2026 IL App (1st) 242487-U
No. 1-24-2487
FIFTH DIVISION January 16, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________
IN RE COMMITMENT OF MICHAEL CROCKER ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Cook County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) No. 21CR8000001 v. ) ) ) MICHAEL CROCKER, ) Honorable ) Lakshmi Jha, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm respondent’s civil commitment as a sexually violent person where the evidence at trial supported the finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 1-24-2487
¶2 Following a jury trial, respondent Michael Crocker was found to be a sexually violent
person (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.
(West 2018)) (SVP Act). Later, following a dispositional hearing, he was committed to the
Department of Human Services (DHS) for secure treatment. Crocker appeals and argues that the
evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an SVP because the
State failed to prove he has a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable he will engage
in future acts of sexual violence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Crocker was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault that occurred in 1997. Near
the end of his prison term in 2021, the State petitioned the court to commit him as an SVP.
Following a hearing on the petition, the circuit court found probable cause to believe that
Crocker was an SVP and ordered that he be detained in the DHS Treatment and Detention
Facility (TDF) pending trial.
¶5 The State’s petition against Crocker proceeded to a jury trial in June 2023. To show that
Crocker had been convicted of a sexually violent offense, the State submitted a certified record
of his conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault. To show that Crocker suffers from a
mental disorder that makes it substantially probable he will engage inacts of sexual violence, the
State presented the testimony of Dr. Richard Travis and Dr. Vasiliki Tsoflias, clinical
psychologists and experts in sex offender evaluation, diagnosis, and risk assessment. Both
experts prepared written reports, which were admitted into evidence at trial.
¶6 Both Dr. Travis and Dr. Tsoflias opined that Crocker is an SVP because he suffers from a
mental disorder that makes it substantially probable he will engage in acts of sexual violence. In
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reaching this conclusion, both experts reviewed and relied on information regarding Crocker’s
behavior contained in, among other things, his Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) master
file, including court records and police reports; his medical and disciplinary records from his
time in IDOC and DHS custody; additional records from the TDF; and reports from Dr. John
Fabian, a clinical psychologist and Crocker’s expert witness. Neither Dr. Travis nor Dr. Tsoflias
interviewed Crocker.
¶7 Dr. Richard Travis testified that he was expert in clinical psychology as to SVP
evaluation, risk assessment, and diagnosis. As a clinical psychologist, he specialized in treating
and evaluating sex offenders for the past twenty-four years. Dr. Travis met Crocker one time, but
Crocker declined to be interviewed. In forming his opinion, Dr. Travis relied upon Crocker’s
behavior as reflected in the records that he reviewed, including his criminal history, police
reports, IDOC records, past evaluations, TDF treatment records, and health and behavioral
records.
¶8 Dr. Travis also reviewed Crocker’s criminal history. He first looked at Crocker’s case
from May 1988. Dr. Travis explained that Crocker used a ladder to climb into a 14-year-old
girl’s upstairs bedroom window but ran away when confronted by the girl’s father. Crocker was
convicted of two counts of attempt residential burglary and was sentenced to seven years in
prison.
¶9 He next reviewed Crocker’s case from June 30, 1988. On that day, at approximately 2
a.m., Crocker climbed through a window into a 17-year-old girl’s room, where he pulled the
girl’s hair, threw her to the ground, and grabbed her breasts. When she screamed, he fled through
the window. Later that same morning, Crocker was interrupted while attempting to break into
another home. He ran away when a man inside screamed. Later that morning, Crocker climbed
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into the bedroom of a 24-year-old woman, put his hand over her mouth to stop her from
screaming, then rubbed her vagina through her underwear. When the woman screamed, Crocker
ran out of her room, but he was caught by the police as he left the house. Eight days later, while
awaiting trial on those offenses, Crocker climbed into the window of a 14-year-old girl’s
bedroom and rubbed her leg while she was sleeping. When the girl woke up and asked what he
was doing there, Crocker answered, “It’s okay. It’s okay. I’m Mike Crocker,” indicating that she
knew him from the neighborhood. He then made the girl undress, bit her breasts, and forced her
to have intercourse before leaving out of the window.
