2025 IL App (1st) 231931-U No. 1-23-1931 Order filed July 30, 2025 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re COMMITMENT OF GWENN HALE ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Cook County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 14 CR 80001 ) Gwenn Hale, ) Honorable ) James B. Novy, Respondent-Appellant.) ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Reyes and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err when it declared respondent a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act and ordered him committed to a secure treatment and detention facility.
¶2 Following a jury trial, the trial court declared that respondent Gwenn Hale, a convicted sex
offender, was a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) No. 1-23-1931
(725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2022)), and ordered him committed to a secure treatment and
detention facility (TDF).
¶3 On appeal, respondent argues that the State (1) failed to prove that he is a sexually violent
person (SVP), and (2) committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.
¶4 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 1
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 In 2014, as respondent neared the completion of his sentence for his 1993 offenses of
aggravated criminal sexual assault, the State petitioned for his commitment under the Act.
¶7 At respondent’s jury trial in July 2023, the State submitted a certified record of conviction
as proof of respondent’s sexually violent offenses: four separate convictions for aggravated
criminal sexual assault. The State also presented two experts in sex offender evaluation, diagnosis,
and risk assessment: Dr. Angeline Stanislaus and Dr. Lindsay Dees. Each prepared written reports,
which were admitted into evidence at trial. Both experts opined that respondent is dangerous
because he suffers from a mental disorder that makes him substantially probable to engage in future
acts of sexual violence. Respondent called Dr. Deborah Nicolai, who testified that respondent is
not an SVP.
¶8 In reaching their opinions, Drs. Stanislaus and Dees relied on information contained in,
among other things, respondent’s Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) master file (including
court records and police reports) and his medical and disciplinary records from his time in the
custody of IDOC and the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS).
1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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¶9 Dr. Stanislaus prepared an initial report in 2014, and though respondent initially refused to
participate in an interview with Stanislaus, he ultimately consented to a clinical interview in
December 2021, and Stanislaus updated her report in January 2022 following that interview. Dr.
Dees prepared her report in October 2022, following respondent’s refusal to participate in an
interview with her. Stanislaus and Dees also reviewed updated DHS medical records before
testifying.
¶ 10 Dr. Stanislaus testified that she relied on respondent’s behavioral history in reaching her
opinion that he is an SVP. Specifically, she considered respondent’s sexually violent record, which
began in 1982 when he was convicted of indecent solicitation of a child, two counts of deviate
sexual assault, and two counts of armed violence for repeatedly raping an 11-year-old boy. At the
time, respondent was a Boy Scout troop leader and invited the 11-year-old troop member to his
apartment to try on a uniform. When the boy arrived, respondent threatened the boy with a gun
before anally raping and engaging in oral sex with him. A few weeks later, respondent found the
same boy in the public library, brought him to his apartment, and anally raped him again.
Respondent was sentenced to 16 years in prison but released on parole in 1989.
¶ 11 In 1993, respondent was charged in eight separate cases for offenses against boys between
the ages of 9 and 13 years old. Respondent went to trial in four of the cases, was convicted in each
of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and was sentenced to 40 years in prison. In the first case,
respondent brought a nine-year-old boy, Nathaniel, to his house; gave him food, money, and
cigarettes; and engaged in oral sex with the boy. Nathaniel reported that there were other young
boys in the house who witnessed these acts, and respondent would also engage in sex with his
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adult roommate in front of the boys. These offenses occurred in 1990, while respondent was on
parole for his 1982 conviction.
¶ 12 Nathaniel’s 12-year-old brother, Quentin, similarly reported that respondent gave him
money, food, and cigarettes and performed oral sex on him approximately 15 times between 1992
and 1993. A third boy, James, stated that he went to respondent’s apartment multiple times
between 1992 and 1993, where respondent tutored him and gave him an allowance. Respondent
performed oral sex on James, who was 12 years old, approximately 40 times. When investigating
officers arrived at respondent’s home in 1993, they found James in the house wearing only his
underwear. Finally, Earl, who was 12 years old, reported that respondent molested him over a
period of three to four months in 1993.
¶ 13 Stanislaus testified that, after respondent was arrested for molesting James, respondent told
police that he ran a tutoring center out of his apartment and used the center to tutor, feed, and wash
poor young boys at his apartment. Respondent claimed that two of the boys held him down while
James put his penis into respondent’s mouth. Respondent initially “resisted” but was forced to
perform oral sex on James and ultimately “helped” James have his first ejaculation. Similarly,
respondent told officers that he was held down by other boys when Earl placed his penis in
respondent’s mouth. Respondent also told police that there were two other 12-year-old boys who
came to his apartment and forced him to perform oral sex on them while other boys held respondent
down. Respondent said he “should have resisted” but admitted that he “liked it as well.”
¶ 14 Stanislaus also considered respondent’s nonsexual criminal history, which included
convictions for negligent homicide/reckless conduct and unlawful use of a weapon, as well as
additional arrests for aggravated battery and unlawful use of a weapon. Finally, Stanislaus
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considered respondent’s conduct while in custody. Specifically, respondent had “several fights and
staff assaults” while in IDOC custody, including a 2004 aggravated battery charge for assaulting
prison staff. Respondent also had multiple violations between 2014 and 2021 while in DHS
custody.
