2021 IL App (2d) 190624-U No. 2-19-0624 Order filed September 8, 2021
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re COMMITMENT OF JAMES CEHODA ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Winnebago County. ) ) No. 16-MR-1113 ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Honorable Petitioner-Appellee, v. James Cehoda ) Brendan A. Maher, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Brennan concurred in the judgment.
¶1 Held: The trial court's determination that respondent was a sexually violent person is affirmed where the State proved that respondent’s mental disorder was a congenital or acquired condition and respondent failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel or juror misconduct.
¶2 Respondent, James P. Cehoda, was adjudicated to be a sexually violent person under the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2016)).
Respondent appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove the allegations of its petition beyond a
reasonable doubt, that respondent’s trial counsel was ineffective, and that the jury engaged in juror
misconduct in rendering its verdict. We affirm. 2021 IL App (2d) 190624-U
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In 1992, respondent was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, ¶¶ 12-13(a)(1), 12-14(a)(2)) and one count of kidnapping (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1991, ch. 38, § 10-1(a)(1)) and was sentenced to 50 years’ incarceration. On December 7, 2016,
respondent was scheduled to be released. However, on November 28, 2016, the State filed its
petition to commit respondent as a sexually violent person under the Act. The trial court appointed
an assistant public defender to represent respondent and scheduled a probable cause hearing for
November 30, 2016. On that date, respondent’s counsel appeared and filed its motion for
substitution of a judge, effectively postponing the probable cause hearing. On December 14, 2016,
the matter was reassigned to a different judge. Sometime after this date, respondent’s counsel left
the Public Defender’s Office, and a new assistant public defender was assigned the case.
¶5 On February 6, 2017, the parties appeared for a probable cause hearing, but respondent’s
new counsel indicated that he “had the opportunity to speak with [his] client,” and that it was “his
wish to waive [the] probable cause hearing.” As such, the parties stipulated on “a finding of
probable cause.”
¶6 On June 21, 2017, while in custody, respondent filed a pro se demand for discharge from
state custody, based on alleged constitutional violations and established decisions of various
courts. The trial court did not address the motion at that time.
¶7 Respondent’s counsel retained an independent evaluator, Dr. Robert Meyer, who was
appointed to conduct an examination of respondent on October 17, 2017. The report does not
appear in the record. “[A] few weeks” before May 11, 2018, respondent’s counsel left the Public
Defender’s Office. By June 7, 2018, the case was reassigned to another assistant public defender,
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who would represent respondent throughout the remaining trial court proceedings.
¶8 On December 14, 2018, the parties appeared for a status call and discussed several issues
concerning respondent’s upcoming jury trial. Respondent’s counsel indicated that she did not
anticipate that respondent would call any witnesses during the trial. While she suggested that she
had obtained a report from her own expert—presumably Dr. Meyer—she also indicated that
respondent would not be entering his own report into evidence.
¶9 On January 23, 2019, the parties held a pretrial conference. Respondent’s counsel presented
a motion in limine seeking to exclude witnesses from the courtroom prior to presenting any
testimony, a motion for individual voir dire, and an oral motion seeking permission for respondent
to dress in street clothes and to remain unshackled during the course of the trial. Noting that its
typical procedure for questioning prospective jurors was already “in effect individual voir dire,”
the trial court denied respondent’s counsel’s motion for individual voir dire but granted her
remaining motions.
¶ 10 On April 17, 2019, the parties held their final pretrial conference. Respondent’s counsel
tendered a copy of her proposed jury instructions to the court. The parties went over the State’s
motions in limine, prompting numerous objections from respondent’s counsel. For example,
respondent’s counsel objected to the State’s requests that the trial court preclude respondent from
arguing or implying that respondent’s criminal convictions were invalid, from suggesting that
respondent “has served his time for [his] offenses,” from suggesting that “respondent would be on
parole or supervised release[ ]if not found to be a [s]exually [v]iolent [p]erson,” or from implying
“any information about commitment options such as secure care or conditional release.”
