2026 IL App (2d) 250074-U No. 2-25-0074 Order filed July 13, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT
In re COMMITMENT OF ANDREW SAVOY
(Andrew Savoy, Respondent-Appellant v. People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Honorable Bianca Camargo, Judge, Presiding. No. 12-MR-23
PRESIDING JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly revoked defendant’s conditional release.
¶2 Respondent, Andrew Savoy, appeals the revocation of his conditional release under the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (720 ILCS 207/40(b)(4) (West 2024)). Because
respondent violated his release conditions and the trial court properly revoked his conditional
release, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Sexually Violent Person Proceedings
¶5 In January 2012, the State filed a petition to commit respondent as a sexually violent
person. The petition noted that respondent was adjudicated delinquent for criminal sexual assault
in June 2009, was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice, and was nearing release. ¶6 After several continuances, a trial on the State’s petition to commit respondent as a sexually
violent person was held on September 12, 2022. At that trial, the State’s evidence included a
certified copy of respondent’s juvenile adjudication for the sexually violent offense of criminal
sexual assault and testimony from two mental health experts, Dr. Barry Leavitt and Dr. Steven
Gaskell.
¶7 Dr. Leavitt, who was qualified as an expert in clinical and forensic psychology, as well as
“risk assessment of sex offenders and sexually violent persons,” testified as follows. Dr. Leavitt
was brought in by the Attorney General’s Office to conduct a second opinion evaluation of
respondent in 2012. Since 2012, Dr. Leavitt had completed five additional evaluations of
respondent and opined that respondent consistently met the criteria of a sexually violent person.
Dr. Leavitt explained that respondent was adjudicated delinquent for criminal sexual assault in
2005, at age 14, based on his sexual assault of his 9-year-old sister by putting his penis inside her
vagina. In addition, respondent admitted to incidents of sexual abuse of his sister the preceding
four to five years. Respondent also admitted to sexually abusing his brother during a period of
about five years.
¶8 According to Dr. Leavitt, the juvenile court ordered respondent to participate in residential
sex offender treatment at a facility in Wisconsin, but respondent was discharged from that facility
“unsatisfactorily” after three years, due to sexually abusing four other children. Afterwards,
respondent was transferred to an Illinois Youth Center facility. There, at age 20, respondent was
released on parole to another residential treatment facility in Indian Oaks, where he received
boundary violation citations after he touched people inappropriately. In particular, Dr. Leavitt was
concerned about respondent’s “more violent and sadistic types of fantasies” involving his sister
-2- and his mother. Respondent’s lack of progress led to a parole violation and his return to the Illinois
Youth Center facility for additional juvenile sex offender treatment.
¶9 Respondent was then transferred to a detention facility with the Illinois Department of
Human Services (DHS), where he has now been for the past 10 years. At that facility, respondent
participated in the five-phase sex offender treatment program but was stuck in the second phase,
which is the “accepting responsibility phase” of treatment. Later, in 2018 or 2019, respondent was
removed from the core sex offender treatment program and disclosure group due to depression and
a lack of engagement. Respondent was then placed in the “Power to Change” group, where he was
“doing better” until May 2022.
¶ 10 Dr. Leavitt diagnosed respondent with mental disorders under the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition. Specifically, Dr. Leavitt diagnosed respondent with
“other specified paraphilic disorder” based on his sexual attraction to nonconsenting persons,
autism spectrum disorder, and “other specified depressive disorder in partial remission.”
Respondent admitted having several victims in the context of his sex offender treatment, including
his biological sister and his biological brother. Despite an extensive period of juvenile treatment
opportunities from the age of 14 to 21, Dr. Leavitt stated that there was a “consistent history of
treatment failure.” Dr. Leavitt further opined that “many factors” created a substantial probability
of respondent’s “continuing to sexually reoffend at some time in the future.” Respondent, now 31
years old, had not successfully completed any course of juvenile or adult treatment.
