries. This fact was well known to the framers of our national charter. Lewis—Eminent Domain: 1909 Ed., Vol. II, Sec. 509, 510 P. 922.

Again under the Fifth Amendment the term due process in condemnation matters has been held to be synonymous with just compensation.

This would ordinarily dispose of the motion except it also by the fact of its being made at all levels a serious accusation against the integrity of the Jury Commission.

Under District law it is required generally that condemnation juries, so called, are to be made up from a special list of persons having the qualifications of jurors, and being also freeholders in the District of Columbia and it is argued as a basis for the “motion to strike,” that for a long period of time no colored persons have been called for service on condemnation panels, and that “* * * the systematic exclusion of qualified colored persons from jury service on condemnation panels amounts to discrimination,” and “that the condemnation panels are constituted by the exercise of discretion by a clerk in the Jury Commission.”

It is clear that no person has a constitutional right to sit on a so-called condemnation panel — and a denial of such service is not unconstitutional, due process [834]*834in such cases as indicated being synonymous with just compensation.

Further it is admitted by the movants, and it is well to note, that they raise no question with reference to the general jury lists, it being admitted that discrimination is not practiced in their preparation, and that men and women who possess in every other respect the qualifications prescribed by law, irrespective of race, color or creed serve on grand and petit juries in the District of Columbia.

Evidence was introduced at the hearing by the District indicating that several individuals of the colored race had been called from time to time, and were either excused in open court, or were not served personally by the Marshal and as a consequence made no appearance.

It appears to be true also that with the practical abandonment of the commissioner system and before that time, neither a person of the colored race nor any female member of the white race has ever sat on a condemnation panel.

No evidence was introduced to indicate that either the Jury Commission or its clerks have any knowledge either actual or otherwise from which the color of any prospective condemnation juror can be determined or inferred.

True two or three condemnation panels certified to the Court, had in the place reserved for the Clerk’s comment the notation “colored”, but these were before the tenure of the present members, nor could such isolated and unconnected evidence in any way be attributed to the Commission or its clerks, in addition being on panel sheets certified to the Court by the Commission, after the Court had the opportunity of seeing the members of the prospective jury in open court.

The total population of the District in 1940 according to evidence (Census of 1940) introduced at the hearing was approximately 687,000 of which roughly 500,-000 were whites and 187,000, more or less, non-whites including all persons of color, the great majority of whom were persons of the negro race.

There were as of that year, according to the same source, in addition about 51,000 freeholders in owner occupied homes of whom a little over 7000 were negroes — it cannot be assumed however that all the persons occupying these homes possess the qualifications of jurors in order to make them eligible — even if freeholders, for the special condemnation list of prospective condemnation juries.

In addition it is to be noted that the Jury Commission is required under the law to * * * prepare a special list of persons having the qualifications of jurors as prescribed by section 11—1417 and being also freeholders of the District of Columbia * * *”. D. C. Code 1940, § 16—603.

Now if as indicated, no question is raised as to the general jury list from which condemnation panels are drawn, how is it then that no colored condemnation jurors have ever been called and served — since they possess the necessary qualifications of general jurors, and appear on such lists, and are freeholders?

The language of the statute referred to above seems to import a broad discretion in the Jury Commission — shall prepare a special list of persons—no female has ever been called

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Related

Secombe v. Railroad Co.
90 U.S. 108 (Supreme Court, 1874)
United States v. Jones
109 U.S. 513 (Supreme Court, 1883)
American Publishing Co. v. Fisher
166 U.S. 464 (Supreme Court, 1897)
Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn
166 U.S. 685 (Supreme Court, 1897)
Bauman v. Ross
167 U.S. 548 (Supreme Court, 1897)

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Bluebook (online)
58 F. Supp. 832, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2622, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-condemnation-of-lots-nos-2-27-803-dcd-1945.