Additionally, respondent’s counsel objected to the State’s requests to preclude respondent from
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mentioning whether “any actuarial instruments used in this case *** [were] experimental or ***
not generally accepted,” or from opining on the “effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any sex
offender treatment program” or relapse prevention plans. 1 After disposing of the motions in limine,
the parties discussed and finalized their voir dire questions that would be used in selecting a jury.
¶ 11 At the final pretrial conference, respondent asked the court about his earlier demand for
discharge, which he filed in June 2017, pointing out that the trial court “never did answer” the
motion. Respondent’s counsel—who was not assigned to the case at the time of the filing—
informed the judge that she would “take a look at that [motion].” The trial court informed
respondent that “generally speaking, a *** defendant who is represented by an attorney does not
have any authority to file pro se motions and have them adjudicated by the [c]ourt.” Nonetheless,
the court advised respondent that it would address the motion on the morning of his upcoming
trial.
¶ 12 On April 22, 2019, the parties appeared for jury selection. Prior to voir dire, the court asked
respondent, “[Y]ou have received and had an opportunity to look at the independent evaluation
that you sought through your attorney from, I believe, it was Dr. Meyer?” While respondent
couldn’t remember the name of his evaluator, he confirmed that “there was an evaluation.” The
trial court then asked, “[T]he defense did, in fact, secure a written evaluation from Dr. Meyer; is
that correct?” Respondent responded, “Right.” The court then asked, “[Respondent], you and your
attorney have had a chance to review the independent evaluation that was secured on behalf of the
1 Because respondent does not challenge the trial court's rulings on the State's motions in
limine, we need not address them further.
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defense in the case together at some point in time[?]” Respondent responded, “Yeah.” The court
then specifically asked respondent, “But the individual retained on your behalf, on behalf of the
defense, you’ve decided not to call that person to testify at the trial?” Respondent once again
agreed with the court.
¶ 13 After this exchange, respondent’s counsel informed the court that she would not be
adopting respondent’s motion to be discharged from state custody. The trial court asked respondent
whether he would like to nonetheless pursue arguing his motion either through new counsel or by
himself, resulting in his current counsel’s discharge. Respondent answered, “I can’t afford a
regular lawyer and a public defender; one is just as good as the other. So leave it as is.” The trial
court asked whether respondent would therefore like to proceed with trial, prompting respondent
to answer, “[L]et’s go to trial and get this over with.” Respondent confirmed that after speaking
with his counsel, he wished to exercise his right to a jury trial in lieu of a bench trial.
¶ 14 On April 23, 2019, the jury trial commenced. Dr. Kristopher Clounch testified that he was
a licensed clinical psychologist who conducted an October 2016 evaluation of respondent, from
which he wrote a report detailing his findings and later, an addendum to that report. As part of the
initial evaluation, Dr. Clounch performed a risk analysis and considered respondent’s mental
condition, criminal history, disciplinary history, and “his behavior in general.” Dr. Clounch
testified that in May 1983, respondent was “initially arrested for indecent liberties with a child;
ultimately, he was in turn charged with contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child.” Records
indicated that prior to respondent’s arrest, he had “kissed and was undoing or unbuttoning the
pants of a minor female.” When speaking with Dr. Clounch, respondent had denied “any sexual
contact,” but he did indicate that “he had been accused of touching his brother’s girlfriend’s niece,”
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who was “13 or 14 [years old] at the time.”