¶ 11 Dr. Gaskell testified next as follows. Dr. Gaskell diagnosed respondent with sexual sadism
disorder, frotteuristic disorder, and other specified personality disorder with antisocial and
borderline traits. All three disorders qualified as a mental disorder under the Act. Dr. Gaskell
identified the following factors as increasing respondent’s risk of reoffense: his relatively young
-3- age; the fact that he had never been married; sexual acts against a male victim; sexual
preoccupation; early onset of sexual offending; deviant sexual interests, including a sexual interest
in children; tolerance of sexual crimes; a negative relationship with his mother; separation from
his parents; neglect and physical or emotional abuse; childhood criminality; a personality disorder;
hostility; general self-regulation problems, such as impulsivity and recklessness; intimate
relationship conflicts; and, a failure to complete sex offender treatment. Like Dr. Leavitt, Dr.
Gaskell opined that respondent’s mental disorders made it substantially probable that respondent
would commit future acts of sexual violence.
¶ 12 In sum, both doctors opined that respondent met the criteria of a sexually violent person.
¶ 13 The last witness was Dr. Deborah Nicolai, who testified on behalf of respondent. Dr.
Nicolai testified that respondent was not a sexually violent person, because he did not have a
qualifying mental disorder; he was at a low risk of reoffense; and, he was making progress in
treatment.
¶ 14 Based on the above evidence, the trial court determined that respondent was a sexually
violent person.
¶ 15 B. Conditional Release Proceedings
¶ 16 At a subsequent dispositional hearing on April 5, 2023, the trial court received a report
from Dr. Nicole Hernandez, who evaluated respondent and opined that the least restrictive
environment where he could be effectively and safely treated was the DHS conditional release
program. At that hearing, respondent confirmed that he had read the conditional release plan,
initialed every paragraph of it, fully understood all of the conditions, was willing to abide by them
if released, and had no questions. The trial court approved the conditional release plan. Respondent
was then released to the custody of DHS.
-4- ¶ 17 On December 20, 2024, the State petitioned to revoke respondent’s conditional release due
to the violation of three release conditions. Specifically, the State’s petition alleged that respondent
violated the following conditions: condition 6, in that respondent withheld information about his
sexual fantasies and masturbation during therapy; condition 27, in that respondent failed to provide
logs of his activities and monthly written reports as directed by his management team; and,
condition 32, in that respondent was not truthful to his agent or therapist on multiple specified
occasions. The State also alleged in its petition that revoking conditional release was required to
protect others in the community.
¶ 18 On January 17, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s petition to revoke
conditional release. Morgan Franden testified first as follows. Franden was employed by the
Specialized Forensic Unit with Liberty Health, which monitors individuals on conditional release
under the Act. Franden was licensed as a Clinical Professional Counselor and a Sex Offender
Treatment provider and served as respondent’s psychosexual therapist beginning in January 2024.
Franden provided individual and group therapy to respondent once a week and also met with
respondent’s case management team twice per month.
¶ 19 Franden explained that “[s]exual functioning logs” provided a way to monitor respondent’s
sexual functioning. On January 11, 2024, the case management team decided to issue a “[l]etter of
[u]nderstanding” against respondent, based on him lying to his conditional release agent at Liberty
Health, Elsa Sandoval. Franden explained that the letter of understanding is “a written kind of
warning” that a rule has been violated. Then, on February 15, 2024, and on March 3, 2024,
“[l]etter(s) of [a]dmonishment” were issued to respondent, again based on lying to Sandoval.
According to Franden, lying was “absolutely significant” in terms of an individual’s ability to be
successful on conditional release.
-5- ¶ 20 Respondent took a polygraph test on May 7, 2024. Respondent’s statements to the
polygraph examiner regarding masturbation were inconsistent with his statements to agent
Sandoval on April 25, 2024, and on May 5, 2024, which “was a big concern” as to why was he
“lying.” Respondent’s lying about sexual functioning was a “huge risk factor” regarding deviant
sexual arousal. Later, on May 20, 2024, respondent was issued another letter of admonishment
based on his inconsistent statements, which violated condition 6 of his conditional release plan
“about being transparent and engaged in treatment.”