¶ 10 For assaulting the 17-year-old girl in her bedroom, he was charged with a number of
sexual offenses, as well as residential burglary and home invasion. He eventually pled guilty to
home invasion and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. For his unsuccessful attempt to break
into the second home, Crocker was convicted of attempted residential burglary and sentenced to
seven years in prison. For assaulting the 24-year-old woman, Crocker was charged with
attempted criminal sexual assault, attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, residential
burglary, and home invasion, and he pled guilty to home invasion and was sentenced to 15 years
in prison. For his assault of the 14-year-old girl, Crocker was charged with criminal sexual
assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, residential
burglary, and home invasion. He pled guilty to home invasion and was sentenced to 15 years in
¶ 11 Crocker was released on parole in September 1995. In January 1996, while on parole,
Crocker sexually assaulted a woman in an alley after the woman tripped while walking to a bus
stop. Crocker initially grabbed the woman, but she ran to a passerby for help. When he caught up
to the woman, Crocker told the passerby not to pay attention to her, claiming that she was his
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girlfriend and was drunk. Crocker then dragged the woman into an alley, pushed her to the
ground, slapped her face, and pulled off her pants and underwear. When the woman resisted his
efforts to force her legs apart, Crocker pushed her knees up to her chest and sexually assaulted
her. When the woman tried to stand up and escape, Crocker knocked her down and sexually
assaulted her a second time. In the meantime, the passerby had called the police, who arrived to
find Crocker on top of the woman. Crocker was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal
sexual assault and was sentenced to 50 years in prison.
¶ 12 Dr. Travis also considered Crocker’s statements regarding his offenses. As to the May
1988 offense, where he was caught trying to climb into the 14-year-old girl’s bedroom, Crocker
claimed that he was only trying to steal money. Regarding the June 1988 offense, Crocker denied
assaulting the 17-year-old girl and initially claimed he broke into the home to steal “jewelry or
small electronics” but fled when the girl started screaming. He then asserted that he had not been
there at all, that he had not even been in the area on that day, and that the police were attempting
to “arrest [him] for some burglaries that were impossible for [him] to commit.” With respect to
the assault of the 24-year-old woman that same day, Crocker admitted he broke into the home
but said he was trying to use the phone and claimed he had not seen any women in the house. He
also told evaluators that the intercourse with his 14-year-old victim could not have been forced
because she knew him and did not scream for help. Finally, regarding his January 1996 offense
in the alley, Crocker initially claimed that he did not sexually assault the victim but later claimed
that they had consensual intercourse.
¶ 13 Dr. Travis reported that Crocker did not engage in any sex offender treatment in the
IDOC and “continued to maintain that he never committed any sexual offenses,” and “didn’t
need any sexual offense treatment.” Dr. Travis confirmed that Crocker was housed at the TDF.
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¶ 14 Based on this information, Dr. Travis diagnosed Crocker with (1) other specified
paraphilic disorder (OSPD), sexual coercion of nonconsenting females; (2) antisocial personality
disorder; (3) substance abuse disorder, alcohol use disorder; and (4) substance abuse disorder,
stimulant use disorder, specific to cocaine. Dr. Travis explained that he diagnosed Crocker with
each of these disorders by determining that Crocker’s “patterns of behavior” satisfied the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) criteria for each
disorder. Crocker satisfied the diagnostic criteria for paraphilic disorder because he not only
exhibited “recurrent kinds of urges and fantasies and arousal about forcing women to do things
that they don’t want to do sexually,” but also repeatedly acted on those thoughts and urges, as
evident from his assaults of three nonconsenting women in 1988. Dr. Travis found that Crocker
further demonstrated his inability to control his deviant sexual urges when he dragged the
woman into an alley and sexually assaulted her just four months after he was released on parole
even though a witness was present to observe his assault. Dr. Travis opined that Crocker’s
paraphilic disorder is a qualifying mental disorder under the SVP Act because it is a congenital
condition that “predisposes [Crocker] to engage in sexually violent acts” by causing him to think
about and want to commit acts of sexual violence against nonconsenting women. Dr. Travis
stated that despite his imprisonment, Crocker continues to suffer from paraphilic disorder
because a person’s “sexual arousal patterns and sexual interests” are formed by his mid-twenties,
because they become “so engrained in him at that point that he has no control over it.” Dr. Travis
noted that Crocker had not engaged in any treatment to address his inability to control his deviant
sexual urges.