¶ 15 Dr. Clounch further described how in May 1985, respondent was arrested and charged with
criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse. “This was for the sexual assault of *** a 17[-
]year[-]old[ ]female stranger.” Police reports indicated that officers arrived at respondent’s
apartment in response to a disturbance, where they encountered the victim’s boyfriend, who
informed police that respondent had raped his girlfriend. The victim similarly reported that she
had “gone to the apartment complex to visit her boyfriend and friend who happened to be living
across from [respondent’s] apartment.” After finding that her boyfriend and friend were not home,
respondent allowed her to enter his apartment, where she could wait and use his phone. There,
respondent “began coming on to her,” offering her marijuana and a drink. He had the victim try
on women’s clothes—including a bikini—that he had at the apartment. While attempting to leave
respondent’s bedroom, respondent pushed her onto his bed and climbed on top of her. He then
removed her top and “sucked and licked on her breasts.” He told her that, if she had his baby, “the
baby would do the same thing to her.” He removed the bikini bottoms from the victim, spread her
legs, and performed oral sex on her. Stopping for a moment, respondent told the victim that “all
the girls love [him] because of [his] long tongue.” He then penetrated the victim vaginally and
ejaculated on the victim’s abdomen and pubic area. Afterwards, respondent told victim that she
needed to go, but that “they should do this again sometime and that she would remember this in
her dreams for a long, long time.” Court records indicated that the criminal sexual assault charge
“was amended to unlawful restraint,” and that respondent was ultimately convicted of that charge
before being sentenced to three years’ incarceration.
¶ 16 Dr. Clounch then recounted respondent’s August 1987 convictions for one count of
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aggravated battery, one count of battery, one count of illegal possession of a weapon by a felon,
and one count of unlawful restraint, which resulted in a sentence of eight years’ incarceration.
Prior to his arrest, respondent was reported to have “jumped out from behind a bush” so that he
could grab the victim, an 18-year-old female, and threaten her with a knife. Respondent indicated
that he would kill the victim if she did not go with him, but she was able to free herself and escape.
¶ 17 Dr. Clounch went on to testify about respondent’s May 1991 arrest for aggravated criminal
sexual assault, unlawful restraint, and kidnapping. Police reports indicated that prior to being
arrested, respondent abducted a 19-year-old female from a parking lot as she approached him to
sell him magazines. After grabbing the victim by the hair and pulling her into his vehicle,
respondent “began beating her head against the inside of the car door,” before producing a pistol.
After being threatened by respondent, the victim was pulled into his vehicle. Respondent forced
the victim to the vehicle’s floorboard and made her remove her clothing. He “fondled her vagina
and roughly fondled her breasts[,] leaving bruises.” Respondent also poked and hit the victim,
before forcing her to “perform oral sex on him on four separate occasions” while respondent drove.
After arriving at his apartment complex, respondent “had the victim get dressed,” “grabbed her by
the throat[,] and covered her eyes as he walked her to his apartment.” There, he again had the
victim remove her clothing, bound her hands behind her back “so tightly that it cut off circulation
to her hands,” before eventually “forcibly” raping her.
¶ 18 After assaulting the victim, respondent forced her to take a shower with him. After taking
the shower, the victim convinced respondent to leave the apartment to retrieve cigarettes for her.
Once he left, she escaped and contacted the police. Ultimately, he was convicted of two counts of
aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of kidnapping. For these crimes, respondent was
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sentenced to 50 years’ incarceration.
¶ 19 Dr. Clounch also reviewed respondent’s nonsexual criminal history in his evaluation. He
described how respondent had “a 16 year history of offenses in which he had been arrested for,”
including drug possession, criminal damage to property, “several batteries,” arson, burglary, and
unlawful restraint. When asked whether respondent was “successful when he was on probation or
parole in the community,” Dr. Clounch answered, “According to records, he has not been
successful while on probation or parole.” Dr. Clounch further indicated that at the time of several
of respondent’s sex-offense arrests, “he had recently been released from incarceration[,] *** [s]o
he would have been under some type of supervision at [those] time[s] as well.” Respondent was
released from prison approximately two weeks before being arrested for the May 1991 aggravated
criminal sexual assault and kidnapping. When asked whether respondent “completed or
participated in any sex offender treatment” while in prison or the community, Dr. Clounch
responded, “No.”
¶ 20 Based on respondent’s criminal history, behaviors, prison records, and interviews, Dr.