¶ 21 A penile plethysmograph (PPG) test was administered to respondent on May 14, 2024, as
part of his conditional release plan. Franden reported that there were “concerns” about the exam
taking “at least twice as long” as normal, as well as respondent’s behavioral presentation, in that
he acted “grandiose, histrionic, joking,” and immature. Because respondent’s conduct during this
PPG test amounted to a violation of his conditional release plan, respondent was issued another
letter of admonishment on June 30, 2024. In addition, based on his lack of transparency, Franden
drafted a behavioral contract for respondent, which was a “a more formal kind of written paper for
clients who are struggling with certain” sexual functioning authenticity and behaviors. When
Franden went over the behavioral contract with respondent, he claimed to understand what was
expected of him and signed it.
¶ 22 In July 2024, respondent asked for his grandfather to be a “support person,” although he
failed to disclose that “one of his victims lived with his grandfather prior to asking for him to
become a support person.” At a case management meeting on July 25, 2024, agent Sandoval
advised Franden that respondent claimed to have told Franden during a therapy session about the
victim living with his grandfather, but Franden denied that respondent revealed this information to
her. As a result, another letter of admonishment for lying was issued on July 30, 2024.
-6- ¶ 23 In addition, on July 31, 2024, a letter of admonishment was issued to respondent for “lying
about calling Com Ed.”
¶ 24 Defendant took a polygraph test on December 5, 2024. After the test, Franden advised
respondent that she was “really concerned, again,” due to him being “inauthentic with” her about
his masturbation level in a 24-hour period. Respondent told Franden “no” regarding masturbation
and then “got to the polygraph and made disclosures,” which was a pattern of behavior. According
to Franden, respondent demonstrated “poor accountability, poor planning, and not being on top of
controlling his behavior,” when he had “all these risk factors that connect to risk of sexual re-
offense.” Respondent also told Franden that his meeting with his psychiatrist went “splendid,”
based on respondent’s claim that he told his psychiatrist of his sexual preoccupation. However,
Franden later learned from agent Sandoval that respondent “didn’t say” anything about his sexual
preoccupation “in his meeting.” In addition, in November and December of 2024, respondent was
not experiencing a decrease in his fantasies of “voyeuristic” and “fetish” acts, which Franden found
to be “big flags” and “big treatment indicators” that respondent was “struggling.”
¶ 25 Based on her education, training, experience and treatment of respondent, Franden did not
believe that respondent could consistently comply with the current conditions of his conditional
release. Accordingly, Franden opined that inpatient therapy was more appropriate for respondent.
Franden’s concern was that after one year of therapy with respondent, he was “not able to intervene
on his risk factors at this point independently.” Respondent suffered from impulsivity, sexual
deviant arousal, and poor self-regulation, which affected “his ability to recognize a risk and
intervene if he were to become emotionally dysregulated.”
¶ 26 Conditional release agent Elsa Sandoval testified last as follows. Sandoval, as an assigned
agent, began supervising respondent in January 2024. Although respondent’s conditional release
-7- began in April 2023, respondent voluntarily returned to the detention facility in June 2023 due to
“suicidal ideations.” Respondent was then “re-released” in January 2024. During Sandoval’s
supervision of respondent from January 2024 to December 2024, she issued letters of
admonishment to him due to “infractions.” When Sandoval reviewed the conditional release plan
with respondent, he initialed the conditions and dated them.