¶ 15 Dr. Travis explained that Crocker also satisfied the diagnostic criteria for antisocial
personality disorder because he exhibited the requisite patterns of “thinking, believing, and
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acting that involves violating other people’s boundaries” without regard to their desires or
feelings. The diagnostic criteria also includes a pattern of violating rules, deceitfulness,
irresponsibility, impulsivity, reckless disregard for the safety of others, aggression, and lack of
remorse which Crocker displayed by continuously changing his accounts of his offenses, and
refusing to take accountability for his behavior or address his urges but rather “continuing to
deny that he hurt any of these women.” Crocker also exhibited irresponsibility and lack of
remorse. Dr. Travis explained that antisocial personality disorder is a qualifying mental disorder
under the SVP Act because it is a congenital or acquired condition which prompts Crocker to
“just take what he wants” from women sexually and “make[s] him likely to continue in this kind
of behavior.”
¶ 16 Finally, Dr. Travis diagnosed Crocker with substance abuse disorders based on his
longstanding alcohol and cocaine use, which “drove him to burglarize” to “feed his habit” and
contribute to his violent outbursts. Dr. Travis found that there was a connection between
Crocker’s abuse of alcohol and his sexual violence, because Crocker reported that his alcohol use
prompted him to become violent with his girlfriend when he was 17 years old, and that although
he knew drinking “was a problem for him,” he could not control it. Crocker also admitted that
he was drunk when he sexually assaulted the woman in the alley in 1996. Although Dr. Travis
noted that there was no evidence that Crocker was using alcohol or other substances in prison,
which is a controlled environment, he stated that Crocker had been unable to abstain from
substance use for more than a week while out of prison on parole and had continued abusing
substances in violation of his parole conditions. Dr. Travis explained that Crocker’s substance
abuse disorders are qualifying mental disorders under the SVP Act because they are congenital
or acquired conditions which predispose him to commit future acts of sexual violence by
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“disinhibit[ing] his behavior” and reducing his ability to refrain from acting on his deviant sexual
impulses.
¶ 17 Dr. Travis performed a risk assessment to assess Crocker’s likelihood of sexually
reoffending. He used two actuarial instruments, the Static-99R and Static-2002R, to determine
Crocker’s baseline risk using his historical factors. Dr. Travis also analyzed the effect of
dynamic risk factors, which change over time and can increase or decrease risk above or below
the actuarial baseline. Crocker’s score of six on the Static-99R was higher than the scores of
92.4% of all sex offenders and placed him in the highest risk category, at four times more likely
to reoffend than the average sex offender. Crocker received a score of six on the Static-2002R,
which also considers juvenile offending (for which Travis had no records), placing him in the
second highest risk category, at three times more likely to reoffend than the average sex
offender.
¶ 18 Dr. Travis noted he lacked enough information to identify dynamic risk factors that could
increase Crocker’s risk. However, he confirmed there were no protective factors to mitigate the
risk of sexual reoffending. Crocker had no medical condition or age factor that reduced his risk
below the actuarial baseline, as these were already considered in the scores. Additionally,
Crocker had not undergone any sex offender treatment to lower his risk. Dr. Travis emphasized
the importance of such treatment for repeat “spree” offenders like Crocker, as it helps them
recognize thinking errors and develop strategies to manage future urges. He added that Crocker’s
time in prison did not lessen the risk, as longer sentences correlate with higher recidivism rates.
In conclusion, Dr. Travis stated Crocker’s mental disorders significantly increase the likelihood
of future sexual violence.
¶ 19 Like Dr. Travis, Dr. Tsoflias based his diagnoses on Crocker’s behavioral patterns in the
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1988 and 1996 sexual assaults, medical and treatment history while in IDOC and DHS custody,
and statements to other evaluators and law enforcement personnel. Dr. Tsoflias diagnosed
Crocker with OSPD and paraphilic disorder due to his repeated actions towards nonconsenting
females. Dr. Tsoflias explained that paraphilia is a deviant sexual interest, which becomes a
disorder when it harms others or causes personal distress or relationship issues. Dr. Tsoflias
further testified that OSPD is recognized as a valid diagnosis in Illinois. Crocker’s paraphilia was
classified as a disorder due to numerous harmful sexual acts against nonconsenting females.
