In re Commitment of Snapp

2022 IL App (3d) 190024
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedMarch 22, 2022
Docket3-19-0024
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2022 IL App (3d) 190024 (In re Commitment of Snapp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Commitment of Snapp, 2022 IL App (3d) 190024 (Ill. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

2022 IL App (3d) 190024-UB

Order filed March 22, 2022 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

In re COMMITMENT OF WARREN C. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court SNAPP, SR., ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois. (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 3-19-0024 ) Circuit No. 97-CF-2580 v. ) ) Warren C. Snapp, Sr., ) Honorable ) Sarah-Marie Francis Jones, ) Judge, Presiding. Respondent-Appellant). )

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McDade and Schmidt concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: Trial court’s finding that respondent, who had been committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections since 1999, was still sexually dangerous and conditional release should not be granted was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 Respondent, Warren C. Snapp Sr., having been found a sexually dangerous person (SDP),

filed a pro se application alleging recovery under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725

ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2010)). Following a bench trial, the circuit court found that he remained an

SDP. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court failed to make the requisite finding that it was substantially probable he would reoffend if not confined, as required by People v. Masterson,

207 Ill. 2d 305, 330 (2003). Alternatively, he claimed that the trial court’s decision denying his

application for recovery was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We found that Masterson

required an express finding of substantial probability and issued an opinion vacating the trial

court’s order and remanding the cause for a new hearing on respondent’s recovery application.

¶3 Respondent appealed to our supreme court, which concluded that, under the post-

Masterson amended Act, it is no longer necessary for a trial court to make a separate express

finding that the respondent is substantially probable to reoffend after determining that the

respondent is a sexually dangerous person and remanded to our court for consideration of

respondent’s alternative argument raised on appeal. In re Commitment of Snapp, 2021 IL 126176,

¶ 23. We now affirm the trial court’s order denying respondent’s application for recovery.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In March 1999, respondent was found to be an SDP and was committed to the custody of

the Department of Corrections (DOC). He filed his third application for discharge or conditional

release in 2010, alleging that he had recovered. 725 ILCS 205/9(a), 10 (West 2010).

¶6 Respondent’s bench trial commenced on September 11, 2018. Dr. Kristopher Clounch, a

clinical psychologist, testified that he evaluated respondent in July 2014 to determine whether he

was still an SDP. He interviewed respondent and conducted a risk assessment to determine his

likelihood to reoffend. As part of the evaluation, Dr. Clounch also reviewed (1) respondent’s prior

evaluations, (2) police reports regarding respondent’s past offenses, (3) court records for each

offense, and (4) respondent’s treatment records. Based on his assessment, Dr. Clounch diagnosed

respondent with pedophilic disorder, sexually attracted to both females and males, nonexclusive

type and concluded that respondent remains an SDP.

2 ¶7 Dr. Clounch testified that a significant factor in reaching his conclusion was respondent’s

sexual offense history. He noted that respondent had (1) sexually abused his younger siblings in

his late teens, (2) repeatedly molested his wife’s eight-year-old brother while in his 20’s, (3)

pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent liberties with three different children in 1973 when he

was 28 years old, (4) fondled his eight-year-old niece’s vagina while on parole for the 1973

conviction, (5) pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse of child in 1992, and (6) kissed

a nine-year-old boy and fondled his penis in 1997, which led to charges of aggravated criminal

sexual assault and his SDP adjudication in 1999.

¶8 Dr. Clounch noted that during the evaluation respondent had “great difficulty” recognizing

that his past offenses involved molestation. For example, when discussing the 1973 offenses,

respondent told Dr. Clounch that he was “teaching” the boys about sex and that he was “in love”

with one of the boys. In addition, respondent explained that he fondled his niece’s vagina because

he was upset with his wife and the victim “looked like her mother” and “ had a pussy like her

mother.” Dr. Clounch opined that respondent’s disconnected reasoning increased his risk of

reoffending. Dr. Clounch also testified that individuals suffering from pedophilic disorder, like

respondent, “will continue to have that sexual arousal to children for the remainder of their life.”

He stated that, in general, their pedophilic desires and thoughts do not dissipate with time.

¶9 Dr. Clounch explained that he utilized two risk assessment tools to evaluate respondent:

the Static-99R and the Stable 2007. Respondent scored in the “average” category for risk of

reoffending on the Static-99R scale. Dr. Clounch estimated that the Static-99R assessment

undervalued respondent’s risk because it did not account for his failure to progress in treatment

and his distorted beliefs regarding past offenses. The Stable 2007 assessment placed respondent in

the “high risk” category. The combined results of both tests indicated that respondent fell into the

3 “well above average” category for risk of reoffending. Dr. Clounch testified “individuals that are

in the well above average category have been found to reoffend at a rate of three to four times the

rate of the average sex offender.”

¶ 10 In addition to the assessment tools, Dr. Clounch identified several other factors that

increased respondent’s risk of reoffending: (1) his high degree of sexual preoccupation; (2) his

large number of victims; and (3) his long history of offending. Respondent’s preference for

children and his emotional attachment to his victims were other concerning factors that

significantly increased his risk to reoffend.

¶ 11 Dr. Clounch acknowledged that there were potential factors that could reduce an

individual’s risk of reoffending, such as advanced age, significant health problems, and making

significant progress in a sex offender treatment program. Dr. Clounch noted that respondent’s age

resulted in a risk reduction, but he had no relevant health problems and, after many years in

treatment, had only progressed to the second phase of a four-phase treatment program. Based on

all the assessment tools and risk factors, Dr. Clounch concluded that respondent was “substantially

probable to reoffend if not confined” and “still meets [the] criteria to be found a sexually dangerous

person.”

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Dr. Clounch testified that respondent has a high risk of reoffending

even though he scored a “2” on the Static-99R assessment. He based his conclusion on the Stable

2007 assessment tool that placed respondent in the high risk category, as well as the other dynamic

factors at work in respondent’s case. He emphasized that risk assessment manuals developed in

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Related

People v. Masterson
798 N.E.2d 735 (Illinois Supreme Court, 2003)
People v. Donath
2013 IL App (3d) 120251 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2013)
In re Commitment of Snapp
2021 IL 126176 (Illinois Supreme Court, 2021)

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2022 IL App (3d) 190024, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-commitment-of-snapp-illappct-2022.