¶ 27 On December 19, 2024, Sandoval issued a letter of admonishment to respondent based on
his failure to disclose information to his therapist Franden and to his psychiatrist about his sexual
functioning. According to Sandoval, respondent failed to maintain sexuality logs and provided
“conflicting information” during his polygraph examination, which was a violation of condition 6
of respondent’s conditional release plan, requiring full participation in treatment. In addition,
Sandoval was present for respondent’s session with Dr. Tinwalla, a psychiatrist, on December 18,
2024, in which respondent failed to mention that he was “sexually preoccupied.” Sandoval also
noted that respondent had violated condition 27 of his conditional release plan by failing to show
up to his individual therapy session with his sexual logs, which he had not completed for seven
days. Further, condition 32 of respondent’s conditional release plan required respondent to be
truthful with his agent and case management. However, Sandoval listed condition 32 as a condition
that respondent had violated based on “the conflicting stories” that he was telling therapist Franden
and the psychiatrist.
¶ 28 Without objection, the State entered several exhibits, which consisted of respondent’s
conditional release plan and Sandoval’s letters of admonishment. A second letter of admonishment,
issued on January 11, 2024, was based on an incident in which respondent had been dropped off
by a transporter at his apartment after treatment. Sandoval explained that respondent did not have
a key to the front foyer of his apartment complex and was instructed to walk around to the back
-8- and then advise when he was inside the apartment. Although respondent claimed to be inside the
apartment, he was not inside, but rather on the back porch. About 45 minutes later, Sandoval
received another call from respondent that he had “just gotten inside the apartment.” Sandoval
testified that she was “confused” over the call. Respondent told Sandoval that his landlord had to
let him in, because the door was not on the hinges. However, Sandoval called the landlord and
learned that respondent had used the security latch and the chain and had locked himself out. When
Sandoval asked respondent what he had been doing for the past 45 minutes, he said he had been
sitting on the porch, waiting to get inside the apartment. Sandoval issued a letter of admonishment
because respondent never told her that he was locked out of his apartment, and because respondent
was not authorized to call anyone other than Sandoval.
¶ 29 Sandoval issued a third letter of admonishment to respondent on February 15, 2024,
concerning his “GPS device.” After Sandoval “received an alert from the monitoring company that
there was a park rule violation,” she called respondent to “find out what was going on.” Respondent
“said nothing, that he was in the apartment,” and he denied that his GPS device was “going off.”
Because the monitoring software indicated that respondent was “at home,” Sandoval “just let it
go.” However, three hours later, respondent called back to see if Sandoval had figured it out,
because his GPS device was going off. Although respondent initially claimed that the GPS device
had been going off for only 10 minutes, he later admitted that it “had been going off since that
initial call was placed approximately three hours prior to that.”
¶ 30 Sandoval then issued a fourth letter of admonishment to respondent on March 3, 2024, after
she conducted an unannounced home visit. When Sandoval knocked on the door, respondent asked
her to give him a minute before opening the door. At first, respondent said that he had been in the
bathroom, which was only a few feet away. However, respondent then stated that he had been in
-9- the bedroom. Respondent’s conflicting stories of where he was at in the apartment concerned
Sandoval.
¶ 31 Sandavol issued a fifth letter of admonishment on May 20, 2024, based on respondent’s
polygraph examination. Respondent had disclosed information to the polygraph examiner, but not
to therapist Franden, regarding his sexual functioning, including “a rape fantasy.” Sandoval then
issued a sixth letter of admonishment on June 4, 2024, based on respondent’s “PPG.” In particular,
respondent appeared “superficially cooperative” and “somewhat dramatic” based on the exam
taking twice as long due to “exaggerated behaviors.”
¶ 32 Sandoval then issued a seventh letter of admonishment on June 30, 2024. This violation
was based on respondent’s claim to Sandoval that his medication increased his sexual arousal,
despite his statement to therapist Franden to “the opposite, that the medication decreased his sexual
arousal.” Respondent was attempting to deflect the results of the PPG and later admitted lying to
Sandoval regarding the side effects of his medication.