Clounch determined “to a degree of psychological certainty” that the respondent suffered from
“other specified paraphilic disorder,” specifically in that he was “sexually aroused by
nonconsenting partners.” The State asked Dr. Clounch whether the paraphilic disorder was “a
congenital or an acquired condition.” Dr. Clounch answered, “Yes, it is,” before explaining that
congenital conditions accompany individuals at birth, while acquired conditions are acquired at
some point during an individual’s life. Dr. Clounch further explained that respondent’s paraphilic
disorder affected his “volitional capacity,” meaning it impacted his “ability to ultimately control
his behavior,” as suggested by the fact that he had “engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with
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at least two victims.” Consequently, Dr. Clounch found respondent to be predisposed to engage in
continued acts of sexual violence.
¶ 21 Dr. Clounch then described how he used an “actuarial approach” as part of carrying out
respondent’s risk assessment through two different instruments: the Static-99R and the Static-
2002R. Because the actuarial instruments relied upon recidivism data which, in turn, was based on
historically underreported sexual offenses, the instruments typically “underestimate risk.” Under
the Static-99R, respondent scored a five, meaning he was at an above average risk of reoffending.
According to Dr. Clounch, “[i]ndividuals with the same score as [respondent] have been found to
reoffend at a rate 2.7 times the rate of the typical sex offender[,] represented by a score of [two].”
Dr. Clounch described how “85 of 100 sex offenders scored *** below [respondent’s] score.”
Under the Static-2002R, respondent again scored a five, indicating that “71 of 100 sex offenders
scored on the measure would score below him.” Again, Dr. Clounch opined that respondent’s test
results indicated an “above average” risk of reoffending, “at a rate of 1.9 times the rate of the
typical sex offender.”
¶ 22 Dr. Clounch additionally utilized the Stable-2007 measure to analyze “both dynamic risk
factors and protective factors” as part of respondent’s risk assessment. He described dynamic risk
factors as “psychologically meaningful factors that have been found to be related to sexual
reoffense” which “can ultimately be addressed in treatment” and protective factors as “factors that
result in a reduction of the individual’s risk.” Respondent scored a “16 out of a possible 24 points
on the measure,” placing him “in the high risk category.” Specifically, respondent was placed “at
the 93.9 percentile *** indicating that 93 of 100 sex offenders[] *** would score below
[respondent’s] score.” In combining this measure with the Static-99R and the Static-2002R,
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respondent “was placed in the Level IVb, well above average *** risk category.” Others in this
risk category “have been found to reoffend at a rate of [three] to [four] times the rate of the average
individual convicted of sexual offenses.”
¶ 23 When asked whether he had “an opinion to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty
*** as to *** respondent’s risk of sexually reoffending, Dr Clounch ultimately responded,
“[Respondent] is substantially probable to reoffend sexually if not confined.” Dr. Clounch then
testified as to his beliefs that “respondent had a conviction for a sexually violent offense,” that
“respondent [is] dangerous because he suffers from a mental disorder that is congenital or
acquired,” and that respondent’s disorder affected “his emotional or volitional capacity and
predispose[d] him to commit continued acts of sexual violence.” Dr. Clounch finally concluded
that respondent met the criteria to be found a sexually violent person.
¶ 24 On cross-examination, respondent’s counsel asked Dr. Clounch whether respondent was
convicted of indecent liberties with a child as a result of his May 1983 arrest. Dr. Clounch indicated
that respondent was found not guilty in that case. Dr. Clounch further agreed that respondent was
not convicted of criminal sexual assault stemming from his May 1985 arrest nor his August 1987
arrest. Dr. Clounch admitted that respondent denied any wrongdoing with regards to any of his
prior described arrests. Dr. Clounch also agreed that respondent “had very little disciplinary history
while in the Department of Corrections.” Respondent did not exhibit any type of sexual violence
during his incarceration. Respondent’s counsel inquired about the reports that Dr. Clounch relied
on in compiling his assessment. Dr. Clounch acknowledged that he did not compile the reports
that his assessment relied on. Instead, he testified that there could “be two or three people removed
from the time [he] would review [other individuals’ reports].”