Crocker’s behavior rapidly escalated over eight years, starting with nonconsensual frotteurism as
a teenager and escalating in 1988 to breaking into girls’ bedrooms and touching them
inappropriately. His behavior escalated even further to include breaking into a home and sexually
assaulting a young girl who had been asleep in her bed. Shortly after he was released from prison
in 1996, and while he was on parole, Crocker’s behavior escalated again when he sexually
assaulted a woman in an alley in the middle of the day and in front of a witness.
¶ 20 Dr. Tsoflias also diagnosed Crocker with a personality disorder based on his repeated
arrests and convictions, which showed his “failure to conform to social norms,” and his lack of
remorse, evidenced by his tendency to “deny, minimize, or rationalize his offenses.” Crocker
never showed remorse or acknowledged the effect that his actions had on his victims. Dr.
Tsoflias did not diagnose Crocker with antisocial personality disorder because there was
insufficient evidence of such behavior before the age of 15, which is one of the diagnostic
criteria. Dr. Tsoflias agreed, however, that Crocker’s admissions of fighting and “getting into
trouble a lot” indicated he likely engaged in the required antisocial behaviors before age 15.
¶ 21 Dr. Tsoflias stated that Crocker’s paraphilic and personality disorders persist because
these chronic conditions do not resolve without treatment, though they can be managed.
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Crocker’s ability not to reoffend while in prison did not change Dr. Tsoflias’s conclusions
because prison is a controlled environment where Crocker was under constant supervision and
“it’s not uncommon that people act differently in prison than they do in the community.” Dr.
Tsoflias explained that Crocker’s mental disorders limit his capacity to control his behavior and
predispose him to engage in future acts of sexual violence, making it more likely that Crocker
will engage in sexually violent behavior.
¶ 22 Like Dr. Travis, Dr. Tsoflias conducted a risk assessment, using actuarial instruments and
considering dynamic factors that might affect the risk of reoffending. Crocker scored a six on
both the Static-99R and Static-2002R, placing him in the “well above average” risk category. Dr.
Tsoflias identified six additional dynamic risk factors that increase Crocker’s overall risk:
grievance thinking, resistance to rules and supervision, offense-supportive attitude, poor
cognitive problem solving, lack of intimate relationships, and preference for sexual violence. Dr.
Tsoflias noted no protective factors mitigating this risk. Based on his findings, Dr. Tsoflias
concluded that Crocker has a mental disorder making him highly likely to commit another act of
sexual violence.
¶ 23 Crocker called Dr. Fabian as a witness, who was qualified as an expert in clinical and
forensic psychology, specifically the evaluation and risk assessment of sex offenders. To
evaluate whether Crocker qualified as an SVP, Dr. Fabian assessed three criteria: whether
Crocker had been found guilty of a qualifying sexually violent offense; whether he had an
acquired or congenital mental disorder that predisposed him to commit crimes of sexual
violence; and, whether it was probable that he would commit a future act of sexual violence. Dr.
Fabian reviewed the records, including police reports, IDOC prison records, TDF records, and
prior SVP evaluations. Dr. Fabian also interviewed Crocker.
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¶ 24 Dr. Fabian testified that the trauma associated with Crocker’s loss of his father at a young
age could have caused some emotional and behavioral issues in school. Dr. Fabian, however,
confirmed that there were no actual juvenile records, so any information was self-reported by
Crocker.
¶ 25 Dr. Fabian acknowledged that it was difficult to evaluate Crocker’s sexual history
because he had been incarcerated most of his life. Based on Crocker’s self-report, Dr. Fabian
noted that Crocker was attracted to females, and his longest relationship was for about a year
when he was 16 years old. Crocker reported a significant history in his mid-teenage years of
using not only alcohol, but also cocaine and marijuana that could have affected his relationships.
