In re C.M.

2026 Ohio 696

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: CA2025-09-086
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re C.M., 2026-Ohio-696.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

WARREN COUNTY

IN RE: : CASE NO. CA2025-09-086 C.M. : OPINION AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY 3/2/2026 :

:

CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS JUVENILE DIVISION Case No. 23-D000088

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Holly M. Simpson, for appellant, mother.

Lauren L. Clouse, for appellant, father.

Andrew Brenner, for CASA.

____________ OPINION

M. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Appellants, Mother and Father, separately appeal a decision of the Warren Warren CA2025-09-086

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of their

four-year old son ("Charlie") to Warren County Children Services ("the Agency").1

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} Father and Mother were married to one another when Charlie was born in

June 2021. They separated in December 2022 and were divorced in July 2023. Charlie's

growth and development was difficult from the start as he had problems with weight gain.

When he was 45 days old, he was hospitalized for two weeks for failure to thrive. He was

diagnosed with development delay, and his then pediatrician recommended Help Me

Grow. The parents participated with Help Me Grow for only a short period of time because

they did not believe it benefitted Charlie.

{¶ 3} Following the parties' divorce, Father had limited contact with Mother and

was rarely able to see Charlie. In mid-September 2023, Charlie spent a weekend with

Father during which Father observed bruises on Charlie's body. Father was suspicious

enough about the bruises that he photographed them to protect himself from accusation.

However, Father did not report the injuries or take Charlie to the hospital because he

believed Mother's explanation that the bruises were caused when Charlie fell during

physical therapy at Children's Hospital and that the hospital had documented the fall and

the injuries. Mother's explanation was a lie. The record shows that Charlie started

attending a daycare in late August 2023 and started showing up with bruises. Mother's

explanation was that Charlie had fallen or was clumsy. In early September 2023, a

daycare employee photographed bruising on Charlie's face, back, and right arm. The

daycare did not report the injuries, and Charlie's Maternal Grandmother asked that it not

report Mother. The photographs taken by the daycare employee were admitted into

1. "Charlie" is a pseudonym adopted in the opinion for purposes of privacy and readability. In re A.M., 2023- Ohio-1523 (12th Dist.); The Supreme Court of Ohio Writing Manual, § 16, at 115 (3d. Ed. 2024). -2- Warren CA2025-09-086

evidence during the permanent custody hearing. Father's photographs were not

submitted into evidence and were no longer on his cellphone.

{¶ 4} The Agency became involved with the family when Mother brought Charlie

to Dayton Children's Hospital on September 29, 2023, with several bruises, swelling, and

a limp arm. Medical examination revealed that Charlie had two fractures on his right

clavicle and a fracture on his right upper arm. He also had bruising on his right ear, the

right side of his forehead, his left eyelid, the right side of his neck, his chest, and the back

of a hand. Mother reported that she had dropped off Charlie at his daycare that morning

with one bruise and a slight temperature, but no other bruises. The daycare provider

reported that Charlie had not been at the daycare on September 29, 2023. Law

enforcement executed an officer removal on September 30, 2023. Prior to his removal,

Charlie resided primarily with Mother and her live-in boyfriend. Charlie also regularly

stayed with Maternal Grandparents.

{¶ 5} On October 2, 2023, the Agency filed a complaint alleging that Charlie was

abused and dependent. The juvenile court placed Charlie in the temporary custody of the

Agency and appointed a Court Appointed Special Advocate ("CASA") for Charlie.

{¶ 6} Charlie remained in the hospital for a week. Upon his discharge on October

6, 2023, he was placed with Foster Mother where he remained for the duration of the

case. Charlie, who was then a little over two years old, was not walking, was nonverbal,

had a severe food aversion, and was receiving nasogastric (NG) feeds four times a day.

The NG-tube was replaced by a gastrostomy tube ("G-tube") in June 2024. Although

Charlie's oral intake of pureed food has improved overtime, it is not enough to sustain his

nutritional needs and he continues to receive G-tube feeds four times a day. Charlie will

stop using the G-tube only after he is able to eat full meals by mouth for at least a year.

{¶ 7} Based on her professional experience with developmental delays and

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special needs, Foster Mother strongly believed Charlie had autism and had him

evaluated. Multiple services were also set up, including occupational therapy, physical

therapy, speech therapy, and feeding therapy. Charlie was officially diagnosed with

autism and global development delay in early 2024. Under Foster Mother's care, Charlie

has made significant progress. He is now able to walk and has been learning to

communicate his needs by using a speech device and learning some sign language since

March 2025.

{¶ 8} During the police investigation regarding Charlie's fractured clavicle and

right arm, Mother told law enforcement and the hospital social worker various stories

about how Charlie sustained the injuries. Mother was eventually indicted on three felony

offenses in January 2024, pled guilty to child endangering for abusing Charlie in October

2024, and was sentenced to a prison term of two to three years in February 2025.