¶ 33 Sandoval also issued an eighth letter of admonishment to respondent on July 30, 2024,
based on his proposal of his grandfather as a support person. Although respondent claimed that he
had told therapist Franden that his grandfather lived with his brother, who was his previous victim,
respondent had “not mentioned that to his therapist.” The next day, July 31, 2024, Sandoval issued
a ninth letter of admonishment to respondent based on Com Ed bills “going to his apartment”
rather than “the Springfield address.” Although respondent claimed to have talked to Com Ed
representatives and taken care of the billing issue, the call logs revealed that “he had not been
calling” Com Ed, given that his calls lasted only “a few seconds.”
- 10 - ¶ 34 C. Conditional Release Revocation
¶ 35 The trial court issued its ruling on the State’s petition to revoke respondent’s conditional
release on February 21, 2025. The court ruled as follows. The relevant time period for the State’s
petition was January 4, 2024, to December 2024. During this period of less than one year,
respondent was issued “a letter of understanding, seven letters of admonishment, one violation
report, and a behavioral contract.” The court found that respondent violated the three release
conditions alleged in the State’s petition.
¶ 36 The first release condition that respondent violated was condition 6, which required
respondent to attend and fully participate in assessment, treatment, and behavior monitoring.
Respondent violated this condition by failing to disclose information to therapist Franden, despite
her direct questions, including a “violent rape fantasy with his minor sister and her friend,” after
making such statements to the polygraph administrator. Respondent received a letter of
admonishment for this inconsistent statement. Respondent also received a letter of admonishment
for “joking around” and acting immature during the PPG test, causing it to take twice as long, and
by being “superficially cooperative and somewhat dramatic.” Further, respondent admitted lying
to Sandoval about the side effects of his medication, which was done in an effort to “deflect the
results from the PPG test.”
¶ 37 Likewise, respondent violated condition 27, which required respondent to provide a written
log of activities and monthly written reports as directed by the case management team. Despite
this requirement, respondent was issued a violation report for failing to complete his sexual logs
for seven days. The court noted that the testimony showed that the logs were important to monitor
respondent’s “current sexual functioning,” given the “concern” that respondent suffered from
“deviant sexual arousal.”
- 11 - ¶ 38 In addition, although condition 32 of the conditional release plan required respondent to be
truthful to agents and case management at all times, respondent demonstrated “several incidents”
that were inconsistent, including failing to disclose the fact that one of his victims was living with
his grandfather, the very support person respondent was trying to onboard. Also, respondent
claimed to have spoken twice to a Com Ed representative to resolve the mailing issue, when the
call logs proved otherwise. Likewise, respondent was not truthful about being locked out of his
apartment or about the GPS device. Specifically, when the agent contacted respondent about the
GPS device being activated, respondent denied that it was going off and claimed that there “were
no issues with the (GPS) monitor.” However, respondent called the agent back three hours later
and stated that the device had “started ten minutes before” his call, “but then later admitted that it
had been going off since the initial phone call with the agent.” In addition, during an unannounced
home visit, respondent asked the agent to give him “a minute,” and then claimed to have been in
the bathroom. Yet, “when pressed,” defendant admitted that “he was actually in the bedroom,” and
he had “no response as to why he lied to his agent.”
¶ 39 The court reasoned that although some of respondent’s violations may seem “petty,”
defendant’s behavior had to be redirected ten times in less than a year. Both of the State’s witnesses
testified about the concerns they had about respondent’s ability to follow the release conditions.
According to the court, respondent’s behavior did not change, and his “little/big lies all screamed
deception and concern.” Respondent could not be “honest with the people designed to help” him.
As a result, the court concluded that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent had violated the rules of his conditional release.
- 12 - ¶ 40 Conversely, however, the court also found that the State had not proven by clear and
convincing evidence “the safety of others portion” of its petition to revoke respondent’s conditional
release.
