In re Commitment of Patten

2025 IL App (5th) 240573-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 22, 2025
• Docket: 5-24-0573
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 240573-U NOTICE Decision filed 12/22/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0573 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re COMMITMENT OF SHANE PATTEN ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Madison County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 20-MR-1324 ) Shane Patten, ) Honorable ) Timothy D. Berkley, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Moore concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the respondent’s civil commitment as a sexually violent person where sufficient evidence was submitted at trial to support the judgment, and the trial court considered the proper factors.

¶2 On March 19, 2024, after a bench trial, the trial court found the respondent, Shane Patten,

to be a sexually violent person (SVP) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act

(Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2022)), and he was committed to the Illinois Department of

Human Services (DHS). The respondent appeals, arguing (1) that the State failed to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that he suffered from a mental disorder and that he was substantially likely to

engage in future acts of sexual violence, and (2) that the trial court’s order was improper given the

1 factors set forth in section 40(b)(2) of the Act (id. § 40(b)(2)). For the following reasons, we affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On December 11, 2020, the State filed a petition pursuant to the Act seeking to have the

respondent adjudicated an SVP and committed to the care and custody of DHS. The petition

alleged that the respondent was convicted of attempt predatory criminal sexual assault, a sexually

violent offense under the Act, and sentenced to eight years’ incarceration in the Illinois Department

of Corrections (IDOC). The respondent had been evaluated by Dr. Angeline Stanislaus, a forensic

psychiatrist, who submitted a report dated December 7, 2020. In that report, Dr. Stanislaus

diagnosed the respondent with pedophilic disorder, sexually attracted to males, nonexclusive type,

hebephilia, and antisocial personality disorder. The petition alleged that the respondent was

dangerous to others because he suffered from mental disorders that made it substantially probable

that he would engage in future acts of sexual violence.

¶5 On December 15, 2020, following a hearing, the trial court found probable cause that the

respondent was subject to commitment under the Act. The trial court ordered him to be detained

at a facility approved by DHS and to undergo an evaluation by DHS.

¶6 The matter proceeded to bench trial on March 19, 2024. At trial, the State presented the

testimony of Dr. Stanislaus and Dr. David Suire. Dr. Stanislaus was qualified as an expert in

forensic psychiatry, with a specialty in sexually violent persons evaluations, diagnosis, and risk

assessment. She had completed more than 100 evaluations pursuant to the Act. She testified that

she conducted an SVP evaluation of the respondent. She reviewed records relating to the

respondent’s history for any sex related offense, charge, or conviction, as well as his general

criminal history. She also reviewed the respondent’s file from IDOC. Dr. Stanislaus further

2 conducted a clinical interview with the respondent. She then completed a report summarizing her

evaluation and stating her opinion. After completing her report, she reviewed additional records

from the treatment and detention facility, but her opinion did not change.

¶7 Dr. Stanislaus testified to the facts relating to the respondent’s first sexual offense. During

her evaluation, she learned that in 2002, the respondent was charged with two counts of predatory

criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a three-year-old boy

that had occurred in 1999. The child’s mother had been living with the respondent and his sister,

and after the respondent had babysat the child, the child reported to his mother that his butt hurt

because the respondent had put his penis in it. The Illinois Department of Children and Family

Services (DCFS) became involved and indicated the report, but no charges were filed at that time.

The respondent was approximately 23 years old at the time the incident occurred.

¶8 According to Dr. Stanislaus, in 2002, the respondent announced at church during prayer

that God told him to ask if anyone wanted to have sex with him to raise their hand. Church officials

later approached him to inquire as to the incident, and the respondent disclosed to them that he had

molested a three-year-old boy and was also in a sexual relationship with a 14-year-old boy. He

further disclosed an interest in other children in the church. Regarding the three-year-old boy, the

respondent disclosed that he was attracted to and felt love for the boy, and if it was wrong then

God would have stopped him. Church officials reported the disclosures to police. The respondent

ultimately pled guilty to one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and was sentenced to three

years in IDOC. In April of 2003, the respondent was released on parole, and in June of 2003, he

violated his parole by using cannabis and by having contact with at least three minor children.

¶9 Dr. Stanislaus testified that she also reviewed the respondent’s 2016 case wherein he was

charged with attempted predatory criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse.

3 In that case, the respondent pled guilty to attempted predatory criminal sexual assault and was

sentenced to eight years in IDOC. Dr. Stanislaus testified that through her evaluation she learned

that in September 2016 a neighbor reported to police that the respondent had molested her two

sons, a 15-year-old and a 12-year-old. The children had frequently spent time at the respondent’s

home until the respondent told the mother that he found the 15-year-old attractive. The mother

then limited the children’s contact with the respondent after that incident. She later spoke with the

children and learned that the respondent had performed oral sex on the 15-year-old. She also

learned that the respondent had pulled down and ripped the underwear of the 12-year-old and that

the respondent had attempted to put his mouth on the child’s penis while playing wrestling.

Another time the respondent asked the 12-year-old to fondle his penis. The respondent was

approximately 40 years old at this time of these incidents.

¶ 10 Dr. Stanislaus then testified that the respondent had seen a psychiatrist and had mental

health evaluations while in IDOC. Through her review of those records she learned that the

respondent had reported to his treatment provider that he was attracted to young boys. He had also

admitted to the provider that he had molested the three-year-old boy in 1999. She also stated that

she had reviewed updated treatment records from the current treatment facility, and that the

respondent was participating in sex offender treatment and admitted to molestations and sexual

attraction to boys in treatment.

¶ 11 After reviewing these records, Dr. Stanislaus diagnosed the respondent with (1) pedophilic

disorder, sexually attracted to boys or males, nonexclusive; (2) other specified paraphilic disorder,

sexually attracted to boys who are not fully mature, also called hebephilia; and (3) antisocial

personality disorder. Dr. Stanislaus explained the elements of each mental condition, their

4 definitions under the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM-5),

and how the respondent qualified for each diagnosis.