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¶ 25 The State then called Dr. David Suire to testify. Dr. Suire testified that he was a licensed
clinical psychologist and sexually violent person evaluator who also evaluated respondent. Dr.
Suire described respondent’s criminal history as being “pervasive” and discussed respondent’s
1983, 1985, 1987, and 1991 offenses. Partly based on these offenses, Dr. Suire diagnosed
respondent with paraphilic disorder with regards to “nonconsenting persons.” Additionally, Dr.
Suire diagnosed respondent with “alcohol use disorder moderate[,] cannabis use disorder mild[,]
and other specific personality disorder, with antisocial features.” In reaching this final diagnosis,
Dr. Suire noted “the fact that *** over a 16 year period[, respondent] had 24 separate charges[
and] 14 convictions. He had convictions for sexually [sic] offenses, [and] nonsexual offenses. He
has had violent offenses. He’s had theft-related offenses. He’s had [offenses] related to substance
abuse.” Dr. Suire further remarked that respondent “has spent most of his adult life either
incarcerated or under some sort of supervision due to his criminal behavior.” Despite this fact,
respondent “has still managed to pile up a *** pretty impressive stack of criminal behaviors,”
which was consistent with an antisocial personality disorder.
¶ 26 The State asked, “Now, these four mental diagnoses that you diagnosed the respondent
with, are they congenital or acquired conditions?” Dr. Suire replied, “They are.” Dr. Suire
postulated that respondent’s disorders affected respondent’s emotional or volitional capacity and
“predispose[d] him to commit future acts of sexual violence.” Pursuant to Dr. Suire’s risk
assessment, respondent scored a “five or a six” under the Static-99R and a five under the Static-
2002R. Dr. Suire also considered dynamic and protective factors in finding that, to a reasonable
degree “of psychological certainty,” respondent’s risk of reoffending was “substantially probable,”
meaning respondent was “much more likely than not” to reoffend. Like Dr. Clounch, Dr. Suire
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agreed that respondent had a conviction for a sexually violent offense, that respondent was
dangerous “because he suffers from a mental disorder that’s congenital or acquired and predisposes
him to commit further acts of sexual violence, and that respondent’s disorders “affect [his]
emotional and volitional capacity,” predisposing “him to commit future acts of sexual violence.”
For these reasons, Dr. Suire opined that respondent met the criteria to be found a sexually violent
person.
¶ 27 On cross-examination, respondent’s counsel asked questions establishing that Dr. Suire
based his opinions “somewhat” on “records that were written by others.” Again, counsel further
elicited testimony establishing that respondent was not convicted from his May 1983 offense, nor
of any sexual offenses stemming from his 1985 and 1987 offenses. Dr. Suire also admitted that he
was unaware of any alcohol or cannabis use that respondent engaged in “since 1991 at least.”
¶ 28 Following Dr. Suire’s testimony, the State and respondent’s counsel negotiated over jury
instructions and respondent indicated that he did not wish to testify. Afterwards, the parties
delivered their closing arguments. During respondent’s closing arguments, counsel pointed out
that the records that Dr. Clounch and Dr. Suire relied on were “written years ago *** by *** two
or three people at least removed from them.” Counsel added that some of the records were “30
year[s] old or more.” Counsel further explained that the State’s experts had also based their
opinions on “short periods of time actually [spent] with [respondent]” and “unsubstantiated
allegations from years ago.” Again, counsel noted that several of the allegations regarding
respondent’s conduct did not result in convictions. Counsel also noted the differences between Dr.
Clounch’s and Dr. Suire’s testimonies—specifically the fact that Dr. Suire found respondent to
have several substance-abuse disorders, despite the fact that “[n]o actual evidence” was able “to
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prove that.”
¶ 29 After deliberating for 26 minutes, the jury found respondent to be a sexually violent person.