¶ 41 The court explained that the next step was to determine whether respondent’s violations of
his conditional release were sufficient to revoke it and, in doing so, the court relied on In re
Commitment of Tunget, 2018 IL App (1st) 162555. According to the court, “the violations
committed” by respondent were “significant when looked at as a whole.” There was “no reason
for the pattern of deception” other than respondent’s “unwillingness to make progress with the
treatment team” and his intent to “deceive the team.” The court highlighted Franden’s testimony
that respondent needed a lot of “redirection,” suffered from “impulsivity, sexually deviant arousal,
[and] poor sexual regulation,” which caused Franden to “worry” about respondent’s “ability to
recognize a risk and intervene if he were to become sexually dysregulated.” Finally, the court stated
that although respondent “had an entire team dedicated to him to ensure that he was successful in
his conditional release,” the need to “implement a behavior contract” to “redirect and refocus”
respondent still failed to result in respondent’s compliance. In sum, respondent’s failure to report
sexual functioning and his withholding of information from the treatment team led the court to
grant the State’s petition to revoke conditional release.
¶ 42 Respondent timely appealed.
¶ 43 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 44 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in “recommitting” respondent “as a
sexually violent person where the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
suffered from a mental disorder that made it substantially probable that he would engage in acts of
sexual violence.” Respondent argues that his “disclosure inconsistencies—though concerning—
- 13 - do not establish a substantial probability of violent conduct,” and that the trial court “credited
speculative risk assessments over the absence of any sexual misconduct, violent ideation, or
behavioral regressions.” In making this argument, respondent relies primarily on In re
Commitment of Rendon, 2018 IL App (1st) 171873.
¶ 45 The State initially counters that respondent’s argument is forfeited. According to the State,
none of respondent’s “points are supported with citations to relevant authorities,” respondent failed
to distinguish the case relied on by the trial court, namely Tunget, 2018 IL App (1st) 162555, and
the case principally relied on by respondent is incorrectly cited, in that the correct citation is In re
Commitment of Rendon, 2014 IL App (1st) 123090. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)
(our supreme court rules provide that contentions in appellate briefs must be supported by citations
to the record, reasoned analysis, and that contentions not so developed are forfeited). In a similar
vein, the State avers that respondent “incorrectly argues” that the revocation of respondent’s
conditional release was a “recommitment” that required the State to prove that it was substantially
probable he would commit sexually violent acts. The State points out that the Act did not require
it to prove that respondent was a sexually violent person “again” at the revocation hearing; rather,
the State needed only to prove that any rule or condition of release was violated, or that the safety
of others required revocation of the conditional release.
¶ 46 In his reply brief, respondent concedes his incorrect case citation but maintains that his
argument challenging the revocation of his conditional release should not be forfeited. We
appreciate the State’s argument regarding forfeiture and agree that respondent’s initial brief
contains minimal argument, an incorrect case citation, and a misunderstanding of the State’s
burden in a conditional release revocation hearing. Although there is merit to the State’s forfeiture
argument, given the nature of the case, we address the merits of respondent’s argument on appeal.
- 14 - See In re Janet S., 305 Ill. App. 3d 318, 320 (1999) (waiver is limitation on the parties, not on the
court).
¶ 47 As the State points out, the Act provides that once a person is adjudicated a sexually violent
person, the trial court “shall order the person to be committed to the Department for control, care
and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person.” 725 ILCS
207/40(a). The court’s commitment order “shall specify either institutional care in a secure facility”
or “conditional release.” Id. § 40 (b)(2). If the person is conditionally released, they remain within
the custody and control of DHS, and subject to conditions set by statute, the court, and DHS,
including full participation in assessment, treatment and behavior monitoring, among other
conditions. Id. § 40(b)(4), (b)(5). The State may petition to revoke that release, either on its own
initiative, or, as in the instant case, at the request of DHS. Id. § 40 (b)(4). Once the State petitions
to revoke a person’s conditional release, it has “the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that any rule or condition of release has been violated, or that the safety of others requires
that the conditional release be revoked. (Emphasis added.) Id.; see also Tunget, 2018 IL App (1st)
162555, ¶ 39 (once the State proves that the sexually violent person violated release conditions,
the State is not also required to prove that the “safety of others” requires revocation of conditional
release, given that the Act’s plain language makes these separate and independent grounds for
revocation). If the court finds that the State has proven either ground for revocation, “it may revoke
the order for conditional release and order that the released person be placed in an appropriate
institution until the person is discharged from the commitment” or “until again placed on
conditional release.” 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(4) (West 2024).