¶ 15 Based on all this information, Stanislaus diagnosed respondent with (1) pedophilic disorder,
sexually attracted to males, and (2) antisocial personality disorder. Regarding the pedophilic
disorder diagnosis, Stanislaus explained that respondent repeatedly sought out opportunities that
gave him access to and “create[d] an opportunity to be around” young boys. Respondent, like other
individuals who are sexually attracted to children, “[chose] occupations or opportunities or
hobbies” that gave him access to children and allowed him to repeatedly act on his “deviant sexual
interest in” children. As a Boy Scout leader and tutor, respondent occupied a leadership role over
the young boys, “created [situations] where young boys were coming to his house,” and provided
them a monthly allowance to “keep [them] coming.” Stanislaus testified that respondent’s
pedophilic disorder is a lifelong, congenital or acquired condition that affects his capacity to
control his sexual behavior and predisposes him to commit acts of sexual violence; indeed,
respondent had acted out on his urges by repeatedly molesting children despite knowing that he
would get into legal trouble. Stanislaus opined that respondent continues to suffer from the
disorder, as demonstrated by his admission to Stanislaus that he masturbates to thoughts of young
boys.
¶ 16 As to the antisocial personality disorder diagnosis, Stanislaus explained that respondent
repeatedly got into legal trouble during a 30-year period, was unable to maintain a “stable job or
lifestyle,” and exhibited anger, grievances, and hostility, which are all indicative of antisocial
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personality disorder. Stanislaus explained that antisocial personality disorder “exists throughout a
person’s life,” and makes respondent “much more likely” to act on his “deviant sexual interest.”
¶ 17 Stanislaus performed a risk assessment to determine respondent’s likelihood of sexually
reoffending, which included the administration of actuarial instruments and analysis of research-
based dynamic and protective risk factors. Respondent’s score of 4 on the Static-99R placed him
in the “average” risk category, but his risk was elevated by multiple dynamic risk factors, including
(1) sexual preference for children, (2) “offensive supportive” attitudes, namely respondent’s belief
that his victims benefitted from the sexual interactions, (3) lack of emotionally intimate
relationships with adults, (4) hostility or negative emotionality as indicated by his anger, fighting,
and insolence while in custody, (5) lack of self-regulation skills, as shown by his inability to
maintain a stable job or lifestyle, (6) impulsivity and recklessness, as shown by his repeated legal
troubles, and (7) problems with supervision, as demonstrated by his offenses while on parole.
Stanislaus found no protective factors that reduced respondent’s risk: he was not of advanced age,
had not completed sex offender treatment, and did not have a permanent or debilitating medical
condition although he was in a wheelchair and exhibited occasional tremors at trial.
¶ 18 Based on all the information, Stanislaus concluded to a reasonable degree of psychiatric
certainty that respondent is an SVP because his pedophilic disorder predisposes him to engage in
continued acts of sexual violence and he is “[m]uch more likely than not” to engage in future acts
of sexual violence.
¶ 19 On cross-examination, Stanislaus stated that she added one point to defendant’s Static-99R
score for lack of a cohabiting relationship for two years but she did not ask respondent about his
relationships. Also, the day before Stanislaus testified, she noted that she had miscalculated a point she
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added to respondent’s Static-99R score for four or more sentencing dates even though respondent had
only three sentencing dates. However, Stanislaus also missed a prior sexual conviction, and that added
a point. So, she opined that respondent still scored a 4 on the Static-99R. But even if he had been a 3,
Stanislaus stated that her conclusion in this case would not change.
¶ 20 Dr. Dees also evaluated respondent and opined that he is an SVP. Like Stanislaus, Dees
relied on respondent’s behavioral patterns, including his 1982 rape of an 11-year-old boy at
gunpoint, 1993 repeated oral sexual assaults on young boys, and disciplinary history while in
IDOC and DHS custody. Dees noted that (1) between 1990 and 1993, respondent demonstrated a
“significant pattern” of “inviting young boys to his apartment where he was orally assaulting them”
even after he had been previously convicted for violently assaulting an 11-year-old boy in 1982,
and (2) these boys, when interviewed by police, stated that respondent would give them food,
money, and candy to commit his offenses.
¶ 21 Dees diagnosed respondent with (1) pedophilic disorder, nonexclusive type, sexually
attracted to males, and (2) antisocial personality disorder with paranoid and histrionic traits.
