In Re Cocke

371 B.R. 554, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 493, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2357
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJuly 11, 2007
Docket04-11801-GLP
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 371 B.R. 554 (In Re Cocke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Cocke, 371 B.R. 554, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 493, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2357 (Fla. 2007).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

GEORGE L. PROCTOR, Bankruptcy Judge.

Upon the evidence presented at the hearing on Trustee’s Objection to Debtors’ Claim of Homestead Exemption, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 29, 2005. On appeal, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, reversed and remanded this Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for further review. After a hearing held on May 8, 2007, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.On November 22, 2004, John L. Cocke and Judy D. Cocke (“Debtors”) filed for Chapter 7 relief under the Bankruptcy Code. (Ex. 2).

2. On Schedule A of their bankruptcy petition, Debtors listed an interest in real property located at 6652 Cabello Drive, Jacksonville, Florida, 32226 (the “Real Property”). (Ex. 3).

3. On Schedule C, Debtors indicated that the Real Property was “held in Trust No. 17296 (the ‘Trust’),” and claimed it as exempt pursuant to Florida’s Homestead Exemption, found in Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution. 1 (Ex. 3).

4. The Trust appointed Judy D. Cocke, as trustee, and named the Debtors and their minor granddaughter (Kathryn L. Cocke) as the grantors and beneficiaries. 2 (Ex. 5 at p. 1, 14). The language of the Trust grants the Debtors, as beneficiaries, the same rights as anyone else with fee simple title to property, including the right to exclude others, and the right to alienate the Real Property. (Ex. 5; Tr. 20). However, the Trust prohibits the beneficiaries from dividing the Real Property amongst themselves. (Ex. 5 at p. 2).

5. On January 18, 2005, the Chapter 7 Trustee, Alexander G. Smith (“Trustee”), filed an objection to Debtors’ claim of homestead exemption in the Real Property. Trustee alleged that the Debtors did not own the Real Property and therefore were not entitled to claim it as exempt. (Ex. 4).

6. The Trust provides that, “[t]he interests of the Beneficiaries shall consist of the following rights respecting the Trust Property:

a. The right to direct the Trustee [Judy D. Cocke] to convey or otherwise deal with the title to the Trust Property hereinafter set out.
*556 b. The right to manage and control the Trust Property.
c. The right to receive the proceeds and avails from the rental, sale, mortgage, or other disposition of the Trust Property.”
(Ex. 5 at p. 1-2).
7. The Trust further provides that the beneficiaries’ rights, listed above,
shall be deemed to be personal property and may be assigned and otherwise transferred as such. No beneficiary shall have any legal or equitable right, title or interest, as realty, in or to any real estate held in trust under this agreement, or the right to require partition of that real estate, but shall have only the rights as personalty, set forth above ...

(Ex. 5 at p. 2).

8. On November 29, 2005, the Court entered an Order Sustaining Trustee’s Objection to Debtors’ Claim of Homestead Exemption in the Real Property. In its order the Court found that based upon the express language of the trust, the Debtors and their granddaughter did not own any beneficial or equitable interest in the Real Property. Accordingly, the Court held that the Debtors could not claim the Real Property as exempt, pursuant to Florida’s Homestead Exemption.

9. On December 9, 2005, Debtors appealed this Court’s order to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division (the “District Court”).

10. On March 14, 2007, the District Court entered an order reversing and remanding this Court’s holding. Specifically, the District Court instructed that:

[ o]n remand, in deciding whether the Debtors’ interest in the [Real] [Property is qualified as exempt homestead, [this] [C]ourt should determine whether: (1) the Debtors have a legal or equitable interest which gives [them] the legal right to use and possess the [Real] [Property as a residence; (2) the Debtors have the intention to make the [Real] [Property their homestead; and (3) the Debtors actually maintain the [Real] [Property as their principal residence.

(District Court Order p. 8).

11. The parties agree that the Debtors satisfy the second and third factors listed above; thus, only the first factor, legal or equitable interest, is at-issue.

12. The District Court specifically stated that, the first factor, legal or equitable interest, may be satisfied “if the Debtors were the [grantors] and the [T]rust is revocable.” (District Court Order p. 9). The District Court further opined that if the Debtors retained the right to revoke the Trust, “then that interest alone may be a sufficient interest to satisfy the requirement that Debtors have an equitable or legal interest in the [Real] [Property.” (District Court Order p. 9-10).

13. Paragraph twenty-five (25) of the Trust states that it “may be terminated at any time by the Beneficiaries and with thirty (30) days written notice of termination delivered to the Trustee [Judy D. Cocke].” (Ex. 5 at p. 9-10).

14. At the hearing this Court held on May 8, 2007, Mr. Cocke testified that the Debtors: (i) do not own another residence; (ii) have continuously resided on the Real Property with their granddaughter since 2003; and (iii) do not intend on vacating the Real Property in the future. (Tr. 12, 17).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The issue before the Court for its determination is whether Debtors may claim the Real Property as exempt, pursu *557 ant to Florida’s Homestead Exemption, located in Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution. In making this determination, the Court notes that, “Florida courts have consistently emphasized that the homestead exemption is to be liberally construed in the interest of protecting the family home against the claims of creditors.” Engelke v. Estate of Engelke, 921 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citing Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So.2d 1018, 1020 (Fla.2001)).

In its order that reversed and remanded this Court’s prior holding, the District Court instructed this Court to determine whether:

(1) the Debtors have a legal or equitable interest which gives [them] the legal right to use and possess the [Real] [Property as a residence;
(2) the Debtors have the intention to make the [Real] [P]roperty their homestead; and
(3) the Debtors actually maintain the [Real] [Property as their principal residence.
(District Court Order p. 8).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
371 B.R. 554, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 493, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2357, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-cocke-flmb-2007.