Dr. Fabian testified that Crocker had no inpatient mental health treatment but had suffered from
anxiety, excessive worry, and panic disorder, and was on an anti-anxiety medication for six to
twelve months while in prison. While Crocker was in prison, he was assessed for paraphilia, a
sexually deviant disorder where the person has recurrent thoughts, behaviors, and fantasies
toward a particular stimulus. Dr. Fabian stated that the IDOC assessor ruled out a diagnosis of
paraphilia.
¶ 26 Dr. Fabian concluded that Crocker “did not endorse sexual paraphilic tendencies” and
“there did not seem to be any *** sexually deviant type tendencies within *** his sex life,”
although Fabian “qualif[ied]” that statement by acknowledging that his examination “rel[ied] on
self-reporting.” Like Dr. Travis, Dr. Fabian diagnosed Crocker with antisocial personality
disorder and substance abuse disorders based on his history of rule violations and consistent
heavy substance use; however, Dr. Fabian determined that neither was a qualifying mental
disorder under the SVP Act. Dr. Fabian agreed that OSPD is an accepted qualifying mental
disorder in Illinois but determined that Crocker did not suffer from OSPD because his was not a
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“unique case.”
¶ 27 Dr. Fabian also assessed Crocker’s risk of reoffending using the Static-99R, Static-
2002R, and risk for sexual violence protocol (RSVP). Crocker scored a six on the Static-99R and
an eight on the Static-2002R. Dr. Fabian explained that Crocker’s scores reflected a three to four
times greater likelihood of sexually reoffending than the average sex offender. Based on the
projected 20-year recidivism rates available for the Static-2002R, Crocker’s score placed his risk
of recidivating at over 50%. Dr. Fabian also stated that Crocker’s score on the RSVP indicated
that he exhibited at least twelve risk factors that correlated with sexual recidivism. Dr. Fabian
conceded that Crocker denied all his sexual offenses and had not participated in any sex offender
treatment. Ultimately, Dr. Fabian could not conclude to a reasonable degree of psychological
certainty that Crocker is “much more likely” to sexually reoffend.
¶ 28 The jury found that Crocker was an SVP. In November 2024, following a dispositional
hearing, the court ordered Crocker committed to DHS custody for secure treatment.
¶ 29 ANALYSIS
¶ 30 Crocker argues that we should reverse the judgment of the circuit court because the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that he was an SVP beyond a reasonable
doubt.
¶ 31 Under the SVP Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2018)), the State may seek leave to
extend the incarceration of a criminal defendant beyond the time he would otherwise be released,
if it can show that the defendant is sexually violent. In re Detention of Hardin, 391 Ill. App. 3d
211, 216 (2009). A person is deemed sexually violent if he has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense and is dangerous because he suffers from a mental disorder that makes it
substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. Id. Involuntary commitment
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under the SVP Act is allowed “for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no
longer a sexually violent person.” Id.; 725 ILCS 207/40(a) (West 2018). Proceedings under the
SVP Act are civil in nature. Hardin, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 216.
¶ 32 When a defendant who has committed a sexually violent offense nears his prison release
date, the State may file a petition to commit him to DHS secure treatment as an SVP. Id. at 216-
17. If the State files such a petition, the court “shall hold a hearing to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that the person named in the petition is a sexually violent person.” Id.
at 217; 725 ILCS 207/30(b) (West 2018). If the court determines that there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant is an SVP, the court must order the person to be taken into custody and
transferred to an appropriate facility for an evaluation as to whether the person is an SVP. 725
ILCS 207/30(c) (West 2018). If the court does not find probable cause, it must dismiss the
petition. Id. Within 120 days after a finding of probable cause, a trial must be held to determine
whether the person is an SVP. 725 ILCS 207/35(a) (West 2018). If the court finds a person to be
an SVP, it must hold a dispositional hearing to determine whether the person will be committed
to institutional care in a secure facility or conditionally released. In re Commitment of Fields,
2014 IL 115542, ¶ 30.
¶ 33 As Crocker is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at his trial, we consider
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact
could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶ 20. Under this standard of
review, it is not the function of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence or to retry respondent.