¶ 12 Dr. Stanislaus testified that she had diagnosed the respondent with pedophilic disorder

because he had sexually molested a three-year-old boy, stated that he was sexually attracted to the

child, and stated that he loved the child. He had also previously disclosed in treatment that he was

attracted to young children. Dr. Stanislaus also diagnosed the respondent with hebephilia because

he reported a sexual interest in boys who were just developing, and in 2016, one of his victims was

a 12-year-old boy. Dr. Stanislaus explained that with pedophilic disorder, the brain is wired to

sexually respond to young children, and while the behaviors can be managed, the interest itself

does not go away. She further testified that both pedophilic disorder and hebephilia are either

congenital or acquired, and they affect the respondent’s emotional or volitional capacity and

seriously impact his ability to control his sexually violent behavior. She noted that after going to

prison for the first incident, the respondent then sexually molested a 12-year-old boy in 2016. Dr.

Stanislaus stated that the diagnosis of pedophilic disorder and hebephilia were current as of the

date of her testimony.

¶ 13 Dr. Stanislaus then testified that she also diagnosed the respondent with antisocial

personality disorder. She stated this is usually characterized by multiple repeated legal issues,

including arrests, and stated that the respondent exhibited characteristics of antisocial personality

disorder. Dr. Stanislaus stated that this diagnosis was current as of the date of her testimony.

¶ 14 Dr. Stanislaus then testified as to her assessment of risk. She conducted an assessment

using an actuarial instrument, the Static-99R, which aids in determining an individual’s risk of

reoffending. The Static-99R uses 10 risk factors that are calculated to determine an offender’s risk

category compared to other sex offenders. The score places the offender in a category of risk of

5 future recidivism as compared to other sex offenders. Those categories of risk are very low; low;

moderate; moderate high; and high. Dr. Stanislaus scored the respondent a 4A on the Static-99R,

which put him in the second-highest risk category of moderate high, and indicated an above

average level of risk to sexually offend.

¶ 15 Dr. Stanislaus then explained how the respondent’s nonsexual history was considered with

respect to risk. She indicated that it is important to look at someone’s history of legal trouble and

inability to follow rules, including supervision rules and parole violations. She explained that if

someone cannot follow rules, they are much more likely to engage in the same behaviors again.

She stated that this would be both a dynamic risk factor and a pattern of rule-breaking that would

be captured on the static risk factor instrument she administered.

¶ 16 Dr. Stanislaus defined a dynamic risk factor as a trait that drives a person’s sexual

offending; in this case, the respondent’s propensity to molest children. She identified both deviant

sexual interest generally, and deviant sexual interest specifically in children, as dynamic risk

factors that applied to the respondent. She also identified emotional congruence with children as a

dynamic risk factor, and explained that falling in love with a child, feeling romantically connected

to a child, and having romantic relationships with children increased risk. Another dynamic risk

factor she identified was the general regulation of a person’s life, and she explained that the

respondent had difficulty regulating his life in the community. The last dynamic risk factor she

considered was the parole violation, where the respondent was released from prison in April 2003

and by June 2003 was having children in his home and having contact with children, a violation

of the rules of his parole.

¶ 17 Dr. Stanislaus also identified several protective factors that can decrease risk of

reoffending. These include debilitating medical conditions, progress in treatment, and age. Dr.

6 Stanislaus testified that none of these factors applied to the respondent. Regarding the progress in

treatment factor, Dr. Stanislaus stated that because the respondent was in the very early stages of

phase two, out of a possible five stages of treatment, he had not made enough progress for the

treatment-related protective factor to lower her assessment of risk.

¶ 18 Dr. Stanislaus then agreed that actuarial instruments, dynamic factors, and lack of

protective factors were all considered in her forming an opinion as to the respondent’s risk. She

stated to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty that it is substantially probable that the

respondent will commit another sex offense if not confined. She defined substantially probable as

much more likely than not.

¶ 19 On redirect, Dr. Stanislaus testified regarding a separate evaluation conducted by Dr.

Elaine Bochenek, a clinical psychologist, wherein Dr. Bochenek only diagnosed the respondent

with antisocial personality disorder and cannabis use disorder. Dr. Stanislaus explained that she

disagreed that the antisocial personality disorder was the only condition driving the respondent’s

criminal behavior. She stated that regarding the law’s requirement of a propensity to commit future

acts of sexual violence, the respondent’s propensity comes from his pedophilic disorder. She stated

that while the antisocial disorder motivates the respondent to get what he wants when he wants it,

the pedophilic disorder drives the desire to be with children and molest them.

¶ 20 Dr. Stanislaus also explained that a scored static risk level can be impacted by dynamic

and protective factors, either going up or down depending on the factors. She stated again that in

this case; she concluded that the respondent was much more likely to commit future acts of sexual

violence. She agreed that when the respondent spoke out in church, he was seeking help but noted

that he reoffended even after that incident.

7 ¶ 21 The State’s next witness was Dr. David Suire. Dr. Suire was qualified as an expert in

clinical psychology with expertise in sex offender evaluation and risk assessment. He had

completed approximately 3,500 evaluations of varying types. He explained that for his evaluation

of the respondent, he reviewed records from IDOC; police records; court records; and DHS

records. He then attempted to conduct an interview with the respondent in approximately February

2021, but the respondent had declined.

¶ 22 Dr. Suire testified that the respondent met the first criteria for an SVP where he had

convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse and attempted predatory sexual assault.

Regarding the mental disorder requirement, Dr. Suire diagnosed the respondent with pedophilic

disorder, sexually attracted to boys, non-exclusive type, as well as unspecified personality

disorder. Dr. Suire explained that pedophilic disorder requires urges, fantasies, or behaviors

involving sexual contact with children 13 years of age or younger, enduring over at least a six-

month period and causing significant distress to the person or harm to others.

¶ 23 Dr. Suire explained that he diagnosed the respondent with pedophilic disorder based on his

having had sexual contact with a three-year-old boy in 1999; having had sexual contact with a 12-

year-old boy in 2016; his self-report of a long history prior to 1990 wherein he was attracted to

young children; his self-report of sexual contact with a five-year-old girl at age 15; his admission

to having contact with other minor children; and his parole violation where he had unsupervised

contact with underage children, including a 9-year-old male. Dr. Suire noted that in a 2002 police

interview, the respondent disclosed his attraction to children and stated that he needed help with

it. Dr. Suire also noted that the respondent’s attraction is both sexual and emotional, and explained

that the emotional component makes it more difficult to give up the sexual component of the

condition. Dr. Suire explained that the respondent would need to stay away from children entirely

8 to manage his condition. Dr. Suire then noted that in September 2023 the respondent stated that

when children reach puberty, they should be able to have sex with whoever they want. Dr. Suire

stated that this demonstrated the respondent’s difficulty in fully accepting the wrongness of the

behavior. Dr. Suire also noted that while the respondent was doing well in treatment, as early as

January 2024 the respondent stated that he still had the interests.

