In Re ColossusBets Limited v. the State of Texas
Opinion
ACCEPTED
15-25-00150-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS October 21, 2025 AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/20/2025 3:35 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
RECEIVED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
No.15-25-00150-CV AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
15th Court of Appeals of Texas
In Re ColossusBets Limited, Relator
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST JERRY B. REED’S SURREPLY
Original Proceeding from Cause No. 25-BC03A-0007 Business Court of Texas Third Division Austin, Texas
LAGARDE LAW FIRM, P.C.
Richard L. LaGarde
State Bar No. 11819550
Mary LaGarde
State Bar No. 24037645
230 Westcott St., Suite 100 Houston, TX 77007
TEL: (713) 993-0660
richard@lagardelaw.com
mary@lagardelaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Relator’s New Procedural-Bar Theory Is Contrary to Texas Law …………………………………………………………… 1 II. Rule 52.4(d) Does Not Bar Jurisdictional Argument …………… 2 III. Section 25A.0041’s Text and Legislative Context Do Not Support a “One-Way Door” Rule……………………………………….. 3 A. The Legislature Delegated Procedural Authority to the Supreme Court—It Did Not Freeze Jurisdiction Forever………….. 3 B. “Final” Means Procedural Conclusiveness—Not Irrevocability …………………………………………………………….. 4 C. The “Limited Potential for Movement” Clause Protects Fairness, Not Finality …………………………………………………… 5 D. Section 25A.006 Expressly Contemplates Remand When Jurisdiction Is Lacking ………………………………………………….. 6 E.Conclusion………………………………………………………… 7 Certificate of Service……………………………………………………... 7 Certificate of Compliance………………………………………………... 8
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page American K-9 Detection Services, LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246, 260 (Tex. 2018)…………………………………………………. 1 Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012)……….... 7 Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) .................................................................................... 7
Statutes TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041……………………………………. 3,7 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(a)………………………………… 1,3 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(a)(3)……………………………... 1,5 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(b)(3)……………………………... 4 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(d)………………………………….. 6
Rules TEX. R. APP. P. 25–28……………………………………………… 2 TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4(d)…………………………………………….. 2
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TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Real Party in Interest Jerry B. Reed files this Surreply to address new procedural and statutory arguments raised for the first time in Relator’s Reply, as well as its expanded interpretation of Texas Government Code § 25A.0041(a) and (a)(3) beyond what was presented in the Petition.
I. RELATOR’S NEW PROCEDURAL-BAR THEORY IS CONTRARY TO TEXAS LAW
Relator’s reply newly contends that Mr. Reed may not challenge whether the Business Court had subject-matter jurisdiction in the first place because he failed to file his own mandamus or notice of appeal within 30 days of the Business Court’s June 18 order. That argument misstates both the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and controlling precedent.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal or by the court sua sponte. American K-9 Detection Services, LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246, 260 (Tex. 2018) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised for the first time on appeal[,] it may not be waived by the parties, and it may—indeed, must—be raised by an appellate court on its own.”) (footnotes, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).
Because jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or waiver, a real party in interest may argue at any time that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, this Court would be duty-bound to raise the question even if Mr. Reed had not.
II. RULE 52.4(D) DOES NOT BAR JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT
Rules 25–28 govern appeals, not original proceedings. Rule 52.4(d)
only confines a response to “the issues or points presented in the petition.” Because Relator’s petition claims the Business Court retained jurisdiction, Mr. Reed’s showing that the court never had jurisdiction is squarely responsive and proper under the rule.
III. SECTION 25A.0041’S TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT DO NOT SUPPORT A “ONE-WAY DOOR” RULE
Relator’s newly expanded argument that Chapter 25A establishes an irrevocable “one-way door” for jurisdiction stretches the statutory language beyond its procedural purpose.
A. The Legislature Delegated Procedural Authority to the Supreme Court—It Did Not Freeze Jurisdiction Forever
Section 25A.0041 does not itself purport to fix Business Court jurisdiction “once and for all” as Relator argues. Its operative clause directs only that:
“The supreme court by rule shall establish procedures for the prompt, efficient, and final determination of business court jurisdiction on the filing of an action in the business court.”
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(a) (emphasis added).
That language shows two key limits. First, § 25A.0041 is procedural—it instructs the Supreme Court of Texas to design rules. It does not legislate substantive jurisdictional consequences. Second, it focuses on determinations “on the filing of an action,” meaning at the threshold stage, not on later amendments or factual changes.
By its own terms, the section concerns procedures for prompt and efficient handling “on the filing of an action”, not permanent jurisdictional attachment. Nothing in the statute says that a Business Court retains jurisdiction even after the facts or pleadings supporting that jurisdictional basis have changed.
B. “Final” Means Procedural Conclusiveness—Not Irrevocability
The modifier “final” in “final determination of business court jurisdiction” refers to the finality of the procedural ruling within that stage—i.e., that the issue be conclusively resolved and not linger indefinitely—rather than to a prohibition on revisiting jurisdiction if the basis for it later disappears.
The Legislature used “final” in connection with “prompt” and “efficient.” Read in context, it describes administrative efficiency, not permanent jurisdiction. The same subsection also authorizes the Supreme Court to set limited periods during which issues or rights must be asserted, considered agreed to, or waived. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(b)(3).
That provision assumes that the Court, not the Legislature, will determine when rights are waived and how jurisdictional determinations are revisited—undermining any claim that the Legislature itself imposed a one-way door.
C. The “Limited Potential for Movement” Clause Protects Fairness, Not Finality
Relator also relies on § 25A.0041(a)(3), which instructs the Supreme Court to consider:
[T]he limited potential for the movement of an action between a district court and the business court as it relates to issues of fundamental fairness or the preservation of constitutionally or statutorily protected rights.
That clause expressly preserves movement between courts where fairness or statutory rights require it. By tying the limitation to “fundamental fairness” and “statutorily protected rights,” the Legislature recognized that certain circumstances may require transfer or remand. A reading that forbids any later remand would conflict with the statute’s express preservation of movement between courts to ensure fairness and protect rights.
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