¶ 48 In the present case, the State’s petition alleged both grounds for revocation of conditional
release, in that respondent violated his release conditions and posed a threat to the safety of others.
- 15 - In its ruling, the trial court determined that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence
that respondent violated his release conditions, but had not proven by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent posed a threat to the safety of others. Accordingly, that ruling is the
subject of our review.
¶ 49 As the court explained in Tunget, 2018 IL App (1st) 162555, ¶ 35, “our review of whether
the trial court erred in finding respondent violated the conditions of his release and whether his
conditional release should be revoked as a result requires a two-step analysis.” First, the trial court's
factual finding that the State presented clear and convincing evidence to establish that the
respondent violated the conditions of his release will not be disturbed unless the finding was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the
evidence only if it is clearly apparent from the record that the trial court should have reached the
opposite conclusion or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based upon the
evidence presented.” In re Commitment of Trulock, 2012 IL App (3d) 110550, ¶ 43. Second, once
a basis for revocation of conditional release has been established, whether to commit a person to a
secure facility or to continue conditional release is within the discretion of the trial court. Tunget,
2018 IL App (1st) 162555, ¶ 35. Regarding this second step, as stated above, the Act provides that
if the court determines that any rule or condition of release has been violated, it “may” revoke the
order for conditional release and order that the released person be placed in an appropriate
institution. 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(4) (West 2024). The permissive term “may” employed in the
statute refers to a discretionary power, which the court may exercise or not as it chooses. Tunget,
2018 IL App (1st) 162555, ¶ 35. “A trial court's decision following an exercise of its discretion
will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.” Id. See also In re Detention of
Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d 585, 608-09 (2007) (applying an abuse of discretion analysis to assess
- 16 - a trial court's decision to commit the respondent to a secure facility). An abuse of discretion will
be found only if the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or no reasonable person
would adopt the same view. Tunget, 2018 IL App (1st) 162555, ¶ 35.
¶ 50 Beginning with the first step of our analysis, the trial court’s determination that respondent
violated his release conditions was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In making its
ruling, the trial court relied on the State’s exhibits entered into evidence as well as the testimony
of therapist Franden and agent Sandoval. Specifically, the trial court found that during the relevant
time period for the State’s petition, which was the year 2024, respondent was issued one letter of
understanding, seven letters of admonishment, a violation report, and a behavioral contract. Our
review of the record and Sandoval’s testimony shows that respondent was actually issued nine
letters of admonishment during 2024. Regardless, we agree with the trial court that based on the
above evidence, respondent violated three release conditions.
¶ 51 First, condition 6 required respondent to fully participate in assessment, treatment, and
behavioral monitoring. Respondent violated condition 6 by failing to disclose information to his
therapist Franden, despite her direct questions. In particular, respondent received a letter of
admonishment for an inconsistent statement he made to his polygraph examiner, which consisted
of a violent rape fantasy involving his sister, who was a previous victim, and her friend, because
he never made such a statement to Franden. In addition, respondent violated condition 6 by acting
inappropriately, being superficially cooperative and dramatic, during the PPG test, causing it to
take twice as long. Defendant also violated condition 6 by lying to Sandoval about the side effects
of his medication in order to deflect the results of his PPG test.