¶ 24 Dr. Suire was asked about the respondent’s diagnosis of hebephilia by Dr. Stanislaus. He

stated that he thought it was a reasonable diagnosis. He explained that he did not give that diagnosis

because the primary interest of the respondent is in children 13 years old and younger, but it was

fair to say that the respondent has hebephilia as well.

¶ 25 Regarding the conclusion of Dr. Elaine Bochenek, Dr. Suire explained that with antisocial

personality disorder, if it exists with a paraphilic disorder like pedophilia, it will make the person

more likely to act on the urges. He further explained, however, that there is no reason a person

with antisocial personality disorder alone would have an interest in prepubescent children. He

stated that while antisocial personality disorder can be an aggravating factor, it would not lead one

to be attracted to a three-year-old child; such an attraction is its own disorder.

¶ 26 Regarding his diagnosis of unspecified personality disorder, Dr. Suire explained that a

personality disorder is a characterological way of looking at the world that leads to difficulties in

functioning and interactions with others. It is different from an affliction; it is who you are, but it

causes you difficulties. Dr. Suire agreed that the respondent met the criteria for antisocial

personality disorder diagnosed by Dr. Bochenek. Dr. Suire also suspected that the respondent had

additional personality disorders, but he did not want to determine any additional disorders without

an interview.

9 ¶ 27 Dr. Suire then explained that, in addition to pedophilic disorder, he believed the

respondent’s antisocial personality disorder would also meet the criteria for a qualifying mental

disorder under the Act. He stated that the respondent’s history of difficult relationships, including

very conflicted, violent, unhealthy relationships with adults, indicated that his personality disorder

will make it difficult for him to form healthy relationships with adults. This will make it more

likely that he will seek out contact with children.

¶ 28 Regarding risk assessment, Dr. Suire explained that he considered actuarial data from

formal risk assessments, aggravating factors, and protective factors in assessing risk. He utilized

two risk assessment actuarial instruments in the respondent’s evaluation, the Static-99R and Static-

2002R. Dr. Suire scored the respondent a four on the Static-99R, placing him in the above average

risk category, meaning he is 1.94 times as likely as a typical sex offender to be convicted of another

sex offense in the future. Dr. Suire testified that because of the nature of sex offenses, not every

sex offense is detected, so the instrument underestimates risk.

¶ 29 Dr. Suire scored the respondent a four or five on the Static-2002R. He stated that he was

not sure whether the three-year-old victim was related to the respondent. He stated that if they are

related then the respondent scored a four, and if they are not related then the respondent scored a

five. If the score was a four, then he would be in the average risk category and 1.39 times as likely

to be convicted of another sex offense as a typical sex offender. If he scored a five, he would be in

the above average risk category and 1.9 times as likely to be convicted of another sex offense as a

typical sex offender.

¶ 30 Dr. Suire again emphasized that the actuarial instruments are understood to underestimate

risk. He stated that it is likely in this case that the respondent’s risk scores underestimate his level

of risk for multiple reasons. First, the respondent reported having additional child victims, but the

10 number of additional victims is unknown. Second, after his first conviction while out on parole,

the respondent had contact with multiple children despite having been seriously sanctioned with

prison time and being under supervision. This indicates an inability to control behavior. Dr. Suire

also found it important that the respondent does not fully accept that the behavior is wrong. Dr.

Suire explained that with actuarial data, where the primary driver is deviant arousal, the instrument

tends to underestimate the score. When someone’s strong attraction to children is the primary

driver of behavior, they tend to score lower.

¶ 31 Dr. Suire then explained his consideration of protective factors. He stated that there was

nothing about the respondent’s health condition that acted as a protective factor. The actuarial

instruments gave reduction in risk for the respondent’s age, so no additional reduction was given

for that factor either. Regarding progress in treatment, Dr. Suire explained that the respondent had

been in treatment consistently since March 2023 and had several treatment-interfering beliefs. The

first was difficulty accepting the wrongness of having sexual contact with children. The second

was recounting events wherein the victims were portrayed as seeking sexual contact. Dr. Suire

explained that if someone believes that underage children want to have sex with them, that would

be a belief that would enable offending. Dr. Suire described the respondent as in early phase two

of treatment out of five, stating he is somebody who has barely begun treatment, hasn’t made a lot

of progress, is able to stay in treatment, but is not at the point where it would be a protective factor.

¶ 32 Dr. Suire elaborated on how completion of treatment is associated with a reduction in risk

to reoffend. He explained that he has recommended people for conditional release or discharge

based on partial treatment progress if they have done well enough in treatment. In making this

determination, he considered whether they had a good understanding of their risk factors,

acknowledged what they had done, acknowledged their risk, and had developed and implemented

11 effective interventions. Dr. Suire did not believe that the respondent understood his risk, and he

had not developed any interventions to address his risk. While the respondent had made progress

in treatment, he was still in the earliest stages. Dr. Suire further opined that it would be difficult to

find any place in the community with an array of sex offender treatment as extensive as that of the

current DHS placement.

¶ 33 Dr. Suire ultimately concluded that the respondent was substantially probable to reoffend

in the future. He stated that the most important factor for that conclusion was the pervasiveness of

the respondent’s attraction to children, how strong it was, and how much it was related to both his

sexual interest and his emotional and affiliative needs. Dr. Suire stated again that it is the view of

the developer of the risk assessment instruments, and the opinion generally held by experts within

the field, that the actuarial risk scores are underestimated.

¶ 34 In addition to expert testimony, the State’s case included two reports that were admitted

into evidence. The first was Dr. Stanislaus’s psychiatric evaluation report (Stanislaus Report) of

December 7, 2020, which indicated that the respondent’s father had never been involved in the

respondent’s life; his mother and sister had both passed away; the respondent had never been

married and was not in a relationship at the time of the interview; and he had no children. The

Stanislaus Report stated that the respondent’s closest relatives were cousins in Kansas City,

Kansas.