Respondent exhibited a “pattern of offending” against “young males age 13 and younger,”
contributing to Dees’ pedophilic disorder diagnosis. Like Stanislaus, Dees opined that respondent
continues to suffer from pedophilic disorder, which “does not spontaneously remit” without “some
type of treatment or intervention,” so that an individual with untreated pedophilic disorder will
“continue to have that sexual urge towards children.” Respondent had not participated in any sex
offender treatment and had recently reported that he continued to have erotic thoughts about young
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¶ 22 Dees based respondent’s antisocial personality disorder diagnosis on his irritability,
aggressiveness, sexual behavior, history of impulsiveness, and “pervasive pattern” of
“disregarding and violating the rights of others.” Respondent demonstrates paranoid traits because
he has consistently exhibited “persecutory ideation” and the feeling that “others are out to get him,
[and] he’s being treated unfairly.” Respondent’s histrionic trait is based on his emotional
dysregulation and volatility. Dees opined that respondent continues to suffer from antisocial
personality disorder because he is “still getting rule infractions in the TDF,” is “still very irritable,”
continues to get into “verbal altercations and becomes defensive very easily,” and has not received
any treatment for the disorder.
¶ 23 Dees opined that both of respondent’s disorders predispose him to engage in acts of sexual
violence. Each of respondent’s disorders, alone, impacts his ability to refrain from acting on his
urges, but “when combined, [respondent’s] antisocial personality disorder basically drives the
pedophilia” by reducing his inhibition to act on his sexual urges and “natural disregard” for the
rights of others.
¶ 24 Dees also concluded that respondent’s disorders make him substantially probable to engage
in future acts of sexual violence. Respondent’s scores on the Static-99R and Static-2002R fell
within the “average” risk categories, but underestimated respondent’s risk because there are
“many, many, many sex offenses that go undetected.” In addition, six empirical risk factors
increase respondent’s overall risk: (1) significant social influences, (2) impulsivity, (3) poor
problem-solving skills, (4) negative emotionality, (5) deviate sexual arousal, and (6) lack of
cooperation with supervision. On cross-examination, Dees conceded that she had previously erred
when calculating respondent’s scores on the Static-99R but affirmed that he scored within the
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“average” risk category when the errors were corrected. Specifically, she erred by adding a point
for respondent not living with a significant other for two years even though that issue was
unknown. Dees also underscored respondent’s prior sex offenses as two points instead of three
points.
¶ 25 Dees opined that age was the only protective factor that applied to respondent, but that it
did not further mitigate his risk of reoffending because it was accounted for in the actuarial scores.
Based on all this information, Dees concluded to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty
that respondent is substantially probable, or “much more likely than not,” to engage in future acts
¶ 26 Respondent presented Dr. Nicolai’s opinion that respondent is not an SVP because he does
not suffer from a mental disorder that is a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional
or volitional capacity predisposing him to engage in acts of sexual violence. According to Nicolai,
although respondent performed oral sex more than 87 times on boys between the ages of 11 and
13 years old between 1992 and 1993, he does not suffer from pedophilic disorder because his
offenses were “very dissimilar” and thus revealed no “pattern of sexually offending against
prepubescent boys.” Moreover, it was “too difficult” to diagnose respondent with pedophilic
disorder, sexually attracted to males, because the boys told each other to go to respondent’s house
and, consequently, she “couldn’t definitively say that [respondent] was seeking out this, like as a
sexual preference.” Nicolai conceded, however, that it “certainly would change [her] mind” if she
learned that respondent had stated as recently as 2021 that he still masturbates to thoughts of
children, and that respondent told Stanislaus in 2021 that he still at that time had erotic thoughts
about “young boys.” Finally, Nicolai did not diagnose respondent with paraphilic disorder,
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sexually aroused by force, because respondent did not use force during any of the offenses between
1990 and 1993.
¶ 27 As for respondent’s risk of reoffending, Nicolai scored respondent in the “average” risk
categories on both the Static-99R and Static-2002R. Although she considered dynamic risk factors
that would increase respondent’s risk, she never explained the factors she considered or why they
did not elevate respondent’s risk. Nicolai found no protective factors that mitigated respondent’s
risk. Ultimately, she noted that respondent would need to engage in sex offender treatment for him
to meaningfully change his behaviors.
¶ 28 The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent is an SVP.
¶ 29 Respondent moved for a new trial on various grounds, including, as relevant here, that (1)
the State failed to prove respondent is an SVP beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court
erred in overruling respondent’s objection to the prosecutor’s statement that counsel did not want
the jury to “get taken in by the idea that these young boys were somehow complicit” in
respondent’s offenses. The trial court denied the motion.
¶ 30 Following a dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered respondent’s commitment to
secure care.
¶ 31 Respondent appealed.
¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 34 Respondent argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is an
SVP. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove that he currently suffers from a mental
disorder that makes it substantially probable that he will engage in future acts of sexual violence
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because the State failed to prove any causal link between his mental disorder and his likelihood to
reoffend. Furthermore, even if a causal link exists between his mental disorder and his likelihood
to reoffend, it does not rise to a substantial probability.
¶ 35 “When reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, [the court]
consider[s] whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier
of fact could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Commitment of Fields,
2014 IL 115542, ¶ 20. A reviewing court will not reverse a jury’s SVP finding unless the evidence
is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it leaves a reasonable doubt, for “[i]t is not the role of the
reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact regarding the credibility of
the witnesses or the weight to be given the evidence.” In re Detention of White, 2016 IL App (1st)
151187, ¶ 56.
