In re: Claudia M. Longobardi

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedMarch 12, 2026
Docket26-30693
StatusUnknown

This text of In re: Claudia M. Longobardi (In re: Claudia M. Longobardi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Claudia M. Longobardi, (Tex. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT March 12, 2026 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk HOUSTON DIVISION

IN RE: § § CASE NO: 26-30693 CLAUDIA M. LONGOBARDI, § § Debtor. § § § CHAPTER 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is a single matter self-styled as “Trustee’s Expedited Motion for an Order Requiring Debtor Claudia M. Longobardi to Appear and Show Cause Why the Credit Counseling Certificate Filed with the Court Appears Altered”1 (“Motion For Show Cause”) filed on February 20, 2026 by Ms. Tiffany Castro, Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”) for the Southern District of Texas. On March 12, 2026, this Court held its initial appearance hearing for Claudia M. Longobardi (“Debtor”) in which the Court also considered the Motion for Show Cause. At the March 12, 2026 hearing, the Court admitted into evidence Trustee’s Exhibits at ECF No. 19, Exhibits 1-5.2 I. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Constitutional Authority This Court holds jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, which provides “the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” Section 157 allows a district court to “refer” all bankruptcy and related cases to the bankruptcy court, wherein the latter court will appropriately preside over the matter.3 This Court determines that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O) this proceeding involves

1 ECF No. 15. 2 Mar. 12, 2026 Min. Entry. 3 28 U.S.C. § 157(a); see also In re Order of Reference to Bankruptcy Judges, Gen. Order 2012-6 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2012). primarily core matters as it “concern[s] the administration of the estate.”4 Furthermore, this Court may only hear a case in which venue is proper.5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a), “a proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court in which such case is pending.” Debtor’s main chapter 13 case is presently pending in this Court and therefore, venue of this proceeding is proper.

The pending dispute before this Court is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). Accordingly, this Court concludes that the narrow limitation imposed by Stern does not prohibit this Court from entering a final order here.6 Alternatively, this Court has constitutional authority to enter a final order because all parties in interest have consented, impliedly if not explicitly, to adjudication of this dispute by this Court.7 None of the parties have ever objected to this Court’s constitutional authority to enter a final order or judgment. These circumstances unquestionably constitute implied consent. Thus, this Court wields the constitutional authority to enter a final order here.

II. Analysis A. History

4 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); see also In re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 930 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A] proceeding is core under section 157 if it invokes a substantive right provided by title 11 or if it is a proceeding that, by its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case.”). Garrett v. Coventry II DDR/Trademark Montgomery Farm, L.P. (In re White-Robinson), 777 F.3d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that a contempt order concerned “the orderly administration of [debtor’s] estate—namely, her attorney's compliance with federal bankruptcy rules and the orders of the bankruptcy court”). 5 28 U.S.C. § 1408. 6 See, e.g., Badami v. Sears (In re AFY, Inc.), 461 B.R. 541, 547-48 (8th Cir. BAP 2012) (“Unless and until the Supreme Court visits other provisions of Section 157(b)(2), we take the Supreme Court at its word and hold that the balance of the authority granted to bankruptcy judges by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) is constitutional.”); see also Tanguy v. West (In re Davis), No. 00-50129, 538 F. App’x 440, 443 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hile it is true that Stern invalidated 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) with respect to ‘counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate,’ Stern expressly provides that its limited holding applies only in that ‘one isolated respect’ .... We decline to extend Stern’s limited holding herein.”) (Citing Stern, 564 U.S. at 475, 503, 131 S.Ct. 2594). 7 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S.655, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1947, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (“Sharif con- tends that to the extent litigants may validly consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court, such consent must be expressed. We disagree. Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express. Nor does the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 157, mandate express consent . . . .”). 1. Debtor filed her voluntary petition for chapter 13 relief under Title 11 on February 2, 2026.8 Since February 2025, Debtor has filed multiple bankruptcy cases: 25-30621, 25-33632, 25- 35818, and 25-36588. Each has been dismissed for failure to file required documents.9

2. Along with the voluntary petition, on February 2, 2026, Debtor filed a Certificate of Credit Counseling10 and Application to Pay Filing Fees in Installments.11 The Application to Pay Filing Fees in Installments has not been granted. A review of the Credit Counseling Certificate in this case (Certificate Number 13858-TXS-CC-039301077) raises concern regarding the authenticity and accuracy of the document. Specifically, the dates appear altered (i) to reflect issuance on January 23, 2026, (ii) the font for dates varies in appearance from the remainder of the document, and (iii) the photostatic copy appears to have other text bleeding through the date fields.12

3. An Order for Initial Hearing and Compelling Attendance was entered on February 3, 2026, requiring Debtor to appear in person or virtually on March 12, 2026, at 8:30 a.m.13

B. The Credit Counseling Certificates Upon inspection by the Court, MoneySharp Credit Counseling, Inc. (“MoneySharp”) reflects only one certificate, dated February 3, 2025, which has been issued to Debtor. Trustee’s Exhibit No. 514 is the business record affidavit signed by Edward Sanchez, the President of MoneySharp wherein he states under penalty of perjury that “The records appended hereto include: Exhibit A — The original certificate of counseling bearing certificate number 13858-TXS-CC-039301077, issued on February 3, 2025. Exhibit B — Internal business records regarding the course purchase, completion, and certificate issuance corresponding to certificate number 13858-TXS-CC- 039301077.”15

The certificate issued by MoneySharp on February 3, 2025 (Certificate Number 13858- TXS-CC-039301077) was filed in case number 25-30621 (Judge Marvin Isgur) at docket number

8 ECF No. 1. 9 Bankr. Case Nos. 25-30621, ECF No.

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In re: Claudia M. Longobardi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-claudia-m-longobardi-txsb-2026.