¶ 52 Second, respondent violated rule 27, which required him to provide a written log of
activities and monthly written reports, as directed by the case management team. Respondent was
- 17 - issued a violation report for failing to complete his sexual logs for seven days. The court took
particular note of the witnesses’ testimony that the logs were important to monitor respondent’s
“current sexual functioning,” given the “concern” that respondent had “deviant sexual arousal.”
¶ 53 Third, respondent violated rule 32, which required respondent to be truthful to agents and
case management at all times, based on several inconsistent statements and/or omissions. These
included: (1) failing to disclose the fact that one of his victims, namely his brother, was living with
his grandfather, who was the person respondent was trying to onboard as a support person;
(2) claiming that he had spoken to Com Ed representatives to resolve the mailing issue, when the
call logs proved otherwise; (3) failing to be truthful about being locked out of his apartment; and
(4) failing to disclose that there was an issue regarding his GPS device. The court noted that when
agent Sandoval contacted respondent about his GPS device being activated, respondent denied that
it was going off and claimed that there were no issues. However, respondent then called agent
Sandoval three hours later and stated that his GPS device had being going off for ten minutes.
After that, respondent finally admitted that his GPS device had been going off since the initial
phone call with agent Sandoval. In addition, during an unannounced home visit, respondent asked
agent Sandoval to give him “a minute,” and then claimed to have been in the bathroom. However,
“when pressed,” defendant admitted that “he was actually in the bedroom,” and he had “no
response as to why he lied to his agent.”
¶ 54 In his reply brief, respondent attempts to diminish the trial court’s findings by
characterizing the above incidents as falling into categories of “self-correction,” a “common
autistic communication trait,” or “cooperation, not dishonesty.” However, it was up to the trial
court to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Trulock, 2012 IL App
(3d) 110550, ¶ 43 (under the manifest-weight standard, deference is given to the trial court as the
- 18 - finder of fact, because the trial court is in a better position than the reviewing court to observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses). Further, the court made clear in its ruling that although
some of respondent’s violations may seem “petty,” both Franden and Sandoval expressed concerns
regarding respondent’s ability to follow the release conditions. According to the court,
respondent’s behavior did not change, and his “little/big lies” screamed deception and concern.
Overall, respondent could not be “honest with the people designed to help” him. For these reasons,
the trial court’s determination that the State provided clear and convincing evidence of
respondent’s violations of his release conditions was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 55 Turning to the second and final step of our analysis, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that respondent’s violations were sufficient to revoke his conditional
release. In this regard, the court specifically found that the violations committed by respondent
were significant when looked at as a whole. The court found respondent’s overall pattern of
deception demonstrated his unwillingness to make progress with his treatment team.
¶ 56 In arriving at this conclusion, the court took particular note of Franden’s testimony that
respondent needed a lot of redirection. At the revocation hearing, Franden testified that respondent
suffered from impulsivity, sexually deviant arousal, and poor sexual regulation, which caused her
concern regarding respondent’s response if he were to become sexually dysregulated. Specifically,
Franden was concerned about respondent’s ability to recognize and intervene in such a situation.
Based on her education, training, experience, and treatment of respondent, Franden did not believe
that he could consistently comply with the current conditions of his conditional release. For this
reason, Franden opined that inpatient treatment was more appropriate for respondent.
- 19 - ¶ 57 Despite an entire team dedicated to respondent’s conditional release, the court noted that
there was still the need to issue multiple letters of admonishment and implement a behavioral
contract to redirect him. Significantly, the behavioral contract did not result in respondent’s
compliance, even though respondent claimed to understand what was expected of him.
¶ 58 In addition, the court noted that some of the condition violations stemmed from
respondent’s failure to report sexual functioning, which was a means of tracking respondent’s
progress towards healthy sexual functioning. In sum, respondent’s inability to comply with release
conditions, as well as his withholding of information from the treatment team, led the trial court
to revoke his conditional release. Based on the above evidence, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in reaching this determination.
¶ 59 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 60 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 61 Affirmed.
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