¶ 36 The trial evidence sufficed to prove that respondent is an SVP. To prove that respondent
is an SVP, the State was required to prove that “(1) respondent was convicted of a sexually violent
offense, (2) he has a mental disorder, and (3) the mental disorder makes it substantially probable
that he will engage in acts of sexual violence.” Fields, 2014 IL 115542, ¶ 20; 725 ILCS 207/5(f)
(West 2022).
¶ 37 It is undisputed that respondent was convicted of a sexually violent offense, and he
concedes that he suffers from a qualifying mental disorder. Respondent’s sole contention that the
evidence was insufficient to show the third element beyond a reasonable doubt fails because both
Drs. Stanislaus and Dees performed a comprehensive sex offender risk assessment—weighing
respondent’s actuarial scores, the dynamic risk factors elevating his risk, and the absence of
protective factors that might mitigate risk, including his failure to complete sex offender
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treatment—and concluded that respondent is substantially probable to commit future acts of sexual
violence. Viewing that expert evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable juror
could find that the State proved this element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Fields, 2014 IL
115542, ¶ 20; In re Commitment of Stevens, 345 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1063 (2004) (evidence sufficed
to show that respondent was substantially probable to reoffend where the State’s experts reached
a conclusion based on clinical diagnoses and actuarial instruments); White, 2016 IL App (1st)
151187, ¶¶ 54-64 (same where the defense expert disagreed with two State experts who testified
that respondent was substantially probable to sexually reoffend).
¶ 38 Drs. Stanislaus and Dees each scored respondent in the “average” risk category on the
Static-99R, and Dees also scored him in the “average” risk category on the Static-2002R. But
neither expert relied solely on the actuarial scores in reaching their professional opinions. Rather,
Dees explained that the actuarial tools underestimate respondent’s risk of sexually reoffending
because they fail to capture offenses that do not result in legal action, and both experts testified
that respondent’s risk of sexually reoffending was elevated by multiple dynamic risk factors.
¶ 39 For instance, both experts testified that respondent’s dynamic risk factors included
impulsivity, problems with supervision, and negative emotionality. Stanislaus determined that
respondent also exhibited dynamic risk factors for sexual preference for children, offensive
supportive attitudes, lack of emotionally intimate relationships with adults, and lack of self-
regulation skills; and Dees found that respondent’s additional risk factors included his lack of any
positive relationships with others, poor problem-solving skills, and deviate sexual arousal.
Moreover, neither expert found any protective factors that would further reduce respondent’s risk.
Accordingly, based on respondent’s actuarial scores, dynamic risk factors, and lack of protective
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factors, both experts testified to their opinions that respondent is substantially probable to commit
future acts of sexual violence. In sum, when properly viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, the State’s expert testimony sufficed to establish that respondent is substantially likely to
sexually reoffend, and respondent’s sufficiency claim fails.
¶ 40 Respondent argues that the evidence is insufficient because the State’s experts “failed to
link” respondent’s mental disorder “with a substantial probability that he would reoffend.” This
argument lacks merit. As this court has repeatedly held, the Act “do[es] not require any specific,
precise, or exact testimony to find that an expert sufficiently made the connection between
respondent’s mental condition and risk of reoffense.” In re Commitment of Montanez, 2020 IL
App (1st) 182239, ¶ 76; see, e.g., In re Commitment of Montilla, 2022 IL App (1st) 200913, ¶ 120;
In re Commitment of Evans, 2021 IL App (1st) 192290, ¶¶ 68-72; In re Commitment of Moody,
2020 IL App (1st) 190565, ¶ 64; In re Commitment of Gavin, 2019 IL App (1st) 180881, ¶¶ 45,
50. Rather, the evidence sufficed because both experts “testified about the requirements of the
SVP Act and concluded that [respondent] met them. They also opined that his mental disorder
makes him substantially probable to engage in acts of sexual violence.” Evans, 2021 IL App (1st)
192293, ¶ 72. Accordingly, “[a]s in Gavin, Montanez, and Moody, the experts’ testimony, when
viewed in context, plainly linked [respondent]’s substantial probability to reoffend to his mental
disorder[s].” Id.
¶ 41 More specifically, both Drs. Stanislaus and Dees explained that respondent’s pedophilic
disorder makes him substantially probable to reoffend. Stanislaus opined that respondent’s
pedophilic disorder affects his capacity to control his sexual behavior and predisposes him to
commit acts of sexual violence, as indicated by his continued molestation of children even after
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he was convicted for violently raping an 11-year-old boy. Dees similarly linked respondent’s
likelihood to reoffend to his pedophilic and antisocial personality disorders, concluding that, when
combined, the disorders reduce his inhibition to act on his sexual urges. Both experts also testified
that pedophilic disorder is a lifelong condition from which respondent continues to suffer; indeed,
respondent told Stanislaus as recently as 2021 that he continues to have erotic thoughts about
young boys. Dees further explained that respondent’s pedophilic disorder will continue to result
in sexual urges towards children unless he participates in treatment, which respondent had not
done. Based on all of this, both doctors opined that respondent’s mental disorders predispose him
to engage in future acts of sexual violence and make him substantially probable to sexually
reoffend.