{¶ 9} Throughout the case and notwithstanding Mother's guilty plea, Father never

believed she inflicted the injuries and instead believed Mother's explanation that her live-

in boyfriend was the culprit. Shortly after the Agency filed its complaint, Father "got

involved" with Mother, resumed living with her around the time she was indicted in

January 2024, and helped her pay her $10,000 bond and attorney fees while her criminal

case was pending. Father denied his relationship with Mother during the proceedings was

romantic and viewed his role as Mother's support person and protector. Father ended the

relationship in January 2025, a month before Mother's sentencing, when Mother started

acting erratically and became verbally hostile and oppositional to him.

{¶ 10} Throughout most of the case, Father was granted unsupervised visitation

for eight hours a week. Because there was a protective order in place prohibiting Mother

from seeing Charlie, Father's decision to live with Mother prevented him from bringing

Charlie to their apartment for visitation. As a result, visitation had to take place in a public

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space or in Lancaster, Ohio where Charlie's paternal grandparents and half-brother live.

On the days Father did not take Charlie to Lancaster, Father would rarely use his full eight

hours of visitation and would frequently return Charlie to Foster Mother's home early,

claiming Charlie was tired or did not want to play anymore. Despite the caseworker's

assurance he could do so, Father did not believe he could break up his eight hours of

visitation into separate visits without a court order. Once Mother was incarcerated and

Father was granted overnight visitation in March 2025, Father used the full eight hours of

visitation.

{¶ 11} Charlie was adjudicated abused and dependent on December 19, 2023.

The Agency implemented a family case plan in November 2023. As relevant here, the

case plan required Father to complete a mental health assessment and a drug/alcohol

assessment and follow all recommendations, maintain stable employment and housing,

and attend and complete parenting classes. On September 18, 2024, the juvenile court

granted a six-month extension of the Agency's temporary custody of Charlie. The Agency

requested the extension to allow for a resolution of Mother's criminal case and to allow

Father time to complete his case plan.

{¶ 12} On February 26, 2025, Father moved for legal custody of Charlie. Two days

later, on February 28, 2025, the Agency moved for permanent custody of Charlie. A

hearing on the motions was held on June 27, 2025, July 11, 2025, and September 8,

2025. The juvenile court heard testimony and took evidence from the Agency's ongoing

caseworker, Mother, Father, Foster Mother, Charlie's daycare provider in September

2023, the CASA, and Charlie's speech pathologist. The CASA testified during the first day

of the hearing, and the State elected to have her testify on the last day of the hearing in

lieu of filing an updated CASA report. Testimony revealed that Father underwent a mental

health evaluation and a drug/alcohol assessment and that neither recommended any

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further action, that Father was fully employed as a security guard and earning $40,000-

50,000 a year, that he has always maintained suitable housing, that he does not have

substance abuse issues, and that there is a mutual loving bond between Father and

Charlie. Father's work schedule consists of 12-hour shifts Saturday through Monday, and

a six-hour shift on Tuesdays. Testimony also revealed the following.

{¶ 13} Over the course of the case, Charlie was hospitalized twice for testicular

surgery–the second surgery required an overnight stay–and was otherwise taken to

Children's Hospital on two separate occasions, once after he hit his head when he fell at

daycare, and once because he had trouble breathing. Although Father was aware of the

surgeries, he did not attend them and did not visit Charlie at the hospital, including during

the overnight stay. Father explained he did not go because he believed doing so would

count as visitation. He, however, asked Foster Mother to keep him updated. Likewise,

Father did not go to the hospital on the other two occasions. Regarding the time Charlie

went to the ER because of breathing issues, Father testified that Charlie started coughing

during visitation. Father contacted the caseworker who stated it was likely allergies. As

Charlie became lethargic, Father communicated several times with Foster Mother. At her

suggestion, Father dropped off Charlie at her mother's house. When Foster Mother

arrived at the house, Charlie was "totally lethargic," was coughing, and had trouble

breathing. Foster Mother took him to the ER where he was eventually diagnosed with

Croup. Father testified he did not take Charlie to the hospital because he did not have

Charlie's medical card and he believed it would count as visitation.

{¶ 14} Although he was aware of them, Father also did not attend Charlie's autism

evaluation in early 2024 or an Individual Education Plan ("IEP") meeting for Charlie in

August 2024, never inquired about the results of either meeting, and never requested a

copy of the reports. Father testified he knew early on that Charlie was autistic because

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his older son is also autistic (Father's older son is a higher-functioning autistic child).

Moreover, his attorney had provided him with the "highlights" of the autism report. Father

did not explain why he did not go to the IEP meeting.

{¶ 15} Charlie started all his weekly therapies in October 2023. They take place

over several days as Charlie has a very short attention span, can only tolerate one therapy

per day, and would not benefit from the therapies if they all took place on the same day,

as suggested by Father. Although Father was aware of the therapies, it was not until

March 2025, when he was required to take Charlie to all his therapies, that he became

involved with and started attending Charlie's therapies. Before March 2025, Foster

Mother was the only one taking Charlie to his therapies. Father attended one feeding

therapy session in June 2024, and per the caseworker, consistently attended only one of

the other three therapies.

{¶ 16} Testimony shows that Father was originally very dismissive and critical of

Charlie's therapies and against Charlie using a G-tube for feeding and a speech device.

Father believed that Charlie was spending more time playing during therapies than

learning. Once Father started attending the therapies, he became involved, is supportive

and encouraging during therapies, and now admits he sees a lot of benefits in them.