Respondent’s counsel requested that the jury be polled, and each juror confirmed the verdict. On
May 17, 2019, respondent—through his counsel—filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the
jury’s verdict was contrary to the law and to the evidence adduced at trial. Respondent argued that,
instead, “the verdict [was] the result of the passion, bias[,] and prejudice of the jury against ***
[r]espondent.” The trial court denied the motion and the matter proceeded to dispositional hearing.
At that hearing, the State introduced a report from Dr. Suire in support of the State’s position that
“respondent be remanded to *** secure institutional treatment at the treatment detention facility.”
Respondent’s counsel argued that respondent should be placed on conditional release coupled with
treatment outside of a secure facility. After reading the pre-dispositional investigation report and
considering the evidence adduced at trial, the court ordered respondent to be committed to
institutional care at a secure facility. Respondent timely appealed.
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 On appeal, respondent argues that the State failed to prove the allegations of its petition
beyond a reasonable doubt, that respondent’s trial counsel was ineffective, and that the jury
engaged in juror misconduct in rendering its verdict. We address each of these arguments in turn.
¶ 32 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 33 First, the State carried its burden in proving that respondent is a sexually violent person
beyond a reasonable doubt. “When reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence,
we consider whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational
trier of fact could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Commitment of
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Fields, 2014 IL 115542, ¶ 20. We refrain from retrying respondent while reviewing his claims. In
re Tittlebach, 324 Ill. App. 3d 6, 11 (2001). Instead, “[o]n review, we ask only whether, after
viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find
that the elements *** [were] proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
¶ 34 The Act defines a “sexually violent person” as “a person who has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has
been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous
because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person
will engage in acts of sexual violence.” 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2016). Furthermore, “ ‘Mental
disorder’ means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence.” 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2016).
¶ 35 Here, respondent argues that the State failed to carry its burden because neither of its
testifying experts provided whether respondent’s purported paraphilic disorder was specifically
congenital or acquired. Otherwise put, while respondent acknowledges that both experts opined
that his paraphilic disorder was either congenital or acquired, he argues that the State was required
to prove with specificity exactly how “said condition allegedly developed in [respondent].”
¶ 36 Respondent’s argument runs contrary to Illinois case law. In In re Commitment of Moody,
2020 IL App (1st) 190565, which was decided after respondent and the State filed their briefs, the
First District was confronted with the very same argument that respondent now brings before us:
“The respondent alternatively argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove
that he suffers from a mental disorder because, contrary to the plain language of the statute,
the State failed to specify whether he suffered from a condition that was either ‘congenital
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or acquired’ and then prove to which of these two categories his mental disorder belongs.”
Id. ¶ 54.
There, the court disagreed that the plain language of the statute required the State to show exactly
which of the two types of conditions accurately described the respondent’s disorder:
“Contrary to the respondent's contention, the Act does not require the State to prove
with specificity whether the respondent's mental disorder is ‘congenital or acquired.’
*** [T]he most natural reading of the statute is that a mental disorder is any condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual
violence, whether congenital or not. Contrary to the respondent's position, this reading does
not render the phrase ‘congenital or acquired’ meaningless. Rather, it acknowledges the
intent of the legislature to focus commitment proceedings on persons who have a mental
condition that predisposes them towards sexual violence, regardless of the underlying
source of that condition.” Id. ¶¶ 56-57.
We agree with the Moody court’s determination that the plain reading of the statute does not require
the State to show specifically whether a mental disorder was acquired at birth or whether it was
later acquired—such a distinction is meaningless as under either circumstance, respondent’s
condition would still satisfy the Act’s definition of a mental disorder. Respondent cites no case
law advancing his alternative reading of the statute. As such, we disagree with respondent’s
contentions and find that the State proved that respondent had a mental disorder beyond a
reasonable doubt.
