COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS ————————————
No. 08-25-00326-CV ————————————
In re Coby Todd Bausch, Relator
AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN MANDAMUS
M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N
Relator Coby Todd Bausch seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Honorable Pete Gomez
Jr. of the 112th Judicial District Court of Pecos County, Texas to vacate his “Order Granting Motion
Clarifying Successor Trustee’s Powers.” W.L. Garrison created the Garrison Family Trust (the
Trust) in 1984. The Trust’s beneficiaries include Relator Coby Todd Bausch and Real Party in
Interest Lacy Paige Brooke. The trust was to terminate when the youngest beneficiary turned 35,
at which point the trustee would be required to wind up the Trust and distribute its property to the
beneficiaries “in the proportions to which each [is] entitled.” The Trust, however, did not provide
the beneficiary proportions. After the deaths of the original designated co-trustees, neither the designated substitute nor
its successor in interest accepted the role of trustee. The Trust’s assets have since gone
undistributed.
On January 9, 2024, Real Parties in Interest Lacy Paige Brooks and Stephen Lindemood
filed a petition to appoint a third-party successor trustee to wind up the Trust. The trial court
appointed Albert C. Elliott as successor trustee with “all rights, powers, privileges, duties and
authority conferred upon the Trustee of the Trust.” After alleged escalating frictions and threats
between the parties, Brooks and Lindemood filed a motion to clarify the successor trustee’s
powers. The trial court granted the motion without holding a hearing and signed its “Order
Granting Motion Clarifying Successor Trustee’s Powers” (clarifying order) on March 12, 2025.1
1 The trial court granted the substitute successor the “following powers needed to wind up the Garrison Family Trust, including but not limited to:”
1. Enter and inspect the Trust property; 2. Pay taxes pertaining to the Trust property; 3. Employ any third-party to survey, appraise, and/or assist in valuation, sale, and/or partition of the Trust property; 4. Sell or partition Trust property to make distributions; 5. Lease Trust property while the Trust property is distributed, partitioned, or sold, and enter into lease agreements for this purpose; 6. Make any claims as may be necessa1y to collect reasonable rents owed by Mr. Bausch or any/or person for any use and enjoyment of Trust property, done to the exclusion of other beneficiaries; 7. Unless the Trust property is otherwise leased, take control of the Trust property to ensure all beneficiaries have equal access while the Trust property is distributed, partitioned, or sold; 8. Determine and satisfy Trust obligations; 9. Ascertain the proper distributees and their shares of the Trust estate; 10. Plan and make distributions to the beneficiaries; 11. Demand and require that Mr. Bausch submit an accow1ting for all revenues, including leases relating to the Trust property since his occupation, whether paid to Mr. Bausch in his individual capacity or in the name of any entity in which he had an ownership interest, including the “9A Ranch to the Trustee, the Court and all beneficiaries; 12. Exercise reasonable and appropriate powers for the preservation of the Tn1st property; 13. Keep real property and tangible property of the trust insured and in repair; 14. Keep the Trust property productive; 15. Obtain loans from beneficiaries for advancement of costs and fees pertaining to the administration and winding up of the Trust, and pay these amounts first out of any sale of the Trust property; and 16. Take any other action that may be necessary and reasonable for the winding up of the Trust and final distribution of the Trust estate.
2 Bausch then filed a “Motion To Set Aside And Vacate Order, Motion For Reconsideration, Motion
To Stay, & Request For Hearing” (motion for reconsideration). Brooks and Lindemood filed a
response. On September 23, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. The trial court signed
its order denying the motion for reconsideration on October 29, 2025. This mandamus proceeding
followed.
In two issues, Bausch argues that the trial court’s clarifying order is void for failing to
provide notice or a hearing and that the trial court abused its discretion by expanding the trustee’s
powers beyond the scope of the Trust.
I. DISCUSSION
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy granted only when the relator shows: (1) the trial
committed a clear abuse of discretion; and (2) no adequate appellate remedy exists. In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). The burden is on the relator to
show entitlement to mandamus relief. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Bausch, relying on Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye, 798 S.W.2d
792, 793 (Tex. 1990), argues that “this standard is satisfied when the trial court ‘effectively
deprive[s] [the relator] of its fundamental due process right to notice.’” According to Bausch, he
was denied due process because the trial court “failed to provide [him] with notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to signing the [clarifying order].” We disagree.
