In re Colgate-Polmolive MDL
This text of 2013 DNH 049 (In re Colgate-Polmolive MDL) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In re Colgate-Polmolive MDL 12-md-2320-PB 4/2/2013 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
In re: Colgate-Palmolive Softsoap Antibacterial Hand Case N o . 12-md-2320-PB Soap Marketing and Sales All cases Practices Litigation Opinion N o . 2013 DNH 049
O R D E R
Consumers of Softsoap Antibacterial branded soap (“Softsoap
Antibacterial”) have filed a consolidated class action complaint
against Colgate-Palmolive Company (“Colgate”), the manufacturer
of Softsoap Antibacterial. Plaintiffs allege that Colgate is
liable for damages because it induced class members to purchase
Softsoap Antibacterial by making false and misleading marketing
claims. They bring consumer protection claims in California,
Florida, Illinois, Nevada, and New Jersey; breach of express
warranty claims in California, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New
Jersey, and South Carolina; breach of implied warranty claims in
California, Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, and South Carolina; and
unjust enrichment claims in Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New
Jersey, and South Carolina. Colgate has filed a motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) challenging the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ pleadings on various grounds. The law I must use to resolve the plaintiffs’ claims in
this multidistrict litigation will vary depending upon the
choice of law rules of each transferor court. In re Volkswagen
& Audi Warranty Extension Litig., 692 F.3d 4 , 17-18 (1st Cir.
2012). Here, neither party has adequately briefed the law that
governs plaintiffs’ claims.
For example, the elements of consumer protection claims
differ from state to state. In Illinois and Florida, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended to induce
reliance on a false representation of material fact. Geschke v .
Air Force Ass’n, 425 F.3d 3 3 7 , 345 (7th Cir. 2005); Black
Diamond Prop., Inc. v . Haines, 69 S o . 3d 1090, 1094-95 (Fla.
Dist. C t . App. 2011). In California, a plaintiff need not
demonstrate intent. Bower v . AT&T Mobility, LLC, 196 Cal. App.
4th 1545, 1556 (Cal. C t . App. 2011). In New Jersey, a plaintiff
must prove intent only when the unlawful act is a knowing
omission or regulatory violation; if the unlawful act is an
affirmative act, intent is not required. Dewey v . Volkswagen
AG, 558 F. Supp. 2d 505, 524-25 (D.N.J. 2008); Cox v . Sears
Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 4 5 4 , 462 (N.J. 1994).
The elements of breach of express warranty claims also
differ from state to state. In Florida, a plaintiff must
provide notice of the breach to the seller before bringing suit. 2 See Moss v . Walgreen Co., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1368 (S.D. Fla.
2011). Notice is not required in other states. E.g., Keegan v .
Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 929, 949 (C.D. Cal.
2012).
Not only do the elements of the plaintiffs’ claims differ
from state to state, but state courts also interpret those
elements differently. For example, Colgate argues that its
advertising claims are nonactionable puffery that cannot provide
the basis of plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims. States
have varying standards for determining whether an advertising
statement constitutes “puffery.” In California, “puffery” is
“[g]eneralized, vague, and unspecified assertions . . . upon
which a reasonable consumer could not rely.” In re Ferrero
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2011). In Nevada,
statements that constitute “estimates, opinions, or promises of
future performance typically are not actionable as fraud.”
Baroi v . Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC, N o . 2:09-CV-00671-PMP-GWF,
2012 WL 2847919, *2 (D. Nev. July 1 1 , 2012); Hill v . Celebrity
Cruises, Inc., N o . 09-23815-CIV, 2011 WL 5360629, *7 (S.D. Fla.
2011) (finding representation that cruise ship could
“accommodate all guests’ medical needs” mere puffery); Lieberson
v . Johnson & Johnson Consumer Co., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 529,
540-41 (D.N.J. 2011) (finding that statement on product labels 3 that the product was “clinically proven” to help babies sleep
better was not puffery because the claim was not a “vague or
highly subjective claim[] of simple superiority”).
The state by state differences mentioned here are only the
tip of the iceberg. The defendant raises significant questions
relating to the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ pleadings, but
neither party adequately briefed those questions in light of the
applicable state law. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to
dismiss (Doc. N o . 26) is denied without prejudice to the extent
that it is based on claims that plaintiffs have failed to plead
viable causes of action.1
The clerk shall set a telephone status conference to
discuss how the defendant will be permitted to test the
viability of plaintiffs’ claims.
SO ORDERED.
/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge
April 2 , 2013
cc: Counsel of Record
1 I previously rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations and primary jurisdiction grounds.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2013 DNH 049, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-colgate-polmolive-mdl-nhd-2013.