¶ 37 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 38 Second, respondent has failed to adequately show that he received ineffective assistance of
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counsel before the trial court. Persons committed under the Act are entitled to effective assistance
of counsel, measured by the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In
re Commitment of Bushong, 351 Ill. App. 3d 807, 817 (2004). Pursuant to that standard, a party
seeking to establish ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate both that counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
¶ 39 However, under U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984), “if counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of
Sixth Amendment rights [to effective counsel] that makes the adversary process itself
presumptively unreliable.” Under these circumstances, prejudice may be presumed. Id. However,
in order for Cronic’s “narrow” exception to Strickland’s requirements to apply, a party must show
that their counsel’s failure was “complete,” “meaning that ‘counsel failed to oppose the
prosecution throughout the *** proceeding as a whole.’ ” People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 26
(citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002)). In other words, this rarely utilized exception is not
triggered unless “counsel abandons even the pretense of defending his client,” such that “counsel’s
effectiveness has fallen to such a low level as to amount not merely to incompetence, but to ‘no
representation at all.’ ” People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 267 (1989) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S.
at 659).
¶ 40 Here, respondent brings forth a laundry list of purported deficiencies in his trial counsel’s
performance, arguing that counsel’s performance “did not qualify as a meaningful adversarial
testing of the State’s case.” Specifically, the entirety of respondent’s deficient-performance
argument notes the following conduct and perceived omissions:
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“[Respondent’s] trial counsel did not prepare or serve any written interrogatories or
requests to produce nor conduct any depositions of either Dr. Clounch or Dr. Suire. Trial
counsel only prepared one pretrial [m]otion [in limine,] and that only sought the exclusion
of witnesses during trial. Trial [c]ounsel did not file any [m]otions [i]n [l]imine seeking to
exclude or challenging the methods or opinions to be offered by Drs. Clounch or Suire.
Trial counsel’s [o]pening [s]tatement on behalf of [respondent] was only 19 lines of
transcript in length. Trial counsel conducted only limited cross-examination of Dr. Clounch
and of Dr. Suire. Trial [c]ounsel presented no witnesses to testify on behalf of [respondent].
Trial [c]ounsel stipulated to the admission of a certified copy of [respondent’s] 1991
[c]riminal [c]onviction. Trial counsel did not object to the admission into evidence of the
two written reports of Dr. Clounch’s evaluations of [respondent]. Trial [c]ounsel did not
object to the admission of Dr. Suire’s [f]irst and [s]econd written reports of his evaluations
of [respondent]. Trial counsel did not challenge either Dr. Clounch or Dr. Suire on the basis
of a prior inconsistent statement. Trial [c]ounsel’s final argument on behalf of [respondent]
is extremely brief and is contained on 38 lines on less than two full transcript pages. Trial
[c]ounsel did not request any [s]pecial [v]erdict forms to be given to the jury.” (Internal
citations omitted.)
¶ 41 Respondent’s arguments are seriously undermined by his failure to explain how any of
these purported shortcomings constituted deficient performance. For example, while respondent
criticizes his trial counsel for only filing one motion in limine, he fails to suggest what additional
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motions in limine should have been filed.2 While respondent points out that counsel only engaged
in a “limited cross-examination” of Dr. Clounch and Dr. Suire, he does not provide why a more
detailed cross-examination was necessary, or how counsel’s cross-examination could otherwise
have been improved. Respondent also argues that counsel should have objected to Dr. Clounch’s
reports but does not provide any basis for doing so. Respondent similarly chides counsel for failing
to challenge Dr. Clounch’s and Dr. Suire’s “prior inconsistent statement[s],” but never mentions
what inconsistent statements he is referring to. As such, respondent has not demonstrated that
counsel’s performance was deficient, particularly where respondent has not identified any specific
instances of conduct.
¶ 42 Regardless, the record reflects that respondent’s trial counsel did not fall to the level of
extreme nonaction contemplated in Cronic. Instead, the record shows that respondent’s counsel
filed one motion in limine and two other pretrial motions on respondent’s behalf, objected to
several of the State’s motions in limine, and took an active role in negotiating jury instructions.