In re Detention of Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d 585, 602 (2007). Rather, the jury, the trier of fact
in this case, was responsible for assessing witness credibility, weighing the testimony and
evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. Thus, we will not substitute our
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judgment for that of the jury on questions involving the weight of evidence or the credibility of
witnesses. In re Detention of White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 56. We will not reverse a jury’s
determination that an individual is a sexually violent person unless the evidence is so improbable
or unsatisfactory that it leaves a reasonable doubt on the question. Id.
¶ 34 To establish that Crocker was an SVP, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that (1) Crocker was convicted of a sexually violent offense; (2) Crocker has a
qualifying mental disorder; and (3) Crocker’s mental disorder makes it substantially probable
that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2018). Here, it is
undisputed that Crocker was convicted of a sexually violent offense. Crocker is only challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence on the second and third elements—that he suffers from a
qualifying mental disorder and that his disorder makes it substantially probable that he will
sexually reoffend.
¶ 35 First, we consider Crocker’s argument that State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he suffered from a mental disorder at the time of trial that predisposed him to sexual
violence. Crocker claims that the State’s experts, Dr. Travis and Dr. Tsoflias, failed to explain
how their diagnoses qualified as current mental disorders under the SVP Act where they relied
on his behavior over 28 years ago.
¶ 36 We have previously observed that in SVP cases, courts rely heavily on the conclusions of
expert witnesses exercising professional judgment in assessing whether an individual has a
mental disorder that predisposes that person to engage in acts of sexual violence. In re
Commitment of Montanez, 2020 IL App (1st) 182239, ¶ 70; In re Commitment of Moody, 2020
IL App (1st) 190565, ¶ 48. Here, Dr. Travis and Dr. Tsoflias, two licensed clinical psychologists,
opined to a reasonable degree of certainty based on their training, experience and review of
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relevant information in this case, that Crocker suffered from mental disorders under the SVP Act.
A “mental disorder” is defined as a “congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence.” 725 ILCS
207/5(b) (West 2018).
¶ 37 Dr. Travis concluded that Crocker suffers from OSPD, a disorder arising from his
paraphilic sexual interest in nonconsenting females, based on his pattern of seeking out and
sexually assaulting nonconsenting female victims. Dr. Travis stated that Crocker satisfied the
diagnostic criteria for paraphilic disorder because he not only exhibited “recurrent kinds of urges
and fantasies and arousal about forcing women to do things that they don’t want to do sexually,”
but repeatedly acted on those thoughts and urges, as evident from his assaults of three
nonconsenting women in 1988. Dr. Travis also testified that Crocker met three criteria for anti-
social personality disorder: deceitfulness and lying, consistent irresponsibility, and lack of
remorse and continued denial of wrongs. Dr. Travis explained that antisocial personality disorder
is a qualifying mental disorder under the SVP Act because it is a congenital or acquired
condition which prompts respondent to “just take what he wants” from women sexually and
“make[s] him likely to continue in this kind of behavior.” Dr. Travis explained that Crocker
continues to exhibit the disorder through his ongoing lies about his offenses, refusal to accept
responsibility for his actions, and lack of remorse. Finally, Dr. Travis diagnosed Crocker with
substance use disorders, which he based on Crocker’s cocaine and alcohol use before his
incarceration. Dr. Travis explained that Crocker’s substance abuse disorders are qualifying
mental disorders under the SVP Act because they are congenital or acquired conditions which
predispose him to commit future acts of sexual violence by “disinhibit[ing] his behavior” and
reducing his ability to refrain from acting on his deviant sexual impulses.
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¶ 38 Dr. Tsoflias testified that Crocker suffered from OSPD, paraphilia disorder, and OSPD
with antisocial features based on Crocker’s behavior that occurred over 28 years ago, as well as
his medical and treatment history while in IDOC and DHS custody. Dr. Tsoflias testified that he
diagnosed Crocker with paraphilic disorder based on his pattern of repeatedly acting on his
interest in nonconsenting females. Dr. Tsoflias stated that Crocker continues to suffer from
OSPD, a qualifying disorder under the SVP Act, because paraphilic disorders are chronic
conditions and typically do not resolve without attending sex offender treatment. Dr. Tsoflias
testified that she also diagnosed Crocker with OSPD with antisocial features rather than
antisocial personality disorder based on Crocker’s “failure to conform to social norms as
evidenced by repeatedly engaging in acts that are grounds for arrest,” lack of remorse, denial,
minimization or rationalization of his offenses, and failure to acknowledge the effects of his
actions on his victims. Dr. Tsoflias explained that Crocker’s mental disorders are both congenital
or acquired conditions that limit his capacity to control his behavior and predispose him to
engage in future acts of sexual violence. She opined that Crocker continues to have OSPD, and
the antisocial features “exacerbate the symptoms of the paraphilic disorder,” making it more
likely that Crocker will act on his paraphilic disorder and engage in sexually violent behavior.