¶ 35 The second report was Dr. Suire’s SVP commitment psychological examination (Suire

Report) of February 8, 2021, which indicated that the respondent received social security disability

benefits due to learning problems, a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia, and a back injury. The Suire

Report also indicated that the respondent had a history of substance abuse involving alcohol,

marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and K2, with cannabis as his substance of choice. The

12 respondent had received substance abuse treatment on two occasions and Dr. Suire believed it was

likely that the respondent had a substance abuse disorder centered on cannabis, but he did not have

sufficient information to give the diagnosis. The Suire Report noted that the respondent was

recommended for substance abuse treatment in IDOC, but that he did not ever participate in any

such treatment.

¶ 36 The Suire Report also indicated that the respondent had a history of at least two psychiatric

hospitalizations. There was no documentation that the respondent participated in any ongoing

mental health or sex offender treatment in IDOC during either of his two periods of incarceration.

The respondent had reported that he had attended a few sessions of sex offender treatment in the

community while on parole in 2003.

¶ 37 The Suire Report also set forth a history of the respondent’s behavioral incidences while

in IDOC. During his incarceration in 2003 and 2004, the respondent had been issued six tickets

for behavioral incidences. During his incarceration in 2019, the respondent had been issued three

tickets for behavioral incidences, and the most recent one was for threatening his cellmate.

¶ 38 The Suire Report also outlined the treatment available at DHS’s Treatment and Detention

Facility (TDF). It stated that at the TDF, the DHS sex offender treatment program was comprised

of five phases: (1) assessment, where participants were evaluated; (2) accepting responsibility,

where participants fully disclose their history of sexual offenses; (3) self-application, where

participants develop understanding of their sex offense cycle and identify ways to avoid

reoffending; (4) incorporation, where participants use their self-identified interventions and create

a plan to avoid reoffending in the community; and (5) transition, where participants modify their

plans to prepare for implementation and integration into the community.

13 ¶ 39 Upon completion of the State’s case, the respondent called Dr. Elaine Bochenek to testify.

Dr. Bochenek is a licensed clinical psychologist. The parties stipulated that she was an expert in

the field of sex offender evaluations. Her sources for conducting the evaluation were a video

conference interview with the respondent; the Department of Corrections Sexually Violent Persons

Commitment Act checklist, a sex-offender pre-release evaluation from December 6, 2019, the

respondent’s IDOC inmate status, IDOC movement history, IDOC master and medical files, State

of Illinois criminal records from Madison and St. Clair counties, and law enforcement records. She

had completed approximately 78 SVP evaluations.

¶ 40 Dr. Bochenek did not use any actuarial instruments in her evaluation of the respondent. Dr.

Bochenek testified that she did not agree that the respondent had a paraphilic mental condition and

did not do a risk assessment of the respondent because she did not find that he had a qualifying

mental disorder. She was unsure as to whether she would agree with the other doctors that the

respondent is substantially probable to commit another sex offense. She concluded that he was

much more likely to commit another type of crime due to his antisocial personality disorder. Dr.

Bochenek believed the respondent was not minimizing anything during their interview.

¶ 41 Dr. Bochenek stated that she had asked the respondent about the incident involving the

three-year-old. He told her that the child was having trouble using the bathroom and so he placed

Vaseline in the child’s anus and put him back on the toilet. Dr. Bochenek found this explanation

to be plausible. Regarding that case, the respondent told Dr. Bochenek that he should not have

pleaded guilty. Regarding the 2016 case, he told Dr. Bochenek that he pleaded guilty because the

jury would not have believed him due to the earlier case. Despite this, Dr. Bochenek said the

respondent did seem to take responsibility for the crimes.

14 ¶ 42 Dr. Bochenek also noted that the parole violation was written up only for cannabis, and

while it mentions that the respondent had contact with a child, the actual violation was for the

cannabis use. Dr. Bochenek additionally noted that the respondent was able to explain the

usefulness of various aspects of treatment, and in 2002, he stated that to avoid future sex crimes

he was going to steer clear of all young people.

¶ 43 Dr. Bochenek further stated that in the respondent’s early twenties, he was diagnosed with

psychotic disorders. Dr. Bochenek found it notable that during the announcement the respondent

made in church, the respondent said if anyone wanted to have sex with him, they should raise their

hand. He did not limit that announcement to children. She stated that the incident could have been

caused by a psychotic disorder or break of some kind, and that cannabis use could have contributed

to that incident. She believed that the incident could have been a call for help. She agreed that the

respondent was formerly on antipsychotic medication, but at this time he was no longer on any

such medication and had no psychiatric symptoms.

¶ 44 Dr. Bochenek diagnosed the respondent with antisocial personality disorder and cannabis

use disorder. Regarding the antisocial personality disorder, the criteria that Dr. Bochenek

determined to apply to the respondent were substantial criminal history, impulsivity, irritability

and aggressiveness, reckless disregard for the safety of self or others, lack of remorse, age, and

evidence of a conduct disorder before age 15. Criteria that Dr. Bochenek determined did not apply

were deceitfulness and consistent irresponsibility. She also diagnosed the respondent with severe

cannabis use disorder and opined that his abuse of cannabis interfered with his ability to function.

¶ 45 Dr. Bochenek did not, however, conclude that the respondent was an SVP. She explained

that this was because there was not an intense and persistent desire or urge to engage in deviant

sexual behavior. In order to meet the criteria for pedophilic disorder, Dr. Bochenek explained that

15 the person must have engaged in fantasies or sexual urges regarding, or engaged in sex with, a

prepubescent child over a period of at least six months. She found that the respondent did not meet

that criteria.

¶ 46 Dr. Bochenek defined hebephilia as a recurrent urge or need to be involved sexually with

someone between 11 and 14 years old. She stated that a 15-year-old victim would not be counted

as hebephilia. Dr. Bochenek then agreed that the respondent’s motivation for his offenses was

antisocial in nature and was opportunistic. She also explained that if a person has a paraphilic

disorder and they are using alcohol or drugs to excess, it could impact their paraphilic behaviors

because it disinhibits the individual.