¶ 42 Based on this testimony, we conclude that a rational factfinder could find that respondent’s
mental disorders make him substantially likely to reoffend and, thus, respondent’s sufficiency of
the evidence claim fails. See, e.g., Evans, 2021 IL App (1st) 192293, ¶¶ 19, 21, 29, 72 (rejecting
argument that experts failed to connect mental disorder to risk where experts testified that the
respondent had a qualifying “mental disorder that predisposes him to engage in acts of sexual
violence” and that the respondent was “substantially probable” to “commit future acts of sexual
violence”); Montanez, 2020 IL App (1st) 182239, ¶¶ 74-76 (expert who “identified that respondent
was ‘substantially probable’ to reoffend” and opined that respondent was “dangerous” and
predisposed to continue to engage in acts of sexual violence sufficiently “bridge[d] the connection
between” his risk of reoffending and his mental disorders).
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¶ 43 B. Closing Argument
¶ 44 Respondent argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing
arguments by bolstering and vouching for its expert witnesses, stating personal opinions, and
arguing facts of respondent’s sex crimes as substantive evidence.
¶ 45 This court applies an abuse of discretion standard to determining the propriety of a
prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument but reviews de novo whether any improper
comments denied respondent a fair trial. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 121 (2007); see also
People v. Cook, 2018 IL App (1st) 142134, ¶¶ 63-64 (reiterating the bifurcated standard of review
for comments in closing arguments). Whether a claim is forfeited presents a question of law, which
is reviewed de novo. People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 19.
¶ 46 Before either side presented closing arguments, the trial court provided the following
instruction:
“What the attorneys say in arguments is not evidence and should not be considered
by you as evidence. If an attorney makes a statement that is not based on the evidence or
a reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, you should disregard the statement.”
And, during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, the court reiterated that “what the lawyers say
during arguments is not evidence.”
¶ 47 During closing arguments, the prosecutor explained that the State was required to prove
three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) respondent had a qualifying sexually violent
offense, (2) respondent suffers from a qualifying mental disorder, and (3) respondent is
substantially probable to commit future acts of sexual violence. The prosecutor asserted that the
first element “is not up for debate” because both parties stipulated that respondent had been
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convicted of four different qualifying offenses. The prosecutor similarly asserted that the second
element “shouldn’t really be up for debate after the testimony [the jury] heard” because two
doctors testified that respondent suffers from pedophilic disorder and antisocial personality
disorder. The prosecutor argued that both doctors testified “openly and honestly to explain”
“everything they considered as to how they determined their opinions.” The prosecutor noted that
the experts “acknowledged the limits” of their testimony when such limits existed and the jurors
“could be confident in the truth of what [the experts] told” them. Respondent did not object to any
of these statements.
¶ 48 The prosecutor also noted the testimony of Drs. Stanislaus and Dees that respondent
repeatedly lured young boys between the ages of 9 and 13 years old with force, money, and food—
despite knowing that he could face prison for his offenses—because he “saw himself as helping
these boys” and “he got some enjoyment out of it.” The prosecutor stated that both doctors saw a
pattern and thought that the jury could see the pattern, too. Respondent did not object to any of
these statements.
¶ 49 The prosecutor argued that the jury should not “get taken in by the idea that these young
boys were somehow complicit” in respondent’s behavior, to which respondent objected but was
overruled. The prosecutor further conceded that Dr. Nicolai is a “qualified expert,” but argued that
she “got it wrong” when she concluded that respondent is not an SVP and told the jury “with a
straight face that the respondent did not have a mental disorder” despite his numerous offenses
against young boys. The prosecutor stated that, considering the State’s evidence, she thought the
State had clearly proven the second criteria, to which respondent did not object. When the
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prosecutor stated that if the jury was determined to credit Dr. Nicolai’s testimony, “there is nothing
that I can say here to convince you otherwise,” respondent objected but was overruled.
¶ 50 As for the third element—whether respondent is substantially probable to commit future
acts of sexual violence—the prosecutor argued that Stanislaus and Dees both assessed
respondent’s risk of reoffending and told the jury “honestly about any mistakes or errors they had
made in their calculations,” but noted that these mistakes did not alter either doctor’s conclusions.
The prosecutor noted that both doctors applied actuarial instruments and analyzed respondent’s
dynamic and protective risk factors. The prosecutor emphasized the doctors’ testimony that
respondent lacked any protective factors and scored in the average risk range to reoffend. The
prosecutor also compared Stanislaus’s testimony that respondent was in the 79th percentile to
reoffend to the methods by which doctors assess a child’s physical development, explaining that
“those of you who have kids” know that if a child’s head size is in the “eightieth percentile” then
“your kid’s head is really big.” Respondent did not object to this comparison.
