In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-13-00038-CV ____________________
IN RE COMMITMENT OF RANDOLPH LEE PUCKETT
_______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 12-05-04916 CV ________________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Randolph Lee Puckett challenges his civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.151 (West 2010 &
Supp. 2013) (the SVP statute). Puckett raises four issues in his appeal, challenging
the denial of Puckett’s motion for a protective order against requests for
admissions and the admission of his responses during the trial, the granting of a
directed verdict that he is a repeat sexually violent offender, the admission of
details about his sexual offenses, and the admission of testimony suggesting he
may have offended against other children. We conclude that Puckett’s issues do
not present reversible error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Compelled Responses to Requests for Admission
In issue one, Puckett argues the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied Puckett’s request for protection from answering requests for admissions
that required Puckett to admit or deny that in 1979 he pled guilty to and was
convicted of indecency with a child by contact, that he was given a five-year
sentence, and that he was incarcerated for the offense. The State read Puckett’s
responses into evidence at trial. The trial court subsequently granted the State’s
motion for a directed verdict on the issue of whether Puckett is a repeat sexually
violent offender.
Puckett argues the State improperly used requests for admissions to compel
him to admit elemental allegations denied through his general denial pursuant to
Rule 92 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. “The primary purpose of requests
for admission is to simplify trials by eliminating matters about which there is no
real controversy; to obviate in advance of trial, proof of obviously undisputed
facts.” In re Commitment of Jackson, No. 09-12-00291-CV, 2013 WL 5874446, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). The requests at
issue in this appeal concerned ascertainable facts and arguably eliminated the need
for the State to prove the penitentiary packet contained Puckett’s records, but the
trial court did not order Puckett to admit a disputed fact or admit that he had no
ground of defense. See id.; see also Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.
1996). Because requests for admission were not used improperly in this case, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Puckett’s request for a
protective order and allowed the State to read the admissions to the jury during the
trial. We overrule issue one.
Granting Directed Verdict
In his second issue, Puckett contends that the trial court erred in granting the
State’s motion for a directed verdict that Puckett is a repeat violent sexual offender
because the trial court’s ruling violates the SVP statute’s requirement that “[t]he
judge or jury shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a
sexually violent predator[]” and that “[a] jury determination that the person is a
sexually violent predator must be by unanimous verdict.” Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 841.062. Puckett argues section 841.062 expresses legislative intent
to employ the process for criminal prosecutions in civil commitment proceedings.
Directed verdicts for the State are not unheard-of in criminal law. Where a
defendant enters a guilty plea before the jury, it is proper for the trial court to
instruct the jury to return a verdict of guilty. Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 313
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Where the defendant pleads guilty and the trial court
accepts the plea, but the jury has not or cannot be waived, the proper procedure is
for the trial court to direct a verdict of guilt and proceed with punishment. Morin v.
State, 682 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also In re State ex rel.
Tharp, 393 S.W.3d 751, 758-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (where the State refuses to
join the defendant’s waiver of jury trial, and the defendant pleads guilty, the trial
court must submit all relevant issues, including punishment, to the jury). The
defendant is not deprived of a jury trial because the jury receives evidence on the
disputed issues. See Morin, 682 S.W.2d at 269. Similarly, when a defendant pleads
true to enhancement allegations, the trial court instructs the jury to render a verdict
of true and assess punishment in the enhanced punishment range. Urbano v. State,
808 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.). This is an
analogous situation, in that Puckett admitted he is a repeat violent sexual offender.
The trial court directed the jury to find that Puckett is a repeat violent sexual
offender and submitted the disputed issue of behavioral abnormality to the jury.
Moreover, civil commitment proceedings under the SVP statute are
generally subject to the rules of procedure for civil cases. In re Commitment of
Scott, No. 09-11-00555-CV, 2012 WL 5289333, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct.
25, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Section 841.062 requires a unanimous verdict but
does not expressly prohibit a directed verdict on issues that have been established
as a matter of law. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.062. In Scott, we
decided that courts conducting trials under the SVP statute may follow the directed
verdict procedure for civil cases, and consequently the trial court does not err in
directing the jury to find that a person is a repeat sexually violent offender where
the issue is conclusively established. Scott, 2012 WL 5289333, at *2; see also Tex.
R. Civ. P. 268. We decline to reconsider our holding in Scott. We overrule issue
two.
Allowing Expert Testimony Regarding Details of Crimes
In issue three, Puckett contends the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting into evidence before the jury the graphic details from the April 1976
indecency-with-a-child, the June 1979 kidnapping and, the June 1993 aggravated-
sexual-assault-of-a-child criminal offenses Puckett committed against children. A
psychiatrist, Dr. Lisa K. Clayton, provided expert testimony expressing her opinion
that Puckett is a sexually violent predator. Puckett objected that Dr. Clayton’s
testimony was hearsay and that the underlying facts or data should be excluded as
prejudicial and confusing. See Tex. R. Evid. 705(d). The trial court overruled the
objections and instructed the jury that hearsay information contained in records
reviewed by experts is admitted only for showing the basis for the expert’s
opinion. See id.