¶ 47 On cross examination, Dr. Bochenek explained that with paraphilia, someone may be

aroused by having sex with a woman against her will, and that is the motivation. With antisocial

personality disorder, if something happens to be available, the person will take advantage of it.

The motive is not to hurt someone for the stimulation of hurting them. It is opportunistic. She

agreed that anyone suffering from antisocial personality disorder could potentially decide to have

sex with a three-year-old. She explained that if an opportunity becomes available, someone with

antisocial personality disorder will take what they want regardless of what the person or the law

thinks. When asked if the respondent wanted a three-year-old, Dr. Bochenek said she did not know.

¶ 48 When asked if antisocial personality disorder could be a qualifying disorder under the Act

that is leading the respondent to commit sex crimes, Dr. Bochenek said no, because it is not a

paraphilic disorder. When questioned as to whether the antisocial personality disorder could cause

the respondent to commit further sexual offenses, Dr. Bochenek agreed that it was the cause of the

respondent’s prior sex offenses but stated that the respondent was much more likely to commit

other future offenses rather than a sexual offense.

16 ¶ 49 Dr. Bochenek stated that she was aware that the respondent had admitted to other sexual

offenses, including with a four-year-old girl, but stated that she did not believe those statements to

be credible. She was aware of the respondent’s voluntary statement to Belleville police that he had

sex with the three-year-old more than once. The respondent told her that he was acknowledging

what he was accused of with that statement, not admitting to the conduct, and she believed his

explanation.

¶ 50 Dr. Bochenek also stated that she was not aware of the respondent’s admission to his

disclosure group that he had sex with a 12-year-old boy. After reviewing a report from January

2024 she acknowledged that the respondent made the statement, that he talked about having

deviant sexual fantasies around the time of the offense, and that he talked about the grooming

behaviors he had used. She did not change her opinion regarding paraphilia because the fantasies

were at the time of the offense and did not account for a six-month period of time.

¶ 51 Dr. Bochenek agreed that the respondent also said he felt shame about his interest. She

disagreed that this met criteria for pedophilic disorder because the treatment note that included the

statement was not clear where the shame was coming from, either the legal consequences he was

experiencing or the interest in children. When she was asked whether the context of the statement

helped to clarify the source of the shame, where the treatment note said he expressed the feelings

of shame in the same paragraph where he discussed his sexual interest in children and his grooming

of children, Dr. Bochenek stated that the grooming behaviors were buying gifts for and playing

with the children, and so she was not sure if that was grooming or just helping them out.

¶ 52 Dr. Bochenek stated that she did believe that the respondent’s crimes had occurred, despite

his denying them to her. When asked if that was deceitful, Dr. Bochenek stated that the respondent

did admit to being with a 15-year-old, and so he was not deceitful. When asked again about the

17 three-year-old, she expressed an understanding that at first there was doubt as to whether that had

occurred when the child initially reported it.

¶ 53 Regarding pedophilic disorder, Dr. Bochenek stated that her issue with the diagnosis was

that the respondent did not appear to display the urges over a period of six months. When asked

about the years between offenses and the respondent’s admission to offenses involving a 5-year-

old girl, the 3-year-old two times, a 14-year-old female, and a 14-year-old male, Dr. Bochenek

explained that because the respondent went 16 years without having a second offense charged, the

urges were not recurrent, intense, and persistent. Dr. Bochenek did not agree that the 12-year-old

would fit the criteria for pedophilic disorder because puberty for boys can start at age 11, and so

the DSM-5 is antiquated because children are maturing earlier these days.

¶ 54 The respondent also testified at the trial. He explained that he completed phase one of

treatment over a two-year period, and that he had been in phase two for about a year. When asked

about his disclosure of the five-year-old female victim, the respondent stated that he was

embarrassed of his charges and would sometimes fabricate different reasons for being in prison.

He stated this was the case with the victim he had identified as a 14-year-old girl. He testified that

she did not exist.

¶ 55 The respondent stated that the reason for the incident that occurred in church was that he

was feeling guilty about the three-year-old. He explained that during the testimony part of the

church service, people would stand up and ask for help with things like rent. He said that when he

stood up and asked the question about having sex with him, he was just being obnoxious. He also

said that he only told the church deacon about one male who he found attractive at church who

was at least 16 years of age.

18 ¶ 56 The respondent also addressed several other topics that had come up during trial. Regarding

whether the three-year-old was a relative of his, the respondent explained that he was not related

to the child. Regarding the children in his home during the parole violation, the respondent testified

that he was living with his mother at the time, and his sister was also living there with her children,

but the children were not there for any purpose relating to the respondent. Regarding the nine-

year-old, the respondent stated that he was working on his car and the child approached him and

asked him to fix the chain on his bicycle. He fixed it and the child left, but when law enforcement

came to the home, the child approached and asked what was going on, and the incident was blown

out of proportion. The respondent also denied ever telling anyone about a five-year-old. He stated

that when he was 15, he was in inpatient treatment for marijuana. He stated that he never had an

incident with a five-year-old, and he never told anyone that such an incident occurred.

¶ 57 The respondent stated that at group therapy, the group was asked whether a 16-year-old is

still a child. He said no because 16-year-olds get in trouble and can be charged as adults. After

group, a therapist questioned him about the answer, and the respondent explained his belief that it

should not be up to the State to decide a 16-year-old’s consensual age. He testified that this was

not for himself because he is too old, but that he expressed the opinion from the point of view of

a young person whom he thought would want to make his or her own choices.

¶ 58 The respondent was asked about reports he made in therapy about fantasies he had at the

time of the offense involving the 12-year-old. He had reported fantasies involving imagining the

victim unclothed; fondling the victim’s penis; anally penetrating the victim with his penis; orally

penetrating the victim with his penis; and being in a relationship with the victim. He had also

reported thoughts about other male and female adolescents between 13 and 17 years old unclothed.

The respondent agreed that he had made those statements in therapy but said that the fantasies

19 were not acted upon and were mostly about the 15-year-old. He admitted to initially denying

contact with the three-year-old but then stated that he had made an attempt with the child.