Father testified that Charlie has come a long way since Father started attending Charlie's

therapies in March 2025. Incidentally, that time period is also when Charlie started using

the speech device, thereby greatly improving his communication with others. As reported

by the CASA, Father acknowledged telling her in May 2025 that the therapies were

"fucking useless." However, Father denied the statement applied to all the therapies.

Rather, he was likely referring to a feeding therapy session during which the therapist did

not try to make Charlie use a spoon. Father testified that if he is given legal custody of

Charlie, he will "absolutely" take him to all his therapies.

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{¶ 17} Throughout the proceedings and during the permanent custody hearing,

Father claimed that Charlie eats food by mouth when he is with him, that Charlie has

started to talk and can tell his name and date of birth, that Charlie can play hide-and-

seek, that Charlie is capable of jumping off from a small stand, and that Charlie has never

had a tantrum during visitation. Foster Mother, who has a much closer day-to-day

relationship with Charlie than Father, has never observed similar actions at home and

they were never replicated during therapies. Father testified that although Charlie eats

food by mouth during visitation, he also uses the G-tube to feed Charlie because he is

required to do so.

{¶ 18} At the time of the permanent custody hearing, Father did not have a

childcare plan in place for when he would work on the weekends. He, however, intended

to rely on Maternal Grandparents despite the Agency's and the CASA's concerns

regarding them. The concerns were based upon a substantiated allegation of emotional

abuse of a foster teenager by Maternal Grandmother, the fact that Maternal Grandparents

initially blamed Father and the daycare for Charlie's injuries, and their failure to report

Charlie's injuries even though they knew the reporting procedure as former foster parents.

Father testified that while the substantiated allegation of emotional abuse against

Maternal Grandmother carried some weight, it was not enough for him to disallow any

contact between Charlie and Maternal Grandmother. Likewise, the fact that Mother was

in contact with Maternal Grandparents did not worry Father because Mother was their

daughter. Finally, Father stood by a prior statement that if he gets legal custody of Charlie,

how he will set up childcare, including using Maternal Grandparents, will no longer be the

Agency's concern.

{¶ 19} Father testified he had found two daycares that specialized in autism.

However, he had not had time to look into them. The CASA testified that she contacted

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both daycares and discovered that Charlie was ineligible to attend one of them and that

there was a very long waiting list (the other daycare never returned her call). The CASA

also testified that Father did not understand how difficult it will be to find a daycare that

can care for Charlie's special needs and G-tube feeding and accommodate Father's

weekend work schedule.

{¶ 20} Throughout the case and during the permanent custody hearing, Father

never wavered from his belief that Mother's live-in boyfriend, and not Mother herself,

inflicted the injuries that prompted the Agency's removal of Charlie. Notwithstanding

Mother's guilty plea to child endangering, Father repeatedly testified that Charlie's abuser

was still free, that Mother did not cause the injuries, and that Mother was only responsible

for not keeping Charlie safe and for failing to report the injuries. Father also testified that

Mother lies a lot, that he still loves her, and that she is the mother of his son. Before

resuming living with Mother in January 2024, Father told the CASA that Mother is a

frequent liar who can expertly weave a convincing story. By contrast, after resuming living

with Mother, Father talked positively about her until she was sentenced in February 2025.

Positive statements included "she makes me a better person," "she lights up a room when

she's in there," and describing Mother as "a gentle, wonderful person." Father testified he

did not break up with Mother because of her guilty plea. Rather, he only broke up with her

when she started behaving erratically shortly before her sentencing.

{¶ 21} Foster Mother described Charlie as a very social, outgoing, and happy child

whose special needs require a lot of sustained work, including at home. Foster Mother

testified that Charlie has made significant progress since he has been placed with her,

thanks to the coordinated efforts and work of his amazing team consisting of Charlie's

teachers, doctors, therapists, and herself. Foster Mother testified that Father does not

fully understand what it takes to care for Charlie as he only has him for a few hours at a

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time. Furthermore, Father has never expressed a willingness to learn from her or the

therapists, and never asked to be part of Charlie's treatment team. Foster Mother

expressed her desire to adopt Charlie should permanent custody be granted to the

Agency.

{¶ 22} The caseworker testified that the Agency had the following concerns

regarding Father throughout the case: (1) his failure to report the injuries he observed

during his September 2023 visitation, (2) his living with Mother during the majority of the

case, (3) his belief Mother was not the one who abused Charlie, (4) his ending his

relationship with Mother only before she was sentenced, and (5) his failure to fully use his

visitation, attend Charlie's therapies, and visit him in the hospital before the motion for

permanent custody was filed in February 2025. The caseworker also testified that in light

of Father's intention to rely on Maternal Grandparents, their continued contact with

Mother, and the concern Mother could have contact with Charlie once released from

prison, it was in Charlie's best interest to grant permanent custody to the Agency. When

asked whether a court order prohibiting Mother and Maternal Grandparents from having

any contact with Charlie would alleviate the Agency's concerns, the caseworker replied it

was not clear whether Father would comply with the court order. Father testified he would

comply with a no-contact court order regarding Maternal Grandparents even though he

disagreed with it.