¶ 39 Although Dr. Fabian opined that Crocker did not suffer from a qualifying mental disorder
under the SVP Act, it was the jury’s role, not ours, to determine which expert’s opinion was
more persuasive. See White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 56. Based on the foregoing, we find
that a rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Crocker had a qualifying mental disorder. In so finding, we reject Crocker’s argument that the
State’s experts’ reliance on behavior that occurred over 28 years earlier while purposefully
ignoring the lack of any sexually deviant behavior since then is fatal to the State’s petition. To
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the contrary, we have repeatedly affirmed SVP adjudications despite the absence of sexually
violent acts in controlled environments like IDOC and DHS custody. See, e.g., White, 2016 IL
App (1st) 151187, ¶¶ 58-60 (evidence held sufficient even though the respondent had not
committed sexual assault in the past 30 years while incarcerated); Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d
585, 602 (2008) (evidence held sufficient despite the respondent not engaging in nonconsensual
sexual activity in the past 26 years while incarcerated); In re Detention of Welsh, 393 Ill. App. 3d
431, 455-56 (2009) (evidence held sufficient even though respondent did not engage in
inappropriate sexual conduct while incarcerated).
¶ 40 Crocker next argues that even if the State proved that he had a qualifying mental
disorder, the State failed to prove that the mental disorder makes it substantially probable that he
will engage in future acts of sexual violence. After establishing that a defendant has a qualifying
mental disorder, the State must show that such a disorder makes it “substantially probable” that
he will engage in acts of sexual violence in the future. 725 ILCS 207/5(f), 45(d) (West 2018). As
used in the SVP Act, “substantially probable” means much more likely than not that Crocker will
commit acts of sexual violence because of his mental disorder. Gavin, 2019 IL App (1st) 180881,
¶ 43.
¶ 41 Dr. Travis and Dr. Tsoflias both scored Crocker a six on the Static-99R and Static-
2002R, placing him in the “well above average” and “above average” risk categories to sexually
reoffend. As for dynamic factors, Dr. Tsoflias explained that Crocker exhibited multiple risk
factors that increased the likelihood that he will commit future acts of sexual violence, including
grievance thinking, resistance to rules and supervision, distorted thinking about women and
consent, poor cognitive problem solving, lack of intimate relationships with an adult, and
preferences for sexual violence. She also noted that Crocker had a history of substance abuse.
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Both Dr. Travis and Dr. Tsoflias found that Crocker had no protective factors that would
decrease his risk of reoffending because he was 50 years old with no major medical problems
and had received no sex offender treatment. Based on Crocker’s scores, dynamic risk factors,
and lack of protective factors, both experts opined that it was substantially probable Crocker
would commit future acts of sexual violence.
¶ 42 Although Dr. Fabian opined that Crocker was not substantially likely to reoffend, the jury
found Dr. Travis’s and Dr. Tsoflias’s risk assessments more compelling than Dr. Fabian’s risk
assessment and determined it was substantially probable Crocker would reoffend. See In re
Commitment of Montilla, 2022 IL App (1st) 200913, ¶ 118 (evidence found to be sufficient
where experts considered actuarial scores in conjunction with “idiosyncratic, dynamic, and
protective factors”); White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 60 (same). Viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, we find the evidence is sufficient to establish that Crocker is substantially
likely to sexually reoffend. Crocker’s argument that Dr. Fabian’s conclusion that he was not
substantially likely to reoffend was more persuasive or better supported is an impermissible
request to reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of the witnesses, neither of which is
within our power. White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 62.
¶ 43 CONCLUSION
¶ 44 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 45 Affirmed.