¶ 51 During rebuttal, the prosecutor discussed respondent’s risk of reoffending and explained
that respondent’s use of a wheelchair could make him more dangerous because he appears
“disarming” to parents and children. Respondent did not object to this characterization, either.
¶ 52 Respondent’s counsel, by contrast, argued that none of the doctors were “biased” but
merely reached different conclusions about respondent’s risk of reoffending. Counsel stated that
Stanislaus showed “honesty” by conceding that she changed her actuarial score, but argued that
this change “may show that [she] got it wrong before” and that “it’s not easy” for the doctors to
reach their conclusions. Counsel also emphasized that the doctors considered “things that
happened a long time ago” and stated that “[he has] a problem with” the fact that doctors look at
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incidents that do not result in charges or sentences. Counsel noted that Nicolai determined that
respondent did not qualify as an SVP and argued that “given what [the jury] heard”—including the
fact that the experts “are in conflict with each other”—respondent “is not substantially likely to
reoffend” and the State had not carried its burden.
¶ 53 Respondent challenges the following comments made during the State’s closing argument:
(1) that the experts testified “openly and honestly,” the jury “could be confident in
the truth of what they told [the jury] on the stand,” and that the jury could be “confident in
the truth” of what the experts said;
(2) the prosecutor’s statement that “[She] do[esn’t] think that” whether respondent
is substantially probable to reoffend “is up for debate”;
(3) that the prosecutor did not “think [the jury] need[s] a degree. [She] think[s] you
can see the pattern as well”;
(4) that if the jury did not believe Stanislaus and Dees, “there is nothing that I can
say here to convince you otherwise”;
(5) that the prosecutor “think[s] the People have clearly proven the second criteria”;
(6) that the prosecutor “do[esn’t] want you for one moment to get taken in by the
idea that these young boys were somehow complicit in this behavior”;
(7) the prosecutor’s invocation of the jurors’ children when explaining respondent’s
risk of reoffending; and
(8) the prosecutor’s reference to respondent’s medical condition and stating that it
will decrease parents’ inhibitions and allow him to prey on children more effectively
because he does not seem like a threat.
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¶ 54 Respondent has preserved only claim 6 for review and forfeited his remaining claims by
failing to both contemporaneously object when the challenged statements were made at trial and
include them in his posttrial motion. As respondent concedes, “to properly preserve an issue for
appeal, a party must both make a contemporaneous objection and raise the issue in a posttrial
motion.” (Emphasis added.) Jackson v. Seib, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1076 (2007). “A party’s failure
to make a contemporaneous objection” to closing arguments “result[s] in forfeiture of the issue.”
Vanderhoof v. Berk, 2015 IL App (1st) 132927, ¶ 94; accord Babikian v. Mruz, 2011 IL App (1st)
102579, ¶ 13. Likewise, “[t]he law is well established that in order to preserve an issue for appeal,
the party must” raise it in “a written posttrial motion.” Fields, 2012 IL App (1st) 112191, ¶ 53;
accord In re Detention of Melcher, 2013 IL App (1st) 123085, ¶ 65 (respondent forfeited his claim
because he failed to raise it in his posttrial motion). Thus, because respondent failed to
contemporaneously object to seven of the eight remarks at trial and challenge them in his posttrial
motion, those seven claims (i.e., claims 1-5 and 7-8) are forfeited.
¶ 55 Respondent argues that this court should excuse his forfeiture under the plain-error doctrine
because the evidence concerning whether he met the criteria of an SVP was closely balanced. This
court has applied the criminal plain-error doctrine to SVP proceedings, despite their civil nature.
See In re Commitment of Curtner, 2012 IL App (4th) 110820, ¶ 26. The plain-error rule allows
courts to review a forfeited error if the error falls under one of two alternative prongs:
“ ‘(1) when a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that
the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the
seriousness of the error, or (2) when a clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so
serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of
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the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.’ ” People v. Johnson, 2024
IL 130191, ¶ 43 (quoting People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 20).
“Under both prongs, the burden remains with the [respondent] to persuade the court to excuse the
forfeiture.” Id. “Our first step in plain error review is to determine whether any error occurred at all.”
People v. Sullivan, 2014 IL App (3d) 120312, ¶ 26. Reviewing courts are to consider the whole
closing argument, rather than focusing on selected phrases or remarks, in determining whether
there was prejudicial error. People v. Lewis, 2017 IL App (4th) 150124, ¶ 67; see People v.
Quezada, 2024 IL 128805, ¶ 57 (“appropriate way to address unpreserved errors in a cumulative
error claim is to determine whether the aggregate effect of those errors rises to the level of plain
error”).
¶ 56 Regarding respondent’s forfeited challenges to the prosecutor’s statements, we find that no
error occurred. First, respondent argues that the prosecutor improperly engaged in bolstering and
vouching for the State’s expert witnesses. It is improper for a prosecutor to personally vouch for a
witness’s credibility or express a personal opinion. People v. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d 411, 434 (1987).
However, a prosecutor may comment on a witness’s credibility (People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d
322, 356 (1988)), and challenge a defendant’s credibility and defense theory when such remarks
are based on facts in evidence or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. People v. Hudson, 157
Ill. 2d 401, 444 (1993).