{¶ 23} The CASA filed several reports throughout the case. Her final report, filed

three weeks before the first day of the permanent custody hearing, recommended that

Charlie remain in the temporary custody of the Agency and that he be placed in Father's

fulltime care following a slow transition. However, in the event the juvenile court was "not

inclined to give Father more time," the CASA recommended granting permanent custody

of Charlie to the Agency. By contrast, the CASA testified during the hearing that it was in

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Charlie's best interest to award permanent custody to the Agency. The CASA explained

that although Father's heart was in the right place and there was a clear loving bond

between Father and Charlie, Father was not prepared and did not have the capabilities

to care for all of Charlie's special needs on a fulltime basis. The CASA testified that

Father's actions do not correlate with his statements, and she described Father's progress

as "one step forward and then two steps backwards."

{¶ 24} Specifically, the CASA expressed concerns that Father does not seem to

understand child development in general, let alone autistic child development, that Father

does not fully understand Charlie's special needs, his developmental age, and his level

of autism, and what it will take to care fulltime for Charlie, that Father has unrealistic

expectations of Charlie's current and future capabilities, and that Father will not follow

through with continued necessary therapies based on his belief he can make Charlie do

more at home than the therapists can. The CASA also noted that Father's alignment with

Mother for most of the case negatively interfered with his visitation and indicated Father

was prioritizing his relationship with Mother over Charlie's needs.

{¶ 25} On September 9, 2025, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry granting

the Agency permanent custody of Charlie. The juvenile court found that Charlie had been

in the temporary custody of the Agency for 12 of a consecutive 22-month period, and that

even if Charlie had not been in the Agency's temporary custody for 12 months of the last

22 months, he could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time

or should not be placed with them. The court further found that granting permanent

custody to the Agency was in Charlie's best interest.

{¶ 26} Mother now appeals the juvenile court's decision, raising three assignments

of error. Father also appeals the juvenile court's decision, raising two assignments of

error. This court consolidated the appeals for review and disposition. For ease of

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discussion, Mother's first and second assignments of error and Father's two assignments

of error will be considered together.2

II. ANALYSIS

{¶ 27} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 1:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO THE AGENCY WHEN THE DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE [DECISION].

{¶ 28} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 2:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF [CHARLIE] TO THE AGENCY WHEN THE DECISION VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF BOTH PARENTS.

{¶ 29} Father's Assignment of Error No. 1:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT THE CHILD CANNOT OR SHOULD NOT BE PLACED WITH EITHER PARENT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD PURSUANT TO THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN R.C. 2151.414(E).

{¶ 30} Father's Assignment of Error No. 2:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, PURSUANT TO THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN R.C. 2151.414(D), WAS REACHED BY GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO WARREN COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES AND THAT THE AGENCY MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO REUNIFY THE CHILD WITH FATHER.

{¶ 31} Father and Mother each challenge the juvenile court's decision granting

permanent custody of Charlie to the Agency. Mother argues the decision is not supported

by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence because (1)

2. Mother's first assignment of error and Father's second assignment of error both present three issues for review. The second issue in Mother's first assignment of error and the third issue in Father's second assignment of error will be addressed separately later in the opinion. - 12 - Warren CA2025-09-086

Father completed his case plan and demonstrated he can meet Charlie's needs, and (2)

the juvenile court improperly focused on Father's one-off statements (e.g., the "fucking

useless" comment) when in fact "[Father's] actions are the complete opposite of his

words." Father argues the juvenile court erred in determining that Charlie could not or

should not be placed with him and that it was in Charlie's best interest to grant permanent

custody to the Agency. Both parents argue that Charlie's need for a legally secure

permanent placement could be achieved by granting legal custody to Father.

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 32} The right to parent one's children is a fundamental right. Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). R.C. 2151.414 authorizes a juvenile court to terminate parental

rights and award permanent custody of a child to a children services agency. In re V.T.,

2026-Ohio-11, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.). Before a parent's constitutionally protected liberty interest

in the care and custody of his or her child may be terminated, the State bears the burden

of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory standards for permanent

custody have been met. Id. Additionally, the State is required to prove that it made

reasonable efforts to reunite parent and child during the child-custody proceedings prior

to the termination of parental rights. In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 26, citing R.C.

2151.419(A)(1).

{¶ 33} Because "R.C. 2151.414 requires that a juvenile court find by clear and

convincing evidence that the statutory requirements are met, . . . the sufficiency-of-the-

evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards of review are the proper

appellate standards of review of a juvenile court's permanent-custody determination, as

appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the parties."

In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11. "Although sufficiency and manifest weight are distinct

legal concepts, a finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest weight of the

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evidence necessarily includes a finding that sufficient evidence supports the judgment."

In re B.O., 2024-Ohio-1732, ¶ 37 (12th Dist.), citing In re L.B., 2020-Ohio-3045, ¶ 29 (10th

Dist.). When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court weighs the evidence and

all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether,

in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed. In re V.T. at ¶

33. "In weighing the evidence, there is a presumption in favor of the findings made by the

finder of fact and evidence susceptible to more than one construction will be construed to

sustain the verdict and judgment." In re M.A., 2019-Ohio-5367, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). We are

especially mindful of this presumption in permanent custody cases. In re V.T. at ¶ 33.