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In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-13-00038-CV ____________________
IN RE COMMITMENT OF RANDOLPH LEE PUCKETT
_______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 12-05-04916 CV ________________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Randolph Lee Puckett challenges his civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.151 (West 2010 &
Supp. 2013) (the SVP statute). Puckett raises four issues in his appeal, challenging
the denial of Puckett’s motion for a protective order against requests for
admissions and the admission of his responses during the trial, the granting of a
directed verdict that he is a repeat sexually violent offender, the admission of
details about his sexual offenses, and the admission of testimony suggesting he
may have offended against other children. We conclude that Puckett’s issues do
not present reversible error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Compelled Responses to Requests for Admission
In issue one, Puckett argues the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied Puckett’s request for protection from answering requests for admissions
that required Puckett to admit or deny that in 1979 he pled guilty to and was
convicted of indecency with a child by contact, that he was given a five-year
sentence, and that he was incarcerated for the offense. The State read Puckett’s
responses into evidence at trial. The trial court subsequently granted the State’s
motion for a directed verdict on the issue of whether Puckett is a repeat sexually
violent offender.
Puckett argues the State improperly used requests for admissions to compel
him to admit elemental allegations denied through his general denial pursuant to
Rule 92 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. “The primary purpose of requests
for admission is to simplify trials by eliminating matters about which there is no
real controversy; to obviate in advance of trial, proof of obviously undisputed
facts.” In re Commitment of Jackson, No. 09-12-00291-CV, 2013 WL 5874446, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). The requests at
issue in this appeal concerned ascertainable facts and arguably eliminated the need
for the State to prove the penitentiary packet contained Puckett’s records, but the
trial court did not order Puckett to admit a disputed fact or admit that he had no
ground of defense. See id.; see also Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.
1996). Because requests for admission were not used improperly in this case, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Puckett’s request for a
protective order and allowed the State to read the admissions to the jury during the
trial. We overrule issue one.
Granting Directed Verdict
In his second issue, Puckett contends that the trial court erred in granting the
State’s motion for a directed verdict that Puckett is a repeat violent sexual offender
because the trial court’s ruling violates the SVP statute’s requirement that “[t]he
judge or jury shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a
sexually violent predator[]” and that “[a] jury determination that the person is a
sexually violent predator must be by unanimous verdict.” Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 841.062. Puckett argues section 841.062 expresses legislative intent
to employ the process for criminal prosecutions in civil commitment proceedings.
Directed verdicts for the State are not unheard-of in criminal law. Where a
defendant enters a guilty plea before the jury, it is proper for the trial court to
instruct the jury to return a verdict of guilty. Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 313
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Where the defendant pleads guilty and the trial court
accepts the plea, but the jury has not or cannot be waived, the proper procedure is
for the trial court to direct a verdict of guilt and proceed with punishment. Morin v.
State, 682 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also In re State ex rel.
Tharp, 393 S.W.3d 751, 758-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (where the State refuses to
join the defendant’s waiver of jury trial, and the defendant pleads guilty, the trial
court must submit all relevant issues, including punishment, to the jury). The
defendant is not deprived of a jury trial because the jury receives evidence on the
disputed issues. See Morin, 682 S.W.2d at 269. Similarly, when a defendant pleads
true to enhancement allegations, the trial court instructs the jury to render a verdict
of true and assess punishment in the enhanced punishment range. Urbano v. State,
808 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.). This is an
analogous situation, in that Puckett admitted he is a repeat violent sexual offender.
The trial court directed the jury to find that Puckett is a repeat violent sexual
offender and submitted the disputed issue of behavioral abnormality to the jury.
Moreover, civil commitment proceedings under the SVP statute are
generally subject to the rules of procedure for civil cases. In re Commitment of
Scott, No. 09-11-00555-CV, 2012 WL 5289333, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct.
25, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Section 841.062 requires a unanimous verdict but
does not expressly prohibit a directed verdict on issues that have been established
as a matter of law. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.062. In Scott, we
decided that courts conducting trials under the SVP statute may follow the directed
verdict procedure for civil cases, and consequently the trial court does not err in
directing the jury to find that a person is a repeat sexually violent offender where
the issue is conclusively established. Scott, 2012 WL 5289333, at *2; see also Tex.
R. Civ. P. 268. We decline to reconsider our holding in Scott. We overrule issue
two.
Allowing Expert Testimony Regarding Details of Crimes
In issue three, Puckett contends the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting into evidence before the jury the graphic details from the April 1976
indecency-with-a-child, the June 1979 kidnapping and, the June 1993 aggravated-
sexual-assault-of-a-child criminal offenses Puckett committed against children. A
psychiatrist, Dr. Lisa K. Clayton, provided expert testimony expressing her opinion
that Puckett is a sexually violent predator. Puckett objected that Dr. Clayton’s
testimony was hearsay and that the underlying facts or data should be excluded as
prejudicial and confusing. See Tex. R. Evid. 705(d). The trial court overruled the
objections and instructed the jury that hearsay information contained in records
reviewed by experts is admitted only for showing the basis for the expert’s
opinion. See id.