Although the trial court signed the clarifying order without holding a hearing, it later held
a hearing on the matter after Bausch filed his motion for reconsideration and Brooks and
Lindemood filed their response. The trial court reconfirmed its ruling after the parties filed their
3 motions and responses and after it heard them at the September 23, 2025 hearing. 2 We cannot
conclude that Bausch was denied due process. E.g., Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc.,
989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998) (holding that any error arising from trial court’s failure to give
notice of submission date for motion for summary judgment was harmless when trial court
considered nonmovant’s response and reconfirmed its prior ruling on the motion).
Mandamus is not warranted because Bausch has not shown that no adequate appellate
remedy exists. Parties generally may pursue challenges regarding the powers granted to a trustee
through ordinary appeal. For example, Bausch relies on Sorrel v. Sorrel—a direct appeal—in
support of the proposition that a trustee cannot partition trust property after the termination of a
trust. 1 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, no pet.). In that case, as here,
the parties disagreed about what powers the trustees retained after the trust terminated. Id. at 870.
However, the appellants directly appealed the trial court’s order declaring that the trust had
terminated, ratifying the trustees’ actions, and declaring ownership of all real estate belonging to
the trust. Id. at 869–70. 3
Bausch does not even attempt to satisfy his burden to show that no adequate appellate
remedy exists; he points to no authority extending extraordinary mandamus relief to address
challenges to powers granted to a trustee, and we are not aware of any. “The requirement that
persons seeking mandamus relief establish the lack of an adequate remedy is a ‘fundamental tenet’
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COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS ————————————
No. 08-25-00326-CV ————————————
In re Coby Todd Bausch, Relator
AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN MANDAMUS
M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N
Relator Coby Todd Bausch seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Honorable Pete Gomez
Jr. of the 112th Judicial District Court of Pecos County, Texas to vacate his “Order Granting Motion
Clarifying Successor Trustee’s Powers.” W.L. Garrison created the Garrison Family Trust (the
Trust) in 1984. The Trust’s beneficiaries include Relator Coby Todd Bausch and Real Party in
Interest Lacy Paige Brooke. The trust was to terminate when the youngest beneficiary turned 35,
at which point the trustee would be required to wind up the Trust and distribute its property to the
beneficiaries “in the proportions to which each [is] entitled.” The Trust, however, did not provide
the beneficiary proportions. After the deaths of the original designated co-trustees, neither the designated substitute nor
its successor in interest accepted the role of trustee. The Trust’s assets have since gone
undistributed.
On January 9, 2024, Real Parties in Interest Lacy Paige Brooks and Stephen Lindemood
filed a petition to appoint a third-party successor trustee to wind up the Trust. The trial court
appointed Albert C. Elliott as successor trustee with “all rights, powers, privileges, duties and
authority conferred upon the Trustee of the Trust.” After alleged escalating frictions and threats
between the parties, Brooks and Lindemood filed a motion to clarify the successor trustee’s
powers. The trial court granted the motion without holding a hearing and signed its “Order
Granting Motion Clarifying Successor Trustee’s Powers” (clarifying order) on March 12, 2025.1
1 The trial court granted the substitute successor the “following powers needed to wind up the Garrison Family Trust, including but not limited to:”
1. Enter and inspect the Trust property; 2. Pay taxes pertaining to the Trust property; 3. Employ any third-party to survey, appraise, and/or assist in valuation, sale, and/or partition of the Trust property; 4. Sell or partition Trust property to make distributions; 5. Lease Trust property while the Trust property is distributed, partitioned, or sold, and enter into lease agreements for this purpose; 6. Make any claims as may be necessa1y to collect reasonable rents owed by Mr. Bausch or any/or person for any use and enjoyment of Trust property, done to the exclusion of other beneficiaries; 7. Unless the Trust property is otherwise leased, take control of the Trust property to ensure all beneficiaries have equal access while the Trust property is distributed, partitioned, or sold; 8. Determine and satisfy Trust obligations; 9. Ascertain the proper distributees and their shares of the Trust estate; 10. Plan and make distributions to the beneficiaries; 11. Demand and require that Mr. Bausch submit an accow1ting for all revenues, including leases relating to the Trust property since his occupation, whether paid to Mr. Bausch in his individual capacity or in the name of any entity in which he had an ownership interest, including the “9A Ranch to the Trustee, the Court and all beneficiaries; 12. Exercise reasonable and appropriate powers for the preservation of the Tn1st property; 13. Keep real property and tangible property of the trust insured and in repair; 14. Keep the Trust property productive; 15. Obtain loans from beneficiaries for advancement of costs and fees pertaining to the administration and winding up of the Trust, and pay these amounts first out of any sale of the Trust property; and 16. Take any other action that may be necessary and reasonable for the winding up of the Trust and final distribution of the Trust estate.