B. The Two-Part Permanent Custody Test

{¶ 34} Before terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody of a child

to a children services agency, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) requires a juvenile court to make

specific findings under a two-part test. First, using the factors set forth in R.C.

2151.414(D), the juvenile court must find that the grant of permanent custody to the

agency is in the best interest of the child. Id. Second, under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the

juvenile court must find that any one of the circumstances set forth in R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) applies. This includes a circumstance, often referred to as the "12

of 22" provision, where the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at

least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. In re A.D., 2022-Ohio-736, ¶ 20 (12th

Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). This also includes the circumstance that the child

cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with

either parent. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

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C. Whether One of the Circumstances set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) Applies

{¶ 35} As stated above, the juvenile court found that Charlie had been in the

temporary custody of the Agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period

prior to the Agency filing its motion for permanent custody. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

The juvenile court also found that Charlie could not be placed with Mother or Father within

a reasonable time or should not be placed with either of them pursuant to R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(a). With respect to the 12 of 22 provision, temporary custody is deemed

to begin on the date that the child is adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent, or 60

days after the child's removal from the home, whichever occurs earlier. R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(d); In re B.T., 2025-Ohio-3019, ¶ 39 (12th Dist.). Here, the earlier date

was the date 60 days after Charlie was removed from the home on September 30, 2023.

Thus, Charlie is considered to have entered the Agency's temporary custody as of

November 29, 2023. When the Agency moved for permanent custody on February 28,

2025, Charlie had been in the Agency's custody for almost 15 months. Mother does not

dispute and Father expressly concedes the juvenile court's 12 of 22 determination, and

the record supports the court's finding.

{¶ 36} In his first assignment of error, Father challenges the juvenile court's

determination that Charlie could not be placed with him within a reasonable time or should

not be placed with him. We need not review this issue. In re B.T. at ¶ 40. Only one of the

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the permanent

custody test. Id. at ¶ 36. Because the juvenile court found that the "12 of 22 provision"

had been satisfied under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), its "could not/should not be placed"

finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) was unnecessary to grant permanent custody. In re

C.P., 2022-Ohio-3320, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.). Because Mother and Father do not challenge

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the juvenile court's "12 of 22" finding and the record supports it, we affirm the juvenile

court's decision regarding the second prong of the permanent custody test without

conducting any further analysis. In re B.T. at ¶ 40. Father's first assignment of error is

overruled.

{¶ 37} We now turn to the first prong of the permanent custody test–whether

granting permanent custody to the Agency was in Charlie's best interest.

D. Best-Interest Determination

{¶ 38} An agency that seeks permanent custody of a child bears the burden of

proving by clear and convincing evidence that the grant of permanent custody is in the

child's best interest. In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, at ¶ 26. Before granting permanent

custody, the juvenile court is required to consider all relevant factors under R.C.

2151.414(D)(1). Id. These factors include (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the

child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, and any other person

who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by

the child or through the child's guardian ad litem; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4)

the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of

placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5)

whether any of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) applies in relation to the

parents and child. In re J.M., 2025-Ohio-1406, ¶ 29 (12th Dist.), citing R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e). No single factor under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) is entitled to more

weight than the others. In re V.T., 2026-Ohio-11, at ¶ 38 (12th Dist.).

1. Interaction and Interrelationship

{¶ 39} The record shows that Father and Charlie are bonded and have a loving

relationship, and that Charlie is always happy to see Father. However, from September

2023 to March 2025, Father did not always fully use his eight hours of visitation because

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it was difficult to do so in a public place, attended only one of Charlie's therapies, did not

attend Charlie's autism evaluation and IEP meeting and did not inquire afterward, and did

not visit Charlie whenever he was in the hospital. That Father could not visit Charlie in his

home was a direct result of his decision to resume living with Mother during most of the

case despite the no-contact order. Father brought it upon himself. The record also

indicates that Father reluctantly uses the G-tube to feed Charlie because he is required

to do so.

{¶ 40} Charlie has resided with Foster Mother since early October 2023, a period

of nearly two years. The record shows that Charlie has thrived and made significant

developmental progress in the care of Foster Mother, that he is bonded with Foster

Mother, and that she puts his needs first. Whereas Father did not engage with Charlie's

therapies before March 2025, has never expressed a willingness to learn from the

therapists, and has never requested to be part of Charlie's treatment team, Foster Mother

was the one who had Charlie evaluated for autism, has always attended Charlie's

therapies, and fully understands the importance of working with Charlie's team.