Dr. Clayton stated the sex and age of the children and described what the
records showed Puckett did to each child. Puckett argues the primary issue for the
jury to resolve is whether Dr. Clayton was being truthful when she testified Puckett
told her that after he committed the second offense he realized he was sexually
aroused by little girls’ vaginas and that because of this admission, Puckett met the
criteria for pedophilia, or whether Puckett was being truthful when he denied
telling Dr. Clayton that he had sexual fantasies about children. Dr. Clayton
explained that the facts of Puckett’s criminal offenses were significant to her
findings concerning sexual deviance and pedophilia because they illustrate he
cannot control his sexually violent urges to the point that he assaults young girls.
Therefore, the details evidence had probative value beyond determining whether
Dr. Clayton was being truthful about Puckett’s statements to her during the
interview.
Puckett argues the State did not have much need for details evidence
because the jury heard other, less inflammatory evidence that the jury could have
used to determine whether to accept Dr. Clayton’s opinion that Puckett has a
behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual
violence. However, Puckett does not identify the “less inflammatory” evidence
regarding Puckett’s lack of control over his sexually violent impulses in which he
refers. The description of Puckett’s sexual acts perpetrated on prepubescent
children is inflammatory because it indicates the presence of deviant behavior and
his inability to control his behavior, which persisted notwithstanding his
incarceration. The evidence, therefore, is inflammatory for the very reason it is
probative as a factual basis for the expert’s opinion that Puckett has a behavioral
abnormality that makes him likely to commit a predatory act of sexual violence.
The trial court could reasonably conclude that the probative value of the evidence
outweighed any danger the evidence would be used for a purpose other than as an
explanation or support for the expert’s opinion. Id.; see also In re Commitment of
Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 198-99 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied). We
overrule issue three.
Allowing Speculation
In issue four, Puckett contends the trial court “erred in admitting speculative
testimony suggesting that [Puckett] may have committed numerous other unknown
sex offenses against other children which the State never proved were even
committed.”
Puckett presented expert testimony from a psychologist, Dr. Marisa Mauro,
that in her opinion, Puckett does not have a behavioral abnormality that makes him
likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. During her direct
examination, Dr. Mauro mentioned that at times Puckett denied having committed
indecency with a child and kidnapping and at other times, he admitted having
committed one or both offenses. He did admit to committing the aggravated sexual
assault that resulted in his most recent incarceration. Dr. Mauro did not diagnose
Puckett with pedophilia. She testified that she disagreed with the diagnosis of the
State’s expert because that diagnosis was based on the two convictions that
occurred more than six months apart, which alone was insufficient evidence in
light of Puckett’s large number of self-reported consensual encounters with adult
women. Dr. Mauro testified there was little evidence to show that Puckett has
recurring and intense desires for children. Dr. Mauro suggested that Puckett’s
behavior could be explained by opportunity, high sex drive, alcohol use, or
curiosity. According to Dr. Mauro, Puckett received a “score of 2” on the Static-
99R, placing him at low to moderate risk to reoffend, which Dr. Mauro stated
represented a five percent recidivism rate over five years. Dr. Mauro also
considered a study by Boccaccini that found recidivism rates for sexual offending
were lower in Texas.
On cross-examination, Dr. Mauro agreed that she could not say for sure
whether Puckett will sexually reoffend in the future. Over Puckett’s objection to
speculation, counsel for the State asked, “And you agree that sex offenses are often
under-reported or not reported at all?” Dr. Mauro replied, “I think all offenses are –
some can go unreported, some might be reported that didn’t really happen and the
same can be true for a sex offense.” Counsel asked, “So do you agree that sex
offenses are often under-reported?” Dr. Mauro disagreed with the qualifier “often”
but agreed it is possible. Dr. Mauro agreed that, in evaluating an individual for a
behavioral abnormality, important considerations include certain victim
characteristics such as age, the number of sex offense convictions, the offender’s
entire criminal history, the offender’s substance abuse history, and the presence of
some personality disorders. Counsel for the State asked Dr. Mauro about specific
factors she considered in evaluating Puckett but did not ask Dr. Mauro if she
considered whether Puckett may have committed uncharged offenses.
“A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the
matter.” Tex R. Evid. 602. The trial court could determine that, as a psychologist
testifying about the process of evaluating sex offenders for behavioral abnormality
and explaining how certain statistical studies correlated to risk of recidivism, Dr.
Mauro possessed sufficient knowledge to answer the question. See Tex. R. Evid.
702, 703. Puckett’s argument that by asking the questions the State suggested
Puckett committed additional offenses against other children is not supported by
the record, which shows counsel asked a general question that was not applied to
Puckett as an individual. We overrule issue four and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
________________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice
Submitted on December 3, 2013 Opinion Delivered June 12, 2014
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.