Furthermore, counsel undermined Dr. Clounch’s and Dr. Suire’s testimonies by questioning them
on respondent’s lack of sexual assault convictions, the age of their reports, and the secondhand
nature of their reports. Counsel also pointed out inconsistencies between the experts’ testimonies
during closing arguments, requested that the jury be polled, filed a motion for a new trial, and
actively argued for respondent’s conditional release. Clearly, these actions rise above the types of
2 While respondent does suggest that certain motions in limine should have been filed in
order to exclude or challenge Dr. Clounch’s or Dr. Suire’s “methods or opinions,” he does not
specify which “methods or opinions” were improper.
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complete nonrepresentation contemplated under Cronic, meaning counsel’s conduct cannot be
presumed to have caused prejudice. Respondent does not otherwise argue prejudice in his brief.
Because respondent has consequently failed to establish either the deficient performance or
prejudice prongs under Strickland, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim necessarily fails.
¶ 43 C. Juror Misconduct
¶ 44 Finally, because respondent’s arguments of “juror misconduct” are unsupported by any
applicable authority, they have been forfeited. A party’s appellate brief must be accompanied by
citation to pertinent authority. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). However, unpublished
federal court orders interpreting state law are not precedential and should not be cited for purposes
other than dealing with double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Napleton v. Great Lakes Bank, N.A., 408 Ill. App. 3d 448, 453 (2011). “Unreported decisions have
no precedential value, and this is even more true for decisions from foreign jurisdictions.”
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Plunkett, 2014 IL App (1st) 131631, ¶ 38.
¶ 45 Here, respondent argues that the jury “[c]onducted [j]uror [m]isconduct” solely because
their deliberations totaled only 26 minutes. According to respondent, “Such a short period of time,
in light of the complex psychological testimony each given by the State’s two witnesses, violated
the oath as jurors and violated [respondent’s] constitutional rights to procedural due process of
law.” In support of this argument, respondent only cites one case—United States v. Morgenstern,
725 Fed. Appx. 546 (2018)—which is unpublished and, being from the Ninth Circuit,
nonprecedential. Again, “ [u]npublished federal decisions are not binding or precedential in Illinois
courts.” Kings Health Spa, Inc. v. Village of Downers Grove, 2014 IL App (2d) 130825, ¶ 63.
¶ 46 Even if we were to consider Morgenstern as persuasive authority, the case does not support
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respondent’s argument. Morgenstern involved a defendant who appealed his convictions for
aggravated sexual assault, production of child pornography, and transportation with intent to
engage in sexual contact with a child. Morgenstern, 725 Fed. Appx. at 547. While the defendant
there did similarly argue that the length of the jury’s deliberations constituted misconduct, the
Morgenstern court summarily dismissed the defendant’s arguments in three sentences:
“The jury was presented with an overwhelming amount of digital evidence that depicted
[the defendant] performing sexual acts on the victims. No defense was presented at trial.
[The defendant] was not denied a fair trial based on the length of the jurors’ deliberations.”
Id. at 549.
¶ 47 This brief passage does not suggest that the length of a jury’s deliberations alone is
demonstrative of juror misconduct. Id. The case does not even mention how long the jury there
deliberated, further reducing its usefulness as a comparison to the jury’s deliberations here.
Furthermore, like the evidence produced before the jury in Morgenstern, the evidence adduced at
respondent’s trial was overwhelming. Here, both of the State’s experts uncontroverted opinions as
to respondent’s disorders and likelihood to reoffend were in agreement with one another, and
respondent had a pervasive history of sexual misconduct. While respondent’s trial counsel
correctly pointed out that several of respondent’s offenses did not result in convictions for sex
offenses, it is clear that those offenses were still sexually motivated and involved sexual
misconduct. Respondent’s 1991 conviction—which did include a conviction for a sex offense—
was particularly disturbing. Respondent also never received treatment that may have lessened his
risk of reoffense. Given the staggering weight of this evidence, Morgenstern implies that the
relatively short length of the jury’s deliberations did not deprive respondent of a fair trial. For these
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reasons, we decline respondent’s request to “rule in his favor on this issue of first impression.”
¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 49 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.
¶ 50 Affirmed.
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