2. Charlie's Wishes

{¶ 41} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) gives the juvenile court the choice of considering

the child's wishes directly from the child or through the guardian ad litem. In re C.F., 2007-

Ohio-1104, ¶ 55. Due to his age and disabilities, Charlie was unable to express his

wishes. Instead, the juvenile court relied upon the CASA's recommendation. The CASA

filed a written report three weeks before the permanent custody hearing and testified at

the hearing. The CASA's report recommended that Charlie remain in the temporary

custody of the Agency and that he be placed with Father fulltime following a slow

transition. That is, the CASA's initial stance was to recommend an extension of temporary

custody and granting Father more parenting time. However, upon hearing the testimony

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of Father, Foster Mother, and the caseworker over three days of hearing, the CASA

recognized that Father still did not fully understand Charlie's special needs, his

developmental age, and his level of autism and that he was therefore not ready to assume

custody of Charlie. Consequently, the CASA recommended that permanent custody be

granted to the Agency.

3. Custodial History

{¶ 42} The juvenile court found that Charlie has been in the custody of the Agency

since the beginning of the case and continues to be in its custody. By the last day of the

permanent custody hearing, Charlie had been in the Agency's custody for close to two

years. As this court recently observed, "While parents work toward reunification, children

continue to grow, develop attachments, and need stability. Time for a child differs

markedly from time for an adult. Two years represents a substantial portion of young

children's lives," and Charlie here spent that formative period bonding to Foster Mother.

In re V.T., 2026-Ohio-11, at ¶ 47 (12th Dist.).

4. Need for Legally Secure Permanent Placement

{¶ 43} The juvenile court found that Charlie's need for a legally secure permanent

placement could not be achieved without granting permanent custody to the Agency. In

support of this finding, the court stated that Father "was given an opportunity to

demonstrate he was capable of taking care of [Charlie] and all his special needs, but

Father failed to convince anyone other than himself that he is ready." The court also

stated that while Father has met several case plan objectives, he has not met "the most

important one–to demonstrate that he understands all of [Charlie's] special needs and

that he is capable of providing the type of care that [Charlie] needs."

{¶ 44} Both parents challenge the juvenile court's finding, arguing that Father has

completed all his case plan requirements and was ready for reunification, and that the

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juvenile court did not consider Father's "substantial progress on his case plan objectives."

{¶ 45} Although Father completed his case plan requirements regarding mental

health and alcohol/drug assessments, stable employment and housing, and parenting

classes, he did not complete all of them promptly. We have repeatedly held that the

completion of case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody.

In re V.T., 2026-Ohio-11, at ¶ 50 (12th Dist.). This is because a case plan is merely a

means to a goal and not a goal in itself. Id. "The key concern is not whether the parent

has checked boxes on a form, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the

concerns that caused the child's removal." Id. A juvenile court's primary focus in a

permanent custody proceeding is the child's best interest, therefore a parent could

complete all the case plan goals and the juvenile court could still appropriately terminate

their parental rights. In re K.K., 2023-Ohio-400, ¶ 51 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 46} In the present case, Father has not demonstrated he can provide Charlie

with a safe and stable environment tailored to his special needs or consistently provide

for his basic needs. As this court has stated, parents are "afforded a reasonable, not an

indefinite, period of time to remedy the conditions causing the children's removal." In re

B.O., 2024-Ohio-1732, at ¶ 60 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 47} The Agency became involved with the family in late September 2023, 11

days after Father observed bruises on Charlie's body, photographed them to protect

himself from accusation, and failed to report them or take Charlie to the hospital.

Seventeen months elapsed between the day Charlie was removed from the family and

the day the Agency moved for permanent custody. During that time period, Father chose

to resume a relationship with Mother and live with her, despite the felony charges filed

against her and her subsequent guilty plea to child endangering for abusing Charlie.

Consequently, visitation could not take place at Father's home and Father rarely used his

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full eight hours of visitation. Although he was aware of them and was encouraged to go,

Father did not attend Charlie's surgeries and never visited Charlie whenever he was

hospitalized. Although he was aware of them and was encouraged to go, Father did not

attend Charlie's autism evaluation and his IEP meeting, and never inquired about the

results of either meeting. For the most part, Father did not attend Charlie's therapies, was

dismissive of them, and was critical of Charlie's diagnosis of food aversion and his using

a G-tube for feeding and a speech device to communicate.

{¶ 48} It was not until March 2025, shortly after the Agency moved for permanent

custody and three months before the permanent custody hearing, that Father started

attending and became involved in all of Charlie's therapies and that he admitted they were

beneficial to Charlie. Nonetheless, testimony revealed that Father grudgingly uses the G-

tube to feed Charlie, that he does not fully understand Charlie's special needs and his

level of autism and what it takes to care fulltime for Charlie, and that he continues to have

unrealistic expectations of Charlie's capabilities. Testimony also revealed that Father still

believes Mother did not cause Charlie's injuries, that he does not have a daycare and

childcare plan in place to accommodate his work schedule, and that he anticipates using

Maternal Grandparents for child care despite the concerns regarding them and the fact

they are in contact with Mother. Moreover, concerns regarding Father's ability to provide

a safe and stable environment for Charlie were not alleviated given his testimony that he

disagrees with a potential no-contact court order regarding Maternal Grandparents, and

that if he gets legal custody of Charlie, how he will set up childcare will no longer be the

{¶ 49} The phrase "legally secure permanent placement" connotes more than a

roof over the children's heads. It encompasses stability, both material and emotional;

consistency in meeting the children's needs; and the reasonable assurance that such

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stability will endure. In re V.T., 2026-Ohio-11, at ¶ 55 (12th Dist.). Here, the evidence

does not paint a picture of continuing parental stability. Against this backdrop, Charlie's

placement with Foster Mother offered genuine security. Foster Mother has expressed her

desire to adopt Charlie who has bonded with her over two years. Charlie is thriving in her

care and the stable and secure environment she provides, and is progressing

developmentally.

5. Factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11)

{¶ 50} In considering R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), the juvenile court held that "there

are no other factors in [R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11)] that apply to this case beyond what was

enumerated in the [court's discussion of the 'could not/should not be placed' finding]."

Under that discussion, the court only specifically cited the (E)(10) factor–that Mother had

abandoned Charlie. The factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) involve a parent's having

been convicted of or pled guilty to specific criminal offenses against the child, the child's

sibling, or another child who lived in the parent's household; a parent's repeatedly

withholding medical treatment or food from the child; a parent's repeatedly placing the

child at a substantial risk of harm because of alcohol or drug abuse; a parent's

abandoning the child; and a parent's having had parental rights as to the child's sibling

involuntarily terminated. In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 19. None apply to Father.

E. Time's Up

{¶ 51} A child's life is not something the juvenile court should take a gamble on,

no matter how good the odds may seem. In re V.T., 2026-Ohio-11, at ¶ 59 (12th Dist.).

"Children are not experiments in parental rehabilitation. The law does not require the court

to test whether children will suffer great detriment or harm before protecting them." Id.

{¶ 52} Father was given ample opportunity and time to prove he could adequately

provide for Charlie and his special needs. Father, however, failed to demonstrate he can

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provide a safe and stable environment that is tailored to Charlie's needs and capabilities

and dedicated to Charlie achieving his potential. The fact that Father may have finally

embraced Charlie's therapies and treatment for three months before the permanent

custody hearing is simply too little, too late. The juvenile court, just like this court, must

act in a manner that places Charlie's best interests above all else. The juvenile court's

decision to grant permanent custody of Charlie to the Agency does just that. Therefore,

the juvenile court did not err in finding that granting permanent custody to the Agency was

in Charlie's best interest. Mother's second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 53} We now turn to the parties' remaining issues for review.

F. The Juvenile Court's Consideration of All the Evidence Presented

{¶ 54} In her first assignment of error, Mother also questions whether the juvenile

court truly weighed all the evidence presented when, during the second day of the

permanent custody hearing, it did not remember the daycare employee's testimony that

she had photographed Charlie's bruises and that Maternal Grandmother had asked the

daycare not to report Mother. This issue lacks merit. The record shows that during the

caseworker's testimony, the court was momentarily confused regarding who had

photographed Charlie's bruises, when the Agency became aware of the daycare

employee's photographs, and whether the daycare had reported the bruising to the

Agency. With clarification from the prosecutor, the juvenile court then correctly

summarized the caseworker's testimony as follows: "the bruising happened, perhaps, two

weeks before. Dad noticed it, took photos. Daycare noticed it and took photos. No report

was made to the Agency, but after the injuries to [Charlie] this time, this is when it all

came out." In its decision granting permanent custody to the Agency, the juvenile court

correctly stated that the daycare employee took photographs of the bruising on Charlie's

body, that Father also photographed the bruising, and that neither the daycare nor Father

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reported the bruising.

{¶ 55} In light of all of the foregoing, Mother's first assignment of error is overruled.

G. The Agency's Reasonable Reunification Efforts

{¶ 56} In his second assignment of error, Father also argues that the Agency did

not make a reasonable effort to reunify him with Charlie. Father generally asserts he

"does not believe" that "the Agency was in favor of aiding him in securing services for

[Charlie], daycare/schooling, allowing him to attend visits or increasing his parenting

time," or that "the Agency made reasonable efforts to aid him in relieving their final

concerns they may have had with Father." During the permanent custody hearing, Father

summarily testified that the Agency did not help accommodate Father's visitation when

the Agency refused his offer that Mother leave their apartment when he had visitation.

{¶ 57} In a permanent child custody matter, the State is required to "make

reasonable efforts to reunify the family during child-custody proceedings prior to the

termination of parental rights. If the agency has not established that reasonable efforts

have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, then it must

demonstrate such efforts at that time." In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 43. "Reasonable

efforts" are "'[t]he state's efforts to resolve the threat to the child before removing the child

or to permit the child to return home after the threat is removed." Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Will

L. Crosley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State's Burden Under Federal

Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U.Pub.Int.L.J. 259, 260 (2003).

{¶ 58} In determining whether an agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the

family during the custody proceedings, the issue is not whether the agency could have

done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard. See In re

A.B., 2022-Ohio-4716, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.). "'Reasonable efforts' does not mean all available

efforts. Otherwise, there would always be an argument that one more additional service,

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no matter how remote, may have made reunification possible." Id.

{¶ 59} The record shows that the juvenile court made reasonable efforts findings

on several occasions. A reasonable efforts finding was made following the adjudication

hearing. The magistrate also made a reasonable efforts finding following several review

hearings. The record also reflects that the Agency made reasonable efforts to reunify

Father with Charlie through the creation of the case plan. Father never challenged the

juvenile court's multiple reasonable efforts determinations in the underlying proceedings

or otherwise expressed to the juvenile court that the Agency was failing to make

reasonable efforts to facilitate his reunification with Charlie. Father should not be heard

to do so now.