¶ 57 Viewing the challenged statements in context, we conclude that the prosecutor was not
improperly offering a personal opinion on the truth of a witness’s statement. Rather, the prosecutor
was arguing that Drs. Stanislaus and Dees testified credibly despite making certain errors in their
calculations of respondent’s risk to reoffend because they honestly acknowledged the mistakes
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they had made in their calculations and had reviewed their evaluations of respondent so they could
be confident in the truth of their testimony. Contrary to respondent’s argument on appeal, the
prosecutor’s challenged statements did not leave the impression that the prosecutor knew the
evidence better than the jury and therefore the jury should trust the prosecutor’s judgment rather
than its own. See People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 122745, ¶ 20 (“courts should use a
commonsense approach to determine whether the statements convey to a reasonable juror that the
prosecutor believes that a witness is credible based on the prosecutor’s personal knowledge, other
information not contained in record, or that the testimony is credible because it has the approval
of the government”).
¶ 58 Next, respondent argues that the prosecutor repeatedly inserted her personal opinion during
closing argument by couching her arguments with the term “I,” and thereby improperly aligned
herself with the jurors and told them that she personally believed Drs. Stanislaus and Dees and
specifically disbelieved respondent’s expert Dr. Nicolai. We reject respondent’s characterization
of the prosecutor’s comments about the State meeting its burden to prove the three elements to
establish that respondent is an SVP as the insertion of the prosecutor’s personal opinion. Instead,
we conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks were fair comments on the evidence. See People v.
Baker, 195 Ill. App. 3d 785, 788 (1990), overruled on other grounds, People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d
550, 556 (1997) (“[w]hile it might be good practice for prosecutors to refrain in argument from
using sentences beginning with, ‘I believe’ or ‘I think,’ we reject defendant’s argument that any
time a prosecutor does so error results”).
¶ 59 Respondent also argues that the prosecutor attempted to inflame the emotions of the jury
and scare it into deciding that respondent is an SVP by using the jurors’ children as a comparison
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to sex offenders and by referencing how respondent’s medical issues made him more dangerous.
We disagree. In context, the prosecutor was explaining the relevance of respondent’s percentile
rank based on the experts’ testimonies regarding the rate on reoffending. Moreover, in rebuttal, the
prosecutor stated that the doctors had considered respondent’s medical condition and concluded
that it was not a protective factor and could make respondent more dangerous by appearing
disarming in a wheelchair, particularly where he had groomed and preyed on children under the
guise of tutoring them. This argument was based on facts in evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom.
¶ 60 Nevertheless, even if respondent’s unpreserved claims did amount to clear or obvious error,
they are not susceptible to review as first-prong plain error because the evidence at trial was not
so closely balanced that the “verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence.”
People v. Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 57. The “ ‘totality of the evidence’ ” and “ ‘a qualitative,
commonsense assessment of [all the evidence] within the context of th[is] case’ ” (People v. Logan,
2024 IL 129054, ¶ 71), establishes that the evidence proving that respondent is an SVP was
overwhelming and not closely balanced.
¶ 61 It is undisputed that respondent has four separate convictions for criminal sexual assault,
each a qualifying sexually violent offense under the Act. And two experts opined that respondent
suffers from multiple mental disorders that make him substantially probable to engage in future
acts of sexual violence. In reaching their conclusions, both experts considered respondent’s
repeated violations of parole conditions and institutional rules, and his extensive history of
committing sexual offenses, including five convictions for sexual misconduct against young boys.
The experts concluded that respondent suffers from multiple mental disorders, characterized by a
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deviant sexual interest in children and inability to control his sexual urges, and that these disorders
make respondent substantially probable to sexually reoffend. Respondent’s disorders require sex
offender treatment, but respondent had engaged in no treatment to mitigate his substantial risk of
reoffense. To the contrary, respondent continued to be aroused by thoughts of young boys and
masturbated to those thoughts in 2021. In short, the State presented compelling evidence that
respondent is an SVP.
¶ 62 Dr. Nicolai’s contrary opinion does not undermine the strength of the evidence proving
that respondent is an SVP. Nicolai’s opinion that respondent did not suffer from pedophilic
disorder was not credible on its face because it was based on her purported inability to “identify a
pattern of sexually offending against prepubescent boys” despite her recognition that respondent
performed oral sex on boys between the ages of 11 and 13 years old more than 87 times. Moreover,
Nicolai neither interviewed respondent nor considered that he told Stanislaus in 2021 that he
masturbates to thoughts of children. In addition, Nicolai conceded that her opinion might have
been different had she known of respondent’s admission to Stanislaus. Finally, like the State’s
experts, Nicolai scored respondent in the “average” risk category to reoffend and opined that he
needed sex offender treatment to meaningfully change his behaviors, but she did not explain to the
jury why dynamic risk factors—which she considered—did not increase his risk. Nicolai’s
testimony did not refute the strong evidence proving that respondent is an SVP.