¶ 59 Following closing arguments, the trial court found the respondent to be an SVP. The trial

court stated that the first element, conviction of a qualifying offense, was clearly proven. The trial

court then found that the respondent had qualifying mental disorders including pedophilia and

hebephilia. It explained that because the discrepancy in the doctors’ opinions related to motivation,

the antisocial personality disorder diagnosis did not explain why a grown man would want to have

sexual relations with a three-year-old. The trial court found that there would have to be sexual

attraction; it stated that there are many other antisocial things that could be done to a three-year-

old, but sexual abuse is another level. Further, the trial court stated that the respondent would be

much more likely to act on those behaviors because he is also antisocial. It noted that the

respondent’s risk to reoffend was calculated to be twice the level of other sex offenders and found

that the State had proven that the respondent’s mental disorder created a substantial probability

that he will engage in future acts of sexual violence.

¶ 60 The trial court then stated that it had enough information to proceed to disposition. It stated

that at the current stage, the respondent would be a danger to the community if released. It also

stated that it had considered the nature and circumstances of the respondent’s behavior, his mental

history and present mental condition, and what arrangements were available to address his mental

condition. The trial court found that the respondent would participate in necessary treatment so

long as he continued to reside at the DHS treatment facility where the treatment is intensive. The

trial court noted that the respondent was still in the early stages of treatment where he had

progressed to stage two out of five stages, and it expressed concern that the respondent is still

20 minimizing his crimes against children and his involvement in those crimes. The trial court then

ordered the respondent to be committed to DHS for institutional care in a DHS facility.

¶ 61 The respondent, through trial counsel, filed a notice of appeal on April 17, 2024, and a

special defender was appointed to represent the respondent on appeal.

¶ 62 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 63 On appeal, the respondent argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that the

respondent is an SVP where the evidence was contradictory that the respondent suffered from a

mental disorder and was inadequate to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent was

substantially likely to reoffend. The respondent also argues that his remand to the custody of DHS

was improper given the factors set forth in the Act.

¶ 64 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 65 On appeal, the respondent first argues that the State failed to prove each element required

for the trial court to find that the respondent was an SVP. Under the Act, the State must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent (1) was convicted of a sexually violent offense,

(2) has a mental disorder, and (3) the mental disorder makes it substantially probable that he will

engage in future acts of sexual violence. 725 ILCS 207/5(f), 35(d) (West 2022); In re Commitment

of Fields, 2014 IL 115542, ¶ 20. The term “substantially probable” means “much more likely than

not.” In re Commitment of Moody, 2020 IL App (1st) 190565, ¶ 62.

¶ 66 The respondent argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

suffered from a mental disorder and that he was substantially probable to engage in future acts of

sexual violence. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court asks whether,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have

found the elements of the Act beyond a reasonable doubt. Fields, 2014 IL 115542, ¶ 20. It is the

21 trier of fact’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence, determine the credibility of

witnesses, and decide what weight is afforded to witness testimony. Moody, 2020 IL App (1st)

190565, ¶ 43. Thus, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact and will not

reverse its decision unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it leaves a

reasonable doubt. Id.

¶ 67 In the present case, the respondent does not, nor could he, dispute the State’s proof of the

first element, i.e., that he was convicted of at least one sexually violent offense. Rather, the

respondent contends that the State failed to prove that he has a mental disorder and that this

disorder makes it substantially more likely that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. We will

address each of the respondent’s contentions in turn.

¶ 68 1. Mental Disorder

¶ 69 The respondent first argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

has a mental disorder as defined by the Act. Referring to the discrepancies in diagnosis between

Dr. Stanislaus, Dr. Suire, and Dr. Bochenek, the respondent argues that the differences in opinion

between the three experts indicate reasonable doubt as to whether the State proved the respondent’s

diagnosis beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

¶ 70 The Act defines a mental disorder as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the

emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual

violence.” 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2022). In determining whether the State has met its burden,

reviewing courts have routinely relied on expert testimony, and deferred to the factfinder’s

determinations regarding an expert’s credibility. In re Commitment of Gavin, 2019 IL App (1st)

180881, ¶ 36; Fields, 2014 IL 115542, ¶ 27; In re Detention of White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187,

¶¶ 58-62.

22 ¶ 71 In the present case, the evidence was sufficient to find that the respondent had a mental

disorder as defined by the Act. Dr. Stanislaus diagnosed the respondent with pedophilic disorder,

hebephilia, and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. David Suire diagnosed the respondent with

pedophilic disorder and unspecified personality disorder. Both doctors testified that they diagnosed

the respondent with pedophilic disorder because he had sexually molested a three-year-old boy

whom he was sexually attracted to and had emotional involvement with, had disclosed that he was

attracted to young children in treatment, and had sexually molested a 12-year-old boy in 2016.

¶ 72 Dr. Stanislaus additionally diagnosed the respondent with hebephilia because he reported

a sexual interest in developing boys, told church officials he was in a relationship with a 14-year-

old boy in 2002, and molested a 15-year-old boy in 2016. When asked about Dr. Stanislaus’s

diagnosis of hebephilia, Dr. Suire stated that he thought it was a reasonable diagnosis. He explained

that he did not give it because he believed the respondent’s primary interest is in children 13 years

old and younger, but it is fair to say that the respondent met the criteria for diagnosis of hebephilia

as well.

¶ 73 Dr. Stanislaus also diagnosed the respondent with antisocial personality disorder due to his

multiple repeated arrests and legal issues. Dr. Suire diagnosed the respondent with unspecified

personality disorder. Dr. Suire opined that the respondent likely met criteria for antisocial

personality disorder, however, he did not make that diagnosis because the respondent refused an

in-person interview. Dr. Suire did testify, however, that the respondent’s history of difficult

relationships, including very conflicted, violent, unhealthy relationships with adults, indicates that

his personality disorder will make it difficult for him to form healthy relationships with adults, and

this will make it more likely that he will seek out contact with children.