{¶ 60} Father's second assignment of error is overruled.

H. Extension of Temporary Custody

{¶ 61} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 3:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY WHEN IT HAD THE OPTION TO GIVE [FATHER] AN EXTENSION TO PROVE HE IS CAPABLE OF CARING FOR [CHARLIE].

{¶ 62} R.C. 2151.415(D)(2) provides that a juvenile court may order a second

extension of temporary custody of up to six months if it determines by clear and

convincing evidence that (1) the additional extension is in the best interests of the child,

(2) there has been substantial additional progress on the case plan since the original

extension of temporary custody in the case plan of the child, (3) there has been

substantial additional progress since the original extension of temporary custody toward

reunifying the child with one of the parents or otherwise permanently placing the child,

and (4) there is reasonable cause to believe the child will be reunified with one of the

parents or otherwise permanently placed within the period of extension. Notably, the

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statute provides only that the juvenile court may extend the temporary custody order, not

that it must do so. Thus, a juvenile court's decision to grant or deny an extension of

temporary custody is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In re H.G., 2015-

Ohio-1764, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 63} There was no motion for a second extension of temporary custody pending

before the juvenile court for consideration. At the permanent custody hearing, the parties

waived opening statements, and there was no oral motion to extend temporary custody

raised prior to the presentation of the parties' cases-in-chief. In closing argument, Father's

attorney twice referred to a second extension of temporary custody, essentially claiming

there was time left in the custody proceedings to grant such extension. However, he did

not expressly request a second six-month extension of temporary custody, mention R.C.

2151.415(D)(2), or argue he had proved the four statutory requirements by clear and

convincing evidence. In re H.B., 2025-Ohio-5090, ¶ 39 (9th Dist.). Furthermore, the

juvenile court's finding that granting permanent custody to the Agency was in Charlie's

best interest necessarily implied that an extension of temporary custody was not. In re

H.G. at ¶ 24; In re G.B., 2017-Ohio-8759, ¶ 28 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 64} In light of the foregoing, the juvenile court did not err by failing to extend the

Agency's temporary custody of Charlie for an additional six months. Mother's third

assignment of error is overruled.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 65} Upon thoroughly reviewing the record, we find the juvenile court did not err

in granting the Agency permanent custody of Charlie. This is because, as discussed fully

above, the juvenile court's decision to grant permanent custody was supported by

sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 66} Judgment affirmed.

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BYRNE, P.J., and SIEBERT, J., concur separately and jointly.

BYRNE, P.J., and SIEBERT, J., concurring separately and jointly.

{¶ 67} Given the evidence presented before the juvenile court and given the

standard of review applicable in cases like this one, we conclude that we must affirm the

juvenile court's permanent custody decision. In re V.T., 2026-Ohio-11, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.)

(holding that manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review applies but if the evidence is

susceptible to more than one construction, deference must be given to trier of fact). We

therefore join our court's lead opinion. However, we write separately to note that this is a

very close case, and if either of the judges joining this concurring opinion acted as the

trial court judge, the Agency might not have been granted permanent custody. While there

is sufficient evidence in the record to affirm the juvenile court's award of permanent

custody to the agency, there is also significant evidence in Father's favor.

{¶ 68} In particular, our votes to affirm should not be read to suggest that a parent

can never object to, criticize, or even refuse to participate in certain medical or therapeutic

endeavors recommended by a child's medical providers or therapists. Such actions may

sometimes be appropriate. Parents are responsible for their child's life and health. The

recommendations of medical and therapeutic providers must of course be given some

weight, but such providers are fallible, and parents may have knowledge about their

child's particular circumstances that is superior to such providers' knowledge.

{¶ 69} The providers in this case seem to have developed a negative attitude

toward Father because he initially criticized or did not see the value in their methods.

Parents have the right to express or hold opinions about the appropriate care or treatment

of their children. In fact, Father surely had more exposure to Charlie than did any of

Charlie's providers, and it is concerning that those providers may have simply disregarded

Father's statements about Charlie's progress at home. In cases involving disputes

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between parents and medical professionals regarding health or development issues, the

state may not simply rely on the recommendations of those professionals as if they are

unquestionable, to the exclusion of the reasonable assessments and opinions of parents.

{¶ 70} That being said, the evidence regarding Father's initial disagreement with

Charlie's recommended therapies is not the only evidence in this case potentially

supporting the juvenile court's permanent custody decision. That additional evidence

includes evidence that could lead the juvenile court to conclude that Father was likely to

reunite Charlie with Mother (his abuser) after her release from prison, that Charlie's

therapies were indeed necessary, and that Father only participated in Charlie's therapies

to assuage the agency and court until he regained custody and was otherwise potentially

misleading about his intentions. Based on the overall weight of the evidence, we cannot

reverse the juvenile court and we join our court's lead opinion.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.

It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.

/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge

/s/ Mike Powell, Judge

/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge

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