2 Bausch then filed a “Motion To Set Aside And Vacate Order, Motion For Reconsideration, Motion
To Stay, & Request For Hearing” (motion for reconsideration). Brooks and Lindemood filed a
response. On September 23, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. The trial court signed
its order denying the motion for reconsideration on October 29, 2025. This mandamus proceeding
followed.
In two issues, Bausch argues that the trial court’s clarifying order is void for failing to
provide notice or a hearing and that the trial court abused its discretion by expanding the trustee’s
powers beyond the scope of the Trust.
I. DISCUSSION
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy granted only when the relator shows: (1) the trial
committed a clear abuse of discretion; and (2) no adequate appellate remedy exists. In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). The burden is on the relator to
show entitlement to mandamus relief. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Bausch, relying on Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye, 798 S.W.2d
792, 793 (Tex. 1990), argues that “this standard is satisfied when the trial court ‘effectively
deprive[s] [the relator] of its fundamental due process right to notice.’” According to Bausch, he
was denied due process because the trial court “failed to provide [him] with notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to signing the [clarifying order].” We disagree.
Although the trial court signed the clarifying order without holding a hearing, it later held
a hearing on the matter after Bausch filed his motion for reconsideration and Brooks and
Lindemood filed their response. The trial court reconfirmed its ruling after the parties filed their
3 motions and responses and after it heard them at the September 23, 2025 hearing. 2 We cannot
conclude that Bausch was denied due process. E.g., Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc.,
989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998) (holding that any error arising from trial court’s failure to give
notice of submission date for motion for summary judgment was harmless when trial court
considered nonmovant’s response and reconfirmed its prior ruling on the motion).
Mandamus is not warranted because Bausch has not shown that no adequate appellate
remedy exists. Parties generally may pursue challenges regarding the powers granted to a trustee
through ordinary appeal. For example, Bausch relies on Sorrel v. Sorrel—a direct appeal—in
support of the proposition that a trustee cannot partition trust property after the termination of a
trust. 1 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, no pet.). In that case, as here,
the parties disagreed about what powers the trustees retained after the trust terminated. Id. at 870.
However, the appellants directly appealed the trial court’s order declaring that the trust had
terminated, ratifying the trustees’ actions, and declaring ownership of all real estate belonging to
the trust. Id. at 869–70. 3
Bausch does not even attempt to satisfy his burden to show that no adequate appellate
remedy exists; he points to no authority extending extraordinary mandamus relief to address
challenges to powers granted to a trustee, and we are not aware of any. “The requirement that
persons seeking mandamus relief establish the lack of an adequate remedy is a ‘fundamental tenet’
2 Neither party disputes that the trial court held the September 23, 2025 hearing on the motion for reconsideration. 3 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and concluded:
[W]here the express terms of the trust specify that the trust terminates upon the occurrence of a certain event and directs how the property is to be distributed, the trustees may not partition the trust property prior to distributing it in accordance with the instrument, but may only convey it to the appropriate beneficiaries in the manner instructed by the trust.
Sorrel v. Sorrel, 1 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, no pet.) (emphasis added) (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 345 (1959)).
4 of mandamus practice.” In re Murillo, No. 08-24-00323-CV, 2024 WL 4512347, at *2
(Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 17, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (quoting Walker v. Packer, 827
S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)). The trial court’s order is not the type of ruling that justifies
extraordinary relief, particularly given that a district court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all proceedings by or against a trustee and all proceedings concerning trusts, and district courts
have exercised that jurisdiction over these types of disputes. Tex. Prop. Code § 115.001 (providing
that “a district court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings by or against a
trustee and all proceedings concerning trusts,” including proceedings to “construe a trust” and
“determine the powers, responsibilities, duties, and liability of a trustee”); see also In re E. Texas
Med. Ctr., No. 12-17-00183-CV, 2017 WL 4675511, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 18, 2017, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (“The requirement that there be no other adequate remedy by law is met when
parties are in danger of permanently losing substantial rights.”) (emphasis added).
We cannot conclude that extraordinary mandamus review, as opposed to relief through an
ordinary appeal from a final judgment, is necessary. Bausch has not shown a clear abuse of
discretion or the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal.
II. CONCLUSION
We deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We further deny the December 5, 2025 motion
to stay the underlying proceedings.
MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice
June 26, 2026
Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.