23 ¶ 74 Dr. Bochenek diagnosed the respondent with antisocial personality disorder and severe

cannabis use disorder, neither of which, in her opinion, were qualifying offenses pursuant to the

Act. Dr. Bochenek did not believe that pedophilic disorder was an appropriate diagnosis because

the respondent went 16 years without having a second offense charged, and so that meant he did

not experience recurrent, intense, persistent urges over a period of six months. She did not agree

that the 12-year-old the respondent molested would fit the criteria of pedophilic disorder because

puberty for boys can start at age 11, and so she believed the criteria used by the DSM-5 is

antiquated. Dr. Bochenek also disagreed with the other experts’ opinions that the respondent has

hebephilia, as hebephilia requires a recurrent urge to be involved sexually with someone between

11 and 14-years-old. She did not address why she did not diagnose hebephilia with regard to the

respondent’s 12-year-old victim and his self-reported 14-year-old victim, except to express doubt

as to the veracity of the respondent’s self-reporting.

¶ 75 Dr. Bochenek ultimately did not believe that deviant sexual urges motivated the

respondent’s conduct. When asked if antisocial personality disorder could be a qualifying disorder

under the Act that is leading the respondent to commit sex crimes, Dr. Bochenek said no, because

it was not a paraphilic disorder. When questioned as to whether the antisocial personality disorder

could cause the respondent to commit further sexual offenses, Dr. Bochenek agreed that it was the

cause of his prior sex offenses but stated that he was much more likely to commit other offenses

in the future rather than a sexual offense.

¶ 76 Dr. Stanislaus disagreed with Dr. Bochenek. She testified that the respondent’s propensity

to commit sex offenses comes from his pedophilic disorder. She explained that while the antisocial

disorder motivates the respondent to get what he wants when he wants, the pedophilic disorder

drives his desire to seek being with children and molesting them.

24 ¶ 77 Dr. Suire also disagreed with Dr. Bochenek that the respondent did not suffer from a

paraphilic disorder. He stated that there is no reason that a person with a criminal way of thinking,

as in antisocial personality disorder, would have an interest in prepubescent children. He explained

that when antisocial personality disorder coexists with a paraphilic disorder like pedophilia, the

antisocial personality disorder will make the person more likely to act on the urges, but antisocial

personality disorder alone would not lead to an attraction to a three-year-old. Such an attraction

would be its own disorder.

¶ 78 The trial court had evidence that two experts diagnosed the respondent with a qualifying

mental disorder, pedophilic disorder, and it had testimony from both experts as to the nature of the

disorder and how the respondent fit the criteria. The trial court also explained that it found Dr.

Bochenek’s diagnosis unsatisfactory to explain why the respondent had sexual desire for a three-

year-old. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that there was

sufficient evidence presented by the State for a rational factfinder to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that the respondent suffers from a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional

or volitional capacity that predisposes him to engage in acts of sexual violence. The respondent’s

argument to the contrary amounts to a request to reweigh the experts’ testimony and credibility, a

task we, as the reviewing court, simply cannot undertake.

¶ 79 2. Substantial Risk to Reoffend

¶ 80 The respondent next argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

respondent was substantially probable to reoffend. He argues that the only evidence offered to

prove his risk of reoffending were the actuarial scores, and that those assessments were based on

past conduct. He argues that no evidence of current behaviors was provided that would make it

much more likely that he would reoffend.

25 ¶ 81 The third element of an SVP the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,

was that the respondent’s current mental disorder created a substantial probability that he would

engage in acts of sexual violence in the future. 725 ILCS 207/5(f), 35(d) (West 2022); In re

Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 559 (2000). Substantially probable means “much more

likely than not.” Gavin, 2019 IL App (1st) 180881, ¶ 43.

¶ 82 The respondent’s argument that his actuarial scores, based on past conduct, were the only

evidence offered to prove substantial probability to engage in future sexual violence and were

insufficient without evidence of current behaviors, fails for two reasons. First, the argument

implies that to meet the third element of an SVP, evidence of current behaviors must be presented.

The respondent cites no authority to support this position. While a respondent cannot be

involuntarily committed based solely on past conduct (Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 559), the State is

not required to provide evidence of current behaviors to meet the third element of an SVP. See 725

ILCS 207/5(f), 35(d) (West 2022). The plain language of the statute makes no reference to current

behaviors. The State is required to present evidence of a substantial probability created by a current

mental disorder. Id.

¶ 83 Second, neither of the State’s experts relied solely on actuarial scores to determine that the

respondent’s paraphilic disorders created a substantial probability of future sexual violence. Both

experts provided the respondent’s diagnosis of paraphilic disorders, explained the lifelong nature

of those disorders, discussed how risk is increased due to dynamic factors, set forth dynamic

factors as they applied to the respondent, and indicated that no protective factors applied to reduce

the respondent’s risk to reoffend. Both of the State’s experts concluded that the respondent was

substantially probable to reoffend in the future, and in doing so, Dr. Suire emphasized the

26 pervasiveness of the respondent’s attraction to children and how it was related to both his sexual

interest and his emotional and affiliative needs.

¶ 84 Dr. Bochenek did not complete a risk assessment because she did not find that a qualifying

mental disorder existed. She was unsure as to whether she would agree with the other experts’

opinions that the respondent is substantially probable to reoffend.

¶ 85 The standard of substantially probable to reoffend “cannot be reduced to a mere

mathematical formula or statistical analysis.” In re Detention of Hayes, 321 Ill. App. 3d 178, 188

(2001). Ultimately, the trial court found the State’s experts’ comprehensive risk assessments more

compelling than Dr. Bochenek’s denial of the mental conditions that contribute to that risk, and

determined the respondent was substantially probable to reoffend. We defer to the trier of fact on

expert credibility and will not reweigh conflicting expert testimony. In re Commitment of Evans,

2021 IL App (1st) 192293, ¶ 67. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we

find that there was sufficient evidence presented by the State for a reasonable trier of fact to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent’s mental disorder made it substantially probable

that he would commit future acts of sexual violence.

¶ 86 While each case is fact specific, this case is well in line with a multitude of cases finding

sufficient evidence that a respondent was an SVP. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Floyd, 2025 IL

App (1st) 230047-U, ¶ 121 (collecting cases). We do not find that the evidence was so improbable

or unsatisfactory that it leaves a reasonable doubt and accordingly, the respondent is not entitled

to reversal on this issue.