¶ 63 Accordingly, respondent fails to meet his burden to prove that the evidence was so closely
balanced that the alleged errors alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against him, regardless
of the seriousness of the errors. Because respondent has not shown that the alleged errors are
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susceptible to plain-error review, we hold him to his forfeiture of his claims concerning the
prosecutor’s arguments in claims 1-5 and 7-8.
¶ 64 Respondent’s sole preserved claim—challenging the prosecutor’s statement that she did
not want the jury to get “taken in by the idea that these young boys were complicit”—fails because
the statement was neither erroneous nor substantially prejudicial.
¶ 65 Challenged comments “must be considered in context of the entire closing arguments made
by both parties.” In re Commitment of Butler, 2013 IL App (1st) 113606, ¶ 30. Reversal is reserved
for rare cases where “the comments were of such magnitude that they resulted in substantial
prejudice to the respondent and constituted a material factor in the verdict.” In re Commitment of
Tenorio, 2020 IL App (1st) 182608, ¶ 42.
¶ 66 Counsel’s statement that he “d[oes] not want [the jury] for one moment to get taken in by
the idea that these young boys were somehow complicit in this behavior” was not improper because
it reasonably commented on the evidence adduced at trial, specifically, the evidence that some of
respondent’s victims willingly went to respondent’s house to receive money and food.
¶ 67 “A prosecutor has wide latitude in making a closing argument” and “may comment on the
evidence and any fair, reasonable inferences it yields.” People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121
(2005). Closing arguments must be viewed in their “entirety” and “challenged remarks must be
viewed in their context.” Id.; see In re Commitment of Kelley, 2012 IL App (1st) 110240, ¶ 42
(When courts “review a challenge to remarks made by the prosecution during closing arguments,
the comments must be considered in [the] context of the entire closing arguments made by both
parties.”). Here, respondent’s own expert testified that she did not diagnose respondent with
pedophilic disorder because respondent’s victims voluntarily went to his house and, consequently,
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she could not be sure that the victims were not “seeking [ ] out” respondent’s sexual advances. It
was within the wide latitude afforded to counsel to respond to Dr. Nicolai’s characterization of
respondent’s acts. Kelley, 2012 IL App (1st) 110240, ¶ 42 (“[T]he prosecution may comment upon
*** the defense characterizations of the evidence or case”).
¶ 68 Moreover, the context in which the statement was made further demonstrates that it was
intended to address Nicolai’s testimony that respondent had not preyed on his victims. Shortly
before the challenged statement, the prosecutor emphasized that respondent “chose certain
occupations that drew him into close contact” with his victims and that he “saw himself as helping
these boys.” Immediately after stating that the jury should not get taken in by the idea that the boys
were complicit, the prosecutor noted that respondent “figured he could bring his victims to him”
by “putting these boys on the payroll, having them show up on the first of the month for their $11
and buying them pizza” in order to “continue to bring them into his reach.” Thus, the challenged
statement, in conjunction with the surrounding statements, appropriately commented on the
evidence and was not erroneous.
¶ 69 Nevertheless, even if respondent could establish that the prosecutor’s remark was
improper, respondent is not entitled to a new trial because he cannot show substantial prejudice. In
re Commitment of Gavin, 2014 IL App (1st) 122918, ¶ 69 (applying substantial prejudice standard
in fair-trial claim). Respondent cannot carry that heavy burden because he cannot show that it “is
impossible to discern whether the verdict was based on the evidence or the improper remarks.” Id.
¶ 70 First, the trial court’s jury instructions mitigated any potential prejudice that could have
resulted from the prosecutor’s closing arguments. The court’s repeated admonishments that
closing arguments were not evidence “protect [respondent] against any prejudice caused by
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improper comments made during closing arguments” (People v. Boston, 2018 IL App (1st)
140369, ¶ 103), because the jury presumptively followed those instructions (see People v.
Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 49 (“Absent some indication to the contrary, we must presume that
jurors follow the law as set forth in the instructions given them.”)). Respondent has offered no
basis to conclude that the jury failed to follow the trial court’s repeated admonishments such that
he could have been prejudiced by the allegedly improper remark.
¶ 71 Moreover, the jury heard ample evidence that respondent has a qualifying mental disorder
that makes him substantially probable to sexually reoffend, and any error in the closing remarks
had no bearing on the jury’s verdict. See Butler, 2013 IL App (1st) 113606, ¶¶ 7, 38 (where experts
determined that respondent was an SVP, the prosecutor’s closing remarks, “even if error,” were
not of “such magnitude that they resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant and constituted a
material factor” in the jury’s verdict); Kelley, 2012 IL App (1st) 110240, ¶¶ 6-28, 47 (where two
experts opined that respondent was an SVP, any improper comments during closing arguments did
not prejudice defendant). Considering the overwhelming evidence that respondent is an SVP,
respondent has failed to show that it is “impossible” (People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 549-50
(2000)), to know whether the jury based its verdict on the single allegedly improper remark during
closing arguments.
¶ 72 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 73 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 74 Affirmed.
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