¶ 87 B. Commitment to DHS

¶ 88 The respondent next argues that the trial court’s order remanding him to the care, custody,

and control of DHS was improper. The respondent states that when the trial court determined

27 whether he should be committed for institutional care or conditionally released, it failed to consider

the statutory factors. Specifically, the respondent argues that the trial court failed to consider the

respondent’s mental health history, present condition, and the testimony and findings of Dr.

Bochenek, and instead focused on the testimony of Dr. Suire. The respondent also argues that the

trial court failed to consider the arrangements available in the community which could have given

the respondent proper treatment.

¶ 89 Under section 40(a) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/40(a) (West 2022)), once an individual is

found to be an SVP, the trial court “shall order the person to be committed to the custody of

[DHS].” Id. In its order, the trial court must specify whether the individual is to be committed to

institutional care in a secure facility or conditionally released. Id. § 40(b)(2); In re Commitment of

Dudley, 2025 IL App (4th) 230462-U, ¶ 71. In determining whether commitment should be for

institutional care in a secure facility or for conditional release, the court shall consider (1) the

nature and circumstances of the behavior that was the basis of the allegation in the petition under

paragraph (b)(1) of section 15 of the Act (725 ILCS 207/15(b)(1) (West 2022)); (2) the person’s

mental history and present mental condition; and (3) what arrangements are available to ensure

that the person has access to and will participate in necessary treatment. Id. § 40(b)(2). We review

the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Commitment of Trulock, 2012 IL App

(3d) 110550, ¶ 52. An abuse of discretion is only found where the decision is arbitrary, fanciful,

or unreasonable. Id.

¶ 90 In this case, after finding the respondent was an SVP, the trial court proceeded to

disposition. The trial court stated that it had considered the nature and circumstances of the

respondent’s behavior, his mental history and present mental condition, and what arrangements

28 were available to address the respondent’s mental condition. The trial court then ordered the

respondent to be committed to the custody of DHS for institutional care.

¶ 91 The respondent’s first argument is essentially that, regarding the nature and circumstances

of the respondent’s behavior and his mental history and present mental condition, the trial court

failed to consider those factors because it did not credit the respondent’s expert witness over the

State’s expert witnesses. The record indicates that both Drs. Stanislaus and Suire discussed the

respondent’s criminal behavior, his mental health history, and his current mental health condition.

Dr. Bochenek and the respondent both testified as to the respondent’s criminal behavior. Dr.

Bochenek also testified regarding the respondent’s mental health history and current mental health

condition. As noted above, the trial court indicated that it considered all of these factors in making

its determination. Again, it is the trier of fact’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence,

determine the credibility of witnesses, and decide what weight is afforded to witness testimony.

Moody, 2020 IL App (1st) 190565, ¶ 43. The trial court stated that it had considered each of the

relevant factors, and it had ample evidence before it relating to each factor. A credibility

determination from the trial court does not amount to a failure to consider the statutory factors,

and we do not find that the trial court failed to consider the statutory factors here.

¶ 92 Next, the respondent argues that the trial court failed to take into account what

arrangements were available in the community to ensure that he had access to and would

participate in necessary treatment. We again disagree.

¶ 93 In rendering its decision, the trial court specifically stated that the respondent would be a

danger to the community if released. The trial court found that the respondent would participate in

necessary treatment so long as he continued to reside at the DHS treatment facility where the

29 treatment is intensive. The trial court also noted that the respondent was only in phase two of

treatment and expressed concern that the respondent was still minimizing his crimes.

¶ 94 While the trial court did not specifically elaborate on the arrangements available in the

community, it is not required to do so. The trier of fact in a bench trial is not required to mention

anything that contributed to its verdict. If the record contains facts that support the trial court’s

finding, the reviewing court may consider those facts to affirm the finding, even if the trial court

did not state specifically that it relied on them. See In re Commitment of Kordelewski, 2018 IL

App (2d) 170623-U, ¶ 34; see also In re Commitment of Schauer, 2017 IL App (2d) 170266-U,

¶ 31.

¶ 95 In this case, the trial court had evidence before it that the respondent was substantially

probable to reoffend, and it found that he posed a danger to the community. The trial court also

had evidence before it that the respondent had difficulty following rules, had not progressed to the

planning phase of treatment, and had not voluntarily engaged in treatment to a meaningful degree

during either his two periods of incarceration or his subsequent release after his first period of

incarceration. The trial court had further evidence before it that the respondent does not have a

support system in Illinois to assist or support the respondent with treatment in the community.

Each of these facts is relevant to the trial court’s consideration of what arrangements were available

in the community to ensure that the respondent had access to and would participate in necessary

treatment. The trial court stated that it had considered what arrangements were available, and the

record contained sufficient evidence for the trial court to make that determination.

¶ 96 Although the respondent claims that the trial court failed to consider all three statutory

factors, the record shows that the trial court was presented with and considered all of the evidence

and its relationship to the factors listed in section 40(b). On review, we will not reweigh the

30 relevant factors or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. In re Commitment of Haskins,

2016 IL App (3d) 150767-U, ¶ 16. While the respondent argues that absent an opportunity to be

treated in the community, he cannot ever prove he is not a threat, a trial court does not abuse its

discretion by committing a person to a secure facility where the person’s mental disorders make it

substantially probable that he or she will commit future acts of sexual violence. Id. ¶ 15. The trial

court heard and considered evidence regarding the nature and circumstances of the behavior that

was the basis of the State’s petition to have the respondent adjudicated an SVP. The trial court

heard extensive testimony about the respondent’s mental condition, past and present, and his high

risk of reoffending. The trial court also heard evidence regarding whether the respondent could

access treatment in the community and whether it was likely that he would participate in treatment

in the community. The trial court stated unequivocally that it considered all of the factors. The

plain language of the statute required no more. See In re Commitment of Schauer, 2017 IL App

(2d) 170266-U, ¶ 31.

¶ 97 We cannot find that the trial court ignored any of the section 40(b)(2) factors. Evidence

was presented as to each factor, and the trial court stated it had considered each of those factors in

its determination to commit the respondent to DHS. There is no indication in the record that the

trial court’s determination was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial

court’s order of commitment.

¶ 98 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 99 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment finding the respondent was

an SVP and ordering commitment to DHS.

¶ 100 Affirmed.